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Abstract 
 
The main aim of this thesis is to analyse the nature and function of Spatio-Temporal 
Imagination (STIm) under an imagination-as-simulation framework. STIm is defined as 
any imaginative act that allows you to consider a location and/or a time other than the one 
you are currently experiencing. I will focus on the phenomenal visual imagery aspect of 
this mental phenomenon and hence will not discuss other potential versions of STIm in any 
detail. 
 
Part I will explore the current simulation literature to get an idea of what imagination-as-
simulation may mean and to see how it dovetails with other researchers who have a similar 
style of approach (Chapter 2). I will then defend the Kosslyn Model of visual imagery, 
which I will argue is ameneable to being interpreted as an imagination-as-simulation 
process (Chapters 3&4). 
 
Part II will look at what different perceptual theories may say about the imagination-as-
simulation debate. Using the Selective vs. Generative Approach distinction as a guide, we 
will look at two theories that are obviously examples of each respectively: Naïve Realism 
&KDSWHUDQGP\RZQWKHRU\RI67,P&KDSWHU:HZLOODOVRORRNDW7\H¶V
PANIC theory, as a related approach that will also be used to illustrate other points 
relevant to the debate about the relation between perception and imagery (Chapter 6). 
 
I will argue that visual STIm has much in common with visual perception in that they are 
both: locally generated visual style phenomenal representational mental states. This is 
even though there are some other crucial differences in how they are caused and 
experienced. The thesis will also describe a way that these images can be labeled with 
different spatial and temporal contexts. This is what allows STIm to be used to consider 
alternative possibilities both temporally and spatially and to function as a way to plan our 
actions in the present and to have an extended spatial and temporal awareness of our 
environment.  
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1 - Introduction 
 
 
µ0\PDLQDLPLVWRGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWLPDJLQDWLRQLVDIDFXOW\WKDWUXQVWKURXJKWKH
most diverse of mental phenomena; it is a theme on which there are many 
variations. We need imagination to have mental images, to dream, to believe, to 
UHSUHVHQWSRVVLELOLWLHVWRPHDQ«WKHLPDJLQDWLRQ,FRQWHQGLVDIDUPRUH
SHUYDVLYHDVSHFWRIWKHKXPDQPLQGWKDQUHFHQWSKLORVRSK\PLJKWVXJJHVW¶&ROLQ
McGinn (2004: 5) 
 
1.1 - What is Spatio-Temporal Imagination (STIm)? 
Imagination is a broad topic and it can be categorised in a number of different ways. For 
LQVWDQFH\RXFDQGLYLGHLWXSDFFRUGLQJWRZKHWKHULWKDVDSKHQRPHQDOµZKDWLWLVOLNH¶
aspect to it (Nagel 1974) and this could be labelled phenomenal or sensory imagination. If 
it lacks this sensory aspect then it may merely involve considering a more semantically 
based counterfactual, such as: your birth date being 20 years later; or what would happen if 
the president died. You may want to refer to this as supposition and it could be categorised 
as propositional or semantic imagination. This initial supposition may then lead to some 
further, more obviously phenomenal, imagery and the generation of other associated 
memories. It may even lead to an extended daydreaming episode that surprises you where 
you end up, for example: imagining yourself as a young vice-president who gets a sudden 
promotion. It may also involve aural imagination as you go over the options using the 
µYRLFHLQ\RXUKHDG¶<RXFDQDOVRH[SORUHLPDJLQDWLRQEDVHGRQZKDWLWGRHVRUKRZLW
works, and it may be hard to rigorously isolate one category from another. This may be 
because these categories overlap somewhat and that they work quite closely together. The 
use of imagination to order our thoughts is probably more pervasive and inter-linked than 
at first you might have suspected (and see opening quote). 
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This thesis involves an analysis of a sub-category of imagination that I call Spatio-
Temporal Imagination (STIm). My definition of STIm is any imaginative act that allows 
you to consider a location and/or a time other than the one you are currently experiencing. 
This will centrally include imagining a future possible situation or considering a past 
counterfactual situation. But it may just involve imagining a different location in the 
present. There are a few odd cases of STIm where you may be imagining the local area in 
the present slightly differently; or even more oddly, the present as it is. You may also just 
be imagining an object (e.g. a camel) in abstraction from any spatial or temporal location 
in order to work something out (e.g. what shape ears it has). For the purposes of this essay 
I will treat these as special cases of imagining spatially and where the exact location or 
temporal context is left unspecified. It should be obvious from the thesis that they can 
certainly be explained in the same way as other more central cases of STIm, without 
having to invoke any new mechanisms or capacities. At any rate it will become clear as we 
progress how these different varieties can be accommodated by my theory. This is because 
in order to develop a robust theory of STIm, I will also develop a general theory of 
imagery. 
 
So even though there are many ways to categorise imagination, I do not propose to 
undertake an extensive analysis of the imagination literature. In this thesis I will try to keep 
the focus as narrow as possible and hence restrict my analysis of STIm in two ways. First 
of all, it is already restricted by content, or what it is about, in that it allows us to consider 
another time and/or place. Secondly I will restrict my analysis to vision-like phenomenal 
imagination of the kind often used in visualization and hence I will not address non-
sensory versions of STIm. I class something as vision-like if it is seemingly experienced in 
a visual style that involves features like apparent shapes and colours in a similar way that 
visual experience does. This is even though these features may only be apparent and they 
7 
GRQ¶WDFWXDOO\SRVVHVDFWXDO'VKDSHDQGFRORXU7KHYLVLRQ-like category definitely 
includes visual hallucinations, after-images and visual imagery, but may include other 
vision-like states that I do not mention here. I use the term visual style to indicate an 
experience that occurs in a modality that features apparent or real shapes and colours and 
this includes both vision and vision-like mental states. 
 
Because of the restricted focus just described, I will spend some time looking at visual 
mental imagery that allows us to phenomenally imagine a different time and/or place. I 
will also look at the mechanisms that underlie this phenomenon and examine whether 
visual imagination can best be seen as an offline version of perception. That is, we will 
look at how closely visual imagination is linked to visual perception and whether some of 
the mechanisms that are used in perception, are also used in an offline (or mock, or 
pretend) manner in visual imagination. I call this an imagination-as-simulation approach 
and it can be seen in the wider context of other simulationist approaches to the mind: e.g. 
the simulation theory of mindreading. There is some initial evidence that suggests many of 
the brain areas active during perception are also active during visualization and this is 
initially indicative that imagination may be an offline simulation of perception1. We will 
look very closely at what this might mean in what follows. 
 
1.1.1 ± STIm in general and links to other subject areas 
Before we do that, here are some central examples of STIm in action, which gives an initial 
indication of the wider function I think it may serve in our mental economy. I have 
appended each one with its possible temporal and spatial aspects in brackets: 
 
                                               
1
 Cf. Kosslyn et al (1997 & 2001), Currie (1995a,b), Currie and Ravenscroft (1997, 2002) and Goldman 
(2006). 
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 Choosing between long term plans in life by forming an image of a future situation 
and assessing your emotional reaction to it to decide if you want to work towards 
that goal or not. Then working out the steps you believe are necessary to achieve 
that goal, which may in turn also involve imagining these steps in detail (distant to 
nearer future / variable location). 
 Thinking about what you want (desire) to do next and how to achieve it (belief). 
Perhaps by imagining how the room you are in needs to be changed and how it may 
look when you change it (near future / local). 
 Listening to someone explain something that is (or has been, or will be, or could 
be) going on elsewhere, and generating an idea of what that may look like in your 
imagination (current, past or future / elsewhere). 
 Thinking about how you could have done something else in the past and how this 
may have made the present work out differently. Perhaps then using this to learn 
from your mistakes and prevent the same thing happening again. Conversely you 
may want to repeat good practices that turned out well (past counterfactual or 
factual / variable location). 
 Working out how to pack the trunk of your car most efficiently when you are off on 
a camping holiday. You may need to visualize which bags go best where and even 
mentally rotate them to try out different combinations before ever lifting a bag. 
(future / local). 
 Solving the Tower of Hanoi puzzle by keeping track of the moves you have already 
done and anticipating moves you may need to make in the future. Keeping the final 
goal in mind and judging whether each move is helping you to achieve it (future, 
past/ local).  [NB. See Appendix A for an explanation of the Tower of Hanoi 
puzzle] 
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The main idea of giving these examples is to suggest that STIm plays a certain role 
amongst many other mental states. These include: emotions, beliefs, desires (or goals), 
memories, language comprehension etc. Solving the Tower of Hanoi puzzle is used as a 
test of executive function deficit and failure to solve it may be indicative of damage to the 
prefrontal cortex or of mental disorders such as autism and schizophrenia2. It also indicates 
how it may be crucially involved in supporting your personal identity over time and people 
who lack it may be stuck in the present without any personal history or future aspirations3. 
Talking like this also parallels the new and expanding Episodic Thinking and Mental Time 
Travel (MTT) literature4. The former involves thinking using episodes from your past life 
or predicting possible episodes in your future life, and the latter involves mental 
projections to other times. I think that STIm can certainly be seen as a form of episodic 
thought and certainly involves mental projection to another time and indeed much of this 
analysis has been inspired by that literature and is aimed to eventually contribute and 
comment on it. Consider the table below as a way of illustrating the way I see STIm 
possibly matching up with this growing field: 
                                               
2
 C.f. Currie (1996), Carruthers (1996), Boucher (1996), Perner and Lang (2000), Pennington & Ozonoff 
(1996) and Russell (1997).  
3
 C.f. Subject K.C. described in Tulving (2002). 
4
 &I$WWDQFH	2¶1HLOO&OD\WRQHWDl (2003), Suddendorf and Corballis (1997, 2007). 
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EPISODIC THINKING SYSTEM 
 
 
MTT to Past 
 
MTT to Future 
 
Spatio-temporal Memory 
 
STIm 
 
Actual  / Factual 
 
 
Counterfactual  / Possible 
 
Possible 
 
Episodic Memory 
 
Episodic Imagination 
 
Episodic Imagination 
 
Figure 1.1 ± One possible way to represent the relationship between  
Episodic Thinking, Mental Time Travel and STIm 
 
 
Unfortunately it will not be possible to develop these other themes in detail here, however I 
will mention a little bit more about them as we go along and this will help illustrate what I 
see as the main function of STIm. For now the main idea is to show how explicit 
visualization of a non-actual situation, and making judgments about it, can help you plan 
and guide your actions in the present. It also seems possible to suggest that STIm had a 
central role to play in strategy testing in an ancestral environment and hence would greatly 
increase our survival and reproductive chances. This is perhaps how it has earned its 
evolutionary keep and why it may have come into existence in the first place. I have 
written on this aspect elsewhere5 and will mention it at times as we progress. Gregory 
Currie has suggested that it is this evolved capacity that we access today and may be the 
basis for certain other mental phenomena: 
µ6WUDWHJ\WHVWLQJLVRQP\K\SRWKHVLVWKHSURSHUIXQFWLRQRIWKHLPDJLQation; the 
function appeal to which explains why we have the faculty of imagination. 
«'D\GUHDPLQJDQGIDQWDV\DORQJZLWKLPDJLQDWLYHLQYROYHPHQWLQILFWLRQVDUH
PDGHSRVVLEOHE\DV\VWHPWKDWDOUHDG\H[LVWVIRURWKHUSXUSRVHVVWUDWHJ\WHVWLQJ¶
Currie (1995b: 158) 
                                               
5
 C.f. King (2003, 2005a,b,c). 
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This ability to strategy test is perhaps currently most extremely exhibited in the 
LPDJLQDWLYHZD\VWKDWZHVHHPWRILQGRIDQWLFLSDWLQJHDFKRWKHU¶VDFWLRQVDQGNLOOLQJHDFK
other in the context of warfare and espionage. 
 
Related to that point, perhaps another special situation involving STIm is where you may 
be imagining a different spatio-temporal situation that involves other creatures and their 
own decision making process. I refer to this as Mentalizing Imagination and it obviously 
links with the literature on Mind Reading and Theory of Mind6. I see this as another 
possible extended case of STIm, but where the objects involved in the imagination are now 
attributed intentional mental states of their own. This means you not only now have to 
predict what these objects will do, but you also have to predict this based on imagining 
what they are thinking, since this inevitably affects their actions. I see Mentalizing 
Imagination as a more developed and complicated version of STIm, requiring a greater 
intelligence and awareness of ones surroundings and the creatures that inhabit it. For the 
purposes of this thesis however we will stick to analysing STIm on its own, but I am aware 
of the wider implications of this thesis in this respect and I have investigated this 
elsewhere7. The above is aimed at illustrating the wider contexts that this thesis can be 
situated in and what the primary function of STIm might be. 
 
1.1.2 ± STIm: the broad structure of the thesis and background assumptions 
Given the broad context above, I can now be more specific about the structure of this 
thesis. The main approach of this thesis can be split into two main streams. The first is to 
look at the mainly psychological literature on mental imagery and to develop a theory of 
the neural underpinnings of visualization. To that end I will focus on the visual imagery 
GHEDWHDQG,ZLOOGHIHQGDYHUVLRQRIZKDW,UHIHUWRDVWKHµ.RVVO\Q0RGHO¶.RVVO\QHWDO
                                               
6
 C.f. Carruthers & Smith (1996), Davies & Stone (2000) 
7
 (VSHFLDOO\LQP\0$WKHVLVRQ6WLFKDQG1LFKROV¶ERRNFDOOHGµ0LQGUHDGLQJ¶ 
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2006 and see below). This defends a hybrid depictive representational approach, based on 
DµYLVXDOEXIIHU¶LQWKHYLVXDOFRUWH[$VPHQWLRQHGHDUOLHUHPSLULFDOHYLGHQFHVXJJHVWV
that vision and visual imagery both utilise the visual buffer and that they compete for 
resources in the same sense modality. This immediately motivates an imagination-as-
simulation approach, since we can argue that perhaps a good initial explanation of these 
phenomena is that the visual buffer is taken offline to support visual imagery. By offline I 
mean that the visual buffer is fed internally generated mock inputs, and these are treated in 
DQµDV-LI¶RUSUHWHQGZD\*HQHUDOO\WKLVPHDQVWKH\ZLOOQHHGWREHlabelled or flagged as 
mock inputs in some way during processing, so that they are not treated as normal inputs. 
The first half of the thesis (Chapters 2- 4) therefore deals with this more cognitive 
processing aspect of STIm, with Chapter 2 explaining what I mean by imagination-as-
simulation in detail. Chapter 2 will also discuss ways that other researchers utilise 
simulation to develop their theories. )RUH[DPSOH*UXVK¶VHPXODWRUWKHRU\DQG
+XUOH\¶VVKDUHGFLUFXLWVPRGHO%RWKRIZKLFKDSSHDOWRVLPXODWLRQSURFHVVHVLQ
some way. This will give us an idea of the further potential and utility of this approach, as 
well as giving us some further useful tools to use in the rest of the thesis: e.g. visual 
emulators. Chapter 3&4 will be concerned with explaining and defending the Kosslyn 
Model and I will say a bit more about this below. 
 
The second half of the thesis looks at visual imagery from the other side of the signal to 
phenomenal gap and sees what certain perceptual theories have to say about imagery. This 
is motivated by the idea that if you are suggesting that imagery is an offline simulation of 
an online perceptual process, then it would be helpful to know what that online process is 
thought to be doing in the first place. If you have an idea of what is thought to be 
happening in the online case, then perhaps you can get an idea of what else needs to be 
done to achieve the offline imagistic version. It may be that feeding the visual buffer mock 
13 
inputs is enough, or it may be that extra steps are required. Therefore the second half of the 
thesis (Chapter 5-7) will look at different perceptual theories and investigate their 
implications for my imagination-as-simulation approach. The rest of this introductory 
chapter will establish all the groundwork necessary before moving on to analyse each of 
these aspects in detail. 
 
2QDWHUPLQRORJLFDOQRWH,ZLOORQO\XVHWKHSKUDVHµTXDOLD¶ZLWKRXWTXalification if I am 
referring to it in the narrow sense of being non-intentional, intrinsic properties of 
experience (c.f. Block 1996). I will use the more general term phenomenal character for 
WKHZLGHUVHQVHRIµTXDOLD¶WKDWVLPSO\PHDQVDQ\TXDOLWDWLYH experience that has a what-it-
is like aspect to it. It should also be noted that throughout this thesis I use the term 
µSKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHU¶UHODWLYHO\QRQ-technically, to merely describe the character of ones 
phenomenal experience, and not to particularly mean a property of an experience or 
anything else like that. Hence if you are experiencing a blue object, the phenomenal 
character of your experience is blueness; or to put it another way, your experience has the 
character of blueness which you experience phenomenally. This could be because the 
object you are directly experiencing is itself actually blue, or because your brain is putting 
\RXLQDQLQGLUHFWSHUFHSWXDOVWDWHWKDWUHSUHVHQWVWR\RXWKDWWKHUHLVDµEOXH¶REMHFWLQIURQW
of you. Hence the use of this term does not pre-suppose adopting any particular approach 
to perception. So phenomenal character, as it will be utilised here, just characterises the 
qualitative nature of your experience and makes no comment as to what this is ultimately a 
property of8. 
 
 
 
                                               
8
 But see Fish (2009: 6) for a discussion of its more narrow and technical use. 
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1.2 ±Visualization, memory and after-images 
Before we go on it may be a useful to get a stronger first person idea of what I mean by a 
visual image and perhaps a good way of doing this is to experience some paradigmatic 
examples of mental imagery yourself. To that end try to answer the following two 
questions: 
1) How many small squares are there in total on all the faces of a Rubiks Cube 
puzzle?  
2) How many windows are there in your house? 
It may be helpful to take some time at this point to try to work these out and to take note of 
WKHNLQGVRIPHQWDOVWHSVLQYROYHG,I\RXGRQ¶WNQRZZKDWD5XELNV&XEH9 is then you can 
imaginatively construct an image of one as you read through the solution below and see 
how closely it matches the one depicted in Figure 1.2 overleaf. 
 
1.2.1 - Visualization ± the Rubiks Cube Problem 
For the first question it is normal to form a mental image of a Rubiks Cube so as to be able 
to count off, or work out, how many small squares there are on each face (or at least this is 
what I will assume here and this will be discussed further in what follows). A Rubiks Cube 
KDVWKUHHURZVRIWKUHHVTXDUHVSHUIDFHVRWKDW¶VQLQHSHUIDFH,WPD\WKHQEHQHFHVVDU\WR
mentally rotate the cube and work out, or check, how many faces there DUHRQDFXEH,W¶V
possible you just know this from memory already. Then after some simple arithmetic (9x6) 
the solution is reached (54). 
 
It is worth noting that the claim here is not that this is the only way to the answer, some 
people can do this by simply calling up the facts in a fairly non-sensory and semantic way. 
                                               
9
 7KHDFWXDOWHUPLVµ5XELN¶V&XEH¶EXW,DPMXVWXVLQJµ5XELNV&XEH¶ZLWKRXWWKHDSRVWURSKHWRDYRLG
textual clutter.  
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The claim here is that in most cases a phenomenal image of a Rubiks Cube is experienced 
and this helps with finding the answer. At the very least one might claim that it allows you 
to know how you know the answer, and perhaps gives you a certain access to how you 
have worked it out and how confident you are of the solution10. While some people deny 
they have any mental imagery at all, studies (Kosslyn et al 2006: 179) have shown that the 
majority of people claim to enjoy some form of phenomenal imagination. While I will 
discuss eliminativism about phenomenal imagination in Chapters 3&5, for the most part I 
will assume that there is such a thing and that it requires some kind of explanation. This 
thesis attempts to give one such possible explanation as far as I think is currently possible.  
 
 
 
 
Figure. 1.2 ± Examples of different kinds of Rubiks-style Cubes.  
The Rubiks Cube referred to in the text is the second from the left (red, white, blue: 
with 27 of its small squares showing) 
 
 
The difficulty of this explanatory task is illustrated by asking what this visual image of a 
Rubiks Cube actually is and where, if anywhere, it occurs. The usual thing to say at this 
point is that it is experienced LQVRPHµLQQHULPDJLQDU\VSDFH¶EXWLWLVWKHQYHU\KDUGWR
get a tangible grip on what that is or to provide any coherent explanation of what inner 
LPDJLQDU\VSDFHPLJKWEH:KDWZHFHUWDLQO\GRQ¶WZDQWWRVD\LVWKDWWKHUHLVDQDFWXDO
                                               
10
 In other words it may help you understand how you know the answer and how confident you are of it by 
double-checking it. This is perhaps a form of meta-cognition (thoughts about thoughts) and may indicate 
another use for visual imagery (c.f. Rosenthal 2000 and other papers in that volume for discussions on meta-
cognition). 
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Rubiks Cube in your brain, because if this is so, then you are probably in a lot of trouble! 
Neither do we want to say there is a literal picture of a Rubiks Cube in your head, which 
you see with an inner eye and rotate with inner hands, because this also leads to further 
problems explaining these features (cf. Block 1983). So some other form of explanation of 
this visual image may be appropriate here and this thesis is aimed at doing just that. This 
will also include explaining some of the following phenomenological observations about 
visual imagery: 
1. ,WLVKDUGHUWRPDLQWDLQDQGGRHVQ¶WODVWYHU\ORQJLQPRVWFDVHV 
2. It is generally less vivid and complete that an equivalent visual episode, although 
this can vary significantly. 
3. It can be willed or occur spontaneously and it can contain surprising contents. 
4. ,WFDQEHPDQLSXODWHGDQGWKLVFDQµVLPXODWH¶DFWXDOSK\VLFDOPDQLSXODWLRQLQ
certain ways e.g. rotation and scanning. 
5. It is generally not experienced as being out there in the world, in contrast with 
afterimages, illusions, perceptions and a certain kinds of hallucinations (see below). 
6. It generally seems to be limited in the same way that visual experience is: e.g. you 
imagine in shapes and colours similar to those in your potential perceptual range. 
 
As the thesis proceeds all these features will be touched on and explained in more or less 
detail. 
 
At this point the reader may think that the experiments by Perky (1910) may offer a 
counterexample to the suggestion above (i.e. entry number 5) that imagined objects are not 
experienced as if they are in the external world. In these experiments people were asked to 
imagine an object (e.g. a banana) whilst looking at a white screen. At the same time, and 
without their knowledge, that same object was faintly presented on the screen at just above 
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the threshold of awareness. The subjects were reported to have been unable to tell these 
faint images apart from their imagery and sometimes were even surprised that they had 
imagined features that were in fact features of the faint image. This may indicate that 
imagery is experienced externally in a similar way as the faint projections. However these 
results were hard to duplicate by later experimenters (c.f. Segal 1971) and can be 
interpreted as due to confusing a perception of a projection for a self generated mental 
image, rather than making any predictions about our normal imagistic phenomenology.  
 
In the after-images section (1.2.3) below I will give one illustration of the difference 
between an after-image being experienced in the external world like perceptions, and I will 
DVVXPHWKDWPRVWSHRSOH¶VH[SHULHQFHRIYLVXDOLPDJHU\LVWKDWLWLVQRWH[SHULHQFHGLQWKH
same way. Hence I will take it as a fairly well accepted general rule that visual images are 
experienced as non-external. I ZLOODOVRUHIUDLQIURPUHIHUULQJWRµLQWHUQDOLPDJLQDU\VSDFH¶
from here on and simply suggest more broadly that visual imagery is just not experienced 
externally and leave it open as to how this is then developed further. I will return to discuss 
this in more detail in Section 7.3.2 and I will use this Rubiks Cube Problem to illustrate 
other points during the thesis. 
 
1.2.2 ±The second question - visual imagery in imagination and memory?  
In reply to the second question, as described above, it is common to imaginatively go 
through each room in your house and count off the windows in each room and then add 
them up (e.g. there are seven in my house). This certainly seems to involve some kind of 
vision-like phenomenal state that is distinct from what is present in your current 
surroundings. Specifically this would mean imagining every room and perhaps checking 
each wall, or at least visualizing the window in each room. Perhaps this can be seen as 
mentally simulating walking through your house. However at this point it becomes unclear 
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whether you are really imagining this or just remembering it, and this is an example of the 
ambiguity between imagination and memory. Generally I would distinguish phenomenal 
memory from phenomenal imagination by suggesting memory is of a past factual situation. 
Perhaps you could call it spatio-temporal memory, where the temporal aspect is restricted 
to events or episodes in the past, which did actually occur to you.  
 
To illustrate this further, consider another situation where the distinction between memory 
and imagination gets blurred. For example, remembering a dinner party viewed from above 
the table, even though at no point during the diner party were you hanging from the 
chandelier (at least you hope not!). This is a factual situation, which you were present at, 
but is recalled from a novel viewpoint, which you were never located at. Hence it could 
possibly be seen as an act of imagination based on remembered facts from the past. So 
perhaps it represents a combination of memory and imagination and it may be hard to get a 
clear definition of what counts as each in all cases11. In what follows I do not propose to 
untangle memory from imagination, but only suggest there are definite cases of each with 
some grey areas in between. For the main purpose of this thesis we can leave the border 
between the two blurry, because I will be concerned with describing how visual imagery 
can be seen as an offline perceptual process, and this can explain both memory and 
imagination. And indeed I will propose a detailed method by which they interact under the 
Kosslyn Model based on accessing an Associative Memory Mechanism. 
 
1.2.3 - After-images 
In terms of after-images, again a good way of getting a feel of these is to just experience 
them yourself. However in this case I think it is much more important to actually do so if 
\RXKDYHQ¶WEHIRUHEHFDXVH,ZLOOXVHWKLVDVSDUWRIP\DUJXPHQWWRVXJJHVWWKDW
                                               
11
 For examples of this overlap see: Schacter et al (2007), Buckner and Carroll (2007) and Hassabis et al 
DQGDOVRD1HZ6FLHQWLVWDUWLFOHHQWLWOHG³)XWXUH5HFDOO´th March  2007). 
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externally experienced phenomenal character can be generated by the brain in at least some 
cases. So try the two below by looking at them for one minute and then looking at a white 
sheet or a light coloured wall. Also try moving it around by looking at light coloured 
surfaces at different distances from you and observe the phenomenology: 
 
 
Figure1.3 ± Union Jack and Santa Claus after-images 
(see text above and below for an explanation) 
 
:KDW\RXVKRXOGVHHLILW¶VZRUNLQJSURSHUO\LVDIDGHGYHUVLRQRIWKHQRUPDOFRORXU
LPDJHRIHDFKLPDJHH[SHULHQFHGDVLILWLVµRXWWKHUH¶LQWKHH[WHUQDOZRUOGDQd this can be 
moved from surface to surface depending where you look. You should note how different 
this is from the phenomenology of visual imagery, which is not experienced as in the 
external world and this should give you a clear idea of what I mean by this distinction12. 
 
Unfortunately the full scientific explanation of this phenomena cannot be given here, but 
the commonly accepted basic idea is that the receptors in your eyes gets saturated by the 
colours in the actual image, and this causes a neuronal rebound so that for a while 
DIWHUZDUGV\RXµVHH¶WKHRSSRVLWHFRORXULQWHUPVRIFRORXUSURFHVVLQJLQWKHH\HHJ
yellow becomes blue). I take this to mean that this is the equivalent of the eye sending 
signals to the visual cortex that there is actually an object out there that has these opposite 
                                               
12
 It is worth noting that I find after-images much easier to generate from looking at them on a computer 
screen. For a good collection of these and other fascinating illusions go to: http://www.moillusions.com 
[accessed Sept 2009] 
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colours13. I will introduce a third, slightly more involved, after-image to illustrate some 
points in Chapter 5. For now this section was aimed at illustrating the difference between 
two vision-like experiences that are experienced obviously externally (the after-image) and 
not externally (visual imagery) and to give you some first person experiences of visual 
imagery to refer to throughout the thesis. 
 
1.3 ±The Kosslyn Model and the Tye-like Approach 
As mentioned briefly earlier I will defend an approach to mental imagery and STIm that I 
UHIHUWRIROORZLQJ%DUWRORPHRDVWKHµ.RVVO\Q0RGHO¶7KLVWKHRU\LVDOHDGHULQLWV
field and has been developed over the last three decades by several researchers under the 
PDLQGLUHFWLRQRI6WHSKHQ.RVVO\Q+HQFH,XVHWKHWHUPµ.RVVO\Q0RGHO¶IRUHDVHRI
reference only, and recognise that this term refers to the lead researcher in what is an 
extensive temporal and geographic collaborative effort. I make extensive use of the latest 
YHUVLRQRIWKLVWKHRU\DVH[SRXQGHGLQWKHERRNµ7KH&DVHIRU0HQWDO,PDJHU\¶FR-
authored by Stephen Kosslyn, William Thompson and Giorgio Ganis (2006). There are 
two key themes in that book that will be crucial to my analysis.  
 
The first main theme to be defended is a depictivist approach that suggests mental images 
are processed using hybrid depictive representations. This means I will defend the Kosslyn 
Model against its main rival, which is the propositional, or descriptivist approach 
(Pylyshyn 2003). I favour the use of the term propositional to refer to this latter position, 
because it is more easily distinguished from depictivism than descriptivism is (see what I 
mean!). Hopefully this will make the reading a bit easier and henceforth take 
propositionalism to be synonymous with descriptivism, and note that I will avoid using the 
                                               
13
 But see Pautz (2006: 212) for a good explanation of why they take the colours they do based on an 
µRSSRQHQWSURFHVVLQJWKHRU\¶ 
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latter term. The main claim of depictivism is that visual information is at least partially 
processed in a depictive manner and this is crucial to the way it represents. That is, it uses 
space to represent space in a similar way that a 2D photograph depicts a real 3D event (I 
will explain this in detail in Chapter 3). The propositionalist will deny this and argue that 
any apparent depictive qualities of the representations are a merely contingent feature of 
the way perception and imagery are processed. I will argue in Chapter 3 that the latest 
version of the Kosslyn Model seems to deal with most of the latest propositionalist 
objections, and hence remains very much a viable and useful approach in my opinion. In 
addition its extensive explanatory power and rich detail make it a favourable one to adopt 
once these considerations have been dealt with. 
 
The second main theme is that visual imagery and perception crucially rely on the visual 
buffer for processing. The nature of the visual buffer will be explored in detail on Chapters 
3 & 4, but a brief description will be given here. Here is an example of how the Kosslyn 
Model defines it: 
µ«DWOHDVWWKLUW\-two distinct areas of [visual] cortex are involved in visual 
SHUFHSWLRQLQWKHPRQNH\EUDLQ«DQGSUREDEO\PRUHLQKXPDQV6RPHRIWKHVH
DUHDVDERXWKDOILQWKHPRQNH\EUDLQDUHWRSRJUDSKLFDOO\RUJDQLVHG«GDPDJHWR
discrete portions of these areas produce scotomas ± blind spots ± that are localized 
LQVSDFHDFFRUGLQJWRZKHUHWKHGDPDJHRFFXUV«ZHJURXSWRSRJUDSKLFDO
organized areas in the occipital lobe into a single functional structure, which we 
call the visual buffer¶.RVVO\QHWDO-136) 
 
µ«PHQWDOLPDJHVDUH not like points in an array in a computer in at least one 
fundamental respect: each neuron in the visual area does not simply register the 
presence or absence of light. Rather, the neurons also code for specific properties 
such as the orientation of the line segments, hue, and binocular disparity (which is 
DFXHIRUGHSWK7KXVDOWKRXJKWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQKDVDGHSLFWLYHFRPSRQHQW«LW
is in fact a hybrid representation. Each point is interpreted in part in terms of its 
role in the depiction, but also in terms of the additional information it codes 
DEVWUDFWO\¶.RVVO\QHWDO-19) 
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From the first quote we can see that the visual buffer consists of multiple functionally 
linked topographically organised areas in the visual cortex14, each of which process 
different aspects of our visual experience e.g. colour and depth. The topographic areas are 
said to be made up of individual cells that together form a visual array, which depictively 
represents certain aspects of the visual scene in front of you (this is illustrated in the 
diagram below). However since these cells are spread out on a relatively flat area of the 
brain, they contain other information within them, which represents things like depth. This 
is what makes them hybrid depictive representations: they depictively represent 2D space 
using physical space across the array, but also each cell can contain more abstract contents, 
and hence may also contain propositional elements. I will develop a method for annotating 
this in more detail in Chapters 3 & 4, but to illustrate the role of the visual buffer further 
OHW¶VORRNDWZKDWWKHHYLGHQFHIURPVFRWRPDVWHOOVXV 
 
Kosslyn et al (2006: 15) describe evidence that shows that damage to certain areas of the 
visual buffer correspond to loss of detail in corresponding parts of the visual field: i.e. they 
produce a blind spot or scotoma. And further this is linked topographically because: 
µFUXFLDOO\WKHFORVHUWZRGDPDJHGUHJLRQVRIWKHWRSRJUDSKLFDOO\RUJDQL]HGYLVXDOFRUWH[
are, the closer in the visual fieOGWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJVFRWRPDVZLOOEH¶7KLVLVLOOXVWUDWHGLQ
the diagram below, where I have split the visual buffer (on the left) into cells and the 
depiction of the visual field (on the right) into pixels: 
                                               
14
 See Appendix B for a diagram showing the approximate locations of the main areas of cortex and the 
dorsal and ventral visual processing streams in the brain. 
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Figure 1.4 ± Schematic of the visual buffer array on the left (cells), which is related 
to visual field representation on the right (pixels). The two diagrams show 
differently spaced damage in the visual buffer leading to correspondingly spaced 
scotomas in the visual field. 
 
 
Hence the main aim of defending the Kosslyn Model here is to look at what each of the 
cells in the visual buffer contain and how they are filled-in and manipulated. We can also 
look at the relationship between cells LQWKHYLVXDOEXIIHUDQGKRZWKH\UHODWHWRµSL[HOV¶ in 
the experienced visual field. This gives us a potential correlation between the underlying 
cognitive processing and the eventually experienced visual phenomenal character, and this 
WKHPHZLOOEHGHYHORSHGIXUWKHUDVZHSURJUHVV,XVHWKHWHUPµSL[HO¶KHUHDVDloose 
analogy with TV-screen pixels and to refer to a very small area of the visual field. But it is 
important to note that I do not use it to suggest that the visual field is actually divisible in 
this way; it may be, but this is not a claim I will defend here. Hence this term is not meant 
to be taken literally as any claim for how the visual field is actually divided up and just 
refers to a small portion of your visual field.  
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,WVKRXOGDOVREHQRWHGWKDWWKHWHUPµDUUD\FHOOV¶PLJKWDOVREHVOLJKWO\PLVleading, since 
each cell is actually composed of millions of neurons that are massively inter-connected 
and processed in a parallel-GLVWULEXWHGIDVKLRQ7KHWHUPµDUUD\FHOO¶LVDIXQFWLRQDOWHUP
for a group of physically adjacent neurons that behave in a way that can be characterised, 
and more easily described, by referring to it in an analogous way to the cells in a computer 
array. Hence the diagram above is highly schematic and I am not suggesting a one-to-one 
relationship between cells and pixels. The brain is probably much more messy than that, 
but perhaps we can still talk functionally about certain cells relating to certain areas of the 
visual field. It is crucially important to bear this in mind during this thesis, because at times 
it may seem like I am over simplifying things. However this is mainly because this is 
required for the exposition to run smoothly and be aware that I am conscious of the actual 
complexity of the matter at all times. Saying that, I think the general points I make about 
imagination-as-simulation will be robust enough to endure a more complex empirical 
treatment and will remain useful as an approach that can be tested further. I think aligning 
myself with the Kosslyn Model also supports that prediction and much of Chapter 3 is 
aimed at explaining and justifying these claims. 
 
In Chapter 4 I will defend the Kosslyn Model against alleged counterexamples to the 
necessary involvement of the visual buffer in visual imagery. These are purported 
examples where visual imagery persists even if the visual buffer may not be used or 
accessible. The main challenge will come from subjects who are cortically blind and have 
extensive damage to the visual cortex, but yet still claim to have vivid imagery. We will 
also look at the evidence from the Neglect literature that also shows apparent double 
dissociations between perception and visual imagery. These terms will be explained in 
Chapter 4 and this will also give us a full account of the Kosslyn Model that describes how 
the spatial layout of visual imagery is generated and maintained. 
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,WKLQNWKLVDSSURDFKLVYHU\FORVHWRWKHXQGHUO\LQJVWUXFWXUHRI7\H¶V
representational PANIC theory. And indeed many of the concessions and adaptations that 
the modern Kosslyn Model has made are in response to earlier criticisms by Tye (1991). 
Hence another theme of this thesis is to adopt a very Tye-like approach to at least the 
processes underpinning perception and imagery. That is even though I will disagree with 
him on how he eventually explains the generation of phenomenal character (see next sub-
VHFWLRQ,GRILQGKLVXQGHUO\LQJµV\PEROLFDUUD\¶DSSURDFKYHU\DSSHDOLQJDQGVWLOO
currently relevant. Consider this from Tye to illustrate this point: 
µ7KHUHLVVWURQJHYLGHQFHWKDWLPDJHVDQGYLVXDOSHUFHpts share a medium that has 
EHHQFDOOHGWKH³YLVXDOEXIIHU´«)RUYLVXDOSHUFHSWVDQGDIWHULPDJHVWKHYLVXDO
buffer is normally filled by processes that operate on information contained in the 
light striking the eyes. For mental images (other than afterimages), the visual buffer 
is filled by generational processes that act on information stored in long-term 
PHPRU\DERXWWKHDSSHDUDQFHRIREMHFWVDQGWKHLUVSDWLDOVWUXFWXUH«,PDJHVDQG
percepts, I have argued elsewhere, are interpreted, symbol filled patterns of cells in 
the visual buffer «,PDLQWDLQWKDWERGLO\VHQVDWLRQVJHQHUDOO\SHUFHSWXDO
experiences, and imagistic experiences all have their contents encoded in arrays or 
PDWULFHVIXQFWLRQDOO\OLNHWKHVRUW,KDYHGHVFULEHG¶7\H%R[± 
footnotes removed, emphasis mine) 
 
,ZLOOGLVFXVVZKDW7\HPHDQVE\µLQWHUSUHWHGV\PEROILOOHGSDWWHUQVLQWKHYLVXDOEXIIHU¶LQ
Chapter 6 and argue that perception and imagery can occur even in un-interpreted arrays; 
that is as long as certain other qualifications are met. I will also make some distinctions 
EHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWNLQGVRISRVVLEOHPHDQLQJVRIµLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶DQGSURSRVHDWKHRU\WKDW
suggests that willed images might need to be labelled (or interpreted in one sense) to be 
useful. Conversely I ZLOODOVRDUJXHWKDWSKHQRPHQDOLPDJHVFDQRFFXUHYHQLIWKH\DUHQ¶W
examined or conceptualised (or interpreted in another sense). That is, they may go 
unnoticed because attention is elsewhere, or they may be very abstract, or non-conceptual, 
or vague, and hence be fairly un-interpretable. They may also occur spontaneously and 
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automatically and hence their presence and contents may be surprising and sometimes 
unwelcome (e.g. distressing flashbacks).  
 
Despite that, I will argue that if you are using visual images to consciously work something 
out, then they will need to be attended to, and have an appended context (or spatio-
temporal label) and be associated with an act of will that is aimed at reaching a desired 
goal. The Rubiks Cube Problem described above is an example of this and I will return to 
elaborate on this further in Chapter 6. The net effect is that eventually we will have a fairly 
comprehensive explanation of how visual imagery occurs and how it can come to be 
labelled or interpreted as representing a non-current spatio-temporal setting. Hence, after 
certain intermediary steps are completed, this hopefully leads us to a fairly comprehensive 
theory on the nature and function of STIm. For now we have a good introduction to the 
first half of the thesis and an indication of why I think it is relevant to the overall aims of 
the project. 
 
1.4 ± STIm and Vision: Selective vs. Generative Approaches to Perception 
In the second half of the thesis (Chapter 5-7) we will start to look at what taking an online 
visual mechanisms offline to form phenomenal visual image might involve. This will take 
the form of discussing what certain perceptual theories say about the nature of online 
visual perception and investigating the ramifications of this for their offline equivalents. 
One of the key distinctions I will utilise in the thesis is that between perceptual theories 
that suggest all phenomenal character supervenes locally on the brain and those that 
suggest it supervenes more widely and constitutively depends in some way on the object 
itself. A good way of illustrating this is to use a distinction made by Howard Robinson 
between Selective and Generative Approaches to perception. A Selective Approach is best 
27 
associated with relational15 theories like Naive Realism and suggests that the causal 
QHXURQDOSURFHVVµGRHVQRWJHQHUDWHDFRQWHQWEXWSXWVRQHLQWRXFKZLWKWKHVWLPXOXVWKDW
LVDOUHDG\RXWWKHUH¶ That is the phenomenal character widely supervenes on the 
object, the brain and all the causal processes in between and properties you are aware of 
(e.g. colour) can belong to the object itself. A Generative Approach on the other hand 
suggests that the neuronal areas involved in perception, not only detect and process the 
stimulus, but they also generate the phenomenal character too. That is, the phenomenal 
character itself supervenes only locally on the brain, but the classification of the kind of 
phenomenal episode it actually is, also supervenes on how it is caused: i.e. if it is caused by 
an external object then it gets classed as a perception or illusion; if not then it is a 
hallucination or a visual image. Classic examples of a Generative Approach are most 
indirect realist theories such as Sense-Data Theory and certain types of Qualia Theories. 
This distinction and its implications will be explained in more detail in the introduction to 
Part II of the thesis, but I will give a brief summary of that here too. 
 
So why is this distinction useful in this context? This is because I will argue that if some 
form of Generative Approach to perception is favoured, then it seems we already have 
potential mechanisms in the brain for also generating phenomenal imagery. If a Selective 
Approach of perception is favoured then it seems no such mechanism is readily available, 
and it is possible that we may need a separate one for locally generated phenomenal 
character. So my main claim here is this: that perhaps by looking at things in this way, we 
would predict much more overlap between imagistic and perceptual mechanisms in a 
Generative Approach, because they might use the same underlying mechanisms and be 
generated in similar, yet slightly different, ways. Note that the claim in not that there is a 
complete overlap, because we still have to explain the differences between phenomenal 
                                               
15
 ,XVHWKHWHUPµUHODWLRQDO¶KHUHWRGLVWLQJXLVKLWIURPµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO¶ theories as per Crane (2006); this 
will be explained further at the introduction to Part II of the thesis. 
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character like perception, that is experienced as if it is external, and visual imagery which 
is experienced non-externally. So although they may both be generated locally by the 
brain, they are somehow represented slightly differently and hence experienced differently. 
Thus under an imagination-as-simulation approach we would expect a fairly extensive 
overlap in certain crucial mechanisms (e.g. visual buffer), but also some differences in how 
images are experienced phenomenologically speaking. This will be explained in detail in 
Chapter 7. 
 
On the other hand if you adopt a Selective Approach, then it appears possible that all your 
brain does in perception, is somehow make you aware of the properties (e.g. colours) that 
external objects have independently of your mind. In which case the simulationist will 
predict that there is much less overlap between perception and imagery, because in 
imagery the brain perhaps also has to generate the phenomenal character, since you 
REYLRXVO\FDQ¶WMXVWDFFHVVLWfrom the external world (if you could there would probably 
be no point in imagining it!). Hence it is proposed that by looking at different perceptual 
theories on either side of this divide, the simulationist might have to make different 
predictions about the nature of the relation between perception and imagery. Analysing this 
is one of the core aims of the second half of this thesis. Figure 1.5 illustrates one way that 
this difference could be functionally depicted: 
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Figure 1.5 ± Functional depiction of a Selective Approach (above) and Generative 
Approach (below) to perception ± showing the extra generation process possibly 
required for imagery in Selective Approaches. 
 
 
So in order to analyse how close the relationship between perception and imagery is, I 
propose that it would be useful to see what different theories of perception might say about 
the imagination-as-simulation debate. In terms of a Selective Approach I intend to use 
modern Naïve Realism16 as my paradigmatic example and this categorization is supported 
by the fact that at least one current Naïve Realist (i.e. Fish 2009: 137), specifically refers to 
it as such. Hence I will analyse a modern expositions of this theory17 in Chapter 5 in order 
to examine its potential consequences for the imagination-as-offline-simulation debate.  
 
                                               
16
 7KHµPRGHUQ¶TXDOLILFDWLRQGLVWLQJXLVKHVLWIURPROGVW\OHFODVVLFDOQDwYHUHDOLVPZKLFKLVGHVFULEHGE\/H
0RUYDQDVµDVWURQJIRUPof Direct Realism, [which] claims that perceived objects or events 
DOZD\VDSSHDUH[DFWO\DVWKH\DUH¶:KLFKREYLRXVO\IDOOVSUH\WRWKHDUJXPHQWVIURPLOOXVLRQDQG
hallucination. 
17
 C.f. Martin (2004, 2006), Fish (2008, 2009) and Kennedy (2007, 2009) 
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I will also access the burgeoning Disjunctivism debate where necessary18, as this is 
crucially linked to understanding Naïve Realism. This is because, according to some: 
µ«WKHSULPHUHDVRQIRUHQGRUVLQJ'LVMXQFWLYLVPLVWREORFNWKHUHMHFWLRQRIDYLHZRI
SHUFHSWLRQ,¶OOODEHONaïve Realism¶0DUWLQ. Disjunctivism is distinguished by 
its key tactic of separating off vision and vision-like states with a disjunct like the 
following: EITHER you are in a visual state of a certain kind (e.g. veridical perception); 
OR you are in a non-veridical vision-like state of a significantly different kind (e.g. 
hallucination). The idea here is to separate veridical perception off as a different kind of 
thing from phenomenal hallucinations, even though they may superficially look like the 
same thing. This helps protect Naïve Realism from the Argument from Hallucination used 
against Selective Approaches and this will be discussed further in Section 5.1. Related to 
that, following Johnston (2004), I will refer to a theory that denies Disjunctivism, as a 
Conjunctivist Theory and you can see these labels being used in Figure 1.5 above. 
Conjunctivism would accept that there is a significant common overlap in the kind of 
things perception and hallucination are, in that they may both be phenomenal experiences 
that are locally generated by the brain (e.g. both are kinds of sense-data or qualia)19. Again 
I think Figure 1.5 illustrates this difference between these approaches quite well and this 
will also be discussed further in the introduction to Part II of the thesis. 
 
7KLVDSSURDFKWKHUHIRUHFRQQHFWVWKLVGLVFXVVLRQWRWKRVHDERXWWKHDPRXQWRIµFRPPRQ
FRUH¶RUµFRPPRQIDFWRU¶EHWZHHQSHUception and hallucination20. Disjunctivists deny any 
such commonality and it seems that this can be potentially extended to my analysis on the 
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 C.f. Haddock and Macpherson (2008) and Gendler and Hawthorne (2006). 
19
 )RUH[DPSOH-RKQVWRQVD\Vµ$Q\6HQVH'DWXP7KHRU\WKDWWUHDWVVHQVHGDWDDVWKHRQO\
REMHFWVRILPPHGLDWHDZDUHQHVV«LVREYLRXVO\DYHUVLRQRID&RQMXQFWLYH$QDO\VLV%XWRWKHUPRGHOV«VXFK
as Adverbial Theory and various Intentionalist accounts of visual experience, can also take a Conjunctive 
IRUP¶ 
20
 C.f. Crane (2005) for a good introduction to the use of these terms. 
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common overlap between perception and imagination. Consider this quote by Martin from 
DFRPSLODWLRQRQµ7LPHDQG0HPRU\¶WRLOOXVWUDWHWKLVSRLQW 
µ7KHPRUDOWRHPSKDVL]HDWWKLVSRLQWLVMXVWWKDWWKHDVVXPSWLRQDWZRUNLQVRPXFK
philosophical discussion of memory is that the phenomenological or the sensational 
must be a common element of experience and imagery can and should be denied. We 
should not accept that there is a common core of sensation which is neutral between 
perception and imagination or memory of such perceptual encounter. Imagination 
and memory relate to perception not through replicating the sensational or imagistic 
component of perception, but through being a form of representing such experiential 
HQFRXQWHUZLWKWKHZRUOG¶0DUWLQ-274) 
 
Hence we can see that there is an explicit denial of a common core between perception on 
one side and imagination and memory on the other. It turns out that this denial depends on 
some fairly heavy implicit Naïve Realist and Disjunctivist assumptions, which would be 
denied, for example, by a Representationalist and Conjunctivist like myself21. I will 
investigate what this denial of a common factor means for the imagination-as-simulation 
approach in Chapter 5. There I will also reject Naïve Realism by offering an updated 
version of the Time-lag Argument, which I call the Time-spread Argument. This is aimed a 
justifying why I do not favour any version of a Selective Approach to perception. 
 
,ZLOOWKHQH[SODLQDQGDQDO\VH7\H¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO3$1,&WKHRU\LQDELW
more detail in Chapter 6. This will start by explaining how his underlying array based 
symbol manipulation theory still seems very compatible with the updated Kosslyn Model. 
It will then move on to look at how this underlying structure leads to phenomenal 
FRQVFLRXVQHVVLQSHUFHSWLRQDQGLPDJHU\7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\LVRIWHQWUHDWHGDVD
common factor theory in the literature, as there seems to be a significant overlap between 
perceptual and imagistic states as illustrated in the quote from him above. However I will 
                                               
21
 In fact it was uncovering these implicit assumptions (and rejecting them) that inspired much of the way 
that my PhD has turned out. 
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criticise his position for being overly representationally reductive22 and try to assess 
whether his theory is best interpreted as a Selective or Generative Approach to perception. 
I will argue that I think it is best seen as a Selective Approach and therefore I will also 
reject it by applying the Time-spread Argument to it. 
 
In the end I will eventually defend and adopt a representationally non-reductive Generative 
Approach to perception in Chapter 7. I take this to be a general term that lumps together 
theories that suggest phenomenal character supervenes locally and is also generally 
representational in nature. It however denies that phenomenal character can be reduced to 
representational content and hence some further feature is required (e.g. sense-data or 
qualia). I will also assume a Generative Approach will usually accept that the following 
Brain in a Vat (BIV) intuition: 
µ$WVRPHSRLQW\RXUEUDLQLVVWRSSHGVRWKDW\RXFHDVHWRH[SHULHQFHDQ\WKLQJ<RXU
brain is then removed and placed in a VAT at which point it is wired up so that it 
receives exactly the same input. Your brain is then restarted and you cannot tell the 
GLIIHUHQFH¶± BIV intuition 
 
I also think this is compatible with the claim that a microphysical duplicate of your brain 
will be having the same experiences as you and this is because the brain generates the same 
phenomenal experiences in both cases. I think examples of this kind of approach 
potentially include Sense-Data Theories, certain forms of Adverbialism, certain Qualia 
                                               
22
 7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\LVFODVVHGDVUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOO\UHGXFWLYHEHFDXVHLWFODLPVWKDWSKHQRPHQDO
character can be reduced to representational content without remainder, and hence there is no need to invoke 
extra entities like qualia (see Chapter 6 for more on this). It is an odd feature of the timing of this thesis that it 
will be completed just after Tye (2009) has published a more updated version of his current position. In this 
QHZZRUNKHVSHFLILFDOO\UHMHFWVDSSURDFKHVEDVHGRQµSKHQRPHQDOFRQFHSWV¶VLQFHKHQRZWKLQNVWKHVHDUH
indefensible. Since the appeal to phenomenal concepts was a crucial part of his defense of the 
representationally reductive nature of his PANIC theory, it seems this may entail a wholesale rejection of his 
previous position. Unfortunately he is not specific on how extensive this rejection or modification may be, so 
this is a point that is still in need of further clarification. 
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Theories and the newly developing set of theories that fall under the banner Phenomenal 
Intentionality23. 
 
However since all I crucially need to do is to defend any form of a Generative Approach, 
because I think this is the crucial thing to ascertain in terms of the imagination-as-
simulation debate, I will try to stay as general as possible in this area. In other words I will 
try to keep it open as to which specific Generative Approach to perception I think is the 
best for developing this account further. Although I will say specific things about specific 
versions of these theories as we go along, I will try to stay general as possible in terms of 
committing myself to one particular generative theory or another. This will be developed 
and explained further in Chapter 7, where I will conclude that there is a significant 
common overlap between imagination and perception in that their nature is best captured 
by referring to them as: locally generated visual style phenomenal representational mental 
states, with relatively minor differences in how they are caused and experienced.  
 
I will finish by suggesting a method by which these visual images become labelled with a 
different spatio-temporal contexts, and how these may function in our wider economy, and 
hence this will indicate what I think the nature and function of STIm is under an 
imagination-as-simulation approach; which is what the title of the thesis asks. So 
answering this question is the main aim of the thesis and the summary above gives you an 
initial idea of how I plan to go about it. For now we can begin this journey by getting a 
more detailed explanation by what I mean by imagination-as-simulation in the next chapter 
and by looking at other researchers who may be appealing to similar things. This will give 
us a platform to work from for the rest of the thesis and also put my discussion on visual 
                                               
23
 C.f. Robinson (1994) for a modern sense-data theory; and Wright (2008) for a collection of qualia theories; 
and Horgan and Tienson (2002), Horgan and Kriegel (2008), Kriegel (2007a) for papers on Phenomenal 
Intentionality. And note that Kriegel (2007a) also adopts a form of Adverbialism. 
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imagery into the wider context of discussions of other forms of mental imagery: e.g. motor 
imagery. 
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Part I: STIm and the Mechanisms Supporting Visual 
Imagery: a defence of the Kosslyn Model under an 
imagination-as-simulation approach 
 
 
 
2 - STIm as an Offline Simulation Process 
 
³(YROXWLRQLVFOHYHUHUWKDQ\RXDUH´- 2UJHO¶V6HFRQG5XOH 
attributed to evolutionary biologist Leslie Orgel (1927 ± 2007) 
 
 
In this chapter I will discuss in detail what I mean by an offline simulation process and 
relate this to my investigation of STIm. I will do this by looking at some generic examples 
of offline simulation processes and explain how some other researchers utilise this notion 
in their work. This will involve discussing situations where offline simulation processes 
are utilised to explain motor imagery. This analysis will give us some key features that any 
offline simulation process should possess and this can then be used as a platform to argue 
that offline simulation is the main process that sub-serves visual imagery in what follows. 
Thus the main aim of this initial analysis is to provide some useful distinctions that can 
then be applied to the following chapters on the relation between visual imagery and 
perception. 
 
Therefore in this chapter I will aim do the following four main things. Firstly, I will 
introduce some cautionary notes about this style of approach and highlight things that we 
should be aware of throughout the course of the thesis. Secondly, I will explain what I 
mean by a simulation process and introduce a few varieties of these. I will then explain 
how offline simulation is a specific version of a simulation process and outline some 
features this kind of process may have. Thirdly I will relate this to an emulation system in 
the motor imagery literature (Grush 2004), which has certain features in common with 
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simulation, but also certain crucial features that are different. This will also allow us to 
investigate in Chapter 4, whether there is such a thing as a visual emulator that could be 
harnessed in visual imagery. Finally I will link this with work done by Susan Hurley 
(2008) on her Shared Circuits Model, where she combines emulation and simulation to 
underpin a mental feature she calls deliberation. I take deliberation to be roughly 
equivalent to strategy testing and hence this aligns her style of approach fairly closely with 
mine in certain respects. This is because we both want to explain a capacity for planning 
based on more simple emulation and simulation processes. The combined effect of this 
chapter is aimed at giving us a clearer idea of what counts as an offline simulation and 
provide further insight into the nature and function of STIm. 
 
Before we continue I should make it clear that, although I will mainly be focusing on 
concerns within the field of Simulation Theory during this thesis, I do in general adopt 
what is called a Hybrid Theory. This is an approach that accepts that a combination of 
Theory Theory and Simulation Theory is required to explain our full range of mental 
capacities24. For instance, in mindreading we may need to form theories about other 
SHRSOH¶VPHQWDOVWDWHVDVZHOODVVLPXODWHZKDWWKH\PLJKWEHWKLQNLQJ+RZHYHUVLQFH
Theory Theory is not quite as relevant to the mental imagery debate, this explains my 
exclusive focus on simulation theories in this context.  
 
2.1 ± Cautionary notes about simulation approaches 
Before we continue I will briefly go over three cautionary notes about using this kind of 
approach, which I will to heed during the thesis. 
 
                                               
24
 See Carruthers & Smith (1996) and Davies & Stone (1995) for general collections on this theme and Stich 
DQG1LFKROVIRUWKHXVHRIWKHWHUPµK\EULG¶ 
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2.1.1 ± Personal vs. Sub-personal Levels Caution 
The first thing to be aware of is that simulation theories can be investigated at the sub-
SHUVRQDORUSHUVRQDOOHYHODQGWKHWZRDUHQ¶Wnecessarily connected. I shall define the 
personal level as any mental phenomenon that is accessible to us in a first person way. 
These include mental features that we are currently conscious of and those we can 
potentially become conscious of which may currently only inhabit our sub-consciousness: 
e.g. the sound and feel of our breathing. Alternatively, sub-personal processes as those that 
DUHQ¶WDFFHVVLEOHWRXVDVDSHUVRQ7KLVFDQLQFOXGHQHXUDOSURFHVVHVRUIXQFWLRQDO
groupings of neuronal processes described at the level of underlying mechanism. These are 
ones that we can never be conscious of and are more to do with the basic workings of our 
brain: e.g. breathing regulation. Although this exact nature of this distinction is currently 
debated25, in terms of this thesis it is fairly clearly demarcated. The distinction we will be 
concerned with here is between phenomenal episodes that we consciously experience at the 
personal level (e.g. phenomenal imagery) and the functional neuronal mechanisms that 
may sub-serve these processes at the sub-personal level (e.g. the visual buffer). 
 
This warning was first put forward by Heal (1998), where she makes an important 
distinction within the simulation literature that deals with mindreading. She refers to 
personal level mindreading as co-cognition, where all she means is the shifting of our 
perspective to simulate another point of view: e.g. ourselves in another time or place or 
ourselves in the position of another person. This can be seen as a separate issue as to 
whether this mental ability is based on a simulation process at a lower sub-personal level. I 
will describe three main versions of simulation at this lower level in the next section to 
illustrate what this could mean.  
 
                                               
25
 C.f. Bermudez (2000), Hornsby (2000) and Dennett (1968). 
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7KHSRLQWRILQWURGXFLQJWKLVFDXWLRQKHUHLVWRKLJKOLJKW+HDO¶VPDLQFRQFHUQWKDWIDLOXUH
to describe things at one OHYHOGRHVQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\LQGLFDWHIDLOXUHDWWKHRWKHUOHYHO+HQFH
if you are not convinced of arguments about sub-personal simulation mechanisms in the 
brain, this can potentially be separated from discussions about simulating other 
perspectives at the personal level (i.e. co-cognition). However having highlighted this 
concern, this thesis will try and make some links between these two levels of description. 
%XWWKHUHDGHUVKRXOGEHDULQPLQGWKDWLWLVSRVVLEOHWKDWWKHVHWZRDJHQGD¶VFRXOGEH
treated separately if so desired26. The relevance of this distinction to this thesis is as 
follows. The first half of the thesis will mainly focus on sub-personal offline simulation 
processes that might support visual imagery (Chapters 2-4). And the second half of the 
thesis will look at how these may relate to our personal level phenomenal experience 
(Chapters 5-7).  
 
2.1.2 ± Interlevel Isomorphism Assumptions Caution 
In what follows we should also bear in mind the following warning from Susan Hurley. 
Hurley (2008: DEVWUDFWVXJJHVWVWKDWKHUWKHRU\µLVFDVWDWDPLGGOHIXQFWLRQDOOHYHORI
description, that is, between the level of neural implementation and the level of conscious 
SHUFHSWLRQVDQGLQWHQWLRQDODFWLRQV¶7KLVLVEHFDXVHLQDORWRIFDVHVVKHLVORRNLQg at 
subpersonal mechanisms that make possible or enable personal level experiences. In what 
follows I sometimes refer to this as these subpersonal processes underpinning the personal 
level ones.  
 
Hurley is careful to respect this personal/subpersonal disWLQFWLRQDQGDYRLGµLQWHUOHYHO
LVRPRUSKLVPDVVXPSWLRQV¶7KDWLVGHVFULSWLRQVRIIXQFWLRQVDWWKHVXESHUVRQDOOHYHOQHHG
not share structure with personal level descriptions. Obviously it is a matter of debate as to 
                                               
26
 It is also possible that Goldman (2006: Chapter 6&7) makes a similar distinction between high and low 
level simulation in terms of mindreading. 
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how much isomorphism there is between levels and this can be addressed by looking at 
how closely specific personal level capacities are controlled by, and match up with, these 
underpinning subpersonal mechanisms. The cells to pixel relationship briefly introduced in 
the last chapter is perhaps an example where there may be a close link, but we must be 
wary of over simplifying things by invoking a one-to-one relationship and just assuming 
interlevel isomorphism. The brain to mind relationship is a complex one and we may only 
be able to make some tentative suggestions about it here. This issue will be returned to and 
discussed in more detail in Section 7.2. 
 
2.1.3 ± Boxological Flow Diagram Caution 
7KURXJKRXWWKHWKHVLV,ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRXVHµER[RORJLFDOGLDJUDPV¶VLPLODUWRWKHRQH,
used in Figure1.5 in the last chapter. However there are a few it is worth making here 
about what they are supposed to represent and their depictive limitations. Stich and Nichols 
(2003) make some useful points in this area27. They utilise some functional box diagrams 
LQWKHLUH[SRVLWLRQVLQRUGHUWRLOOXVWUDWHDµIXQFWLRQDOO\FKDUDFWHUL]HGSURFHVVLQJ
PHFKDQLVPRUDIXQFWLRQDOO\FKDUDFWHULVHGVHWRIPHQWDOVWDWHV¶>SJ@+HQFHDORWRI
their book is focused on introducing and defining certain mental functions that they think 
are crucially involved in reasoning, mindreading and pretence. And they think showing 
how they interact is sometimes usefully represented in a boxological flow diagram. They 
MXVWLI\WKHLUµIXQFWLRQDODQDO\VLV¶E\VXJJHVWLQJWKDWLWLVWKHILUVWVtep to understanding how 
the mind works and cite a certain amount of philosophical pedigree that supports this 
approach (e.g. Fodor 1968, Dennett 1978, Lycan 1981, 1988).  
 
                                               
27
 6WLFKDQG1LFKROVDOVRLQWURGXFHDQGGHIHQGDµ3RVVLEOH:RUOGV%R[¶PHFKDQLVPWKDWLVLQYROYHGLQ
pretence, planning and mindreading. This is invoked to allow the subject to entertain imaginary beliefs in 
order to consider alternative possibilities and guide our actions. I would suggest that this is very close to my 
idea of what STIm is crucially involved with in strategy testing but with some crucial differences. I have 
analysed the Possible Worlds Box as a form of imaginative capacity in my MA thesis (King 2005c), but I will 
unfortunately not be able deal with it any further in what follows. See also Heal (2003, 2005). 
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However they warn that this way of depicting processes is not to be confused with the idea 
that these functionally specific mechanisms are localised in the brain. The prediction of a 
functionally isolated system says nothing about how they are physically realised. They 
could be realised very locally or distributed throughout the brain, as long as they serve to 
SURYLGHWKDWIXQFWLRQLWGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\PDWWHUKRZRUZKHUHWKH\DUHORFDWHG%XWREYLRXVO\
this is where brain imaging and brain lesion studies can help us identify certain areas that 
roughly correspond to certain functional mechanisms in the brain. Perhaps a potentially 
limiting overriding constraint is that areas that often communicate with each other are 
more efficiently physically located near each other where possible. Its possible that the 
visual buffer is a good example of different topographical areas located reasonably locally 
in the visual cortex, that might best be treated together functionally in the Kosslyn Model; 
more on this in the next two chapters. 
 
&RPPHQWLQJRQWKHXVHRIWKHVHµER[RORJLFDOGLDJUDPV¶+HDO1) suggests we must 
be wary of the way they oversimplify the interactions in the mind. For instance, there are 
vast amounts of inputs and outputs going in and out of each actual mental mechanism, and 
these may subtly affect the experiences we have and the decisions we make. Depicting this 
process with a few one-way arrows that only interact with a single box gives the 
impression that only these interactions are possible or allowed. In reality the interactions 
may be much more complex, bi-directional and distributed, and indeed the types of 
knowledge, memory and learning we bring to bear on a decision may be vast and subtly 
LQWHUUHODWHG+HQFH+HDOVXJJHVWVZHQHHGWREHDULQPLQGWKHµHSLVWHPLFKROLVP¶RIKRZ
the mind works, which is a feature that is possibly lost, or severely under represented, in 
these kind of diagrams. These points will become crucial when I defend the Kosslyn 
0RGHOLQWKHQH[WIHZFKDSWHUV7KHWDNHKRPHOHVVRQLVWKDWRQHVKRXOGQ¶WWDNHWKHVH
schematic diagrams too seriously, since their only purpose is to help illustrate certain 
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points in the text in a simplified and accessible fashion.  It is merely hoped that this will 
aid in the subsequent analysis, rather than be taken as a thorough representation of the 
complex workings of the human mind. With these cautions in mind we are perhaps now 
ready to look at different simulation processes in more detail. 
 
2.2 ± Offline Simulation 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQ,ZLOORXWOLQHP\GHILQLWLRQRIµRIIOLQHVLPXODWLRQ¶ZKLFK,ZLOO
subsequently adopt for the remainder of the thesis. This will provide a more detailed idea 
of what I mean by the term so this can then be elaborated on and utilised in the following 
chapters. Perhaps the best way of explaining this is to give some examples of it and show 
how it differs from some other main kinds of simulation processes. 
 
2.2.1 ± Basic offline simulation 
 The most simple way of explaining offline simulation is to describe it as a process by 
which you take an already existant functionally defined main mechanism and feed it mock 
inputs so as to produce mock outputs, in order to know what the real inputs might have 
been had the inputs been real. A mock input or output is basically the same as a normal 
real input except that it is flagged or labelled as merely imaginary or pretend. This means 
that it is not generated from a real stimulus or as a response to real current events. This can 
take various forms and be generated in various ways and examples of these will be given 
below.  
 
When the main mechanism is working normally, using real inputs and outputs, it is said to 
be working online. The process of feeding a mental mechanism mock inputs, and 
subsequently generating merely mock outputs, is what defines it as being taken offline. 
The merely mock input-to-output relationship should in some way mimic or simulate what 
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you might have occurred had the situation been real. For example, if processing 
information from items in our environment during visual perception is the online function 
of the visual buffer, then arguably the visual buffer can be fed offline mock inputs (based 
on memory), in order to generate offline mock outputs as visual images; or in other words 
it can generate imaginary visual scenes instead of actual visual scenes. These visual images 
can be said to mimic or simulate what it might be like to see the same events actually 
occurring. But obviously there will be some phenomenological differences and these will 
be discussed and accounted for in what follows. Perhaps the offline simulation process can 
be illustrated in the following generic way: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 ± Schematic of basic offline simulation process 
 
The crucial thing in the diagram above is that the online mechanism is re-used in the 
offline process, but the mock flag attached to the inputs prevent this from being treated 
normally and this keeps the mock outputs isolated from online action control. This is 
LPSRUWDQWEHFDXVHZHGRQ¶WZDQWWKHVHOI-generated offline mock signals to be confused 
with real online environmental input. For example, should we decide that we need to 
visually imagine a tiger, it is important that the visual image does not cause us to panic and 
run away and potentially hurt ourselves unnecessarily. Conversely it is important that an 
online perception of a real tiger does lead to urgent evasive action and is not confused for a 
relatively harmless visual image of a tiger. Obviously using the same mechanism for two 
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different purposes runs this risk of confusing the two, but generally it is assumed that this 
separation could be hard wired in such a way, that failure to distinguish the two rarely 
occurs. It is possible that certain forms of hallucination and other mental problems can be 
explained by a situation where this process goes wrong and we will touch on this more in 
what follows. 
As a way of illustrating this process perhaps we can look at how this would work in a 
generic formulation of an offline decision-making process, of the kind that is sometimes 
invoked by simulationists in the mindreading literature. Here it is suggested that we have a 
decision-making mechanism that usually works online to guide decisions based on the 
current intentional mental states of the subject: e.g. their beliefs and desires. That is, it 
takes the relevant beliefs and desires of the individual as an input and processes these 
along with other information (e.g. perceptions, memories), to output a decision, in order to 
guide what the best next course action is likely to be. In an episode of imaginative 
decision-making this would only generate pretend beliefs and desires, which can then be 
used as mock inputs into the same system. These would be flagged or labelled as such to 
prevent them from being acted on as if they were our real current beliefs and desires. The 
decision-making mechanism could process these nearly as normal and the mock label 
would be transferred to resulting mock decision output. This can seen as the equivalent to 
the decision you would have made had the original beliefs and desires been real and not 
just imaginary. This mock decision could then possibly be assessed by comparing it with 
other pretend decisions, which in turn have been generated from a different set of pretend 
beliefs and desires, and the most beneficial one identified and eventually actually carried 
out. Note that I am not attempting to defend this approach here in any detail. I merely 
introduce it as an illustration of one way that the features of offline simulation process 
could be realised in another field of enquiry. This is aimed to help indicate how this 
process might work in the arena of visual imagery.  
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2.2.2 - Varieties of simulation 
Another way of illustrating what is special about offline simulation processes is to 
highlight the differences between it and other varieties of simulation. To that end, I would 
suggest that offline simulation differs from a computer simulation, because in offline 
simulation an actual real mechanism is somehow involved in the process and in a computer 
simulation it is not. Taking an online mechanism offline would be difficult to do if you 
were, for example, modelling the weather, since you cant really feed mock inputs into the 
ZHDWKHUV\VWHP,ZLOOFDOOWKLVNLQGRIFRPSXWHUEDVHGVLPXODWLRQSURFHVVDµIXOO
VLPXODWLRQ¶VLQFHDOOSDUWVRIWKHV\VWHPHJWKHZHDWKHUDre modelled in a completely 
new medium (i.e. binary in a computer). Another kind of simulation process is where you 
make a scaled model of the original system and test it out using scaled down versions of 
the conditions you want to test it under. For instance, building a scale model of a bridge 
and testing it in a wind tunnel in order to see how a real bridge would react to windy 
conditions. I call this a scaled simulation, since not only is the model scaled, but also the 
prevailing physical conditions have to be scaled down too. Conversely the results would 
need to be scaled up so as to predict the relevant outcomes in the actual situation. 
 
It may be worth noting that out of the three types of simulation identified above, offline 
simulation, arguably and broadly speaking, seems to require the least amount of effort, 
since you are re-using much of the online system already present. The main trick is to work 
out how to make it work offline and make the inputs and outputs meaningful, and how to 
keep them isolated from the online system. This potentially adds parsimony to its attributes 
and this is something that may make it more amenable to an evolutionary process (see 
ODWHU,QZKDWIROORZVWKHQZHZLOOPDLQO\EHFRQVLGHULQJµRIIOLQHVLPXODWLRQ¶DQGµIXOO
siPXODWLRQ¶DQGVSHFLILFDOO\ORRNLQJDWYHUVLRQVRIWKLVWKDWPLJKWZRUNZLWKLQKXPDQ
EUDLQV)RULQVWDQFH,ZLOOGLVFXVVLQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQLIDµPRWRUHPXODWRU¶PHFKDQLVPLV
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best interpreted as being a full simulation process. I would also suggest that full simulation 
and offline simulation are the most obvious candidates for potential sub-personal 
mechanisms in the brain. Conversely scaled simulation seems less clearly appropriate and 
consequently will not be mentioned again in what follows: i.e. no one would want to 
suggest we actually use scaled down models of the external world in our brains. 
 
At this point let me offer a working definition of offline simulation: 
Definition ± Offline Simulation: Where part of an online real system is fed mock 
inputs, which it processes in a similar way to real inputs, but which only yield mock 
outputs (in normal cases). This is done in order to provide information about a situation 
where the inputs and outputs might have been real, which can then usually be utilised 
for other purposes, such as guiding real online actions. 
 
To that end the main focus of this thesis, will be discussing whether visual imagination can 
be seen as an offline simulation of the normal online visual process. The hypothesis to test 
will be to see whether the mechanisms normally used for vision can be fed mock inputs, in 
order that a visualisation (as a mock output) of a non-presently-occurring scenario is 
produced. We can then propose that this willed phenomenal experience could then 
potentially be manipulated and accessed to test out alternative possible scenarios. From 
this the most appropriate course of action can be chosen, in order to execute this actual 
action in the present. It remains to be shown how these mock inputs and outputs can be 
proGXFHGDQGLQWHUSUHWHGDQGKRZWKLVµUXQQLQJRIIOLQHRIWKHYLVXDOV\VWHP¶FDQRFFXU
But I think this now gives a fairly robust initial definition of offline simulation to use 
throughout the thesis28. 
                                               
28
 It LVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWRIIOLQHVLPXODWLRQVHHPVWRURXJKO\PDWFKXSZLWKWKDWUHIHUUHGWRDVµUH-use 
VLPXODWLRQ¶LQDUHFHQW6LPXODWLRQ7KHRU\H[FKDQJHEHWZHHQ*ROGPDQDQG+XUOH\E,WVHHPV
that re-use simulation necessarily involves the re-use of the original process in order to simulate something. 
7KLVGLVFXVVLRQVWHPVIURPDGLVWLQFWLRQPDGHE\*ROGPDQLQDERRNFDOOHGµ6LPXODWLQJ0LQGV¶
which deals mainly with mindreading. Re-use simulation is contrasted with resemblance simulation because 
WKHODWWHURQO\LPSOLHVWKDWDVHFRQGSURFHVVVLPXODWHVWKHILUVWSURFHVVLILWµGXSOLFDWHVUHSOLFDWHVRU
UHVHPEOHV¶WKHRULJLQDOSURFHVVLQVRPHVLJQLILFDQWUHVSHFWUHODWLYHWRWKHWDVN,WVHHPVWKDWUHVHPEODQFH
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2.2.3 ± Features of Imagination-as-Offline-Simulation 
The next stage is to look at what features we would expect from an imaginative mechanism 
that is based on an offline simulation process. This is the foundation of an imagination-as-
offline-simulation approach. One important step in this analysis is to ascertain why this 
kind of mental mechanism may have developed like this is the first place. Recall that in 
Chapter 1, I have quoted Currie (1995b) as suggesting the proper function of the 
imagination is to strategy test. Well perhaps we can suggest that once this feature evolved, 
it seems possible that any increase in its scope and range might have also benefited the 
organism. That is, the more things it can bring into consideration and the further it extends 
its ability to plan ahead and learn from the past, then perhaps the better it will do in life. 
Hence any increase in the range and scope of STIm could have also been selected for once 
it arose; that is as long as the benefits it yields outweigh the cost of evolving and running it 
in the first place.  
 
Talking like this seems to parallel some ideas presented by Dennett (1995), who envisages 
DQHDUO\HYROXWLRQDU\GHYHORSPHQWVWDJHKHFDOOVDµ3RSSHULDQ&UHDWXUH¶+HUHWKH
organism can model the external environment internally and review possible future actions, 
thus permitting its hypotheses to die in its stead and allowing it to choose the best course of 
action in advance. The suggestion is that the creature has an internal model that is: 
µ«DQLQQHUVRPHWKLQJ-or-other that is structured in such a way that the surrogate 
actions it favours are more often than not the very actions the real world would also 
bless, if they were actually performed. In short, the inner environment, whatever it is, 
must contain lots of information about the outer environment and its regularities. 
1RWKLQJHOVHH[FHSWPDJLFFRXOGSURYLGHSUHVHOHFWLRQZRUWKKDYLQJ¶'HQQHWW
(1995: 375) 
 
                                                                                                                                              
simulation category incorporates all of my varieties of simulation above, but only offline simulation can be 
identified with re-use simulation. 
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So not only can the organism internally represent its environment but it can also 
manipulate this representation in order to simulate different future actions and assess their 
outcomes. This inner model of external reality could be interpreted as an equivalent way of 
talking about an early imaginative capacity or a proto-STIm: i.e. the very beginnings of the 
ability to recreate a different time and/or place in order to strategy test29. Given the above, 
the simulation theorist might prefer to talk of running already existant mechanisms offline, 
rather than creating an internal model, but the evolutionary benefit of developing 
something like this is the same in each context. Hence maybe these approaches could just 
be seen as different ways of explaining the same thing; but perhaps the simulation 
approach offers a more efficient explanation of the initial way this could have developed. 
 
To support this idea, Currie and Ravenscroft (1997: 177) and Currie (1995a) present 
evidence that visual imagery and motor imagery are parasitic on the already existent 
processes of visual perception and motor action. They use this to argue that these imagery 
tasks can be interpreted as simulation based processes and hence we can see that this 
method of re-using and running offline already existent processes may have been applied a 
few times to different imagination tasks. So what perhaps further strengthens our claims 
for simulation based explanations, apart from its proposed relative simplicity, is that if 
evolution hits on a good trick to solve an environmental challenge (i.e. offline simulation), 
it makes more sense to suggest that this same trick is used again in a different domain, than 
to propose a whole new process or entity to do the same job. They suggest that simulation 
is one such problem solving trick that has been used again and again by evolution. It is this 
                                               
29
 I have analysed a plausible story for the early evolution of imagination-as-offline-simulation elsewhere by 
taking based on taking primitive stimulus-response pairings offline (King 2005a). It should be noted that 
Dennett was not specifically proposing a simulation theory here, but I think my approach could be one way 
of developing his ideas. Another researcher who discusses a similar thing in terms of the evolution of 
µVFHQDULRYLVXDOLVDWLRQ¶LV5REHUW$US8QIRUWXQDWHO\WKHVHDUHDOVRDVSHFWVRIWKLVILHOGRIVWXG\
that I will not be able to explore further here, but intend to in future. See also Carruthers & Chamberlain 
(2000). 
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parsimony, all other things being equal, that might support simulation based theories over 
other theories that bring something new into the world. This is of course only if all the 
other features of imagery can be accommodated. This thesis is designed to develop this 
hypothesis by testing and updating further. 
 
A further point to make is related to the relative efficiency of imagination-as-offline-
simulation. Currie and Ravenscroft (2002) warn of a potential confusion in this area, where 
someone might propose that two steps are required in an act of simulation: first pretend 
inputs are generated; and then the original system being used in the simulation is stopped 
DQGWKHQµWDNHQRIIOLQH¶7KLVPD\EHVHHQDVDIDLUO\LQHIILFLHQWSURFHVVWKDWPD\HQGXS
with some strange consequences. For instance, according to this mHWKRGVKRXOGQ¶WZHJR
WHPSRUDULO\EOLQGDV\RXUYLVXDOV\VWHPLVWDNHQRIIOLQHGXULQJLPDJHU\RUµ«ZHZRXOG
always fall in a heap when we mind-UHDG¶>SJ@2EYLRXVO\WKLVLVQRWZKDWKDSSHQV
when we imagine a novel scene in the visual medium or when we take our decision making 
system offline. So perhaps a better way of describing this process invokes only one step: 
the feeding of pretend inputs into the real system (e.g. memory traces of cats); that go 
through a small part of the online system as normal; but only yield pretend outputs (visual 
images of cats). While this is occurring the main visual system can operate nearly as 
normal, although there will be a slightly extra demand on our attentional abilities and 
possibly a drop in the information being processes from the external world. So this 
description potentially fits more closely with the phenomenology of this event and matches 
what the empirical evidence tells us as mentioned in Chapter 1. How this might occur in 
visual imagery will be elaborated on in Chapter 4, but for now we can see the point that 
imagination-as-offline-simulation can possibly not only be motivated by efficiency 
constraints, but also by potential evolutionary benefits and a good fit with the current 
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empirical evidence. All of which, I think, adequately motivates further research, at the 
same time as elaborating on other features of this approach. 
 
 Although what I have discussed immediately above does appeal to the relative simplicity 
of imagination-as-offline-simulation approacKHVZHGRQHHGWREHDZDUHWKDWWKLVµWDNLQJ
RIIOLQH¶PD\DOVRQHHGWREHinstigated and interpreted for it to work properly. By 
instigation I mean the kind of thing that prompts the episode of imagination to be initiated 
in the first place. Perhaps this could be because it is utilised as a way of working out the 
answer to a question, such as the Rubiks Cube Problem introduced in the last chapter. By 
interpretation I mean the subsequent processes that make use of a mental image. This 
could involve evaluating the useful information that the mental image is supposed to be 
delivering and how it relates to the initial task it was designed to help with. It seems that 
elaborating on these other steps may involve introducing a few more mechanisms into a 
full explanation of the processes involved in mental imagery to those depicted in Figure 
2.1.  
 
It should be noted however that many of the same additional processes would potentially 
still need to be invoked in other non-offline-simulation based alternative approaches for 
explaining imagination. It may also be that many of these extra processes could in turn be 
parasitic on already existing online mechanisms. So while adding these mechanisms may 
add to the complexity of this explanation, it does not necessarily add to its relative 
inefficiency when compared with other approaches. We can also make a distinction now 
between the relative simplicity of explaining how imagination-as-offline-simulation may 
have evolved, as opposed to the complex faculty of reasoning based on imagination that 
humans posses today. The increased complexity in what follows is aimed at providing a 
structure that can capture the nuances of our intricate modern imaginative capacity. It is 
50 
also specifically designed to match the intricate nature of the Kosslyn Model to be 
discussed later. 
 
In terms of what other mechanisms might be needed for full blown modern STIm, Currie 
(1996: 249) has in the past suggested the following mechanisms might be necessary for 
offline simulation to run effectively: a simulation motivator, an input identifier, a feeder 
mechanism and an output detector. The four components were given as a rough example of 
how simulation theories could possibly explain the wide variability of disabilities found in 
autism. This is because different mechanisms could be affected in different ways to 
potentially explain different autistic deficits30. For our purposes here we do not need to go 
into the details of the application of this for potentially explaining the spectrum of autistic 
disorders; although this is something I am certainly interested in doing elsewhere. 
$OWKRXJKLW¶VZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWDSSHDOLQJWRWKHFRPSOH[LW\RIWKLVDSSURDFKLQWKLVZD\
will help defend the Kosslyn Model in Chapter 4.  
 
So I will now introduce these components here as a suggested way that the basic offline-
simulation flow diagram shown in Figure 2.1 above could be developed further. So on top 
of the four mechanisms introduced above, perhaps it would be useful to also introduce two 
further mechanisms that give this process meaning and also help to keep it running in an 
appropriate manner. These are respectively: an interpretation capacity and an executive 
controller. The details of the function of each of these six proposed functions is listed 
below, along with that of the main mechanism to be run offline: 
 
1) Simulation Motivator ± identifies when it would be beneficial to run a simulation 
and motivates its initiation: e.g. the decision to visualize a future situation, as it may 
be useful for planning; this may also involves the sending of instructions to 
manipulate the image to test out novel variations e.g. rotation, zooming etc. 
                                               
30
 Although it is worth noting that Currie (1996: 249) did qualify this by saying that each component has a 
different level of plausibility from the other in that context 
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2) Input Identifier ± chooses the appropriate inputs to be fed into the simulation 
process: e.g. beliefs and desires in the case of mindreading or decision making; or 
relevant memory traces in the case of visual imagery. 
3) Feeder Mechanism ± ensures the input is fed to the appropriate part of the main 
mechanism and that it is tagged appropriately as offline: e.g. signals sent with 
correct labellLQJWRDSSURSULDWHSDUWVRIµYLVXDOEXIIHU¶ 
4) Mechanism to Run Offline ± a mechanism that has a normal online function, but 
which can be fed mock inputs and will give mock outputs that can be utilised for 
SODQQLQJHJWKHµYLVXDOEXIIHU¶RIWKHYLVXDOFRUtex which is used in both vision 
and visual imagery. 
5) Offline Output and Output Detector ± which allows the processes running the 
simulation to detect the outputs and keep them labelled as offline so as not to 
confuse them with real events. It also takes the output from the main mechanisms 
and processes it appropriately to generate the final outcome: e.g. visual images, 
pretend decisions or feedback of imagined bodily movement in motor imagery. 
6) Interpretation Capacity ± something that can use the outputs in a meaningful way 
that will benefit survival: e.g. interpreting a visual image so that it can be used to 
inform further manipulations or to draw some conclusions. 
7) Executive Controller ± controls the amount of time and resources used by the 
simulation system VRWKDWLWGRHVQ¶WDIIHFWUHDOWLPHSHUIRUPDQFHLHVWRSSLQJ
imagery from occurring while urgent events occur in real time (e.g. stopping 
daydreaming while your house is on fire), and stopping iterations continuing 
beyond a useful point (e.g. prevents perseveration: which is the obsessive repetition 
of actions or thoughts). 
 
Table 2.1 ± Potential mechanisms Necessary for an offline simulation process 
 
 
The above is aimed to cover the full range of mechanisms required for modern humans to 
deploy their imaginative capacity: from instigation to interpretation; and from original 
input stimulus to final actual response. The relevance and importance of these proposed 
mechanisms will be ascertained throughout the thesis. Interestingly this approach also 
offers a way that this process can be used in increments to support a step-like imagistically 
based reasoning process. This is perhaps best illustrated in the diagram below of roughly 
how I envisage these mechanisms being inter-connected:
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Figure 2.2 ± Schematic of the proposed main components involved in full offline simulation 
(This is presented generically so as to possibly apply to imagination in any modality: 
but note that a visual imagery specific diagram will be given later) 
 
 
Note that equivalents of the original components from the basic offline simulation 
represented in Figure 2.1 are still obviously included, but that these are labelled slightly 
differently (e.g. the offline input is now split into two mechanisms). Also note how the 
imagery episode can be run iteratively should the simulation motivator deem it necessary 
and the executive controller allow it. This might involve comparing the current state with a 
final goal state and ascertaining that further changes to the image are necessary to complete 
the task: for example, when ascertaining if two rotated objects are in fact the same shape. 
This process could also be terminated if urgent online issues become more important to 
deal with: i.e. when immediate actions are more important than planning and deliberation. 
$OVRQRWH,KDYHDEEUHYLDWHGWKHµ2IIOLQH2XWSXWDQG2XWSXW'HWHFWRU0HFKDQLVP¶IURP
7DEOHWRVLPSO\WKHµ2IIOLQH2XWSXW¶LQWKH)LJXUHVLQFHWKHVHZLOOEHWUHDWHGLQ
conjunction from now on (and see the intro to Part II for more on this). 
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In Chapter 4 I will try to identify potential candidates for each of these mechanisms in 
visual imagery based on the Kosslyn Model. Some will be more obvious than others and 
some remain poorly understood, or are a part of a wider analysis of how the mind works. 
Hence this diagram can be used as a platform to analyse the relation between vision and 
visual imagery. I would suggest that we have now discussed enough here to provide a solid 
introduction to an imagination-as-offline-simulation approach. We can now apply this by 
looking at how it relates to emulation processes. 
 
2.3 ± To Emulate or to Simulate? That is the question 
In a recent article, Grush (2004) has put forward a theory that puts emulation at the centre 
of motor control and motor imagery. He even links it to filling in missing parts of 
perceptual experience and pre-empting what we expect to perceive visually: i.e. he appeals 
to a visual emulator. Hence he seems to be addressing two of the main areas of interest in 
this thesis: what are the underlying mechanisms of imagery and what is their relation to 
perceptual capacities. In his paper he spends some time explaining why emulation theory is 
to be favoured over simulation theory, or why simulation theorists may have meant 
emulators all along. He summarises his view on the differences between the two positions 
in the following quote: 
 
µ7RPDNHDQDQDORJ\7KHHPXODWLRQWKHRU\FODLPVWKDWPRWRULPDJHU\LVOLNHD
pilot sitting in a flight simulator, aQGWKHSLORW¶VHIIHUHQWFRPPDQGVKDQGDQGIRRW
PRYHPHQWVHWFDUHWUDQVODWHGLQWRIDX[³VHQVRU\´LQIRUPDWLRQLQVWUXPHQW
readings, mock visual display) by the flight simulator which is essentially an 
emulator of an aircraft. The simulation theory claims that just a pilot, moving her 
hands and feet around but driving neither a real aircraft nor a flight simulator, is 
VXIILFLHQWIRUPRFNVHQVRU\LQIRUPDWLRQ¶*UXVK 
 
This is a serious claim and makes the simulationist responsible for quite a large error. But 
mixed up in this analogy are several assumptions that need to be unpacked, not least of all 
*UXVK¶VFODLPWKDWDIOLJKWVLPXODWRULVµHVVHQWLDOO\DQHPXODWRURIDQDLUFUDIW¶6RLQRUGHU
to reply to this criticism, in what follows, we will need to look at what he means by an 
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emulator and what he thinks the simulationist is so mistaken about.  I will eventually give 
a response at the end of this section that suggests that, while Grush makes a good point 
against simulationists in terms of what they fail to address specifically, it is a limited one, 
and we are probably not as mistaken as he suggests once we explicitly deal with his 
FRQFHUQV+RSHIXOO\WKHQRQFHKLVXVHRIWKHWHUPVµHPXODWRU¶DQGµVLPXODWRU¶DUHDQDO\VHG
and tidied up, much common ground can be found. The added benefit of the exercise is 
that it will further illustrate what the offline simulationist means and will identify a 
potential candidate for full simulations already being used in offline simulation processes in 
the human brain. So in order to begin this clarification process, some background on 
emulators is needed so as a basis for the following discussion on emulation versus 
simulation. 
 
2.3.1 ± Emulation basics and definitions 
The original idea of emulators comes from factory processes that can be made more 
efficient by predicting probable future states of the systems involved and correcting for 
WKHPEHIRUHWKH\KDSSHQ+HQFHWKHWHUPLQRORJ\LQYROYHVDµFRQWUROOHU¶WKDWLVVXHV
FRPPDQGVWRDµSODQW¶ZKLFKLVWKHV\VWHPWREe controlled. The model of the system that 
FDQSUHGLFWIXWXUHVWDWHVRIWKHSODQWLVFDOOHGWKHµHPXODWRU¶7KLVLVLOOXVWUDWHGWKHEDVLF
emulator schematic diagram below:
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Figure 2.3 ± Basic Emulator Schematic 
 
 
In order for the emulator to track what is going on it receives a copy of the control signal 
FDOOHGDQµHIIHUHQFHFRS\¶DQGDOVRLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHFXUUHQWVLWXDWLRQRIWKHV\VWHP
DQGRWKHULQIRUPDWLRQWRGRZLWKDFRPSOH[µ.DOPDQ)LOWHU¶WKDWZHQHHGQRWDGGUHVV
here). Based on this it can model the system and predict its future states. Usually this can 
be done at a much faster rate than waiting for feedback from the system itself. Hence the 
emulator can feed the controller quicker feedback and it can therefore adjust its signals 
with a finer grain of accuracy given the desired goal state. 
 
Given the basic description of an emulation system above, we can maybe draw out two 
very important distinctions. Firstly, I would suggest that in order for something to qualify 
as an emulator, there must be some currently occurring real system that it is trying to 
emulate or mimic. This is because the whole purpose of the emulator is to provide fast 
feedback in order to correct the controller signal to make the plant work more efficiently. 
Hence its main (proper) function is to fine tune the activities of a currently occurring 
system within which it is embedded. This is what is special and unique about an emulator; 
it is part of a wider emulation system and there is a real world system that it emulates. I 
suggest then that the emulator gains its status in lieu of being part of an emulation system, 
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Plant 
 
Emulator 
Feedback 
Efferent Copy 
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and if it is not placed appropriately in connection with a plant and controller then it ceases 
to be an emulator strictly speaking. 
 
With that in mind we can make the second point and ask what happens when we take the 
rest of the emulation system away (e.g. the controller and the plant)? And bear in mind that 
the controller has a dual function of: a) controlling the plant; and b) integrating feedback 
from the plant and the emulator in order to fine tune its commands to the plant. Here I 
would suggest that the function of the emulator in isolation is to: take a mock input; 
process it based on some rules about how the online version might work; and to supply a 
mock output that is a prediction of the output of the real system. But what we have just 
GHVFULEHGLVMXVWDµIXOOVLPXODWLRQ¶SURFHVVDFFRUGLQJWRP\FDWHJRULVDWLRQDERYHLHWKH
target system is completely simulated in a different medium, like weather predictions 
based on a binary computer simulation. So the definition of an emulator that I think will be 
most useful in what follows, is this:  
 
Definition - Emulator: An emulator is a full simulation process that is embedded in an 
emulation system as its primary function. An emulation system normally utilises an 
emulator to provide quick forward-modelling feedback in order to help it fine tune the 
actual control of a currently running real world system. Thus the primary function of 
an emulator is to work within an emulation system and to mimic a currently active 
target system. 
 
I make these distinctions because in what follows we will discuss using an emulator offline 
WRXQGHUSLQµPRWRULPDJHU\¶1RZDVORQJDVWKHSULPDU\IXQFWLRQRIWKHemulator-as-full-
simulator is to work in an emulation system then it is correct and proper to refer to it 
VLPSO\DVDQµHPXODWRU¶+RZHYHULILWLVUHPRYHGDQGSHUPDQHQWO\LVRODWHGIURPWKDW
primary function, then I suggest it should return to being referrHGWRDVDµIXOOVLPXODWLRQ¶
mechanism (or simply a simulator; which as it happens used to be an emulator). Hence the 
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emulation title is inherited from the system that it is currently being used for, or indeed has 
evolved in. But its isolated function withLQWKDWV\VWHPLVXVXDOO\WRSURYLGHDµIXOO
VLPXODWLRQ¶RIVRPHUHDOZRUOGV\VWHPWKHSODQWLQRUGHUWRDLGWKHFRQWUROOHU 
 
7RLOOXVWUDWHKRZWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQLPPHGLDWHO\KHOSVOHWVUHIHUDJDLQWR*UXVK¶VFODLPWKDWD
IOLJKWVLPXODWRULVµHVVHQWLDOO\DQHPXODWRURIDQDLUFUDIW¶)RUWKLVWREHWUXHJLYHQWKH
above definition, the flight simulator would need to be providing feedback into a real 
aircraft system in order for the controller to fine tune (not even control) operations. 
Without this it is jusWDVLPXODWLRQRIIO\LQJDUHDODLUFUDIWZKLFKLVZK\LW¶VFDOOHGDµIOLJKW
VLPXODWRU¶DQGQRWDµIOLJKWHPXODWRU¶6R,ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDW*UXVKKDVH[WHQGHGWKHXVH
RIWKHZRUGµHPXODWRU¶EH\RQGZKDW,WKLQNLWLVEHVWUHVHUYHGIRUDVSHUWKHGHILQLWLRn 
above31. This may just boil down to semantics, and in that case nothing much rests on it, 
DSDUWIURPSRVVLEOHFRQIXVLRQ7KHVLPXODWLRQLVWFDQ¶WVWRS*UXVKXVLQJWKHWHUP
µHPXODWRU¶IRUZKDWZHWKLQNRIDVµVLPXODWRUV¶DQGZHFDQNHHSWKLVLQPLQGZKHQ
reading his work32. The important thing is that we are getting clear about what the function 
of these mechanisms are and how they may relate to each other and our wider activities. I 
think this initial clarification may explain some of what Grush is complaining about. 
However we still need to explain where he thinks the simulationist has gone wrong. This 
will involve explaining where the emulator fits into motor control and motor imagery. 
 
2.3.2 ± Emulation and motor control 
In terms of motor control, Clark and Grush (1999) give an account of how limb movement 
could be emulated in order to fine tune and smooth our reaching and grabbing actions. The 
                                               
31
 $V\QGURPH,WKLQN.HQGDOO:DOWRQRQFHUHIHUUHGWRDVµKDYHWKHRU\ZLOOWUDYHO¶Something a simulation 
theorist must also be in self-regulatory guard against i.e. applying simulation to everything that on the surface 
resembles it but may be inappropriately labelled on further reflection (quoted in Currie 2003). 
32
 And see Hurley (2008: 21 ± IRRWQRWHIRUDVLPLODUSRLQWµ,OLNHPDQ\RWKHUVXVH³VLPXODWLRQ´WRLQFOXGH
³HPXODWLRQ´LQ*UXVK¶VVHQVH¶7KLVDOORZVKHUWRXVHWKHZRUGµHPXODWLRQ¶IRURFFDVLRQVRIVRFLDOOHDUQLQJ
where for example, a child emulates or copies what an adult is doing. 
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need for this emulated input is to provide faster, locally generated (intra-brain), projected 
feedback, rather than having to wait for distally generated slower feedback from the limbs 
or the environment to arrive: 
µ>7KHHPXODWRU@DOORZVWKHV\VWHPWRH[SORLWPRFNIHHGEDFNVLJQDOVDYDLODEOH
ahead of the real-world feedback, and hence allows rapid error-correction and 
control. It can support reasonable sensible behaviour in the total absence of real-
ZRUOGIHHGEDFN¶&ODUNDQG*UXVK 
 
They explain that this extra process, rather than being an expensive hindrance, has a 
beneficial function. That is it has the overall effect of more rapidly correcting and 
smoothing the trajectory of the desired movement, hence resulting in improvements in the 
execution of a real action. So the utility of emulating motor control is fairly evident, as is 
its evolutionary benefit. Perhaps we can now make the analogy that: the motor control 
areas in the brain are equivalent to the controller; the movement of limbs is equivalent to 
the plant; and bodily feelings are the feedback from the system. This is summarised 
diagrammatically below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 ± Emulator functioning in an online motor control system 
 
 
,KDYHSODFHGSHUFHSWLRQRQWKLVGLDJUDPDVIHHGLQJWKHµ$FWLRQ0RWLYDWRU¶ER[DQGJRLQJ
GLUHFWO\WRWKHµ0RWRU&RQWURO¶ER[EHFDXVHLWLVWKRught that visual perception is used 
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directly to help guide motor control, as well as to be used more obviously in motivating 
our actions. The use of perception in action control is the basis of the idea that action and 
perception share information and affect each other dynamically: i.e. in sensorimotor 
control circuits (Hurley 1998, 2001 ± and see later). This is evident in reaching and 
grasping movements where you usually watch what you are doing to help guide that action 
(just try it with your eyes closed to see how much it helps).  
 
Given this motor control context, we might perhaps now want to ask: what actually is the 
motor emulator itself? Grush (2004: 379) offers two alternatives and favours the second of 
his own formulation. So although he admits there are other possibilities, we only really 
need to discuss the one he favours in detail order to analyse his critique of simulation 
WKHRU\7KHILUVWDOWHUQDWLYHKHPHQWLRQVLVDQµDVVRFLDWLYHPHPRU\ORRN-up-WDEOH¶ZKHUH
µSUHYLRXVO\REVHUYHGPXVFXORVNHOHWal input-RXWSXWVHTXHQFHV¶DUHVWRUHGDQGRQUHFHLYLQJ
WKHLQSXWVLJQDOWKHFORVHVWDVVRFLDWHGRXWSXWLVSURGXFHG&DOOWKLVDµMemory-table 
Emulator¶DQGZHFDQVHHWKLVDOVRDVDFUXGHVLPXODWRUWKDW\LHOGVWKHPRVWOLNHO\RXWSXW
given any set of inputs based on previous experiences. This feature seems to anticipate 
some work we will analyse in the next chapter in terms of visual imagery using memory 
traces to determine inputs to the visual buffer. But for the reasons just stated, and following 
Grush, I put this option aside for now.  
 
*UXVK¶VIDYRXUHGHPXODWRUWKHRU\LVRQHKHGHYHORSHGLQKLV'RFWRUDOGLVVHUWDWLRQ
ZKLFKKHFDOOVDQµArticulated Emulator¶,ZLOOJLYHVRPHEULHIGHWDLOVRIWKLVLQWKH
following, but this is only aimed to be just enough to show the reader this can also be 
interpreted as a full simulation process. The real system the Articulated Emulator model is 
the musculoskeletal system and its various articulated limbs and joints. The feedback from 
the musculoskeletal system is kinaesthetic and proprioceptive body reactions (hereafter 
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termed - bodily feedback), which are measured by receptors in the limbs. This system is 
modelled in the brain by the Articulate Emulator by representing equivalent components 
(or articulants) for those of each real limb and joint, which are sorted into neuronal groups 
µZKRVHILULQJIUHTXHQF\FRUUHVSRQGV¶WRWKHVHGLIIHUHQWSDUWVRIWKHERG\DQGZKHUHWKH\
are located (e.g. bent, extended, rotated). These representational neuronal groups interact 
with each other in an excitatory or inhibitory fashion to model, or predict, the real 
musculoskeletal positions. Then (and this bit is quite vague) just as the real 
PXVFXORVNHOHWDOPRYHPHQWVDUHGHWHFWHGE\UHFHSWRUWRSURYLGHERGLO\IHHGEDFNµWKH
articulated HPXODWRUFDQKDYHD³PHDVXUHPHQW´WDNHQRIWKHVDPHYDULDEOHVDQGWKXV\LHOG
DPRFNVHQVRU\VLJQDO¶>SJ@:HZLOOUHWXUQWRDQDO\VHWKLVµPRFNVHQVRU\UHWXUQ
VLJQDO¶ODWHUEHFDXVHWKHDSSDUHQWRPLVVLRQRIWKLVPRFNRXWSXWLVWKHPDLQJULSH*UXVK
has with simulation theorists. 
 
May I suggest that, in this context, the details and the feasibility of the internal workings of 
the Articulated Emulator are not as important to focus on, as how it works in the imagery 
case; I assume anyway that this is an in-house problem for emulation theorists to sort out. 
So I will not analyse the process by which it works, but only at this point suggest that both 
types of motor emulator described above, seem to be a separate and independent brain 
mechanism, that somehow model, or mimic, the real system. And given what we have 
GLVFXVVHGDERYHLWWKHUHIRUHVHHPVWKDW*UXVK¶V$UWLFXODWHG(PXODWRULVDIXOOVLPXODWLRQ
of the working body based on neuronal computations. However it is still properly called an 
emulator because its specific function is to help optimise a currently running real system; 
i.e. to smooth body movements. In slogan form perhaps we can say that: 
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In normal motor control: the emulator is a full simulator embedded in an 
emulation system.  
 
These points will become relevant below. 
 
2.3.3 ± Emulator and motor imagery 
*UXVKWKHQVXJJHVWVWKDWLQPRWRULPDJHU\WKHPRWRUHPXODWRURSHUDWHVDVIROORZVµ«UHDO
VHQVRU\LQIRUPDWLRQKDVQRHIIHFW7KHHPXODWRU¶VVWDWHLVDOORZHGWRHYROYHDFFRUGLQJWR
its own dynamic DQGHIIHUHQFHFRSLHVLIDQ\WKHUHLVQR³FRUUHFWLRQ´RUDOWHUDWLRQIURPWKH
VHQVHV«>DQG@WKHPRWRUFRPPDQGPXVWEHVXSSUHVVHGIURPRSHUDWLQJWKHERG\¶
[pg.384]. I interpret this as suggesting that the emulator is cut off from real motor feedback 
and left to run according to its own dynamic, and the controller prevents the emulator from 
affecting its output commands to the body. I take this to be roughly the equivalent of 
taking it offline from its normal online activity of smoothing movements. 
 
So when the emulator is used in imagery it would seem that the emulator itself is taken 
offline and given mock inputs in order to simulate possible body movements that are 
currently not occurring. These mock inputs are no longer efferent copies because they 
DUHQ¶t a copy of real signals that are being sent to the body. And the imagery system is not 
an emulation system as there are no real movements to mimic or smooth. On receiving the 
mock inputs, the motor emulator processes them and converts them to signals that the body 
may have returned and this is what our imagined feeling of body movement is based on 
according to Grush. Given this, to me it seems clear that the emulator is detached from its 
normal role in an emulation system and is being used as an offline simulation of body 
movement. This seems to be an unusual combination of taking an emulator, which in itself 
is a full simulator embedded in an emulation system, and using it in an offline simulation 
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process to yield motor imagery. And while this may sound odd it does seem to reflect the 
situation, and the distinctions made earlier seem to be able to cope with this proposed 
dynamic. For example: it is still technically an emulator as this is its primary evolved 
function in the real system. However, in the imagery system a part of the online emulation 
system (i.e. the emulator) is fed mock inputs and returns mock outputs that yield 
information equivalent to what may have been felt had the inputs been real; which is just 
the definition of an offline simulation given above. I think this way of talking fits with how 
Grush talks about taking a visual-emulator offline: 
µ$QHPXODWRUE\LWVHOIGRHVQRWGHFLGHZKHQLWJHWVRSHUDWHGRQ-line versus off-line. 
Presumably there is some executive process that makes use of emulators, sometimes 
IRULPDJHU\VRPHWLPHVIRUSHUFHSWXDOSXUSRVHV¶*UXVK 
  
So the use of the offline and online distinction is explicit in his writing. And we can 
perhaps suggest that when undertaking an episode of motor imagery, it does not get used to 
fine-tune any currently running system, but rather to help plan and eventually execute 
future actions more accurately and efficiently (and see later for how doing this covertly 
might give us an evolutionary benefit). Hence, perhaps it is more appropriately referred to 
as an offline simulation process while it is being used in this function. Maybe then we can 
also summarise motor imagery in slogan form:  
 
In motor imagery: the emulator is a full simulator utilised in an offline 
simulation process. 
 
I think this approach makes for a clear and useful explanation of what may be going on, 
DQGFDQEHKHOSIXOLQUHVROYLQJ*UXVK¶VFRPSODLQWVDERXWVLPXODWLRQLVWV 
 
Before doing that, it may be useful to can observe that in the quote above Grush mentions 
executive processes and this may neatly link with my Executive Control mechanism 
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PHQWLRQHGLQ6HFWLRQ7KHEHVWJXHVVDWWKHPRPHQWLVWKDWWKHVHµH[HFXWLYH
SURFHVVHV¶DUHJHQHUDWHGVRPHZKHUHLQWKHSUHIURQWDOFRUWH[3)&DQGWKLVKDVVRPH
general empirical support33. Also consider this quote for an indication that this 
interpretation is on the right lines: 
µ'RUVRODWHUDOSUHIURQWDOFRUWH[LVDOVRQRWRULRXVO\DFWLYDWHGGXULQJSUHSDUDWLRQVWDWHV
when a decision must be taken about which finger to move or about when to start a 
PRYHPHQW)ULWKHWDO¶-HDQQHURG6 
 
7KLVDOVRPDWFKHVXSZLWKZRUNE\.ULHJHO¶VERQWKHVXEMHFWRIWKHQHXUDO
correlates of consciousness. There he elaborates on how the prefrontal areas might 
communicate with more (downstream) posterior areas, in a process that yields these kinds 
of phenomenally conscious representations of: body movement, visual perception and their 
imagistic counterparts. I will return to this topic briefly in Chapter 7.3, but for now this 
gives us an initial useful example of the function of the Executive Control mechanism 
depicted in Figure 2.2 that can be referred to later. 
 
So returning to analysing the role of the motor emulator in motor imagery, we can now 
return to look at how the rest of the motor imagery system functions apart from the 
emulator. Here Grush (2004: 383-385) agrees with the simulation theorist, that real online 
motor control areas in the motor cortex are taken offline in order to generate mock efferent 
(outgoing) motor commands; he calls these areas the efferent control centres. Perhaps we 
can also suggest that this is preceded by a conscious decision to undertake an episode of 
motor imagery, and most probably this is in order to solve a physical problem or practice a 
physical task. So after this, these mock commands to move are sent to the motor areas that 
also control the real commands (i.e. the controller). These outgoing commands (inputs) 
would normally travel to the limbs (the plant) and movements would be executed, but in 
                                               
33
 C.f. Faw (2003) and Russel (1997). 
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this case overt movements are (mostly34) suppressed in imagery. So instead, according to 
Grush, the mock commands are only sent to the emulator, which processes these as 
QRUPDODQGWKHQUHWXUQVRXWSXWVWKDWUHWDLQWKHLUµPRFN¶LPDJHU\ODEHO 
 
Furthermore Grush agrees that brain areas that normally receive bodily feedback (e.g. the 
cerebellum) are also active as the simulationist suggests. But he disagrees that just taking 
the areas that normally detect the return signals offline, is enough to explain how the 
offline input and output areas are linked together. The important thing to realise is that in 
WKHUHDOFDVHDFWXDOPRYHPHQWVDUHWKHPVHOYHVQRUPDOO\GHWHFWHGE\µ«VWUHWFKUHFHSWRUV
DQG*ROJLWHQGRQRUJDQV¶LQRUQHDUWKHPXVFOHV>SJ@7KHVHsignals are what is 
returned to the cerebellum (at the base of the skull) and are what is thought to underpin 
your feelings of bodily feedback (reminder: bodily feedback is short for proprioception and 
kinesthesis). Grush goes to some length to emphasise the difference between outgoing 
motor commands causing movements and returning bodily feedback that have detected 
these movements in the muscles. 
 
*UXVK¶VPDLQFODLPWKHQLVWKDWWKLVLVZKHUHWKHVLPXODWLRQWKHRULVWVJRZURQJ7KH\MXVW
assume taking the relevant motor areas offline will provide the same faint phenomenal 
sensation of body movement. However the actions need to be realised in muscles and 
GHWHFWHGLQPRYHPHQWUHFHLYHUVIRUWKLVWRKDSSHQLQWKHUHDOFDVHDQGVLPXODWLRQLVWVGRQ¶W
offer a parallel offline way of getting this return signal. So it is this second returning part of 
the process that Grush feels is neglected by the simulationist who usually only talks about 
taking the efferent motor command areas offline (e.g. Jeannerod 2001). Which would be 
the equivalent to sending out loads of mock commands and receiving nothing back. Hence 
his analogy of the pilot flapping their hands about on the controls (mock inputs), but these 
                                               
34
 There is some inefficiency in this process as some slight movement can occur as well as other 
physiological changes  - see Jeannerod (2001: S105) 
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not giving any useful return mock outputs on the dials of the cockpit. Grush thinks 
therefore what is needed is an emulator to convert the mock inputs to mock outputs. 
 
In reply to this criticism of apparent omission of a crucial step, the simulationist can simply 
admit that if it is true that taking the motor command centres offline only simulates half the 
process, then this is indeed an error. This is because the simulationist would certainly not 
want to propose a simulation system without any mock outputs; indeed this would prevent 
it from being a simulation almost by definition. However I offer the following quote from 
the simulationist literature that shows that perhaps we may not be as confused as Grush 
thinks: 
µ,IWKHHPXODWRUK\SRWKHVLVLVWUXHWKHQPRWRULQVWUXFWLRQVWKDWDUHSUHYHQWHGIURP
being transmitted to the limbs might still activate the emulator, the operation of 
which then gives rise to those processes we recognize as the perception of bodily 
PRYHPHQW¶&XUULHDQG5DYHQVFURIW 
 
From this quote we can clearly see the emulator is being envisaged as the translator from 
µRXWJRLQJPRFNPRYHPHQWFRPPDQGV¶WRµUHWXUQLQJGHWHFWLRQVRIPRFNPRYHPHQW¶SUHWW\
much in the same way that Grush envisages it need to. So Grush may have simply been 
unaware of this fairly sympathetic inclusion of the emulator in simulation-based 
explanations of motor imagery.  
 
We might also want to say that his criticism of the simulationist is a little bit unfair, since 
both Jeannerod (2001) and Johnson (2000) (his main targets) may refer to areas of the 
brain that are responsible for action detection, which are also active during imagery. For 
instance, Jeannerod (2001: S105) talks about the cerebellum being activated during 
imagery, and Grush (2004: 385) cites this as the most likely neural correlate of a motor 
emulator. So perhaps they think that just by listing evidence for distributed overlapping 
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activity over most of the areas involved in the motor system, then they are also including 
WKRVHUHVSRQVLEOHIRUµERGLO\IHHOLQJV¶$OOWKLVZRXOGWKHQLPSO\LVWKDWWKH\KDYHIDLOHGWR 
give an explicit account of how the mock action commands are translated to mock bodily 
feelings. So it may have just been an omission on the simulation theorists part to be explicit 
about something as simple as, for example, a Memory-table Emulator, which would be 
QHHGHGWRWUDQVODWHWKHµPRFNFRPPDQGV¶PRFNLQSXWVLQWRµPRFNERGLO\IHHGEDFN¶
(mock outputs). If both these areas are active during motor imagery, then it seems there 
may just be an implicit assumption that one is somehow being related to the other in order 
to simulate the complete experience.  
 
What Grush has done is offer the simulationist some emulation-based details of how this 
translation might be made without having to posit a completely new and specifically 
designed mechanism. We can simply process mock inputs and outputs via an emulator 
mechanism that is already doing this for another purpose. Hence offers us a way of making 
this part of the process explicit and giving it a parsimonious solution. I think this makes 
some sense of why the simulationist may have assumed this process, without realising it 
needed a more detailed explanation.  
 
 So in conclusion to this section, perhaps I can now explain how the simulationist can 
UHVSRQGWR*UXVK¶VFRPSODLQWVWKDW,LQWURGXFHGDWWKHVWDUWRIthe section by way of the 
flight simulator quote. Given the above, perhaps we can accept that in an analogous way to 
motor imagery, the simulationist might have failed to explicitly mention how the input 
from the pilots interface with the controls, are translated to meaningful outputs as readings 
on the cockpit display. So we can agree with Grush that the simulationist still owes an 
explanation of how these mock inputs are converted to mock outputs. But the completion 
of this explanation can be as simple as using a full simulator, which could be running on a 
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computer that is hooked up to the cockpit and programmed appropriately to do this job. 
That is, the computer can: firstly receive the signals coming from the cockpit controls; then 
process them using some programmed rules about how they relate to each other normally 
in the online situation; and finally these processed signals can then be sent to adjust the 
cockpit displays appropriately. This inclusion of a full simulator parallels the equivalent 
appeal to a motor emulator that the simulationist might use to explain motor imagery as 
described immediately above.  
 
Conversely the simulationist can still disagree with Grush that this constitutes any need to 
re-name this process as an emulation of an aircraft, since in this case the full simulator is 
not being used for any other online fine-tuning emulation process. Hence it is not strictly 
speaking best referred to as an emulator and it is still appropriate to call it a flight simulator 
as per normal language usage. More specifically the mechanism we have now introduced 
LVQ¶Wnecessarily being used to emulate and fine-tune an online real mechanism (i.e. a real 
plane flight) and potentially all that is needed is a full simulator to translate the inputs from 
the cockpit controls to related outputs on the cockpit displays. Hence there is no need to 
DSSHDOWRDQµHPXODWRU¶LQWKLVSURFHVVDWDOODQGZHFDQMXVWWDONLQWHUPVRIVLPXODWLRQVRI
different varieties. The simulationist can now counter-accuse Grush of using his emulator 
WHUPLQRORJ\WRREURDGO\DQGVLPSO\WU\LQJWRLQVHUWWKHWHUPµHPXODWLRQ¶ZKHUHWKHWHUP
µVLPXODWLRQ¶LVDOUHDG\GRLQJDQDGHTXDWHMRE 
 
I think the confusion arises because there is a crucial disanalogy between the flight 
simulator and motor imagery explanations. And this arises at the point where Grush is 
suggesting a motor emulator is available to take offline to help generate motor imagery. 
But no such mechanism is suggested (yet) in the flight simulation case and hence there is 
no need to use emulation terminology at all in this situation. However, if Grush now wants 
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to suggest that there is an aircraft emulator on board, whose primary functions is to fine-
tunes the online control of a real aircraft flight, then the simulationist can also 
parsimoniously appeal to this mechanism in the offline case, and perhaps now it is more 
appropriate to call it a flight emulator that is being used offline in a flight simulation 
process. 
 
Hopefully the distinctions and clarifications I have given above have made it clear when I 
think it is most appropriate to use the term simulate or emulate; after all that was the 
original question in this section title. But putting definitional issues aside for now, perhaps 
the main point is that we can accept that GruVK¶VGHPDQGIRUFODULILFDWLRQRQWKLVSRLQWLQ
terms of mental imagery, yields a useful elaboration of to the simulationist approach. It 
also offers another useful mechanism for simulation theorists to adopt in their future 
explanations. It seems to me that both theories can support each other, since in some sense 
we are both in the business of suggesting simulation-style processes are useful in 
explaining certain aspects of our mental imagery and action control. 
 
So in summary, this section has aimed to do three main things. Firstly it has responded to 
*UXVK¶VFULWLFLVPRIVLPXODWLRQWKHRU\DVGHVFULEHGLPPHGLDWHO\DERYH6HFRQGO\LWKDV
also elaborated further on how an offline simulation process might invoked to explain 
motor imagery and how it might be able to utilise an already existant motor emulation 
mechanism. This analysis has also involved giving certain clarifications about the 
similarities and differences between emulation and simulation and I have developed some 
useful definitions that I will utilise in what follows. Thirdly, this may now allow us to look 
for parallel explanations in the field of visual imagery. In this context we can now ask 
ZKHWKHUDQDOUHDG\H[LVWDQWµYLVXDOHPXODWRU¶FDQEHLQFRUSRUDWHGLQDVLPXODWLRQLVW
explanation of visual imagery; this will be discussed further in Chapter 4. For now, I would 
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suggest that the exposition above allows the Simulationist and Emulationist approaches to 
compliment each other once again, and for the definitions given to avoid confusion in 
future. In order to test this out further, perhaps we can now look at how Hurley (2008) 
invokes a combination of emulation and simulation in order to underpin a mental function 
she calls deliberation.  
 
2.4 ± Simulation, Emulation and the Shared Circuits Model 
BeIRUHFRQWLQXLQJSOHDVHQRWHWKDW+XUOH\UHIHUVWR*UXVK¶VµHPXODWRU¶DVD
VLPXODWRUVRDVQRWWRFRQIXVHLWZLWKKHUXVHRIWKHWHUPµHPXODWH¶6KHXVHVHPXODWHWR
refer to action copying of a certain kind in the social cognition arena. I will therefore use a 
FDSLWDOLVHGµ(¶WRUHIHUWR*UXVK¶VEmulator mechanism from now on, or just refer to it as a 
simulator when it is not used in guiding actual movements as described above. Also note, I 
DPQRWDWWHPSWLQJWRJLYHDIXOOH[SRVLWLRQRI+XUOH\¶VSRVLtion here. I am just introducing 
the crucial points in order to illustrate a parallel approach that relies on many of the same 
processes. This is aimed to provide support for my approach generally, as well as elaborate 
further on the potential nature and function of STIm. 
 
7KDWVDLG+XUOH\¶V6KDUHG&LUFXLWV0RGHO6&0DLPVWRVKRZKRZFRPSOH[
behaviour, like mind reading, planning and social cognition, can be built up and enabled 
through five hierarchical layers of basic processes. Her main focus is seeing how much of 
this work can be done by the interaction of simulation processes, control processes and 
mirror neurons35: 
 
                                               
35
 Mirror neurons are areas of the brain that fire both when we do an action and when someone else does it. 
In a similar vein canonical neurons not only fire on seeing an object that affords a certain type of action, but 
also fire when the subject performs that same afforded action e.g. seeing scissors and cutting with scissors. 
But note that care must be taken when claiming too much sophistication on behalf of these mirroring neurons 
alone, on the understanding that their activity needs to be imbedded in a system that functions to interpret this 
very basic synchronised firing activity (cf. Rizzolatti 2005). 
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µ7KH>6&0@VKRZVKRZVXESHUVRQDOUHVRXUFHVIRUFRQWUROPLUURULQJDQGsimulation can 
enable the distinctively human sociocognitive skills of imitation, deliberation, and 
PLQGUHDGLQJ7KHPRGHOKDVLQWHUWZLQHGHPSLULFDODQGSKLORVRSKLFDODLPV¶+XUOH\
11 ± emphasis mine) 
 
Each layer of processing she invokes builds on the one below, with Layer 1 being the 
simplest and Layer 5 potentially sub-serving our full mindreading capabilities. As it turns 
RXWVKHSUHWW\PXFKXVHV*UXVK¶V(PXODWRU-as-simulator, as a basis for her 
arguments for how we plan, predict and understand actions in others and ourselves. So 
once again we perhaps have a theory that makes use of an Emulator as well as an ability to 
re-use this mechanism by taking it offline36. We will therefore see below that the two 
layers we are most interested in this context are layers 2 & 4: where layer 2 is simply 
*UXVK¶s online Emulator involved in online motor control; and layer 4 allows deliberation 
by taking the Emulator offline and allowing motor imagery. I wont say much more about 
Layer 2 as this has been discussed above. Hurley also introduces the concept of reverse 
simulation, which gives you the relevant inputs that any given set of outputs might have 
been caused by; which is the opposite way round to normal simulation37. 
 
Before analysing certain implications of the SCM model, we need to make explicit an 
assumptioQLQ+XUOH\¶VZRUNZKLFKZDVPHQWLRQHGEULHIO\HDUOLHU7KDWLVWKHUHLVD
certain amount of overlap between action perception and action control. Simply put, we 
use vision to watch our own actions (e.g. hand movements) and use this, along with an 
Emulator, to help our motor system guide and smooth those movements. Hurley refers to 
WKLVDVµVHQVRULPRWRUIHHGEDFN¶ZKLFKLQFOXGHVPRWRUIHHGEDFNERGLO\IHHOLQJVDQG
                                               
36
 Recall I quote Hurley (2008) earlier as defending as re-use style of simulation that I think is roughly 
equivalent to an offline simulation process. 
37
 This could be explained by something as simple as just reversing the Memory-table Emulator process, but 
DJDLQ,ZRQ¶WKDYHWLPHWRGHDOZLWKWKLVLQWHUHVWLQJPHFKDQLVPLQYRNHGLQ6&0LQGHWDLO,QYHVWLJDWLQJWKH
plausibility of this mechanism in humans is another potential avenue for future analysis. And see Miall 2003 
who suggests some other uses for reverse simulators in artificial systems. 
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sensory feedback from the environment e.g. vision and sound. In addition these areas may 
interact as a unified whole (what fires together, wires together) making a strong link 
between perception and action as studied in control theory; hence it is referred to as a 
shared circuits model. It is possible that if this conjoined system is then used offline we 
PD\VHHVRPHSDUDOOHOVEHWZHHQRXUYLVXDODQGPRWRULPDJHU\ZKLFKLVJHQHUDOO\ZKDW¶V
found (c.f. isochrony studies reviewed in Jeannerod and Frak 1999 & Kosslyn et al 2006). 
Analysis of the visual part of this, and its contribution to visual imagery, will form a vital 
part of the next two chapters.  
 
We can now look at the implications of Layer 4 to this thesis in a bit more detail. To put 
this in context, immediately below is a tabulated summary of the five layers that Hurley 
identifies and their relevant functions (c.f. pgs. 19-20): 
 
Layer Function Mechanism Comments 
1 Online Motor 
Control 
Motor Control of Body Feedback is from environment 
only 
2 Offline Motor 
Prediction and 
Control 
6LPXODWLRQ*UXVK¶V- 
Emulator) 
Improves action execution. 
Efference copy also potentially 
enables distinctions between self 
and world activity 
3 2WKHU¶VDFWLRQ
and goal detection 
and copying 
Mirroring and reverse 
simulation 
7DNHVGHWHFWHGPLUURUHGµPRWRU
RXWSXWV¶DVLQSXWVWRUHYHUVH
simulation in order to prime, 
emulate or imitate  
4 Inhibition of overt 
action for discrete 
planning  
Monitored output inhibition 
combined with simulative 
prediction and simulative 
mirroring 
Allows discrete (not overt) 
consideration of possible actions 
DQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRWKHU¶VDFWLRns 
and goals 
5 Counterfactual 
consideration 
Counterfactual input into 
reverse simulation 
$OORZVRWKHU¶VFRXQWHUIDFWXDO
actions to be analysed, as well as 
reaction to your possible actions 
 
Table 2.2 ± Summary of Hurley (2008) sub-personal functional layers in the SCM 
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2.4.1 - Layer 4 ± ³PRQLWRUHGRXWSXWLQKLELWLRQFRPELQHGZLWKVLPXODWLYHSUHGLFWLRQ
DQGRUVLPXODWLYHPLUURULQJ´  
In terms of the function of Layer 4, I will focus mainly on its role in supporting 
deliberation since it is the most related to STIm. Deliberation is the ability to simulate 
alternative possibilities whilst preventing yourself from acting them out overtly. This latter 
feature is what Hurley refers to as action inhibition, and deterioration in this ability can 
have debilitating action control consequences (see below). Therefore this stage importantly 
involves the inhibition of these imagined and/or imitated actions from being actually 
executed. At this stage it becomes possible to test out future potential actions that might be 
appURSULDWHJLYHQWKHFXUUHQWDIIRUGDQFHVLQWKHHQYLURQPHQWDQGWRFRS\RWKHU¶VDFWLRQVLQ
a motor imagery episode. This is mostly just equivalent to utilising motor imagery to 
rehearse movements, where the Emulator is run offline as described in Section 2.3. More 
interesting though is what Hurley thinks this is used for and this is well represented in this 
quote below. Note she also uses very similar language to that quoted from Dennett (1995) 
in Section 2.2.3 above: 
µ0XOWLSOHVLPXODWLYHSUHGLFWLRQVFRXOGSUovide information about results of alternative 
possible actions, rather than anticipating results for ongoing actions. Simulated results of 
alternative possible actions could be compared for the closest match to a target prior to 
actual action. Layers 2 plXVFRXOGWKXVSURYLGHLQIRUPDWLRQIRU³WULDOVDQGHUURUVLQWKH
KHDG´0LOOLNDQSULRUWRDFWXDOWULDOVDQGSRVVLEO\IDWDOHUURUVDOORZLQJVLPXODWLRQV
to die in a choosers stead. They could thus enable counterfactual instrumental deliberation 
and choice among alternative possible actions¶+XUOH\± my italics) 
 
I think this provides confirmation that the remit of deliberation is essentially the same as 
µVWUDWHJ\WHVWLQJ¶DVSHUP\XVDJH6R,ZRXOGVXJJHVWDVWURQJOLQNWRP\RIIOLQH
simulationist approach described above is evident.  
 
However Hurley goes one step further here and joins this together with her action±reading, 
imitation and simulation capacities. These other capacities are mainly based on mirror 
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neurons and reverse simulation SURFHVVHVWKDW,ZRQ¶WJRLQWRKHUHLQGHWDLO38. Suffice to 
say these features are developed at the same middle functional level of description as that 
of Emulator and offline simulation systems. Hence indicating the potential of combining 
an offline simulation approach with mirror neuron theory in order to explain some other 
useful human abilities. Hurley suggests that this combination of mechanisms allows for 
FRYHUWLPLWDWLRQDQGOHDUQLQJIURPRWKHU¶VDFWLRQV,QLWLDOO\LWVHHPVREYLRXVZK\
sometimes inhiELWLQJRXUQDWXUDOWHQGHQF\WRFRS\RWKHU¶VDFWLRQVKDVDQHYROXWLRQDU\
EHQHILWVLQFHZHGRQ¶WDOZD\VZDQWWRUHSURGXFHZKDWZHVHHKDSSHQLQJHJSHRSOH
KDYLQJDFFLGHQWV%XWWKLVSURFHVVDOVR\LHOGVDQRWKHUDGYDQWDJHWRµLQWHUQDOLPDJHU\¶
which I had not anticipated before reading this paper. That is it prevents your competitors 
copying useful techniques from you, or knowing what you are copying from them:  
 
µ,PLWDWLRQZLWKVHOHFWLYHLQKLELWLRQKDVWKHDGYDQWDJHRIWKHIWRYHUKRQHVWWRLO,QVWHDGRI
letting hypotheses die in his stead, a selective imitator lets others die in his stead, reaping 
the benefits of success without unusual native wit while avoiding the cost of trial and 
error. Imitative social environments may in turn generate pressure to prevent successful 
techniques being appropriated cost free by competitors, resulting in capacities for covert 
RUVLPXODWHGDFWLRQVKLHOGHGIURPSRWHQWLDOLPLWDWLYHWKHIW¶+XUOH\ 
 
In other words covertly rehearsing actions for future plans using mental imagery, and 
LPDJLQDWLYHO\LPLWDWLQJDQGOHDUQLQJVHFUHWO\IURPRWKHUV¶DFWLRQVKDVDQRWKHUREYLRXV
evolutionary benefit. This could then provide an additional drive to develop internal ways 
of testing strategies without actually risking trying them out, or revealing what you know 
about them to others.  
                                               
38
 See footnotes 35&37. But very briefly, the main idea is that mirror neurons imitate and generate the output 
FRPPDQGVWKDWRWKHUSHRSOH¶VREVHUYHGDFWLRQVVWLPXODWH7KHVHFDn then be put through a reverse simulation 
process that yields what the relevant inputs might have been. These can then be imitated by actually 
implementing them, or merely simulated by imagining doing them. This allows us to learn from them or to 
help understand what these actions might have been intended to achieve. It is a short step from here to 
understanding the intentions of others in terms of a basis for mindreading: in short, you can work out what 
you might have intended had you been doing the actions you observe other people doing. 
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So given the above, perhaps we have once again identified a theory that, like mine, leans 
on simulation processes quite heavily. It also anticipates some novel benefits of simulation 
based mental imagery. This is because it allows clandestine copying and rehearsal of useful 
actions, as well as planning for future actions based on choosing between possible 
alternatives using mental imagery. Hurley is also very specific about how STIm-like 
deliberation abilities could have evolved in a hierarchical manner and how they may 
function more widely in our mental economy. Hence providing a parallel plausible story of 
how they may have evolved and how they may currently operate. I would suggest this 
provides some further support and motivation for pursuing this style of approach in what 
follows; which was mainly all this brief analysis of SCM was aimed at doing.  
 
2.4.2 ± Relevant extracts from other layers in SCM and peer commentary review 
It may be worth briefly pRLQWLQJRXWWZRRWKHUUHOHYDQWLPSOLFDWLRQVRI+XUOH\¶V6&0
before a giving a brief review of the reaction it has had in the literature so far.  
 
i) Layer 2 
In terms of Layer 2, Hurley also discusses the utility of having an efference copy of the 
motor command just issued. Along with Frith (1992) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), 
she suggests that this is a good way of distinguishing actions that you caused (motor 
commands), with their expected emulated results, and those caused by the environment39. 
Put simply, if your actual movement is very different from expected, then it likely 
something unforeseen in the environment has moved it: e.g. I can feel my hand moving, 
EXW,GLGQ¶WFRPPDQGLWWRWKHUHIRUHWKHUHPXVWEHVRPHWKLQJPRYLQJP\KDQG/RRVLQJ
track of this ability to discriminate self generated commands, with those caused by the 
environment, could lead to mistaking certain forms of imagery for perceptions: e.g. in 
                                               
39
 +XUOH\LOOXVWUDWHVWKLVZLWKWKHWUDLQVWDWLRQLOOXVLRQZKHUHLWLVGLIILFXOWWRGHFLGHZKHWKHULW¶V
your train, or the adjacent one that is moving, without any other sensory cues 
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schizophrenic hallucination you may think you are hearing voices, when it is actually the 
µYRLFHLQ\RXUKHDG¶ZKLFK\RXDUHORRVLQJDJULSRQ 
 
ii) Layer 5 
/D\HULQYROYHVWKHFRXQWHUIDFWXDOLQSXWRIRWKHUSHRSOH¶VSRVVLEOHDFWLRQVLQRUGHUWRSODQ
your own possible re-actions and consider the results: in other words you can deploy 
Machiavellian Intelligence40. According to Hurley [pg. 19] this underpins our ability for 
full-EORZQPLQGUHDGLQJDQGPDUNVDWUDQVLWLRQIURPµSOD\LQJDJDLQVWQDWXUH¶YVµSOD\LQJ
DJDLQVWHDFKRWKHU¶7KLVSHUKDSVLQGLFDWHVKRZRIIOLQHVLPXODWLRQFDQEHVHHQDVQecessary 
(but not sufficient) for both these processes. Again other parts concerning layer 5 mostly 
deal with mindreading and, though fascinating, lies outside the focus of this project. 
However this layered approach does support my suggestion earlier that mindreading 
involves a more sophisticated level of strategy testing and STIm. And it has been suggested 
elsewhere that predicting the actions of others, and keeping track of these complex 
volitional objects and their social interactions, can sometimes be more pressing and difficult 
than simply dealing the inanimate objects in the environment. This is the basis of the idea 
that social intelligence may have been a major evolutionary force in developing bigger 
brains (relative to body size), and hence is a major driving force in developing more 
powerful minds (c.f. Dunbar 2000, Humphrey 1976). This offers another way to link STIm, 
with what I called Mentalizing Imagination in Chapter 1 (i.e. imagining from another 
SHRSOH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRUPLQGUHDGLQJ7KLVSHUhaps also indicates how sub-personal offline 
simulation processes may perhaps underpin both these mental capacities. 
 
 
 
                                               
40
 C.f. Byrne and Whiten (1988, 1997). 
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iii) Peer commentary review 
,QWHUPVRIWKHSHHUFRPPHQWDU\RQ+XUOH\¶VSDSHUDIHZWKHPHVZHUHUHFRJQLVHGDQG
replies given by Clark and Kiverstein410DQ\WKHPHVZHUHWRGRZLWKµ,PLWDWLRQDQG
0LUURULQJ¶DQGGHDOWZLWKDVSHFWVRIPLQGUHDGLQJVRZHUHOHVVUHOHYDQWKHUH,QSODFHV5
pgs. 44-45), there was some explanation of how SCM could potentially explain certain 
aspects of autism spectrum disorder, by predicting it might be due to damage to the 
interactions of layers 3,4,and 5. I think this is close in spirit to imagination-as-offline-
simulation based explanations of autism developed in Currie and Ravenscroft (2002: 
Chpt.7) and Currie (1996). One of the benefits of this kind of approach is that it may be 
able to explain both the executive function deficits and the mindreading deficits involved in 
DXWLVPLQRQHXQLILHGµGLVRUGHURIWKHLPDJLQDWLRQ¶LHDVDQLQDELOLW\VLPXODWHGLIIerent 
possible situation and thoughts in order to plan and solve problems. Added to that, and 
OLQNLQJLWWR+XUOH\¶VZRUNLWPD\QRZDOVRVXJJHVWDUHODWHGZD\WRH[SODLQSHUVHYHUDWLRQ
and repetition as uninhibited affordance and imitation control42. But we must be wary here, 
DVWKHUHDUHVWLOORWKHUDXWLVWLFV\PSWRPVWKDWFDQ¶WEHVRHDVLO\H[SODLQHGE\WKLVDSSURDFK
e.g. sensory hypersensitivity43. So there seems to be some further initial indications of 
potential for lining up SCM with other aspects of the imagination-as-offline-simulation 
debate. 
 
                                               
41
 This is because sadly Susan Hurley passed away before this article was published. Both authors were 
collaborators of hers on the SCM and hence in the best position to predict what her replies may have been. I 
attended a conference in memory of her in Bristol where many of these themes were touched on (March 
2009). 
42
 Hurley (2008: 16) links this with imitation and utilization syndrome ± ZKHUHWKHVXEMHFWFDQ¶WVWRS
imitating other people or acting on the affordances of an object in the environment. Perhaps the latter could 
superficially look like perseveration. 
43
 And also note the warning by Boucher (1996: 229) that autism may be a complicated spectrum of different 
related disorders rather than one that can be solved with a single neat root cause. I have also written on this 
subject previously in my BA & MA (King 2002, 2005b), where I argued that autism-as-a-deficit-of-
imagination explanations are fairly elegant and have good explanatory power, up to a point. It might be 
interesting to apply some of the methods that Kosslyn uses to defend his theory, by identifying differentially 
affected and spared mechanisms, to explain a range of related autism syndromes (see Chapter 4). 
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In terms of the interaction of levels 2 and 4, it should be noted that this underpinning of the 
ability to consider possible future actions drew very little criticism in the peer commentary. 
This either means there was less interest in this area, or this was seen as less controversial. 
If the latter is true, then it seems that SCM may have been fairly well accepted as a good 
EDVLVIRUVWUDWHJ\WHVWLQJZLWKLQWKLVFRQWH[W,ILW¶VWKHIRUPHUWKHQLWVHHPVLWVIDWH is 
OLQNHGPRVWFORVHO\WRDUJXPHQWVIRUDQGDJDLQVW*UXVK¶V(PXODWLRQWKHRU\6RJLYHQWKLV
regrettably brief analysis of SCM, lets now apply what we have learnt in this chapter about 
emulation vs. offline simulation to the nature of visual imagery in the next two chapters. 
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3 ± Defending Depictivism  
within the Visual Imagery Debate 
 
µ7KHELRORJLFDOSUREOHPLQGHVLJQLQJWKHSV\FKRORJ\RIRUJDQLVPVLVWKXVWRDVVXUH
as much as may be, that modes of representation are optimally mapped with kinds of 
tasks. 3HRSOHDUHRQHVRUWRIVROXWLRQWRWKLVSUREOHP«7KHNH\DSSHDUVWROLHLQ
flexibility. Human beings apparently have access to a variety of modes of 
representation and can exert a rational control over the kinds of representation they 
employ. That is: How the available representational resources are exploited in any 
JLYHQFDVHGHSHQGVRQZKDWWKHDJHQWWDNHVWKHH[LJHQFLHVRIWKHWDVNDWKDQGWREH¶ 
Fodor (1975: 194) ± showing sympathies for invoking different representational 
styles used in parallel in the brain 
 
 
In the last chapter we looked at the kind of features we would expect an offline simulation 
process to exhibit in general. We also looked at examples of this from other areas of the 
simulation debate, such as in decision±making and motor imagery. This gave us an initial 
idea of the crucial aspects we should be looking for in this kind of approach. Given that 
analysis, perhaps we can suggest now that the most important thing to do initially in terms 
of visual imagery, is to identify a main mechanism that may then be available to be taken 
offline. To that end, in this chapter we will start to look specifically at whether the visual 
buffer is a good candidate for this main mechanism, and how the guidelines discussed in 
the last chapter might apply to vision and visual imagery. A crucial part of this process is 
to get clear on the way the visual buffer is thought to work within a theory put forward by 
Kosslyn et al (2006), which I refer to as the Kosslyn Model (as first introduced in Chapter 
1). This is because it will be our main candidate for an online main mechanism that can be 
fed mock inputs to yield mock outputs, and hence support visual imagery.  
 
Although I have briefly introduced some features of the visual buffer in Section 1.3, we 
will return to look at it in much more detail here. I will also try to defend the idea that 
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hybrid depictive representations are the best way to characterise the way that visual images 
are processed within the visual buffer. This kind of representational style is characterised 
by being depictively organised, but also containing information in a more propositional 
format, and hence it is referred to as a hybrid depictive representation. What this means 
will be explained in detail in this chapter and this is important because it is crucial to 
understanding how the visual buffer can potentially be used both for online vision and 
offline visual imagery. Much of the analysis below will take the form of explaining and 
VFUXWLQL]LQJZKDWKDVEHFRPHNQRZQDVWKHµ,PDJHU\'HEDWH¶ (c.f. Tye 1991). This 
dialectic puts Depictivists up against Propositionalists and this was also briefly introduced 
in Section 1.3, but will be expanded on in more detail in what follows. I will defend the 
position proposed by the Kosslyn Model that suggests that it is a specific combination of 
these two approaches that best describes what might be going on in terms of 
representational styles in the brain. The aim of this chapter is to show that a hybrid 
depictive approach based on the working of the visual buffer is a plausible theory that is 
not already obviously falsified. This will provide a platform to analyse how it might be 
used offline in visual imagery in the next chapter and how it is linked more generally to 
perceptual states in the second half of the thesis (Chapters 5-7). 
 
More specifically, in this chapter I intend do the following four main things. Firstly, I will 
introduce and discuss Depictivism in detail and explain how it is now construed under the 
Kosslyn Model. This will involve a detailed introduction to what a hybrid depictive 
representation is actually thought to be. Secondly, I will defend this modern version of 
Depictivism against some initial objections to it. This will involve explaining how 
topographic arrays in the visual buffer give us a good way to explain how raw visual data 
can be processed in the early visual cortex. Thirdly, I will address a specific issue that 
certain researchers (e.g. Pylyshyn 2002, 2003) have with Depictivism, in terms of 
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questioning whether these topographic arrays are actually always used in imagery. This is 
where the idea that the visual buffer is taken offline and re-used in visual imagery is first 
explored and defended. Fourthly, I will analyse why there may still be resistance to the 
Depictivist approach and suggest some problems that alternative theories may have. By the 
end of the chapter we should have a fairly solid grasp on what it means to adopt a hybrid 
depictive approach based on the workings of the visual buffer. 
 
On a terminological note, in what follows, and merely for ease of reference, I will refer to 
.RVVO\Q7KRPSVRQDQG*DQLV¶ERRNµThe Case for Mental Imagery¶VLPSO\DV
³.RVVO\Q´,ZLOOGLVWLQJXLVKRWKHUZRUNE\.RVVO\QDQGKLVFROODERUDWRUVE\UHIHUULQJWRLW
explicitly with DSXEOLVKLQJGDWH,ZLOOGRDVLPLODUWKLQJZLWK3\O\VK\Q¶VµSeeing 
and Visualizing: Its Not What You Think¶DQG7\H¶VµThe Imagery Debate¶DQG
VLPSO\UHIHUWRWKHPDV³3\O\VK\Q´RU³7\H´XQOHVVTXDOLILHGRWKHUZLVH,WDNHWKH.RVVO\Q
and Pylyshyn books to represent a comprehensive explanation of their latest thinking on 
the Imagery Debate and hence to include and update much of their previous work. Which 
LVZK\,PDLQO\IRFXVRQWKHVHWH[WVLQZKDWIROORZV,QFOXGLQJ7\H¶VVOLJKWO\ROGHr work 
where relevant will help elucidate the debate and will also be useful when we discuss his 
version of Representationalism in Chapter 6. 
 
3.1 ± Depictivism and the Imagery Debate 
The dialectic in the Imagery Debate over the last 30 years has mainly been between 
Kosslyn (Depictivism) and Pylyshyn (Propositionalism). As mentioned above, I will argue 
for a hybrid account that aims to take the best parts of each theory. This is the approach 
that is currently favoured by Kosslyn and I will suggest later that an early version of this is 
SRVVLEO\DOVRLQWURGXFHGDQGGHIHQGHGE\7\H.RVVO\Q¶VSRVLWLRQLVQRZIDLUO\PRGHVW
when compared to his original stance, and he argues only that depictive representations are 
81 
at least sometimes used, even if propositional representations are also still widely used 
elsewhere. So not only is it a hybrid approach but it also allows for mixed representational 
styles to be used in a task appropriate way in the brain. This seems to fit broadly speaking 
with the way Fodor (1975) saw things when he first argued for Propositionalism (see 
RSHQLQJTXRWH,QRWKHUZRUGVHYHQ)RGRUWKHIDWKHURI3URSRVLWLRQDOLVPGLGQ¶WLQLWLDOO\
intend to argue that representations in the brain were exclusively propositional. This 
contrasts with Pylysh\Q¶VDSSURDFKZKLFKGHQLHVWKDWGHSLFWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVDUH
necessary at all. I will analyse Depictivism in detail in the next sub-section and this will 
require only the very basic introduction to Propositionalism which is given next. 
 
We can treat propoVLWLRQDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVDVµOLQJXLVWLFDOO\¶HQFRGHGGHVFULSWLRQVRU
propositions of what is represented. For example, a ball sitting on a box could be 
SURSRVLWLRQDOO\HQFRGHGDV³21%$//%2;´ZKHUHWKHUHODWLRQVRIWKHWZRHQWLWLHVLQ
the example (the ball and box) are described by the relation ON and some rule that the one 
listed first is on top of the other. It is given this formal notation to emphasise that this is not 
necessarily described in the mind in a natural language like English, but instead may take 
RQDIRUPWKDWFDQEHORRVHO\GHVFULEHGDV³DODQJXDJHRIWKRXJKW´44. I will discuss 
3\O\VK\Q¶VDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWWKH'HSLFWLYLVWIXUWKHULQ6HFWLRQ 
 
Before we launch into the details of the Imagery Debate, it is worth noting that the 
imagination-as-simulation hypothesis is not crucially affected by the eventual resolution of 
this debate (if such a thing is even possible). This is because irrespective of the underlying 
nature of the visual representations that any theory suggests, the simulationist can still 
potentially talk of taking these systems offline to form visual imagery. That is even if 
                                               
44
 &I)RGRU¶VDUJXPHQWVIRUµPHQWDOHVH¶DQGUHVHDUFKHUVWKDWIROORZed in those footsteps ± c.f. 
Aydede (2004) for a good survey of this). The characterisation above is based on Kosslyn (pg. 10), but is not 
crucial for what follows, since I will mainly be defending Depictivism and not attacking Propositionalism. 
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Propositionalism were to eventually be shown to be true, it would still be possible that the 
simulationist could provide a theory that is compatible with this type of theory and it may 
just be that we would just be taking a different kind of system offline. As Currie (1995a: 
LQGLFDWHVµ7KH6LPXODWLRQRI9LVLRQ+\SRWKHVLVLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKERWKWKHRULHV¶
Hence in what follows it is not really necessary for my purposes to fully defend one theory 
or to disprove the other.  
 
Having said that, what I will try to do is explain the parts of the debate that are relevant to 
discussing the nature of STIm and which give us a plausible mechanism by which visual 
imagery occurs. To that end I do tend to favour explanations given by Kosslyn, because in 
my opinion they are very detailed and have a significant explanatory advantage over other 
theories purporting to explain visual imagery. I also think that the latest version of the 
Kosslyn Model seems to have dealt with most of the current criticisms levelled against it at 
present and hence remains a plausible and compelling theory. Explaining how it does this 
is one the main purposes of this chapter and this will hopefully justify adopting it as well 
as explaining some of the details that will be crucial to the arguments that follow. So we 
can now look at the Depictivist approach to visual imagery in more detail. 
 
3.1.1 ± Depictivism and functional depictions ± introduction and definitions 
In the early days of the Imagery Debate the depictive theory of representation in visual 
LPDJHU\ZDVUHIHUUHGWRDVµWKH3LFWXUH7KHRU\¶DQGWKHLGHDWKDWWKHUHZHUHOLWHUDOO\
µSLFWXUHVLQWKHKHDG¶ZDVIDLUO\ZHOOUHIXWHGFI%Oock 1983). This was mainly on the 
grounds that taken literally it created other insurmountable problems. For example: there is 
QRHYLGHQFHIRUWKHVHLQWHUQDOµREMHFWV¶WKHUHLVQROLJKWWRVHHWKHVHLQWHUQDOSLFWXUHVWKHUH
are no internal hands to manipulate these objects; and there are problems of regress in 
WHUPVRIDQLQWHUQDOµPLQGVH\H¶WRVHHWKHVHSLFWXUHV+HQFHWKHPRUHPRGHUQYHUVLRQV
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usually talk of quasi-pictures that are picture-like, and share some properties with pictures, 
but are not literDOO\SLFWXUHVLQWKHKHDG8QIRUWXQDWHO\WKLVµTXDVL-SLFWXUH¶WHUPLQRORJ\VWLOO
runs the risk of being confused with early picture theories and so I will refer exclusively to 
µ'HSLFWLYH7KHRULHV¶RU'epictivism to make it clear that this is an importantly different 
proposal45.  
 
The reason that Depictivism is related but crucially different to Pictorialism is that, 
although they both appeal to a depictivist style of representation, Depictivism does not 
suggest that anyone literally looks at these representations in the same way that a picture 
would be looked at. So even though a picture can depictively represent a 3D visual scene 
by representing it depictively on a canvas in 2D space, which someone can then observe, in 
modern day Depictivism we do not suggest that a spatially laid out representation in the 
brain depicts by way of someone looking at it at all. Rather it depicts by the way that it is 
stored spatially and the way that it is accessed. However this second non-pictorial kind of 
depiction needs some introduction to make it clear what we mean. 
 
To that end we need to be clear about what Depictivism entails and Kosslyn (pg.11-13) 
provides the following definition of what counts as a depictive representation according his 
school of thought: 
                                               
45
 See for H[DPSOH.RVVO\QSJIRUDQH[SOLFLWVWDWHPHQWRQWKLVSRLQWHJµ7RKDYHDSLFWXUHLQRQH¶V
KHDGZRXOGEHYHU\XQFRPIRUWDEOH¶$QG3\O\VK\QLVVWLOOVRPHWLPHVJXLOW\RIVHWWLQJXSDVWUDZPDQ
LQWKLVUHVSHFWZKHQFULWLFLVLQJ.RVVO\Q¶VZRUNHowever there may be a reason for this as discussed in 
Section 3.1.3. 
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Definition ± Depictive Representation 
Syntax:   
1) Symbols belong to two form classes: points and empty space 
2) The points can vary in size, intensity and colour 
3) The points can be arranged so tightly as to produce continuous variation, or 
so sparsely as to be distinct (like dots in a comic strip) 
4) The rules of combining symbols require only that points be placed in spatial 
relation to one another 
 
Semantics:   
The association between a representation and what it stands for is not arbitrary, 
UDWKHUGHSLFWLRQV³UHVHPEOH´WKHrepresented object or objects. That is: 
 
a) Each portion of the representation must correspond to a visible portion of 
the actual object or objects 
b) 7KHUHSUHVHQWHG³GLVWDQFHV´DPRQJWKHSRUWLRQVRIWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQPXVW
correspond to the distances among the corresponding portions of the actual 
object (as they appear from a particular point of view) 
 
Table 3.1 ± .RVVO\QHWDO¶VGHILQLWLRQRIGHSLFWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV 
 
 
I intend to adopt, utilise and develop this definition in what follows. As a way of 
H[SODLQLQJWKHDERYHSRLQWVOHWVWDNHDSRLQWLOOLVWSDLQWLQJRIDSHUVRQ¶VIDFHDVDQH[DPSOH
This is like the comic strip example described above where coloured dots are used to fill in 
the areas of the painting:  
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Figure 3.1 ± Examples of Pointillist paintings (except for face on bottom left) 
 
 
With these paintings the points can either be made out individually or they will merge to 
make a continuous area of colour depending on how far away you view them. We can now 
ask how would this fulfil the depictive criteria given in Table 3.1? It is fairly obvious how 
the syntax is equivalent since the paintings are mainly composed of spots of colour. 
Classically the points will remain a constant size across the painting and vary only in 
colour and intensity. However there is no reason why they might not get larger to the edges 
of the painting and be very small and detailed in the centre. This way of describing it 
mimics what is thought about vision, where finer detail is processed at the centre of our 
focus of attention (see later). The semantics part of Table 3.1 is to do with preserving the 
distance relations in the representation that in some way resembles those in the original. So 
this could literally be having the painting the same size as the original face and keeping all 
the facial features in the same relative positions (see for example the two faces on the left 
of Fig. 3.1). Or it could be an expanded version that is ten times the size, with all the facial 
features scaled and placed accordingly. The condition of keeping the distance relations 
faithful is compatible with a similar condition expressed by Tye (pg.36) in a bit more detail 
and is captured in the slogan: depictive representations use space to represent space. This 
ensures that, for example, the time taken to scan between two features in the original will 
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be proportional to the time taken to scan between them in the depiction. Obviously they do 
not have to be exactly equal in time, as there may be a difference in scale to adjust for.  
 
To develop this concept further, Kosslyn (pg.12) introduces functional depictions as 
another way that something could depictively represent another thing. Here he uses an 
analogy of images stored in computer memory in an array that could still depictively 
represent the geometric relations of the original. An example of this is how bitmap images 
are stored on a computer or are presented on a computer screen. Here each pixel 
representing a part of the original picture is assigned a coordinate scheme in a cell of an 
array (e.g. top left = [1,1], bottom right = [100,100]). These cells can also be allocated 
certain other parameters, such as its represented colour. Users of computer illustration 
VRIWZDUHZLOOEHIDPLOLDUZLWKDFRORXURQWKHVRIWZDUH¶VFRORXUSDOHWWHEHLQg, not only 
visually represented as colours on the screen, but also presented nearby as an alphanumeric 
proportion of, for example, red, green or blue46. The idea being that you can get any colour 
RQWKHSDOHWWHE\µPL[LQJ¶GLIIHUHQWDPRXQWVRIUHGJUHHQDnd blue in an analogous way to 
mixing paint. Using this method you can fill in an area with colour by representing it 
visually on a screen and/or storing it in a more propositional style format on the hard drive. 
For example, a line of red on the top left of the screen could be represented like this:  
pixels or array cells [1,1 to 1,10] = RED (R-255, G-0, B-0). Or another way of putting it is 
that array cells [1,1 to 1,10] contain the information that, when they are accessed 
appropriately, should be visually represented by a row of pixels at the top left hand corner 
of the image that are coloured red. Hence it seems possible to represent the same 
                                               
46
 The exact colours suggested here are not important and green could be substituted for yellow, for example. 
Alternatively they can also be presented in terms of a hue, saturation, brightness (HSB) scale. The point is 
that these colours can be represented alphanumerically in a way that is more similar to a propositional format. 
For example, in the illustration software on my computer: RED is presented as (R-255, G-0, B-0); BLUE as 
(R-0, G-0, B-255); BLACK as (R-0, G-0, B-0); and WHITE as (R-255, G-255, B-255), and so on. 
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information in an obviously depictive format on the screen, or in a more alphanumerical 
proposition-like format on the hard drive. 
 
7KHDERYHZLOOEHFRPHXVHIXOLQZKDWIROORZVEXWIRUQRZOHW¶VUHWXUQWRDQDO\VH
.RVVO\Q¶VFODLPWKDWWKHVHIXQFWLRQDOGHSLFWLRQVFDQVWLOOSUHVHUYHWKHspatial relations of 
the represented object. In most computers a bitmap image can be stored in a distributed 
way across a hard drive, so that adjacent cells in the array need not literally be stored 
anywhere near each other physically. However, although the physical locations of the array 
cells on the hard drive are assigned arbitrarily, they can still be accessed sequentially, as if 
they were located next to each other. Just so long as the process that accesses them retains 
the information of which cell is stored where and they are indexed and accessed 
appropriately. Hence it would still take a proportionate amount of time to, for example: 
scan across the top of a computer array, cell-by-FHOOORRNLQJIRUWKHHTXLYDOHQWRIDµUHG
GRW¶DVLWZRXOGWRFKHFNORRNLQJIURPOHIWWRULJKWDWHDFKGRWRQWKHWRSHGJHRID
pointillist painting or equivalent screen image. That is, each entry would need to be 
examined for its contents in turn to see if it matched the target criteria of representing a 
µUHG¶FHOORUSL[HO$QGLWZRXOGWDNHSURSRUWLRQDOO\ORQJHUIRUHDFKSURFHVVWKHIXUWKHUWKH
µUHG¶FHOOLVIURPWKHWRSOHIWKDQGFRUQHURIWKHLPDJH,QSULQFLSOHDQHTXLYDOHQWVWRU\FDQ
be told for other more complex scanning and rotation searches e.g. diagonal scanning and 
rotating to match a target. The point is that the array and the processes that work on it can 
be designed to treat the computer-based representation as if it represented space with 
µYLUWXDOVSDFH¶ZLWKLQWKHKDUGGULYH,QRWKHUZRUGVDOWKRXJKWKHDUUD\LVQRWVSUHDGRXWLQ
literal 2D space, the array can be accessed and manipulated to mimic what would happen if 
it were. 
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It is worth noting that for this to happen, these arrays of stored information have to be 
organised and treated as entities that represent functional space. It is not enough for these 
arrays to simply exist as indexed pieces of information to make them depictive. This is 
EHFDXVHWKHVHFHOOVFRXOGEHDFFHVVHGLQPDQ\GLIIHUHQWZD\VWKDWZRXOGQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\
represent their relations in real space. Therefore the order in which they are filled and the 
way they are manipulated is as important as the information that each cell contains. If these 
FULWHULDDUHUHVSHFWHGWKHQWKHVHDUUD\VDQGUHSUHVHQWHGYLUWXDO³GLVWDQFHV´FDQIXOILOWKH
syntax and semantics requirements listed above, and this is what qualifies them as 
functionally depictive representations DFFRUGLQJWR.RVVO\Q¶VGHILQLWLRQ,IWKLVLVWKHFDVH
then these arrays can be made to function as if they are actually depicting real space and 
hence qualify as functional depictions. In slogan form: they represent real space with 
functional (or virtual) space. This analogy can now be used to analyse the equivalent of 
this that is thought to occur in the visual buffer under the Kosslyn Model. So now we have 
an idea of what Kosslyn means by Depictivism and a functionally depictive representation, 
OHW¶VORRNDWKRZKHDSSOLHVWKLVWRYLVLRQDQGYLVXDOLPDJHU\ 
 
3.1.2  - The visual buffer and hybrid depictive representations 
In Section 1.3, I first introduced the idea of a visual buffer and offered some quotes from 
Kosslyn to back this distinction up (see Kosslyn pgs. 18-19 & 135-6). In this section I will 
add to this initial introduction and describe how the visual buffer is thought to work in 
much more detail. To recap, according to Kosslyn, vision and visual imagery are primarily 
processed in what he calls the visual buffer. In terms of vision the visual buffer cells are 
organised into arrays, which contain information about the visual scene in front of you. 
This information is based on wavelength detections (colour) and binocular disparities 
detected at the eyes (distance). This information is sent from detectors in the eyes, to the 
back of the brain where the visual buffer is located, as a sub-area in the early visual cortex. 
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It is generally accepted that different aspects of visual experience, such as: colour, 
distance, edge detection and movement, are processed by different localised areas of the 
visual cortex. This means that at this stage at least, it must operate in a parallel-distributed 
fashion, rather than in a serial or sequential manner. Hence each functional cell is actually 
made up of certain linked areas from these different topographically organised parts of the 
visual cortex (and see Fig 1.4 for an illustration of this). Kosslyn explains the nature of the 
visual buffer further in the quotes below: 
 
µ:HJURXSWKHWRSRJUDSKLFDOO\RUJDQLVHGDUHDVLQWKHRFFLSLWDOOREH>YLVXDOFRUWH[@
into a single functional structure, which we refer to as the visual buffer. Patterns of 
activation within the visual buffer depict shapes, according to the definition of 
depiction offered here [see above]. The visual buffer, in essence, is [like] the 
canvas upon which images are painted; it is the medium that supports depictive 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV¶.RVVO\QHWDO± my inserts in square brackets) 
 
µ,QVSLWHRIWKHLUFRGLQJQRQGHSLFWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQWKHVHK\EULGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
cannot be reduced to propositional representations. Crucially, they use space 
(literally, on the cortex) to represent space in the world. The fact that each point 
FRGHVDGGLWLRQDOLQIRUPDWLRQGRHVQRWREYLDWHLWVUROHLQGHSLFWLQJVKDSH¶.RVVO\Q
et al (2006: 18-19) 
 
There are several things to point out from the above quotes. First of all, in the top quote, it 
LVUHJUHWWDEOHWKDWWKHµFDQYDVDQGSDLQW¶WHUminology is used without more care to qualify 
this as merely an analogy. As mentioned above, much damage still occurs because critics 
use this kind of talk as indicating obvious problems with the pictorial approach. Hence I 
KDYHLQVHUWHGWKHZRUG³OLNH´LQ VTXDUHEUDFNHWVLQWKHTXRWHDERYHEXWLW¶VYHU\SRVVLEOH
that this line will be quoted out of context to show there are still literal pictorial 
assumptions at the heart of this approach. This kind of talk works merely as an analogy 
because, as with placing paint on a certain physical point on the canvas, filling one of the 
visual cells of an array with a representation of colour, would arguably have the same 
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µYLUWXDO¶GHSLFWLYHHIIHFW6RZDUQLQJVDVLGHWKHWRSTXRWHGRHVPDNHH[SOLFLWWKH
functional role of the visual buffer as the medium that supports depictive representations.  
 
The first quote also backs up the functional description of the visual buffer as described in 
the first quote on the visual buffer in Section 1.3. To briefly re-iterate those points here: the 
visual buffer is limited to topographically organised areas, and by extrapolation from the 
monkey related empirical data, there are probably at least sixteen of these areas in the 
human visual cortex. It also seems that damage to localised parts of these areas directly 
relates to impaired vision in corresponding modalities (e.g. colour). I have also explained 
in Section 1.3, how damage that is further apart in the visual buffer can lead to blind spots 
in the visual field that are farther apart (c.f. Figure 1.4), hence this also supports this 
functional definition and structural characterisation. 
 
Related to this, the second quote above is of the most interest for the rest of the discussion, 
because it represents an important concession on the part of Kosslyn. Here we are 
introduced to the position he now favours in terms of hybrid depictions. This position 
suggests that not only do the cells of the array represent depictive information, but also 
more abstract and propositional data is also apSHQGHGWRWKHP5HIHUULQJEDFNWR.RVVO\Q¶V
definition in Table 1.3, we can see that each cell can vary in the following ways and still 
remain depictive: the points can be empty or filled; vary in size, intensity and colour; and 
vary in density. So, as an example, for an area of the visual buffer that only processes 
colour, it is feasible that each cell could remain depictive since a functional representation 
of colour in a cell, not only indicates what colour the cell is filled with, but also that it is 
filled. This seems to be equivalent to a coloured dot on a pointillist painting in certain 
crucial ways: the colour of the dot not only represents a coloured area on the original face, 
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but also represents the fact that there is something there to be represented. This 
clarification will be useful in what follows. 
 
7KLVYHUVLRQRI'HSLFWLYLVPLVQRZYHU\VLPLODUWR7\H¶VDSSURDFKZKLFK
VHHPVDWOHDVWV\PSDWKHWLFWR.RVVO\Q¶VODWHUK\EULGLVPEXWGLIIHUHQWLQRQHUHODWLYHO\
trivial respect. This is because Tye limits the depictive part to be a simple statement of 
ZKHWKHUDFHOOLVILOOHGRUQRW7KLVUHODWHVWRDFRQGLWLRQRIKLVWKDWµHYHU\SDUWRIWKH
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQUHSUHVHQWVDSDUWRIWKHREMHFW¶SJ+HUHIHUVWRWKLVDVSHFWDVDQ2-
symbol and other symbols representing, for example: colour, brightness and depth, are also 
DSSHQGHGWRWKHFRQWHQWVRIWKLVFHOO+RZHYHU,GRQ¶WUHDOO\VHHWKHQHHGIRUWKLV2-
symbol, whose sole purpose is to indicate if the cell is full or not, because surely simply 
the presence or absence of any symbol at all does the same job on its own. By analogy 
when you look at a colour spot on a pointillist painting there are not two different things 
you see, but one thing that represents at least two things. For example, a red point 
indicates: a) that the location is full; and b) that it is filled by red colour. So I think we can 
get rid of requirement for an extra O-V\PEROLQ7\H¶VDFFRXQWZLWKRXWORRVLQJDQ\UHOHYDQW
functionality. The cells are either filled with symbols representing something, or they are 
empty and are equivalent to an empty space. A symbolic entry representing at least colour 
VWLOOUHSUHVHQWVDSDUWRIWKHREMHFWKHQFHPHHWLQJ7\H¶VFRQGLWLRQLQDPRUHSDUVLPRQLRXV
way. Hence while I think we can adopWPXFKRI7\H¶VHDUO\ZRUNLQWKLVDUHDLQWKLV
respect, we can perhaps do away with his O-symbol requirement. 
 
In terms of the potential for the cells to vary in density and to represent depth, consider the 
quote below: 
µ7KHKLJK-resolution central (foveal) portions of these areas [in the visual buffer] 
represent the central portions of the visual field, where as low-resolution, 
peripheral portions of these areas represent more peripheral portions of the visual 
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field. Space on the cortex is literally used to represent space in the world (more 
precisely, space on the cortex is literally used to represent a planar projection of 
space in the world, because the cortical areas are two-dimensional; information 
DERXWGHSWKLVUHSUHVHQWHGLQDGLIIHUHQWPDQQHU«¶Kosslyn (2006: 103) 
 
This indicates that central areas in the visual buffer have a higher density of cells 
UHSUHVHQWLQJZKDW¶VLQWKHZRUOGDWWKHFRUUHVSRQGLQJFHQWUHRI\RXUIRFXVRIDWWHQWLRQ
Analogously these areas are depicted with more densely packeGSRLQWVRUZLWKµILQHUEUXVK
VWURNHV¶&RQYHUVHO\DUHDVWRWKHSHULSKHU\RI\RXUPDLQDWWHQWLRQKDYHIHZHUUHVRXUFHV
devoted to them since they are almost by definition of less interest to you. Analogously 
these areas are depicted with less densely packed SRLQWVRUµEURDGHUEUXVKVWURNHV¶7KLVLV
basically what you would expect in a predator with forward facing eyes, who needs to 
focus in detail on its prey and be less sensitive to the danger all around them. So this 
density variation does not violate KosVO\Q¶VFRQGLWLRQVIRUGHSLFWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ 
 
The condition for the depictive representation of depth is more complex and interesting. 
Light is sensed in the eyes on a 2D surface at the back of the eye cavity, which responds to 
the light distribution in a topographic or retinotopic way. This is purely a function of the 
geometric way that light converges on the retina through our cornea and the distribution of 
sensors (cones and rods) in the retina that detect that light. Hence at any one point on the 
retina, 3D information about the world is not sensed in a single eye, but only the 2D 
distribution of wavelengths incident upon it. However depth information can be recovered 
further upstream, by looking at differences between the light paths to each eye (binocular 
disparities), and using this to calculate the distance to the object. Kosslyn suggests in the 
quotes above that depth (or distance to object) is therefore represented in a non-depictive 
manner and this would appear as an appendage to each 2D cell in a topographic array in 
the visual buffer. Hence any array that contains at least depth and colour information must 
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be a hybrid depictive representation in the following way: the cells that are filled and are 
depictive of a 2D flattened scene in front of you (like a painting of a landscape); and some 
of the information they are filled with is non-depictive in that it describes certain things 
one might find in those related areas, like depth and colour representations. Hence we have 
a mixture of a depictively organised array, which contains propositional information in 
each of its cells when filled. 
 
This explains what Kosslyn means by hybrid depictive representations and how they are 
filled in the visual buffer. This seems to me to be a plausible and intuitive way of 
describing how all the rich information collected at the eyes is represented and processed 
efficiently in the early visual cortex. However at this point the sceptical reader could still 
question whether the way these arrays are topographically arranged is just a coincidence, 
or whether they are actually crucial to how the visual buffer functions as a whole. Hence 
we now need to look at evidence that supports this further claim that these topographic 
areas are functional. 
 
3.1.3 ± Evidence for topographic arrays and their function 
The first evidence usually referred to that suggests these topographic areas exist is from 
Tootell et al (1982) and this is illustrated in the figure below: 
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Figure 3.2 ± Example of stimulus flashing light pattern (left) and the preserved 
visual cortex reaction in macaques (right) as indicated by higher activity in darker 
areas ± adapted from Tootell et al (1982) 
 
What the above shows is areas of the macaque visual cortex (right) firing in a 
topographically matching way to a set of flashing lights set out in a wagon wheel 
formation (left). Before the animal is sacrificed it is fed isotopic sugars that can be traced 
to areas of higher activation (darker areas) that respond to lit areas on the wheel. Areas that 
respond to the inter-light spaces show lower activation and hence require less energy and 
use less sugar (lighter areas). The visual cortex is then sliced and measured to yield the 
right hand part of Figure 3.2. It is quite clear that the spatial distribution of the lights is 
represented in an equivalent spatial manner in the cortex of the monkey. This is good 
evidence that the visual cortex is topographically organised in monkeys, and claimed by 
Kosslyn to show that it depictively represents the external world. 
 
Kosslyn (pgs. 101-107) also provides references and a detailed analysis of other 
experiments that suggest there are multiple topographically organised areas in the human 
visual cortex. Among those are ones that show that the distance between two areas of the 
visual buffer that are damaged, directly relates to how far apart experienced scotomas 
(blind areas) will be. Hence showing there is a spatial link between what is processed in 
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these areas and what is experienced in the visual field (c.f. Section 1.3 and Figure 1.4). The 
details of this need not concern us here, since both sides of the debate can accept that these 
areas exist, but obviously attribute a different amount of significance to these results47.  
 
The key concern to the imagery debate is whether these topographically organised areas 
really qualify as depictive representations. The first point to note with regards to this is to 
ask why these areas are literally topographically organised, rather then just functional 
representations distributed over the visual cortex; like the distributed storing of the bitmap 
image on a hard drive. There is no a priori reason why information from adjacent sensors 
in the retina need be stored in adjacent areas of the visual cortex. Related to this, a lack of 
evidence for topographically organised areas would not necessarily be evidence against 
functional depictive representations (c.f. Kosslyn pg. 50). So what is achieved by copying 
retinotopic sensory arrays from the eyes into various topographic arrays of the early visual 
cortex? 
 
Kosslyn (pg.17 & footnote 5 on pg. 23) offers this suggestion as to why we do actually 
possess and use these topographically organised areas: it has evolved as the most efficient 
way to process visual information. He uses the example of edge detection to illustrate this 
SRLQW,IDQDUHDWKDWLVUHIOHFWLQJDORWRIOLJKWDQREMHFWLVQH[WWRDQDUHDWKDWLVQ¶WWKH
background), it is useful to detect this change by emphasising the difference between them 
and potentially detecting this as an edge of an object. One way of doing this is for neurons 
that are representing the bright area to inhibit areas that are representing the dull area and 
hence accentuate the difference. For these areas to interact efficiently it is better for them 
to be nearer each other physically in the cortex. This is because sending signals down long 
neuronal paths has an energy cost that is avoided by keeping things that need to be 
                                               
47
 Cf. Pylyshyn (2002: 174-180) and Pylyshyn (2003: Chpt.7) for a negative critique of the significance of 
these results. 
96 
UHJXODUO\SURFHVVHGWRJHWKHUFORVHUWRJHWKHUDQGUHFDOO+XUOH\¶VVORJDQIURP&KDSWHU
what fires together, wires together). Since this is going to occur across the visual field, it 
makes sense efficiency-wise to keep functionally closer areas actually closer to each other 
physically. Hence topographic mapping is potentially the result of efficiency constraints 
imposed during the evolution of the visual system. So while adjacent functional cells do 
not essentially have to be near each other it makes evolutionary sense that they are, as it 
will speed up processing and save valuable energy better spent on other survival tasks.  
 
This seems like a plausible explanation and can be further illustrated by a simplified 
worked example of edge detection below. Introducing this also starts to link this with 
0DUU¶VVHPLQDOZRUNRQKRZYLVXDOSURFHVVLQg could occur utilising step-by-step 
DOJRULWKPLFFRPSXWDWLRQV,WVHHPVWKDW0DUU¶VWKHRU\VWLOOUHPDLQVRQHRIWKHEHVWDWWHPSWV
to explain this process even today. So the ability to match up with it can be seen as a 
considerable theoretical bonus. This is a sentiment that is echoed in Tye (pg.93) and he 
also runs through a similar simple edge detection example as the one below (pg.79).  
 
In the example below greyscale data is represented on a scale of zero to nine, with zero 
being black and nine being white. The object in this example is a dark grey square 
(greyscale 2) that is detected against light background (greyscale 7). The raw data is 
organised in an array from top left [1,1] to the bottom right [7,7], and each cell is filled 
with a measure of the greyscale corresponding to that area on the object (in this example 
either a 7 or 2). The first thing that happens to the raw data on the left is that adjacent 
vertical columns are subtracted from each other, which reveals the vertical edges 
represented by 5 and ±5 in the processed array on the top right. Then the same is done on 
the original array for the horizontal rows, with the same result in terms of the horizontal 
edges (middle right array). Then the two processed arrays are summed to give the bottom 
97 
array on the right and we get a rough idea of where the edges of the square are by linking 
up and extrapolating from the 5 and ±5 entries48. So this represents a very simplified 
example of how adjacent cells in arrays could be processed to yield a kind of rough edge 
detection.  
                
 Topographic representation of a square Horizontal (column) subtraction 
                
 7 7 7 7 7 7 7  0 0 0 0 0 0 / 
 7 7 7 7 7 7 7  0 0 0 0 0 0 / 
 7 7 2 2 2 7 7  0 5 0 0 -5 0 / 
 7 7 2 2 2 7 7  0 5 0 0 -5 0 / 
 7 7 2 2 2 7 7  0 5 0 0 -5 0 / 
 7 7 7 7 7 7 7  0 0 0 0 0 0 / 
 7 7 7 7 7 7 7  0 0 0 0 0 0 / 
                
         Vertical (row) subtraction  
         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         0 0 5 5 5 0 0 
         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         0 0 -5 -5 -5 0 0 
         0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
         / / / / / / / 
                
         Addition of processed arrays  
                
         0 0 0 0 0 0  
         0 0 5 5 5 0  
         0 5 0 0 -5 0  
         0 5 0 0 -5 0  
         0 5 -5 -5 -10 0  
         0 0 0 0 0 0  
                
         
Shows rough edge detection of 
square 
                
                
Figure 3.3 ± Example of a number filled array spatially depicting a darker square 
on a grey background and how this can be used functionally to detect edges 
  
 
The above gives a very simple illustration of how topographically organised areas could 
interact with each other more efficiently if they were located nearer to each other in the 
                                               
48
 I accept that there is a zero and ±10 in this example but this is something that could be tidied up using more 
sophisticated algorithms or more steps in the process. And obviously, if desired, this example could be made 
more realistic by inserting the RGB [0-255] colour palette values discussed earlier, but I have tried to keep 
things as simple as possible to make my basic points. 
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EUDLQ7RUHWXUQWROLQNLQJWKLVZLWK0DUU¶VWKHory of visual processing, Marr would 
suggest that each cell in this 2D array is also appended with: depth information; orientation 
of the surface relative to the viewer; and other 3D structural information in symbolic form 
HJZKHWKHULW¶VDQHGJHRUULGJH+HFDOOVWKLVDµò'VNHWFK¶VLQFHZKLOHLWLVVWLOO
structured as a 2D array, it does contain the data necessary to convert it to a 3D image (c.f. 
0DUU7\HSJFRPSDUHVWKLVZLWK.RVVO\Q¶VGHILQLWLRQRITXDVL-pictures at 
the time (i.e. 1991) and suggests that Kosslyn makes no allowance for these appended 
symbols representing depth and orientation etc. However we can see from the above that 
.RVVO\Q¶VUHFHQWDGRSWLRQRIDK\EULGGHSLFWLYHDSSURDFKGRHVQRZPDNHDOORZDQFHIRULW
And thiVLVRQHZD\WKDW7\HDQG.RVVO\Q¶VK\EULGDSSURDFKHVDUHQRZSHUKDSVYHU\
VLPLODUDQGDUHERWKFRPSDWLEOHZLWK0DUU¶VZRUNLQWKHDUHD 
 
Kosslyn (pg.107) also points out that these topographic arrays are not just copies of the 
retina but are doing the ground work of processing the data in a step-by-step fashion as 
0DUU¶VWKHRU\SUHGLFWV(DFKVWDJHXVHVSURFHVVHGGDWDIURPWKHSUHYLRXVRQHDQGDVLW
flows upstream it can become less and less topographically organised. For example, 
representations in the temporal cortex (at the end of the ventral visual stream ± see 
Appendix B) may be only loosely topographically organised, but those in the parietal 
cortex (at the end of the dorsal visual stream) retain some topographically organised 
areas496R.RVVO\Q¶VGHILQLWLRQRIWKHµYLVXDOEXIIHU¶DVWKHIXQFWLRQDOFRPELQDWLRQRIWKH
topographically organised areas in the visual cortex is equivalent to identifying it with the 
areas that are doing the raw processing work based on hybrid depictive representations. 
Perhaps then a good way of representing the contents of each cell in the array in a hybrid 
fashion is as follows: 
                                               
49
 I will explain the terms dorsal and ventral stream in Chapter 4 (but see also Appendix B). And note we will 
see later that the topographic areas in the parietal cortex might be processing spatial information, rather than 
detailed depictive information. 
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Array Cell (X, Y) = [colour (RGB: P, Q, R), depth Z, surface orientation B, edge/ridge D, etc] 
 
In the annotation above each entry (e.g. depth, colour) could potentially be stored and 
processed in a separate topographic array but would be functionally linked to each other by 
their cell designation. That is distributed cells processing only one aspect of vision would 
be functionally linked so that the combination forms a virtual cell that contains all the 
information annotated above. The last two entries (i.e. surface orientation and edge/ridge), 
incorporate information, which Marr suggests the 2½ D sketch would also have, as 
described above. I will utilise this notation and expand on it in what follows, although I 
will mainly focus on colour and depth and generally ignore the last two entries to keep 
things simpler. But note they can be added again at any point should any future study in 
this field become more focused on this aspect. 
 
*LYHQWKHDERYHZKDWLVVWLOOPLVVLQJIURPHYHU\RQH¶VDFFRXQWLVKRZWKLVò'VNHWFKLV
converted to full 3D perception of a visual scene, or a perception-like phenomenal image 
containing apparent shapes and colours. This aspect will be discussed further in the second 
half of the thesis. But note that this comes close to requiring a solution to the hard problem 
of consciousness, which I will not cover in this thesis (see Chapter 7). What we can say 
here is that we now have a fairly detailed description of how the sub-personal mechanisms 
potentially sub-serving vision and visual imagery may work up to this point according to 
WKH.RVVO\Q0RGHO:HFDQQRZORRNDW3\O\VK\Q¶VILUVWPDLQREMHFWLRQVWRWKLVNLQGRI
approach. 
 
3.2 ± Potential problems with functional depictivism 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQ,ZLOOLJQRUHPXFKRI3\O\VK\Q¶VFULWLFLVPVWKDWVHHPWREHGLUHFWHGDWROGHU
versions of pictorial theories of visual imagery. Instead I will focus on what his objection 
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WR.RVVO\Q¶VPRGHrn Depictivism and particularly the functional hybrid depictivism 
described above. Before doing that we need to look at a part of the debate that makes 
explicit how a Propositionalist would deal with some of the experimental results that seem 
at first glance to support Depictivism. At the base of this explanation is an option for the 
3URSRVLWLRQDOLVWWRDSSHDOE\WRµSDGGHGOLVWV¶ZKLFKFRQWDLQGXPP\QRGHVUHSUHVHQWLQJ
empty space but in a non-depictive way. I will try to show that these padded lists may be 
close to describing a hybrid functionally depictive array anyway and why there may be 
some commonality at the core of these approaches. 
 
To discuss this point we can look at the now classic debate50 concerning empirical studies 
involving map scanning and PHQWDOURWDWLRQWLPHVWKDWRFFXUUHGLQWKH¶VDQGQRWH,ZLOO
focus mainly on the map scanning results here. In these experiments subjects were asked to 
memorise a map of an island with various landmarks on it at different distances from each 
other. They were then asked to imagine scanning the map from one object to another and 
the time it took them to scan between different objects was found to be proportional to 
actual distance between the objects on the map. This seems to indicate that imagery occurs 
in a depictive way, because time to search a functionally depictive array could explain why 
it is proportional to actually scanning a map with the eyes. However it turns out that it is 
possible that a propositional description of the same map that describes the whole map 
including empty spaces can also account for this phenomenon. This is because the time 
taken to access such a propositional padded list would vary proportionally with distance, 
since greater distances would have more padded entries (or equivalently more nodes to go 
through). 
 
                                               
50
 C.f. Kosslyn et al (1978), Shepard and Metzler (1971); and Block (1981) for a collection of papers in this 
areas. 
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Another way of explaining these results is to suggest that you are using your tacit 
knowledge of how real visual scanning works to mimic this effect when scanning a visual 
imagery. That is you may be sub-consciously takiQJWLPHWRµH[DPLQH¶HYHQHPSW\VSDFHV
or propositional descriptions along the way so that your scanning time in mental imagery 
matches that in real world scanning. However there are now example of these effects that 
cant be due to tacit knowledge51 and sine this aspect of the debate is less useful to our 
concerns here, I will not elaborate on these any further. I mention them merely to make the 
reader aware of another aspect of the debate. 
 
To try and assess the claim that a padded propositional lists like this is always used, 
Kosslyn et al (1978) changed the design of the experiment so that it was possible for 
subjects to simply decide whether a named object was located on the island. In this 
situation they reasoned no scanning would be required as its possible that the subjects 
could just memorise a list of the names of objects on the island. And this is exactly what 
they found; the time to decide if the named object was on the island was not proportional 
to distances between them on the map. So if a propositional list is always used according to 
the propositionalist, why do we see a difference in these results? The propositionalist 
response to this is that there is no limitation on what kind of list a person can use: it could 
be a padded list or just a list of names. And one can simply access a list that represents the 
data in the most efficient way to complete the task. So it is possible that there are at least 
two lists available to the subject in this task and the propositionalist potentially has the 
resources to invoke other kinds of lists with different properties to explain any new data. 
This gives one an initial sense of how ad hoc the propositionalist position might turn out to 
be. Consider the following remark from Currie on this matter, where he is referring to 
similar results observed in mental rotation experiments: 
                                               
51
 See Kosslyn (Chapter 3) for a good review of these. 
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µ6KH>WKHSURSRVLWLRQDOLVW@FDQQHLWKHUSUHGLFWLQDGYDQFHRIWKHREVHUYDWLRQVWKDW
these response times will be observed, nor offer any plausible account of why they 
take the form they do. She is like the Ptolemaic astronomer who cannot predict the 
observed features of planetary motion in advance, and whose activity is confined to 
bolting on more epicycles every time a new fact is discovered. That, at least, is the 
SLFWRULDOLVW¶VFODLP¶ Currie (1995a: 39) 
 
7RDFFHQWXDWHWKLVVHHPLQJO\DGKRFµSUROLIHUDWLRQRIOLVWV¶SUREOHPZHFDQHYHQLPDJLQH
that there would potentially need to be a padded list to cater for every possible travel path 
at any angle form any point on the map to every other point (i.e. a full 360 degrees for 
every point). This would be needed so as to make sure all the possible scanning tasks in 
any direction would be able to be mimicked. One way out of this might be to suggest that a 
cell-by-cell padded list description of the whole map is created and stored in the brain, but 
this now sounds suspiciously like the 2D functional depictions described earlier. We will 
look at how closely these match up next, but first we can note the general acceptance by 
Kosslyn (pg.30) of a point made by Anderson (1978): that as long as we just have 
behavioural data to go on, then given a preferred underlying representational format, it will 
always be possible to adjust the processes that work on it to explain the results. In other 
words the propositionalist can always change the structural set up so as to mimic the 
properties explained by the depictivist account. Hence these kinds of experiments will 
never be able to decide between the two camps apart from on grounds of parsimony, and 
this will always only ever be suggestive evidence rather than provide anything more 
compelling. This explains why the debate has now moved on from this kind of discussion. 
 
6RUHWXUQLQJWRWKHDQDO\VLVRIKRZWKHSURSRVLWLRQDOLVW¶VSDGGHGOLVWVPD\VWDUWWRUHVHPEle 
WKH'HSLFWLYLVW¶VIXQFWLRQDODUUD\V3\O\VK\QJLYHVWKHIROORZLQJJHQHUDOREMHFWLRQWR
appealing to functional depictions in the first place (and note he uses the term matrix here 
to refer to an array): 
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µ7KHSUREOHPZLWKWKHIXQFWLRQDOVSDFHSURSRVDOLV that functional spaces do not have 
any particular functions intrinsically. Being functional, they are not subject to any 
natural laws and therefore can be assumed to have whatever properties are needed to 
account for the experimental data. Because a functional space has no intrinsic 
properties, any properties it has are stipulated or extrinsically assumed, and so it can 
accommodate any findings whatever. Or, to put it more positively, if the extrinsic 
assumptions provide any explanatory advantage at all, they can be equally well 
adjoined to a theory that assumes any form of representation, not just a pictorial one 
>LHDSURSRVLWLRQDORQH@¶3\O\VK\Q 
 
µ1RWLFHPRUHRYHUWKDWERWK>'HSLFWLYLVPDQG3URSRVLWLRQDOLVP@EHFRPHFRPSOHWHO\
principled iIWKH\DUHWDNHQWREHVLPXODWLRQVRIDUHDOVSDWLDOGLVSOD\«\RXPLJKW
ZRQGHUZK\WKHPDWUL[IHHOVPRUHQDWXUDOWKDQRWKHUZD\VRIVLPXODWLQJVSDFH«>WKLV
may be] because we are used to thinking of and displaying matrices as two-
GLPHQVLRQDOWDEOHV«EHFDXVe of this, it is natural to interpret a matrix as a model of 
real space and therefore it is easy to make the slip between thinking of it on one hand 
PHUHO\DV³IXQFWLRQDOVSDFH´DQGWKLQNLQJRILWRQWKHRWKHUKDQGDVDVWDQG-in for (or 
a simulation of) real space ± DVOLSZHHQFRXQWHURYHUDQGRYHUDJDLQ«%XWZHPXVW
recognise that in this case we are assuming that images are written on a literal spatial 
medium, ZKLFKZHKDSSHQWREHVLPXODWLQJE\DPDWUL[IRUUHDVRQVRIFRQYHQLHQFH¶
Pylyshyn (2002: 167)52 
 
)LUVWRIDOOQRWHWKHODQJXDJHVXJJHVWLQJWKDWLI\RXDUHVLPXODWLQJ³VHHLQJ´UHDOVSDFHWKHQ
it is not surprising you get results similar to those found in vision. This links with my 
indication earlier that even propositionalists can explain certain aspects of visual imagery 
as mimicking actual vision, and hence this theory may be accessible to an imagination-as-
simulation approach. We can also see from the above quote why Pylyshyn assumes that 
Depictivism must be committed to some more classically Pictorialist assumptions, because 
LIQRWWKHQKHDVVXPHVPHUHµIXQFWLRQDOGHSLFWLYLVP¶SRWHQWLDOO\FROODSVHVLQWRRULVDWOHDVW
compatible with, Propositionalism. Which would explain why he feels he can attack 
                                               
52
 Although these quotes are from different sources they are drawn from sections that are almost 
identically structured, so can tolerate being juxtaposed while still preserving the crucial meanings. 
Indeed, much of his 2003 book seems to be based on his 2002 BBS article or vice-versa. 
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Depictivism on its claims that these representations must have some more classical 
pictorial qualities.  
 
He goes on to add that it is not that the matrix or array approach to representation is wrong, 
but only that invoking it is neutral with regards to the current debate. The array only 
behaves in a way that mimics real space if that is the way it is made to work by the 
processes that access and manipulate it (i.e. extrinsic factors). But this is a feature of how 
those processes interact with the array and not a property of the array itself. Hence the 
array taken on its own has no intrinsic spatial properties and is not in this sense 
functionally depictive: it need not use space to represent space. For instance, we could take 
a column or row (or even any two points) from anywhere on the array and subtract them 
from each other, but this would not tell us where a spatially located edge is. There 
therefore needs to be some further restrictions to say that we can only find an edge from 
differences in colour intensity between adjacent rows or columns.  
 
We FDQLOOXVWUDWH3\O\VK\Q¶VSRLQWIXUWKHUE\VHHLQJWKDWHYHQWKH7RRWHOOHWDO
evidence, as introduced above in Fig. 3.2, on its own is not conclusive. This is because, 
DOWKRXJKLWLVWUXHWKDWZKHQORRNLQJDWWKHVOLFHRIWKHPRQNH\¶VYLVXDOFRUWH[with the 
human eye, it does indeed act to depict the original object. Unfortunately this does not 
QHFHVVDULO\PHDQWKDWWKHSURFHVVHVJRLQJRQLQWKHPRQNH\¶VEUDLQDUHDOVROLPLWHGE\WKH
VSDWLDOGLVWULEXWLRQRIWKHVHILULQJQHXURQV,WVHHPVWKDWLW¶VSRssible for information from 
very different parts of the array to be accessed without having to respect how they are 
depictively laid out physically in the visual cortex. Therefore there needs to be some 
further way of restricting how these arrays are accessed and manipulated to preserve their 
status as functional depictions. 
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In reply to this, it seems that Kosslyn has stipulated for this more recently and this is 
shown explicitly in the quote below: 
µ+RZHYHU«DIXQFWLRQDOVSDFHLVVXIILFLHQWDVDGHSLFWLYH form of representation only 
if the geometric properties of the representation emerge because there are fixed, hard-
wired processes that interpret the representation as if it were space; if the processes 
are not fixed, then the representation is not necessDULO\DGHSLFWLRQ¶.RVVO\QSJ 
 
The theoretical addition that Kosslyn therefore makes is that these arrays cannot be treated 
non-spatially. In other words, it is hard wired into how they are processed that adjacent 
cells in functional space are treated as equivalent to adjacent parts of objects in real space. 
Hence, although it is possible that they could be accessed in different ways, as it turns out 
they FDQ¶Wbe in at least some cases. This is because the way these arrays are processed 
µVSDWLDOO\¶Ls fixed by the way they are wired together neuronally and how they are 
DFFHVVHG,KDYHTXDOLILHGWKHVHQWHQFHDERYHZLWKµDWOHDVWLQVRPHFDVHV¶EHFDXVHWKLVLV
all Kosslyn needs to defend his current position. That is, in at least one case functionally 
depictive representations are used, even if propositional representations are used the rest of 
the time. Of course the Depictivist would want to claim that they are used more 
pervasively in the visual buffer, but this just represents the minimal claim necessary for 
.RVVO\Q¶VSRVLWLRQWRJRWKURXJK 
 
Perhaps we can now ask the following question: when would we expect functionally 
depictive topographic arrays to be used in perception and would this be a rare or a common 
occurrence? Well it seems the efficiency claim described above can be applied to many 
different aspects of distributed visual processing. For example: from tracking movement, 
to identifying discrete objects, to processing colour. This is because most objects in our 
ancestral environment are lumped together into discrete areas with fairly homogenous 
properties (i.e. colour) and they also move in a fairly continuous fashion (i.e. smooth 
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movement). In other words, generally speaking: rocks, trees, rivers and prey, are all fairly 
locally grouped and show generally uniform properties of colour and shape. And most 
objects, including other animals, tend to obey the laws of physics and tend to move 
smoothly (e.g. running and falling with gravity) and follow fairly continuous paths (i.e. 
WKH\GRQ¶WWHOHSRrt). Also when you move around your environment things generally shift 
continuously past you. To experience this first hand try walking (or imagine walking) 
through a doorway, or observe how the scene changes as you simply turn your head.  
 
To me it would make sense that, since spatial objects generally follow smooth trajectories, 
that any mechanism that is trying to track this would form in a way that is most efficient to 
process this information. This could mean that information like colour and depth in any 
single array cell is quite likely to transfer with some, usually minor, modification to the 
adjacent ones. Hence the priming and passing of information between adjacent array cells 
is more efficiently done if they are also physically located closer together in the visual 
cortex. This can then be used to help interpret and process the raw information coming 
from the eyes and potentially save on processing effort and improve reaction times and 
avoid making errors. Hence I would suggest we would expect to see this trick used quite 
often in mechanisms involved in object tracking (vision) and object manipulation (motor 
actions). This will probably also be mirrored in imagery, where we are predicting 
imaginary versions of the same kinds of features (e.g. imagining fairly homogenous objects 
in shapes and colours which are moving fairly smoothly in the environment). 
 
3HUKDSVZHVKRXOGQRZDVNZK\GRQ¶WZHWKLQNOLNHWKLVLQWHUPVRIDFRPSXWHUDUUD\"
Well there is one important disanalogy in this comparison: there are effectively no power 
limitations on a computer. Hence any small power savings such as this would be pointless 
to develop since it is relatively uncostly to transfer data from adjacent array cells from 
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physically distant parts of the hard drive. If power resources were at more of a premium in 
computing, then this might be seen a good way of designing-in some novel energy saving 
processes. Conversely in the human mind, the brain is one of the most power hungry 
organs, using up to eight times the energy of equivalent cells in other organs (cf. Dunbar 
2000: 246). Hence any minute power saving would probably be positively selected for, and 
this could include arranging adjacent cells physically near each other so that often 
transferred information can take as short a route as possible.  
 
This effect may also be accentuated by the parallel-distributed processing style of neural 
networks in the brain. It may be that the job of tracking and processing real world objects 
is best done in topographic arrays as this suits the way neural networks inhibit and excite 
nearby neurons. There also seems little point in loosing 2D spatial information available 
indirectly from the retinotopically organised projections to the visual cortex, and it makes 
sense to at least use this as an initial way of sorting out the raw data. Hence giving further 
reason for the visual buffer to organise itself and utilise topographic arrays that operate to 
functionally depict real space. It seems that when these are viewed indirectly in operation 
by a third party (e.g. in a brain scan), they also seem to actually depict 3D space on a 2D 
medium. Hence explaining the mounting empirical evidence that these topographic arrays 
exist and are functional in visual processing (see Section 7.2 for a very modern example of 
this from Kamitani et al 2008). 
 
It seems then that there may be a number of reasons why light reflected from external 
objects would be processed in a topographic manner in the visual cortex. It may therefore 
EHHQRXJKWRSURYH.RVVO\Q¶Vpoint by suggesting that, although it is not necessary for 
WKHVHDUUD\VWRXVHVSDFHWRUHSUHVHQWVSDFHLWWXUQVRXWLW¶VTXLWHDJRRGHYROXWLRQDU\
strategy to do so. As long as the empirical data continues to support the existence of these 
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areas then this seems like a good explanation of why they are there. And further to this, it 
seems that any theory that invokes array-like nested lists to represent space, is quite likely 
to do this also (e.g. padded lists). Why bother making an array unless you are going to use 
it in an array-like way and why not also lay it out in the cortex in the most efficient way 
possible. In light of the above, even the Propositionalist would predict these topographic 
areas might be used occasionally to organise nested lists arrays in a way that mimics a 
hybrid depictive array. 
 
5HODWHGWRWKLVLWVHHPVWKDWVRPHRIWKHZRUNWKDWLQVSLUHG3\O\VK\Q¶V3URSRVLWLRQDOLVPLQ
WKHILUVWSODFHXVHGµQHVWHGOLVWV¶WRVROYHVSDWLDOSX]]OHVEDVHGRQDSURJUDPPLQJ
language called LISP. LISP was an early example of how a propositionalist-style 
programming language could be used to solve problems in a potentially analogous way to 
humans. Thomas (2008: Section 2.2) quotes work by Baylor (1972) and Moran (1973) to 
illustrate this point. In those sWXGLHVLQRUGHUWRVROYHDµEORFNVOLFLQJ¶SX]]OHQHVWHGOLVWV
were used to represent space: e.g. faces, edges and vertices. Hence the invocation of things 
like nested lists or arrays, to represent space is a common feature to both sides. I think the 
main debate now is whether having them laid out in space in topographic arrays in the 
brain means they have a depictive element, or whether this is just Propositionalism with a 
physical efficiency constraint laid on top of it. As mentioned earlier, I am not much 
interested in determining which theory is more likely to be correct, as both are accessible 
to the simulationist. It seems there is convergence on some points and it may be academic 
what we call it. The main thing is that we have seen in some detail what the issues are 
FRQFHUQLQJWKLVGHEDWH7KDWVDLG,GRWHQGWRSUHIHU.RVVO\Q¶VDSSURDFKDVLWKDVPXFK
greater consistency and explanatory potential and for other reasons as described above and 
in what follows. 
 
109 
,W¶VDOVRZRUWKSRLQWLQJRXWWKDWSUHVXPably propositional arrays of this detail (i.e. a cell by 
cell nested list) will be required for every moment of vision, since typically we are 
phenomenally aware of the full scene before us (at least at the centre of our attention). It 
seems to me it would take a potentially infinite amount of descriptions to describe all the 
SURSHUWLHVDQGUHODWLRQVLQIURQWRI\RXDWDQ\RQHSRLQW:RXOGQ¶WLWVLPSO\EHPRUH
HIILFLHQWWRMXVWUHJLVWHUHDFKµYLVXDOSL[HO¶ZLWKDFHOOVRWKDWPRUHgeneral descriptions can 
be formed further up the visual process (e.g. that green patch I am experiencing is called 
³JUDVV´LQ(QJOLVK",IWKLVZHUHWUXHWKHQLWZRXOGVHHPWKDWWKHSURSRVLWLRQDOLVWZRXOG
also predict visual arrays at least in very early visual processing, and perhaps this will be 
most efficiently organised topographically at first. This is because the retinotopic data that 
is projected back onto the cortex will benefit from the same efficiency constraints. And 
indeed Pylyshyn (pg. 394) does not deny that there are topographic areas in the early visual 
cortex involved in vision. What he does deny is that these are necessarily depictive and are 
used in visual imagery. I have dealt with the former complaint already. The latter is 
discussed below, and is motivated by some studies that apparently show that these areas 
are not activated during visual imagery. So we now need to analyse whether early visual 
cortex is used in imagery and whether this relies on functional depictions in 
topographically organised areas. This is where we first start to analyse whether the visual 
buffer is also used offline to support visual imagery. 
 
3.3 ± Are topographic areas used in imagery? 
As discussed in Chapter 1, a crucial claim of the Kosslyn Model is that the visual buffer is 
used in visual imagery as well as in vision. To counter this Pylyshyn often quotes empirical 
evidence that topographic areas in the visual cortex are in fact not used during imagery. 
For example, he specifically refers [pg. 394] to various studies by Mellet et al (1996, 
1998), whose work will become relevant immediately below. Kosslyn replies to this 
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critique in an extremely detailed fashion, by conducting a meta-analysis of 59 studies on 
mental imagery. This happens to include many of the studies that Pylyshyn also quotes. As 
part of the meta-analysis the studies were initially vetted to meet certain quality 
requirements and all involved only visual imagery, as opposed to imagery in other sense 
modalities. Each of the studies was then analysed and tested against the predictions of 
various theories. I wont go into the details of that analysis but merely report the relevant 
results to the discussion here (but see Kosslyn pgs.117-130 & Appendix).  
 
An important initial criterion that Kosslyn sets up is that he is looking for activity in Brain 
Areas 17 and 18 to indicate activation of the visual buffer. This is even though his initial 
definition of the visual buffer is slightly wider including any topographically organised 
area in the whole visual cortex, which includes Area 19 also53. However he quotes Sereno 
HWDODQGWKHLUI05,VWXG\WRVXSSRUWWKHLGHDµWKDWERWKWKHVHDUHDV>	@DUH
NQRZQWREHWRSRJUDSKLFDOO\RUJDQLVHGLQKXPDQV¶SJ+HQFHDFWLYDWLRQGXULQJ
imagery in either of these areas would indicate visual buffer activity, and conversely lack 
of activity together with reports of visual imagery would be a problem for his theory. 
 
The main distinction which Kosslyn suggests needs to be made to explain the apparently 
problematic empirical data, is one between: imagery that involves considering high-
resolution details of objects or shapes (depictive imagery); and those involving only spatial 
relations, such as comparing the relative sizes of objects, or where they are located in space 
(spatial imagery). An illustration of the potential difference between these is given below: 
 
                                               
53
 Area 17 is known as V1 and the primary visual cortex; Area 18 as V2 and the secondary visual cortex, and 
Area 19 as the associative visual cortex and is thought to be used in processing long-term visual memories. 
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Figure 3.4 ± Illustration of different styles of imagery: Left - detailed depictive 
image of a guitar; Middle - spatially comparing the relative sizes of two guitars; 
Right - imaging where a guitar might be spatially located in your house 
 
 
As illustrated above, depictive imagery (left) involves the production and analysis of a 
high-resolution image of a specifically shaped object in order to gather some detailed 
information about it. This may also involve imaging the various sub-shapes and colours 
within the object in detail too (e.g. the strings, the frets, the tuning keys). Perhaps this 
could be used in a task that requires one to work out roughly how many frets a standard 
guitar has on its neck. Kosslyn interprets this as needing a detailed imagistic depiction of 
the object and this is what requires the activation of the topographic areas in the visual 
cortex. As Kosslyn puts it:  
µ«WKHDFWRIVHDUFKLQJIRUDGHWDLOLQDPHntal image results in actually placing the 
detail in the image, which apparently leads to activation in the topographically 
organised visual cortex. Alternatively, the image may need to be reorganised [i.e. 
VFDQQHGRUURWDWHG@WR³VHH´DVSHFLILFSDUWLQGetail; this process would also require 
operating on a high-UHVROXWLRQGHSLFWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ«¶.RVVO\QSJ 
 
+HQFHWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWRLPDJLQHDQREMHFW¶VVKDSHDQGFRORXUIHDWXUHVin detail, in any 
imagery study would predict that the relevant areas of the visual buffer should be activated. 
Once this distinction was made, the meta-analysis found that cases of depictive imagery 
matched up with the studies that showed activation in the visual buffer. 
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Conversely, certain other studies that required only VSDWLDOLPDJHU\GLGQ¶WVKRZDFWLYDWLRQ
in the visual buffer. This is explained because, according to Kosslyn, the parietal cortex is 
responsible for processing this kind of information in its own topographically organised 
areas, and hence it does not necessarily need to utilise the visual buffer (we will look at 
spatial imagery in more detail in the next chapter). Kosslyn also points out that spatial 
imagery can involve quite high resolution and detailed inspection of spatial relations, and 
hence it is not the generation of high-resolution imagery per se that distinguishes these two 
kinds of imagery. It is more precisely whether it is a detailed image of shape and colour 
that is required, versus a detailed consideration of certain spatial features.  
 
So given the distinctions introduced above we can return once more to deal with 
3\O\VK\Q¶VVSHFLILFREMHFWLRQVWRWKH.RVVO\Q0RGHOLQWKLVUHVSHFW,WVHHPVWKHVRPHRI
the studies quoted by Pylyshyn include studies involving only spatial imagery and hence 
one ZRXOGQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\H[SHFWWKHYLVXDOEXIIHUWREHDFWLYHDQ\ZD\. Perhaps then the 
GLIIHUHQFHLQRSLQLRQKHUHLVEHVWH[SODLQHGE\DUHILQLQJRIWKH'HSLFWLYLVW¶VSUHGLFWLRQV
based on the evidence, that the visual cortex will only be active during depictive imagery. 
To give a specific example, Mellet et al (2004) also conducted a meta-analysis of imagery 
experiments conducted by their lab in previous years based on PET scans. Recall that I 
have just mentioned that Pylyshyn appeals to many of the Mellet studies as counter 
examples to the Kosslyn Model. The Mellet meta-analysis returned results consistent with 
.RVVO\Q¶VSUHGLFWLRQVLQWHUPVRIREMHFWLPDJHU\WKHLUWHUPIRUGHSLFWLYHLPDJHU\DQG
VXPPDULVHWKLVFRQFLVHO\LQWKLVH[HUWIURPWKHLUDEVWUDFWµobject imagery activated the 
early visual cortex, whereas spatial imagery induced a deactivation of the early visual 
FRUWH[¶+HQFHVKRZLQJDVSHFLILFZD\WKDWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWNLQGVRI
imagery can defend against this line of critique from Pylyshyn. 
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What Pylyshyn now needs to continue with this avenue of attack, is to refine his critique so 
as to identify an imagery task that obviously specifically requires detailed depictive 
imagery, but where the visual buffer is still inactive. If this combination cannot be 
explained in any other way, then this would count as a new counter-example to the 
.RVVO\Q0RGHO+RZHYHUIRUQRZLWVHHPVWKDW.RVVO\Q¶VUHFHQWDSSURDFKLVVSHFLILFDOO\
designed so that it can deal with the current evidence and hence remains a live option 
pending future studies.  
 
It might be noted that the guitar size comparison illustrated in Figure 3.4 still seems to 
involve imagining the relative shapes of the guitars, and if this is so, it might introduce a 
certain amount of a depictive element to this allegedly purely spatial imagery task. This 
anomaly can perhaps be explained in one of two ways. Firstly, it might be that this is just a 
feature of the way I have illustrated it here and it does not reflect what actually goes on in a 
real spatial imagery process. Namely, the guitar shape is not actually visualized in size 
comparisons and the above diagram just needs to depict shape to illustrate the point in a 
text-based explanation. Or secondly, the details of any shapes that are imagined in this 
situation are so minimalistic that the activation they require from the visual buffer is fairly 
undetectable above a background threshold. To that end, it would be interesting to read 
about an experiment designed to see if activation of the visual buffer increases with the 
amount of depictive detail required for a certain imagery task, and whether this effect 
disappears below a certain threshold.  
 
Clearly there is still much refining work to be done in this area to predict which kinds of 
imagery task use which areas of the brain and how strongly they are activated. There is a 
real potential for even more fine grained distinctions to be made with which areas of the 
brain seem to process these even within the visual buffer (e.g. imagining faces vs. 
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imagining scenes; and see Chapter 7 for an example of this). But for now it seems the 
depictive vs. spatial imagery distinction predicts more accurately when the visual buffer is 
used, and why sometimes it is not used, in a way that is essentially compatible with most 
RIWKHHPSLULFDOGDWD:HDZDLWWKHFULWLF¶VUHSO\RQWKLVPDWWHUDQGSHUKDSVIRUQRZZHFDQ
justifiably move on to the next issue.  
 
Given the above, we can now briefly investigate the possibility that just because the visual 
cortex may be used in imagery at all GRHVQ¶WPHDQWKDWLWUHOLHVRQWKHWRSRJUDSKLFDUHDVLQ
the visual buffer to function. To see this more refined point we need to look at a study by 
Slotnick, Thompson and Kosslyn (2005) that actually shows these brain areas responding 
topographically in perception and equivalent kinds of imagery. This study was also 
designed to rule out various other criticisms from Pylyshyn as indicated in the quote 
below. In this study subjects were asked to observe and imagine a rotating chequered bow 
tie, while fMRI scans were conducted to detect brain activity. They were also asked to just 
pay attention to different parts of the display in order to detect activity associated with 
merely attentional demands. The results matched the predictions made by the Depictivist 
approach, both in terms of location and in mode of presentation: that is, not only were the 
topographic areas of the visual cortex used but the way they were used was similar in 
perception and imagery: 
µ7KHIDFWWKDWWKHSKDVHRIWhe activity (representing stimulus position) in the imagery 
retinotopic maps was similar to that in the perception retinotopic maps ² which in both 
cases directly reflected geometric properties of the stimulus ² is in accord with 
Pylyshyn's criterion for evidence of depictive UHSUHVHQWDWLRQµWKDWWKHZD\WKHLU
topographical organization LVLQYROYHGUHIOHFWVWKHVSDWLDOSURSHUWLHVRIWKHLPDJH¶ 
(Pylyshyn, 2002). In addition, our findings from both the main experiment and follow-up 
experiment counter Pylyshyn's claim that visual mental imagery is accomplished 
primarily through DWWHQWLRQDOPHFKDQLVPV¶6ORWQLFN7KRPSVRQDQG.RVVO\Q
1582) 
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Hence this represents the latest in evidence that responds to scepticism from Pylyshyn and 
provides further empirical evidence in favour of Depictivism. Not only are these 
topographic areas used in a way that is different than attentional demands, but they are also 
activated in a similar way in vision and visual imagery. That is, seeing a rotating chequered 
bow tie utilises the visual buffer in a similar way to the geometric demands of a similar 
task in imagery. Of course, given that the strength of the stimulus and the vividness of the 
experiences are typically much lower in mental imagery, it predictably has a much weaker 
effect, than in the perceptual case. Again we await the response to this evidence from the 
propositionalist camp.  
 
Although the above shows that the same topographically organised areas are used in 
VLPLODUZD\VLQERWKYLVLRQDQGLPDJHU\LWGRHVQ¶Wnecessarily show that it is the same 
mechanism that is used in both. It is possible that imagery just uses areas in the same 
vicinity as the perceptual process, but in fact they just happen to be located near enough to 
each other, and it just so happens that distinguishing these two separate streams falls below 
the resolution of the best modern brain scanners. However, as mentioned in Chapter 1, data 
from Kosslyn et al (1997 & 2001) show that visual imagery interferes with visual 
processing, thus suggesting they are competing for the same resources. This is opposed to 
auditory imagery that does not interfere with visual processes, which also indicates that it 
is not just a phenomenon that derives from a competition for our limited attention. Hence 
there seems to be fairly compelling evidence to show that not only are some of the same 
areas used, but that they also compete for resources available in the same mechanism. This 
is a correlation that is strongly predicted of, and elegantly explained by, the imagination-
as-simulation hypothesis, and indicates that the visual buffer is therefore a good candidate 
for an online main visual mechanism being used offline to support visual imagery. 
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It is worth noting here, that this identification of a main mechanism does not imply there is 
complete overlap in all respects, since obviously there are differences in other areas of 
these two processes e.g. where they process their (mock) inputs and (mock) outputs. And 
analysing the amount of overlap between vision and visual imagery links with another 
major avenue of critique available to the Depictivist camp that I would like to address in 
the next chapter. This comes from purported evidence that people who have damage to the 
visual buffer can still form visual images. I think the best way of replying to this is to first 
JLYH.RVVO\Q¶VIXOOSRVLWLYHDFFRXQWRIWKHYLVXDOLPDJHU\V\VWHPDQGKRZWKLVFDQEH
affected in different ways. This will help explain how they deal with the apparently 
contradictory dissociation data observed from patients with brain damage. Again the 
Kosslyn Model described in the next chapter is specifically designed to be able to account 
for this data. But before going onto that there are a few final general points to make. 
 
3.4 ± Remaining resistance to depictive representational approaches 
Given the above, we might want to assess how strong the resistance still is to at least 
partially depictive approaches in the broader imagery research community. Kosslyn (pg. 
179-80) addresses this point in the final chapter of his book and reports back on a survey 
from 150 researchers in this field compiled in 2003. Firstly he reports that only about 7% 
actually favour a purely propositionalist account, with the majority accepting some 
depictive representations are necessary. Secondly he suggests that those who reported not 
having any visual imagery on a questionnaire, were more likely to be propositionalists at 
WKHRQVHWRIWKHLPDJHU\GHEDWHLQWKH¶V,QGLFDWLQJWKDWRQH¶VSHUVRQDOSKHQRPHQRORJ\
might initially guide how one interpreted the debate. Subsequently, many of those who 
report not experiencing phenomenal imagery, have changed their minds to a more mixed 
theory based on the accumulating empirical evidence in favour of Depictivism; with only a 
few remaining outright sceptics who deny depictive representations are used at all. The 
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point of mentioning this is just to flag up the possibility that variations in phenomenology 
might strongly bias the initial position you take in this field. Hence we must be wary of 
phenomenological reports in analysing this debate and take care to separate the objective 
facts from subjectively biased reports54. But this feature may explain why there was such 
an initial difference in the claims of these two approaches that has slowly narrowed as the 
evidence accumulates. 
 
Countering that thought, it might perhaps also be suggested that the apparent gradual 
acceptance of depictive representations described above, could mainly be due to Kosslyn 
weakening his position so far that it is now largely compatible with Propositionalism (e.g. 
the move to a hybrid approach). But this can equally well be seen as a continued 
modification of his theory in reply to criticism and a refining of the empirical evidence. 
Which is a perhaps a natural and healthy scientific methodological process; that is as long 
DVWKLVGRHVQ¶WEHJLQWRORRNDELWDGKRFZKLFK,GRQ¶WWKLQNLWGRHV7KHHYROXWLRQRIKLV
ideas towards a hybrid approach, perhaps also means that the benefits of the predictive and 
explanatory power of his approach could be available, with certain modifications, to those 
that would usually emphasise the propositional element. It certainly seems that there is less 
to divide the positions than in previous versions. As mentioned earlier, my aim is not to 
particularly to decide between the theories, since the simulationist camp can live with both. 
My aim is more to get a detailed explanation of what might be happening in sub-personal 
PHFKDQLVPVVHUYLQJYLVLRQDQGYLVXDOLPDJHU\DQG,WKLQN.RVVO\Q¶VKybrid theory is the 
leader in the field in that respect. 
 
To highlight the benefits of a Depictivist approach further, perhaps we can look briefly at 
the positive proposals from the propositionalist camp. As discussed, they are unable to 
                                               
54
 And perhaps this may also affect your initial position in terms of the selectivist vs. generativist debate as 
introduced in Chapter 1 and to be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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make testable predictions on the scanning and rotation tasks, and can only explain the data 
post hoc by invoking new-list-properties. Alternatively they can try to explain away the 
results by appealing to external factors, such as tacit knowledge or cognitive penetrability 
arguments. Kosslyn adds to these remarks as follows: 
µ:HZHUHWHPSWHGWRWU\WRGHULYHSUHGLFWLRQVDERXWZKLFKVSHFLILFDUHDV>LQWKH
brain] would be activated during imagery if a propositionalist theory is correct. This 
proved impossible, in large part because no detailed version of propositional theories 
RILPDJHU\KDYHEHHQGHYHORSHG«WKLVFODVVRIWKHRULHVLVGLVWLQJXLVKHGLQODUJHSDUW
E\ZKDWLWUHMHFWVUDWKHUWKDQZKDWLWSRVLWV¶.RVVO\QHWDO 
 
)RUH[DPSOHPXFKRI3\O\VK\Q¶VERRNLVGHYoted to a negative critique of Depictivism 
(Chapter.7) and developing arguments against the functionality of phenomenal mental 
imagery (Chapter.8), and relatively little to explaining how Propositionalism can positively 
explain the data. The utility of this approach at all levels, is supposed to be obvious from 
LWVDELOLW\WRGHDOZLWKKLJKHUWKRXJKWSURFHVVHVEDVHGRQµODQJXDJHRIWKRXJKW¶DUJXPHQWV
However to some, this extrapolation is not very clearly achievable at all and it tends to set 
the propositionalist against those with a more empiricist or dual coding approach (c.f. Prinz 
2002, Paivio 2007). For example, this scepticism is described well by Barsalou (1999: 
section 1.2.2) who suggests there is at best only indirect evidence that propositional-style 
amodal symbolic representations exist. They are a theoretical entities invoked to describe 
our ability to understand and deploy concepts: a mode of representation that is then 
assumed to occur ubiquitously in all forms of thought. However it is possible that modally 
specific representations, like visual imagery, can do a lot of the work usually ascribed to 
propositional representations. So the debate very much boils down to whether you think 
WKDWSURSRVLWLRQDOµODQJXDJHRIWKRXJKW¶VW\OHH[SODQDWLRQVFDn explain all the data or 
whether you think there is at least some depictive element involved. 
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In my opinion I find it hard to see how that a finite set of propositions could describe a 
phenomenally rich visual scene and all its complex spatial relations adequately in the first 
SODFH)RULQVWDQFHZRXOGQ¶WZHQHHGDSURSRVLWLRQWRGHVFULEHWKHFRORXURIDOOWKH
discernable small areas of the visual field? This would be required so that we can at least 
answer the following series of questions about our phenomenal experience: what is the 
colour of that DUHD"«DQGDOVRWKHQH[WDUHDDORQJ"DQGWKHRQHQH[WWRWKDW"«DQGVRRQ
It seems to me that this is best done by describing each small area (or pixel) of the scene, 
which would also need to be represented in a corollary set of cells in an array. These cells 
can then be variously accessed to provide information about other, more coarser grain, 
descriptions of the objects and their relations within the scene: e.g. the red ball is ON the 
blue box. But a cell-by-cell propositional-style description of the visual scene just seems to 
me to be broadly the same as a functional hybrid depictive representation. And note that 
this is the same form of argument as that given above, about having a padded cell list of all 
possible directions you could scan a map. Hence I suspect there is some overlap between 
these two ways of approaching the subject, with the depictive representational approach 
perhaps now offering more explanatory power and empirical consistency besides. 
Therefore at this point I feel fairly justified in adopting a hybrid depictive approach for the 
remainder of the thesis. In the next chapter we will look at more detailed aspects of the 
Kosslyn Model and how it can explain apparent dissociations between functioning vision 
and dysfunctional visual imagery (and vice versa). 
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4 - STIm and the Full Kosslyn Model 
 
 
µ,PDJHU\LVOLNHDMXJJOLQJDFWLQZKLFKRQO\DVPDOOQXPEHURIEDOOVFDQEHNHSW 
DORIWDWRQFH¶.RVVO\QHWDO 
 
µ0HQWDOVLPXODWLRQVDUH imagined scenarios that mimic what one would expect to 
happen in the corresponding actual situation, and depictive representations play a 
key role in such reasoning because they make explicit and accessible aspects of 
shape and spatial relations that otherwise need not be evident. For example, 
consider what occurs when you have a pile of luggage and must pack it efficiently 
LQWRDFDU¶VWUXQN<RXFDQYLVXDOL]HWKHEDJVLQYDULRXVSRVLWLRQVDQGORFDWLRQV
PHQWDOO\PRYLQJWKHPDURXQGXQWLO\RX³VHH´DJRRGconfiguration ± all before you 
HYHQEHJLQWRKDXODVLQJOHEDJRIIWKHJURXQG¶.RVVO\QHWDO 
 
 
,QWKLVFKDSWHUZHZLOOORRNLQGHWDLODW.RVVO\Q¶VIXOODFFRXQWRIWKHYLVXDOLPDJHU\
system, which is described in Chapter 5 of Kosslyn et al (2006). As discussed in the last 
chapter, the visual buffer is thought to be a crucial part of the Kosslyn Model, but there are 
also other important mechanisms that work in conjunction with it and these will be 
introduced and analysed here. So while in the last chapter we mainly looked at what a 
hybrid depictive representation actually is and at evidence that topographic arrays in the 
visual cortex were used in visual imagery, in this chapter we will now look at how the 
visual buffer connects with other mechanisms in the brain. From this we can then see if 
this seems like a model that can be interpreted as an offline simulation process and whether 
we can identify other mechanisms that we would expect to find in this kind of a system. 
We will also look at, and reject, some further putative counter examples to the necessary 
involvement of the visual buffer in depictive visual imagery. 
 
So specifically, in this chapter I will try to do the following three main things. Firstly, it 
will give a fairly full account of the latest version of the Kosslyn Model and explain how 
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the visual buffer is proposed to link up with other important mechanisms. Secondly, I will 
investigate some strong putative counter examples to this model that seem to suggest that 
imagery can persist even without an intact visual buffer. If this is correct it represents 
knock down argument against the Kosslyn Model. However I will argue that once the 
details of model are explained, the force of this evidence is more apparent that real and 
hence can be dealt with adequately. Finally, we will look at how the visual buffer interacts 
with other mechanisms in detail and how this can be seen as an offline simulation process. 
In this chapter I will look mainly at how the inputs to the visual buffer are gathered 
together and delimited, and I will postpone an analysis of the output processes for later 
chapters. Analysing the input side will involve, amongst other things, looking at possible 
ways that the contents of the visual buffer can be filled-in internally by other areas of the 
brain. This is as opposed to being filled-in by external stimulus from light detected at the 
eye. By the end of this chapter we should have a fairly detailed and robust theory about the 
underlying processes supporting phenomenal imagination and hence STIm. This will be 
used later to underpin a more full account of how we can phenomenally imagine other 
times and places. In this chapter we will also specifically develop a theory of how we can 
imagine a certain spatial layout, and the temporal aspect of Spatio-temporal Imagination 
will be developed in subsequent chapters. I will start now by just simply introducing and 
explaining the main mechanisms in the full Kosslyn Model. 
 
4.1 ± the full Kosslyn Model - a theory of the visual imagery system 
One of the most crucial features of the Kosslyn Model is the bifurcation of the visual 
stream into the dorsal and ventral streams. Kosslyn suggests that the dorsal stream, which 
runs upwards along the back of the brain (dorsally) from the visual cortex into the parietal 
cortex, is responsible mainly for spatial properties processing (SPP). Hence this stream 
mainly deals with the spatial aspects of vision and certain features of this have been 
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touched on in the last chapter, where we discussed the nature of spatial imagery (e.g. 
locating a guitar in your house relative to where you are and comparing the sizes of two 
REMHFWV5HODWHGO\WKLVVWUHDPLVDOVRVRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³ZKHUH´VWUHDPEHFDXVH
this involves processing information about where objects are located relative to the 
SHUFHLYHU,WLVDOVRVRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³KRZ´VWUHDPDVLWLVLQYROYHGLQ
coordinating motor actions. This stream is thought to involve the use of an egocentric 
coordinate system that processes information in a coordinate system that is centred on the 
self, which we will discuss in more detail below. This stream is also involved in 
manipulating map-like representations of where you and other objects are located. This 
allows us to keep track of where we are in our environment and where you may need to go 
to do certain things. We will look at some examples of how this may work in Section 4.3. 
 
The ventral stream on the other hand, which runs directly forwards in the brain (ventrally) 
into the temporal cortex, is responsible for recognising objects and object properties 
SURFHVVLQJ2337KLVLVDOVRVRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDVWKH³ZKDW´VWUHDPEHFDXVHLW
allows you to recognise and determine what certain objects are. The object properties it 
processes are things like colour and shape, but not necessarily where it is spatially located 
relative to the observer. The separation of these streams therefore allows dissociation 
between naming and recognising objects in the OPP ventral stream and locating and 
manipulating objects in the SPP dorsal stream. This bifurcation of streams is fairly well 
accepted distinction in mainstream psychology and hence will not be questioned here55. 
 
                                               
55
 Although Kosslyn recognises that Milner and Goodale (1995) have suggested the parietal cortex is mainly 
used to help guide movement (how), they prefer to adhere to the original notion put forward by Ungerleider 
& Mishkin (1982) that is responsible for broader spatial (where) processing.  However they suggest the two 
are not mutually exclusive: one needs to know where something is in order to understand how to use it. 
Hence the areas controlling these functions may overlap in the parietal cortex. More on this later and recall 
the approximate locations of these streams and the main areas of cortex are depicted in the diagram in 
Appendix B. 
123 
The main support for this bifurcation comes from observations of what happens when 
these streams are not working properly. For instance, damage to the OPP stream, 
classically due to damage to the temporal cortex, leads to various forms of Agnosia. This is 
where, for example, people cannot name objects, or recognise people or recognise text. 
Conversely, damage to the SPP stream, usually because of damage to the parietal cortex, 
leads to various form of Neglect. This is where half of the external world is ignored or 
neglected, or is not represented in the first place. Damage to the parietal cortex also leads 
to problems with motor coordination (e.g. reaching and grabbing actions) and 
discriminations involving sizes and locations. These distinctions will be important later and 
represents the main division of labour within the Kosslyn Model. 
 
In addition to these two streams and the visual buffer, Kosslyn invokes three other 
mechanisms in the full Kosslyn Model. The first is Attention Shifting, which can change 
the focus of attention in vision and visual imagery. This has the effect of moving an 
attention window within the visual buffer so that one can concentrate on different things 
within the focus of that window. The second mechanism is that of Associative Memories, 
which takes inputs from both streams and is used to identify and re-identify objects. Long-
WHUPPHPRU\LVOLQNHGZLWKVHYHUDODUHDVLQFOXGLQJWKHDQWHULRUWHPSRUDOOREH:HUQLFNH¶V
DUHDDQGWKH³DVVRFLDWLRQFRUWH[´$UHDRIWKHYLVXDOFRUWH[ZKLFKDUHDOOLQWKH
temporal lobe. Conversely, short-term memory (working memory), which only lasts for a 
few seconds, is linked to the prefrontal cortex, which is in the frontal lobe. We will be 
discussing mainly the use of long-term memory in this context, and will investigate its use 
as a mechanism that helps guide what we visualize relative to a certain task. For instance, 
if we want to visualize a Rubiks Cube we may need to retrieve its parameters from long 
term memory to delimit the shape and colour of our eventual visual image of it. Again this 
illustrates the close link between memory and imagination in this model, since we can not 
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only remember the shape of a Rubiks Cube, but we can also creatively imagine what it 
might look like if it was bright pink all over. Hence this model fairly seamlessly integrates 
memory and imagination components in one visual imagery system. And this is part of the 
UHDVRQZK\,GLGQ¶WZRUU\WRRPXFKDERXWXQWDQJOLQJWKHVHWZRIHDWXUHVLQ&KDSWHU 
 
If an object is not immediately identifiable, and if identification is important, then a third 
mechanism called the Information Shunting mechanism sends relevant information to the 
other systems to shift attention towards certain features of that object. This helps prime 
lower areas for key things to search for. Hence it interacts with the Attention Shifting 
mechanism to conduct a relatively slower process of object identification, which is referred 
to as a search priming process. This may be used mostly when an object is seen from an 
unusual (non-canonical) angle: for example, a fence line seen from directly above or a 
guitar seen from the end of the neck. The Kosslyn Model is summarised in the diagram 
below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 ± WKHµ.RVVO\Q0RGHO¶RIWKHYLVXDOV\VWHP 
Based on Figure 5.1 in Kosslyn et al (2006: 136) 
 
 
The Kosslyn Model predicts that some of these mechanisms and associated brain areas will 
also be active where appropriate in a visual imagery task. It particularly predicts that 
invoking a visual image is a bit like the search priming process described above, but where 
Information Shunting Attention Shifting 
 
Associative 
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Spatial-Properties-
Processing (SPP) 
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the priming surrounding the visual buffer becomes so strong that an actual image is 
produced. This process of filling-in the visual buffer will be discussed in detail in what 
follows, as it may suggest a way of describing how the visual buffer gets fed mock inputs 
in simulationist terms. Obviously this system is designed to fit with all the known 
empirical data and specific examples of this will also be discussed below and in Section 
4.3. 
 
In terms of the visual image itself, there are four processes that are thought to be needed to 
explain our ability to utilise it under this model. These function to do the following things:  
 
1) Image Generation ± this uses propositional information stored in memory 
areas to reconstruct or generate visual images that make the shapes and colours of 
what is imagined explicit. If the task requires considering detailed shape, then this 
could involve information from associative memory to be sent back along the OPP 
stream, to the visual buffer to generate the image of these object properties e.g. the 
colour and shape the object takes. If however it is just spatial imagery that is 
required, then it may be that only parts of the SPP stream are utilised. Since these 
areas specifically retain spatial information in topographical arrays they do not 
need to access the visual buffer to make this information explicit. However data 
from the SPP may be used to help control the spatial layout of a depictive image 
(as discussed in the last chapter and explored further below). 
 
2) Image Inspection ± this shifts the attention window within the image but also 
can lead to image generation in new areas that need to be attended to. Hence it 
sometimes works in conjunction with image generation, as you realise you need to 
attend to a new area, or to attend to something in more detail. At this point the 
required part of the image then needs to be generated accordingly. 
 
3) Image Maintenance ± normally in perception new information from 
subsequent saccades of the eyes over writes previous information in the visual 
buffer. Hence representations are not designed to last in this medium for long and 
this is why a depictive image begins to fade quickly. However by concentrating on 
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maintaining the image, information on what is being visualized can be re-sent to 
the visual buffer and imagery maintained. This takes some effort and explains the 
phenomenology of imagery in this respect. 
 
4) Image Transformation ± this allows the image to be manipulated such as in 
rotation and scanning tasks. Kosslyn predicts there are two varieties of this 
process. One where you imagine how an object would change due to you 
manipulating it physically (e.g. rotating it with your hand), and the other where 
external forces might change how an object looks (e.g. gravity making it fall). 
They predict that only in the former case will motor areas be activated as it 
simulates action commands. Both processes involve changing the mapping 
function between the OPP stream and the visual buffer and controlling how it is 
manipulated and hence changing how it would now appear to you.  
 
Table 4.1 ± Mechanisms needed to examine and manipulate a  
visual image under the Kosslyn Model 
 
 
We will return to discuss most of these imagery specific mechanisms in more detail below, 
although we will not have time to look at the image transformation mechanism in detail56. 
Particularly, in this chapter we will look at the steps involved in the input side of the Image 
Generation process, especially in Section 4.3. For now we can observe that the Kosslyn 
Model involves the interaction of many different mechanisms in order for it to work 
correctly and because of this there are potentially a lot of different things that these can go 
wrong independently of each other. This flexibility in the ways that this system can break 
down will be crucial to explaining certain imagery deficits in Section 4.2. It should be 
noted that the complexity of this model is shaped by the available empirical data and is 
specifically designed to allow for this flexibility in explanation.  
 
                                               
56
 A detailed section on this was removed from the thesis to keep to the main focus of specifically analysing 
STIm. Suffice to say that there are some interesting ways of explaining how the motor areas may interact 
with visual imagery to aid image transformation in certain cases: e.g. rotating an object in the horizontal 
plane, is a bit like imagining walking around it. And this potentially offers a way of explaining how these 
capacities arose in the first place and is linked to the analysis of our ability to imagine other places in the 
analysis below. 
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Having said that, a full analysis of the data motivating this model would go beyond what I 
can do here, but to illustrate the most relevant points we can look at two crucial aspects. 
Firstly, we will look at evidence for overlap between the mechanisms used in vision and 
visual imagery under two seemingly different tasks, which are however predicted to use 
similar areas under the Kosslyn Model. Secondly, we can look at evidence from their 
dissociation where vision is lacking but visual imagery seems to persist, even though the 
visual buffer is severely damaged. Obviously identifying a single case of persisting visual 
imagery without a visual buffer would be a knock down counter example to the Kosslyn 
Model. Hence formulating a reply to it represents the crucial defence of this approach 
against what I think is the strongest challenge to it so far. This will be the final putative 
counter example I will deal with, before accepting the Kosslyn Model wholesale and 
utilising it more positively in the second half of the chapter. We can now explore how the 
Kosslyn Model is positively motivated and how it deals with some seemingly threatening 
counter examples. In doing so we will also get a better idea of how the Kosslyn Model is 
thought to support visual imagery. 
 
4.2 ± Evidence of overlap and dissociation 
4.2.1 - Overlapping evidence 
In the last chapter we looked at evidence from some experiments suggesting overlapping 
use of specifically the visual buffer in vision and visual imagery. In this section we will 
look at a more widespread overlapping use of the Kosslyn Model as a whole system. To 
show how robust their approach is various experiments have been designed by the Kosslyn 
Lab to test their model57. These involved conducting experiments on vision and 
visualization tasks that on the surface of it appear very dissimilar, but are predicted to show 
                                               
57
 The experiment described below is from Kosslyn, Thompson and Alpert (1997), but Kosslyn (pg.151-157) 
refers to many other papers to back his point up, and his lab has produced many of these papers. 
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major overlap if their model is correct. For instance, as introduced above, the Kosslyn 
Model predicts that in vision, when an object is not immediately recognised, areas 
UHVSRQVLEOHIRUµ,QIRUPDWLRQ6KXQWLQJ¶ZLOOVHQGVLJQDOVWRSULPHRWKHUDUHDVLQWKH233	
SPP streams, and prepare them to look for certain features in the visual buffer. Hence 
showing subjects non-canonical pictures of otherwise familiar object (e.g. a guitar from the 
end of the neck) can potentially stimulate this priming process. It was therefore predicted 
that all the visual mechanisms described above would be activated in this task.  
 
In imagery on the other hand, it is suggested a similar priming process occurs except in 
WKLVFDVHLWLVµVWURQJHQRXJKWKDWWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLVHYRNHGLQWKHHDUO\YLVXDOFRUWH[
UHFRQVWUXFWLQJWKHVKDSHRIWKHREMHFWLQWKHYLVXDOEXIIHU«¶.RVVO\QSJ7KHPDLQ
difference here is that you are not trying to categorise a perceived object, but generate an 
image of an object that is detailed enough to complete a task (e.g. the Rubiks Cube 
Problem). To test this second imagery case, they asked people to imagine the upper case 
version of a letter and asked them to judge whether a target X would fall where that letter 
would be on a 4x5 grid. See below for an illustration of this experiment: 
 
 
1) 
Task: 
Imagine an upper case 
OHWWHUµI¶DQGDQVZHUWKH
following.  
 
Would the x in the diagram 
adjacent fall on it if it were 
drawn there? 
 
2) 
4x5 grid and cross only: 
 
 
3) 
*ULGZLWK³LPDJLQHG´XSSHU±
case letter superimposed: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             Answer: yes it would. 
 
Figure 4.2 ± Illustration of imagery task described above: 
 from Kosslyn, Thompson and Alpert (1997) 
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Again it was predicted that all the main Kosslyn Model mechanisms and processes would 
be activated. So on the surface of it these seem like very different visual and visualization 
tasks: i.e. non-canonical object recognition vs. imaging a letter. Both seemingly involving 
very different mental capacities, but given the Kosslyn Model it was predicted that these 
processes would significantly overlap in brain areas activated. 
 
The results from the experiment broadly confirmed these predictions with some useful 
qualifications. On the whole there were 21 areas activated and 14 of these were activated in 
common, and all were in the expected areas of the brain. In addition 5 areas were only 
activated in the imagery task and 2 areas activated solely in the visual task. But although 
slightly different areas might have been used, these were in fact classed as different areas 
of the same mechanism or stream. Suggesting the same processes were used but in slightly 
different ways, which seems like a natural way to interpret the situation.  
 
In detail then, there were two areas associated with the SPP stream that were activated in 
both tasks, but there were also two areas associated with this stream that were activated 
only in the imagery task (50% disparity). Hence although the SPP stream was activated in 
both cases the actual way it was activated was slightly different. Additionally the OPP 
stream and the Associative Memory mechanism had 33% disparity, the Information 
Shunting had 25%, and most importantly the visual buffer shared all areas (no disparity). 
The latter result indicating that the visual buffer in general was used in both cases, 
although I assume there was a difference in strength of activation with the visual case 
being greater than the visualization case (see below). The predictive power of this test not 
only supports the general hypothesis, but the details of the areas activated also supports the 
individuation of the mechanisms. I am unaware of any specific objections to this evidence, 
other than general challenges to the Kosslyn Model, which are discussed next. 
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4.2.2 - Dissociation evidence  
The main challenge from the brain damage literature in this area comes from Bartolomeo 
(2002), who reviews a number of these cases and suggests there are some examples that 
put pressure on the Kosslyn Model. His first claim (Section.1) is quite weak, and suggests 
that in isolated imagery deficits, with no associated visual deficit, it is the temporal cortex 
that is always damaged in some way. However this from of dissociation is consistent with 
a problem with image generation in the Kosslyn Model rather than necessarily requiring a 
VHSDUDWHµLPDJHU\EXIIHU¶LQWKHWHPSRUDOFRUWH[DV%DUWRORPHRFODLPV,QRWKHUZRUGVWKLV
can be explained because the correct stimulus for generating an image from associative 
memory is not available and this could be due to damage to the temporal or the visual 
cortex, or both; the results will be the same as both are needed for depictive imagery. 
Hence an imagery deficit in a subject with an intact visual buffer is explained by an 
upstream problem with image generation consistent with temporal cortex damage that 
interferes with the OPP stream. These results therefore do not seriously challenge the 
Kosslyn Model.  
 
More challenging are reports from people with cortical blindness58 and extensive damage 
to the visual buffer areas, but who still retain some form of visual imagery ability 
(Bartolomeo 2002 Section 2.1). In response to this Kosslyn (pg.165) refers to detailed 
fMRI and PET studies conducted by his lab59, which indicate that although the visual 
buffer is active on both cases, generally less of the it is used in imagery than in perception 
(by about 25%). And further, that imagery activates the visual buffer much less strongly 
than in perception60. LeDGLQJ.RVVO\QHWDOWRVXJJHVWWKDWµ&OHDUO\VHQVRU\
                                               
58
 This is where the eyes are responsive and functioning and blindness is due to more upstream brain damage, 
usually to the primary visual cortex (V1: Area 17). 
59
 For PET scan results see Kosslyn, Thompson & Alpert (1997); for fMRI ± Ganis et al (2004 -especially 
pgs. 234-5). 
60
 Unfortunately I have been unable to find a percentage figure to put to this general claim. 
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input drives [the visual cortex] more strongly than input from information stored in 
PHPRU\¶7KLVPD\EHEHFDXVHLQSHUFHSWLRQPRUHSURFHVVLQJLVQHHGHGIURPWKHUDZ
sensory information (e.g. edge detection), and the stimulus is much stronger when 
generated externally rather than internally.  
 
This feature seems to match up with first person reports that generally vision is more vivid 
than imagery and hence is not really a surprising result. In contrast, with imagery the main 
features of basic objects may already be known and just the areas responsible for more 
general upstream processing may be required. For example, it may be that edge detection is 
not required to generate images from memory as this has already been processed in the 
original perceptual case. Hence it is possible for early processing areas in the visual buffer 
to be damaged and cause cortical blindness, while the areas required for imagery and more 
upstream visual processing to remain intact. It is tempting to suggest that Areas 17 and 18 
are used in vision, but only the upstream Area 18 is used in visual imagery, as this would 
fit nicely with this kind of explanation61. However this is not what Kosslyn claims and may 
be far too simplistic given the complex anterograde (forward) and retrograde (backwards) 
connections in the brain. Instead we may just have to say that as long as there are some 
parts of the visual buffer intact then it seems that visual imagery may be still be possible 
even though vision itself is prevented. 
 
To illustrate this point further lets look at a specific example of this challenge to see how 
well the Kosslyn Model deals with it. Bartolomeo (2002: 363) refers to a study by 
Goldenberg (1995) of a subject (+6ZLWK$QWRQ¶V6\QGURPH7KLVLQYROYHGFRUWLFDO
blindness due to almost complete destruction of the primary visual cortex (V1: Area17), 
combined with vivid hallucinations such that the subject sometimes felt she could really 
                                               
61
 Reminder: Area 17 is known as V1 and the primary visual cortex; Area 18 as V2 and the secondary visual 
cortex, and Area 19 as the associative visual cortex and thought to be used in long term visual memories. 
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µVHH¶WKLQJV&RPSOHWHGHQLDORIRQHVV\QGURPHLVUHIHUUHGWRDV$QRVRJQRVLDDQG$QWRQ¶V
Syndrome is characterised by claims of perception, followed by a re-arranging of the facts 
to explain cases where they find they get it wrong. In other words, they concoct stories to 
explain why WKHLU³YLVLRQ´OHWWKHPGRZQUDWKHUWKHQDFFHSWWKH\DUHEOLQGDQG
experiencing hallucinations. The pertinent facts to our discussion here is that H.S. still 
potentially had some areas of the visual buffer intact. Specifically H.S. had some unilateral 
(one side only) damage to Areas 18 and 19; and even Area 17 had isolated areas that 
seemed intact. This was to such an extent that H.S. eventually regained a small part of her 
vision. Which gives an indication of how far from complete the damage to her primary 
visual cortex was. Goldenberg summarises the situation like this (and see also pg. 1381 for 
a similar exposition): 
 
µ05,VKRZHGDQDOPRVWFRPSOHWHGHVWUXFWLRQRISULPDU\YLVXDOFRUWH[ZLWKVSDULQJ
of only small remainders of cortex at the occipital tip of the left upper calcarine lip. In 
the literature there are a few cases of denial of blindness with similarly severe 
damage to primary visual cortex but none with unequivocal evidence of complete 
destruction of primary visual cortex. We conclude that severe damage to primary 
visual cortex is compatible with visual imagery but that there is a possibility that 
islands of visual cortex must be spared to permit the generation of mental visual 
LPDJHV¶*ROGHQEHUJDEVWUDFW 
 
So it seems this was the most e[WUHPHH[DPSOHRI$QWRQ¶V6\QGURPHLQWKHOLWHUDWXUHDW
that time and yet this makes no real impact on the predictions of the Kosslyn Model. I 
would suggest that this is due to a lack of engagement with the details of the Kosslyn 
Model that predict more upstream areas of the visual buffer (e.g. Area 18) can be utilised 
for visual imagery. It will be interesting, as briefly alluded to in the last chapter, to see if 
the Kosslyn Model can be refined so that certain areas of the visual buffer can be 
associated with different kinds of imagery and perception, depending on the details of the 
task: e.g. does it require edge detection or just general colour and shape generation. That is 
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of course presuming that these can in principle be isolated and detected at such levels of 
detail. If this is possible it would allow further empirical work to attempt to detect more 
refined dissociations of what can be seen and imagined based on differential damage 
within the visual buffer itself. So this line of attack seems ineffective once the details of the 
Kosslyn Model are engaged with, but could lead to motivating finer grained refinements of 
the model in the future.  
 
However there is one last strong challenge from Bartolomeo (2002: 365) that I think gives 
another indication of the intricate nature of the current debate. Here he describes a subject 
0DGDPH'ZKRKDVGLIIHUHQWIRUPVRI9LVXDO$JQRVLDFDQ¶WQDPHREMHFWVIDFHVOHWWHUV
etc), but very clear, effortless and vivid imagery in the same domains. So much so that she 
complains of unnecessary tests on her imagery capabilities when it is clear she has a 
problem with her vision. In other words she is well aware of her condition and hence not 
also Anosognosic. Madame D has damage to Areas 18 and 19 bilaterally that extend to the 
temporal cortex on the left side, but importantly Area 17 is preserved.  
 
Bartolomeo suggests that it is only possible for Kosslyn to explain this dissociation by very 
specifically isolating damage between two processes that he suggests should be physically 
close to each other in the brain. These are: on the one hand, the projections from the visual 
buffer to the temporal cortex (forward or anterograde projections); and on the other hand, 
those involved in the reverse process in imagery (reverse or retrograde projections). 
Bartolomeo suggests that damage to one stream and not the other is quite unlikely as the 
ORFDWLRQRIWKHµFHUHEUDOZKLWHPDWWHU¶VXSSRUWLQJWKHVHSURMHFWLRQVDUHVRFORVHWRJHWKHU
that they are more likely to be damaged together. In other words it seems unlikely that 
bottom-up perceptual processing would be so extensively damaged, while top-down 
imagistic processing would be entirely preserved. One would expect some deterioration of 
134 
0DGDPH'¶VLPDJHU\FDSDFLWLHVEXWQRQHLVHYLGHQW7KLs argument is possibly even more 
of a challenge than Bartolomeo thinks, because he assumes that the intact Area 17 explains 
why imagery is possible at all, and why he focuses on the links between the visual buffer 
and the OPP. Where as from the above we can see that actually bilateral damage to Areas 
18 (also visual buffer) and Areas 19 (in the OPP stream) might make matters worse for the 
Kosslyn Model. 
 
Kosslyn does not respond to this point directly, but I think that a response is possible. This 
is because although damage that is quite this specific is unlikely, it is not impossible. And 
given the example of overlapping areas above, we can see that differential damage and 
VXEVHTXHQWGLVVRFLDWLRQLVDOORZHGIRULQWKHPRGHO+HQFH.RVVO\QVXJJHVWVµ«ZHZRXld 
be surprised if imagery and perception could not be dissociated. As we have seen 
previously, they are not identical; rather, the two functions draw on most- but not all ±of 
WKHVDPHEUDLQUHJLRQV¶SJ+HQFHWKHFULWLFLVPGLVFXVVHGKHUHPD\MXVWEe an 
example of an unlikely freak combination that shows this dissociation potential in its most 
extreme and refined form. It may also be that there are different paths available for image 
JHQHUDWLRQWKDWDUHQ¶WORFDWHGVRQHDUWKHIRUZDUGSURMHFWLRQVIURP the visual buffer to the 
temporal cortex. For example it may be that the backward paths he refers to are actually 
more essential for the non-canonical recognition process rather than for imagery, and 
image generation is a relatively more plastic and distributed pathway. So although the 
areas used for imagery and vision generally overlap, this does not mean they cannot be 
damaged differentially in rare cases. 
 
What Bartolomeo and any other critic needs to do in order to disprove the Kosslyn Model, 
is to show that high-resolution depictive visual imagery can persist with complete 
destruction of the visual buffer; that is with complete damage to all topographically 
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organised areas in the visual cortex. No such study exists I presume or it would have been 
discussed in the literature by now. So for now we can suggest that the Kosslyn Model can 
cope with the known empirical data due to the intricacy of its conception. Which of course 
is no accident since this is exactly what it was designed to do. Hence confirming its 
principled construction (i.e. its not ad hoc or post hoc) and its considerable predictive 
power, testability and robustness. 
 
For someone like Bartolomeo who still thinks that visual imagery is more likely to be 
GHSHQGHQWRQDVHSDUDWHµLPDJHU\EXIIHU¶LQWKHWHPSRUDOFRUWH[WKHUHDOVRUHPDLQVWKH
challenge to explain away the positive data referred to by Kosslyn. Which is that the visual 
buffer is always active in depictive imagery. If it is not essential, then why does it fire? 
And note that arguments suggesting it is epiphenomenal would be fairly weak, since as we 
have discussed in the last chapter, the brain is a power hungry organ and unnecessary firing 
of neurons would be far from epiphenomenal. This is because it would presumably incur a 
severe disadvantage to an organism in terms of wasted energy. So much so that it is 
unlikely that this excessive firing would have avoided de-selection over the generations. I 
would suggest that the associated firings in the visual buffer are much more likely to be 
functional, and most likely it is functional in a way that mimics its well-established online 
function of sub-serving visual style experiences. If it supports bottom-up online visual 
experience then most likely, all other things being equal, it is a good candidate to support 
top-down vision-like experiences when it is re-used for another purpose offline (i.e. visual 
imagery). 
 
For me, it makes sense that as long as the visual buffer contains the right information to 
support vision (e.g. shapes, depths, colours), then this way of representing 3D objects 
could also be parsimoniously used to support visual imagery in some fairly similar way. 
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Why bother forming a whole new brain area to do this? Especially in an area like the 
temporal cortex that is set up to name objects and form memories, and not to process 
hybrid depictive data. It is worth noting here that I assume agnosic subjects do actually 
KDYHDSKHQRPHQDOH[SHULHQFHDQGDFWXDOO\µVHH¶WKHVKDSHRIWKHREMHFWVLWVMXVWWKH\FDQW
recognise or name theP7KLVLVVXSSRUWHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWWKH\GRQ¶WFRPSODLQRI
blindness, just an inability to recognise and name things. Hence while it may be classed as 
a general perceptual recognition problem, it may not be a problem with generating 
phenomenal experience in the first place. Hence it seems that the visual buffer can be 
further isolated as essential for vision-like phenomenal experience. These last points also 
give us an intuitive reason for favouring the Kosslyn Model: supporting phenomenal visual 
imagery just seems a priori like the right function for the visual buffer to be involved in, 
since it also seems crucial in supporting our online phenomenal visual experience; and 
further it seems that the temporal cortex just seems to be specialised in a different task and 
hence is a less likely candidate for underpinning visual imagery. 
 
We can also suggest that the Kosslyn Model is so well entrenched and tuned in with the 
current empirical data, that barring a whole-sale rejection of many of the supporting 
experLPHQW¶VYDOLGLW\WKHQLWLVPRUHOLNHO\WRQHHGVOLJKWPRGLILFDWLRQVWKDQVXIIHU
outright falsification as new empirical data emerges. This modification may take the form 
of: defining exactly which areas of the visual buffer are used in certain forms of imagery; 
which parts of the SSP and OPP streams are used when; and more detail in how the 
³VSDWLDOEXIIHU´ZRUNVDQGLQWHUDFWVZLWKWKHYLVXDOEXIIHUVHHDOVREHORZ6RRQWKH
whole this looks like a theory that has the potential to fully explain the mechanisms 
involved in visual imagery in quite fine detail and is therefore, in my opinion, a sensible 
SRVLWLRQWRDGRSWDWSUHVHQW,FHUWDLQO\FDQ¶WUHDOO\FRPSHWHZLWK.RVVO\Q¶V\UV
experience of study on this subject, but have hopefully done just enough to satisfy myself 
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(and hopefully the reader) that this theory of mental imagery is very plausible and hence 
naturally becomes leader in its field. Therefore I will assume I am reasonably justified in 
adopting it for the remainder of the thesis. While at the same time accepting that this is a 
foundation that can be returned to and questioned at any time in the future. So from this 
point forward I feel I have defended the Kosslyn Model in enough detail to justify adopting 
it without qualification in what follows. At any rate the veracity of the model will be the 
assumption for the remainder of the thesis and hence will be used as a platform for further 
analysis. 
 
4.2.3 ± Dissociation evidence from Neglect and the SPP stream 
As a way of summarising and generalising the form of the argument given immediately 
above, we can perhaps now look at how it might deal with dissociation evidence from 
Neglect due to damage to the SPP stream. The general form of the argument above, as I 
see it, is that there are at least two ways that vision and/or visual imagery can be variously 
affected. The first way is where an involved mechanism is damaged and hence cannot 
operate as it is supposed to. This could be due to damage to the visual buffer itself or a 
mechanism that usually provides relevant information to it. The second way is where the 
communication paths between two involved mechanisms are disrupted and information 
that is being passed between the two is prevented from doing so in some way. This would 
involve damage to the forward or backward projections between the two mechanisms as 
discussed above. In addition to this there are various permutations of each type of damage 
where only partial or one-way damage occurs. For instance, a mechanism might only be 
partially damaged so that it can do some operations but not others, or the connections 
between the two mechanisms are only damaged in one direction or only partially damaged 
in one or both ways. Finally we can envisage situations where there may be a complex and 
subtle combination of both types of damage. For example, where there is partial damage to 
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the visual buffer and partial damage to its network of connections to other mechanisms. 
The sum total of these permutations means that there are many different ways that this 
system can go wrong and hence this re-HQIRUFHV.RVVO\Q¶VFODLPWKDWLWZRXOGEH
surprising if we did not see dissociations between our visual capacities and our ability to 
generate and manipulate visual images. 
 
We can now perhaps apply this general line of argument to specific cases of damage to the 
SPP stream, and hence potentially explain double dissociations in the field of Visual 
Neglect. 7KLVLVZKHUHRQHVLGHRIWKHYLVXDOILHOGLVQ¶WH[SHULHQFHGDQGWKHUHDUH
corresponding cases if neglect in imagery where one side of a visual image is not 
experienced. This latter form of imagery specific Neglect, is referred to as 
Representational Neglect62. As mentioned above the main disorder associated with 
problems with the SPP stream and damage to the parietal cortex is generally referred to as 
Neglect, because it sometimes leads to the affected individual neglecting a certain part of 
their full potential experiential range. Due to certain processing features of the brain it is 
most commonly the left hand side that is neglected, and I will only refer to this variety in 
what follows63. In extreme cases of Neglect individuals will fail to shave, or put make up 
on, the left hand side of their face. And when combined with Anosognosia, they may deny 
that their left hand or arm belongs to them, or that there is anything wrong with their 
limited visual processing. For example, they may try to throw their own leg out of bed 
EHFDXVHWKH\WKLQNLWVVRPHRQHHOVH¶VDQGWKH\ZRQWVHHDQ\WKLQJZURQJZLWKMXVWGUDZLQJ
the right hand side of everyday objects like houses and butterflies. This leads some 
researchers to comment that it is as if the left hand side of their environment ceases to exist 
                                               
62
 C.f. Bartolomeo et al (1994) and Rode et al (2007). 
63
 This is thought to be due to their being some redundancy in processing information for the right hand side 
in the right hemisphere of the brain, which allows it to compensate and represent both sides if necessary. This 
is thought to be linked to the fact that in most cases more of the left-brain is devoted to processing language 
and meaning, and the right hand side is more concerned with spatial processing. I suggest that focusing on 
left side neglect simplifies discussions without loosing any real explanatory benefit in this context. 
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(c.f. Becchio 2005: 484). The idea that damage to the SPP stream seems to prevent us from 
experiencing external objects will become crucial in discussions in Chapter 7, when I talk 
about representing external objects based on integrating information in the visual buffer 
with an online egocentric coordinate system. Hence much of what I will discuss here is 
setting the stage for my final theory, which will draw together all these strands in the final 
chapter. So in summary: in Visual Neglect it is usually the left side of the visual field that 
is not attended to or fails to be represented and a similar thing happens in Representational 
Neglect, where details on the left hand side of the visual images are not reported. 
 
,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWWKHWHUPµ1HJOHFW¶PLJKWEHVWEHVHHQDVDQXPEUHOODWHUPIRUD
collection of mental syndromes that include attentional and representational deficits 
amongst other things (perhaps in a similar way to autism spectrum disorder). In a recent 
review of the current opinion on Neglect, Bartolomeo (2007: 384) suggests that Neglect 
PD\EHVWEHVHHQDVµdysfunction of large-scale right-KHPLVSKHUHQHWZRUNV¶ZKHUHVSDWLDO
information involved in attention salience and representation are variously disrupted across 
a number of modalities. Hence we would expect that different parts of the network can be 
affected differently depending on the location of the brain lesions, and this links well with 
.RVVO\Q¶VPHWKRGRIH[SODLQLQJVRPHRIWKHGRXEOHGLVVRFLDWLRQVREVHUYHGLQWKLV
syndrome. Some examples of the range of these dissociations are as follows: in Neglect, 
not only can visual imagery and vision both be affected together (Bartolomeo et al 1994, 
Rode et al 2007, Bisiach at al 1979); but also, vision can be spared and imagery affected 
(Guariglia et al 1993, Ortigue et al 2001, Coslett 1997); or imagery can be spared and only 
vision affected (Anderson et al 1993, Coslett 1997); and there is even one reported case of 
right visual neglect and left representational neglect (Beschin et al 2000)64.  
                                               
64
 The above list is based on Rode at al (2007: 435). And note that the Guariglia et al (1993) paper reports 
isolated damage to the right frontal lobe so we can immediately suggest that this explains a top-down 
problem with imagery instigation, which would not necessarily effect perception. 
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Whilst investigating and analysing each of these cases in detail would be an interesting 
project, this unfortunately falls outside the main remit of this thesis; although this is 
something I would certainly like to continue to do in future65. This is especially true since 
they do not directly threaten the Kosslyn Model, since a similar reply to that given in 
Section 4.2 can also be used to explain these double dissociations. Specifically we can 
suggest that, although the visual buffer is intact in each case, we can potentially explain 
these various deficits by identifying damage to: either mechanisms feeding the visual 
buffer itself; or to the pathways that help these mechanisms communicate with each other; 
or to a combination of the two, as discussed above. And since vision and visual imagery 
use some, but not all, of the same mechanisms and pathways, there is potential for these 
two abilities to be affected differently or in the same way. Hence in principle the Kosslyn 
Model can fairly easily accommodate these sorts of results. I will touch on a few of these 
issues by giving specific examples in the next section, where we will investigate certain 
ways that the visual buffer could be filled in or accessed in an incomplete way. And we 
will discuss how this could lead to people only reporting half of the information normally 
available in an episode of imagery. But for now this completes my introduction and 
defence of the Kosslyn Model as a whole system. In the next section I will start the job of 
explaining how this can be seen as a good candidate for an offline simulation process. 
 
4.3 ± The Kosslyn Model as an offline simulation process 
In this section I will begin to analyse how the whole Kosslyn Model described above, can 
be seen as an offline simulation process. Some of this analysis will be based on developing 
Figure 2.2 from Chapter 2, which illustrated a generic offline simulation process (an 
                                               
65
 A Kosslyn style meta-analysis (c.f. Kosslyn et al 2006 - Appendix) of all these papers and exactly what 
tasks are being conducted, and where the brain lesions are, would seem a good way of doing this. Some of 
this has already been done for the background research for this chapter. 
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updated version is given below). In detail this will involve taking a closer look at a few of 
the core simulation mechanisms proposed in Section 2.2.3 and seeing how they can be 
merged or identified with mechanisms in the Kosslyn Model. While previously I 
introduced seven mechanisms involved in the simulation process, I will not be able to 
analyse each one in the same amount of detail. Hence I will focus on what I see as the most 
crucial ones to this context. In any case, certain of the more general mechanisms, such as 
the Interpretation Capacity and the Executive Controller, can only be given a very broad 
treatment. This is because they are much more abstract and distributed mechanisms and are 
hence less well understood (but see Chapter 6 for more on the Interpretation Capacity). 
 
To remind you of the generic offline simulation mechanisms that we might look for in the 
Kosslyn Model, I repeat Figure 2.2 below, but update it and make it specific to visual 
imagery. I have labeled some of the mechanisms with suggestions of the mechanism from 
the Kosslyn Model that seem most likely to fulfill this role. Justifying these designations 
will occupy most of the rest of this chapter and the remainder of the thesis. In the 
remainder of this chapter, I will mainly focus on the input (left) side of the diagram and 
look in detail at how the visual buffer may be filled-in appropriately by internal means in 
visual imagery. By internally I mean from other areas of the brain, as opposed to external 
stimulus received from light hitting the eyes. This analysis will involve looking mainly at 
potential candidates for the Offline Input Identifier Mechanism and the Offline Feeder 
Mechanism,ZLOODEEUHYLDWHWKHVHWRµ,GHQWLILHU 0HFKDQLVP¶DQGµ)HHGHU0HFKDQLVP¶
respectively from now on for ease of reference. The remaining main output mechanisms 
will be discussed in the following chapters, where we will look more at the eventual output 
from this process in terms of the phenomenal visual image itself and its eventual 
interpretation. It is worth just mentioning again explicitly that I will assume from now on 
that the Visual Buffer, as described by the Kosslyn Model, is the equivalent of the Main 
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Mechanism in the simulation process that is run offline to support visual imagery. 
Establishing this has been the main purpose of the thesis so far and hence I will not justify 
this anymore in what follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 ± Schematic of the proposed main components involved in full offline simulation 
involved in willed visual imagery under the Kosslyn Model 
 
 
As you can see I have repeated all the mechanisms from Figure 2.2 in the diagram above 
and appended each one with a vision specific suggestion that I will explain in the 
following. Unfortunately, on the input side (left side), I will also not be able to look in 
detail at the Internal Stimulus and the Simulation Motivator Mechanism and only make the 
following brief comments. By Internal Stimulus I mean the thing that triggers the call for 
an episode of imagination. This can be as simple as coming to a point in a long thought 
process which leads you to a realisation that generating a visual image may help solve the 
problem. This could be fairly obviously consciously willed and deliberate (e.g. the Rubiks 
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Cube Problem), but it can also happen in a fairly automatic or sub-conscious way66. Both 
of these would count as an Internal Stimulus to generate an episode of visual imagery, and 
I will focus on obviously consciously willed episodes in this context.  
 
Once this stimulus is generated it sends signals to the Simulation Motivator Mechanism, 
which is what sets the whole process in motion by activating the other mechanisms 
necessary for imagery to occur. Its main job is to send signals to the Identifier Mechanism 
with information of what is to be imagined in order to solve the task at hand. For instance: 
if it is a Rubiks Cube you need to imagine, then this mechanism will motivate the search 
for the parameters of a Rubiks Cube to be drawn together; if it is windows in your house 
you need to count, then this will motivate the search for the parameters to do with the lay 
out of your house to be gathered together; and so on for other objects that may be required 
in your imagery process. Hence it is the Simulation Motivator Mechanism that sends the 
calls out to other mechanisms to start the process and indicates what is required for an 
appropriate episode of imagery to occur.  
 
Given what I have said about these two very upstream mechanisms, we can perhaps 
speculate that failure of either of these processes might lead to an inability to generate 
phenomenal imagery in the first place, even though all the other mechanisms in the system 
may be intact. It may also be that these mechanisms are under developed in certain people 
and may explain the variability in our reliance on visual imagery for thinking. For 
example, this may explain why a small minority of subjects, as discussed in Section 3.4, 
                                               
66
 I appreciate that imagery can initially be stimulated by external sources (e.g. asking someone a problem), 
but I would still suggest this then requires some internal recognition within that problem solving thought 
process that a visual image may be helpful. At any rate this is the kind of process I will focus on here, hence 
WKLVGRHVQ¶WVSHFLILFDOO\GHDOZLWKPRUHVHHPLQJO\VSRQWDQHRXVIRUPVRILPDJHU\WKDWPD\DULVHLQUHVSRQVH
to, for example, a smell or a sound: e.g. a smell of perfume giving rise to a visualization of the face of your 
first lover. Again, I think this is an aspect that could be easily dealt with by extending this model but would 
fall outside the main focus of this project. 
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fail to experience any imagery at all67. Perhaps this is because they: either never really 
realise they have a need to form it (internal stimulus deficit); or they cannot motivate an 
episode of it even if they think it will be useful (simulation motivator deficit)68. So the 
above gives us a brief description of what unique roles these two steps on the input side 
may provide. Given that we can now start to look at some more crucial down stream input 
mechanisms. We will start by looking at potential candidates for the Identifier Mechanism 
in the next sub-section, and then look at the Feeder Mechanism in the sub-section after 
that. 
 
4.3.1 ± Offline Input Identifier Mechanism   (Identifier Mechanism) 
The role of this mechanism is to identify the correct parameters that should be sent to the 
visual buffer so that they can be depictively represented there and can subsequently lead to 
the generation of a task appropriate visual image. For instance, once the Simulation 
Motivator has sent out the calls to gather data together to use in generating an image of a 
Rubiks Cube, it is this mechanism that actually does the searching for these parameters and 
makes them accessible. It seems to me that there are two potential ways that the Identifier 
Mechanism could work within the Kosslyn Model. One involves mainly the OPP stream 
on its own and the other involves both the OPP and SPP stream. The former would involve 
imagining an object without particularly needing to locate it anywhere specific spatially, 
and the latter would involve integrating with the SPP stream in order to delimit what is 
imagined based on some spatial specifications69. It should be noted that the net effect of 
                                               
67
 Recall this was based on a survey asking researchers in this field if they experience imagery and how this 
affected their interpretation of the Imagery Debate: as discussed in Kosslyn [pg. 179-180]. 
68
 This way of talking parallels a possible explanation of Autism under an Autism-as-failure-of-imagination 
approach suggested by Currie (1996:249). This may represent just one way that autistic individuals might 
have different minds from normal people, in that it may prevent them solving puzzles and imaginatively 
SURMHFWLQJWRRWKHUSHRSOH¶VSHUVSHFWLYH1%WKLVZDVWKHLQLWLDOVRXrce for suggesting this mechanism in the 
first place. 
69
 $QGQRWHWKDWLQERWKFDVHVWKHLPDJHZLOOHYHQWXDOO\EHH[SHULHQFHGµVSDWLDOO\¶LQWHUPVRILWEHLQJDQ
apparent 3D object that takes up space. The distinction here is whether it is imagined in a specific spatially 
located context: e.g. a 3D object in your office, compared with the same object in your bedroom. 
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each process is to make sure the correct information is accessed from the Associative 
Memory Mechanism, which is then sent to the Visual Buffer. Hence I have appended the 
Identifier Mechanism in Figure 4.3 with the Associative Memory label, as I think it is the 
most likely candidate for this mechanism. We will return to look at each of the two 
potential processes introduced immediately above later in this sub-section. Before doing 
that I will briefly introduce a distinction between allocentric and egocentric coordinate 
systems that will be helpful in the following analysis. This talk of different coordinate 
systems will also provide a platform for moving on to talk about externally and non-
externally represented objects in Section 7.3.2. 
 
i) Allocentric vs. egocentric coordinate systems 
As alluded to earlier, egocentric coordinates are literally self-centred coordinates and are 
those that pertain to a location of objects relative to the subject. Allocentric coordinates, on 
the other hand, are independent of the location of the subject and refer to the location of 
objects relative to other objects, or to the relative location of pertinent features within an 
object. For example, a cube must have corners at equidistant allocentric coordinates by 
definition, irrespective of where it is located relative to you. Consider the following quote 
from Goodale and Murphy (2000) to illustrate this distinction in coordinate systems 
further: 
µ7RUHLWHUDWHDOORFHQWULFVSDWLDOLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKHOD\RXWRIREMHFWVLQWKH
visual scene is computed by the ventral [OPP] stream mechanisms (which mediate 
conscious perception), while precise egocentric spatial information about the 
location of an object in body-centred frame of reference is computed by the dorsal 
>633@VWUHDPPHFKDQLVPVZKLFKPHGLDWHWKHDXWRPDWLFYLVXDOFRQWURORIDFWLRQ¶
Goodale and Murphy (2000: 192 ± square brackets added) 
 
They base their distinction on a subject DF who seems to have relatively little problem 
reaching for things (egocentric processing), but has problems judging the relative distances 
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between objects (allocentric processing). In tests she can point to a number of counters 
accurately but struggles when asked to reproduce their relative locations by copying their 
arrangement with identical counters. This is interpreted as being due to an intact egocentric 
processing stream, but a dysfunctional allocentric processing stream. The details of this 
study are relatively un-important here and I just mention them as an example of the 
principled use of these different coordinate systems in the literature. However it is worth 
noting that the quote above does in fact also act to indirectly support the visual stream 
bifurcation used in Kosslyn Model. 
 
The main point of introducing these distinctions here is to illustrate how egocentric 
coordinates seem more linked to determining the external coordinates of objects, because 
they determine where the object is in the environment relative to the observer70. Where as 
allocentric coordinates seem more detached from absolute location relative to the observer, 
because they remain constant across perspectives. This may make them more useful in 
certain problem solving tasks where the relative shapes and sizes of objects is more 
important, than actually where they are in the world compared to where you are. To 
illustrate this, it seems that solving the Rubiks Cube Problem relies more heavily on 
DOORFHQWULFFRRUGLQDWHVEHFDXVHLWGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\PDWWHUZKHUHWKHREMHFWLVUHODWLYHWR\RX
to complete the task, as long as you get the internal geometric relations correct: e.g. the 
equidistant sides essential to a cube and the way it is divided up into three rows and 
columns. This is even though of course it may be still be necessary to take a certain 
µVWDQGDUG¶GHIDXOWHJRFHQWULFSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHLPDJLQHGVLWXDWLRQ5HJDUGLQJWKDW,ZRXOG
suggest that, broadly speaking, the default imagery perspective we employ is just to 
imagine the object directly in front of you, at some middle distance, at which the object is 
                                               
70
 There are many ways to define egocentric coordinates e.g. somatocentric (body) vs. cephalocentric (head) 
vs. retinocentric (eyes) coordinate systems (Mesulam 1999). But since I am interested in the visual field I 
will be assuming retinocentric coordinates, but refer to the unified single visual field produced from 
information detected by both eyes. 
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most commonly encountered from. So unless a specific egocentric location is crucial to the 
task at hand, then a default one may be used that is probably the one most commonly 
experienced or is just simple to use and ameneable to the task at hand. I wont say much 
more about the allocentric coordinate system in what follows. I only introduce it here to 
offer a contrast to the egocentric coordinate system, which I will say much more about in 
what follows. 
 
So given the above, how does it help us here? Well perhaps imagining a Rubiks Cube is an 
example of how Associative Memory could be accessed directly in the OPP stream with a 
minimal demand for accessing the SPP stream. That is a default egocentric perspective is 
adopted and the Rubiks Cube is imagined using mainly the most familiar parameters stored 
in memory of its shape, colours and other intra-object details (e.g. texture). In contrast to 
this we might try imaging the Rubiks Cube in a familiar location from a certain 
perspective, such as waking up with it at the end of our bed, and try to remember what else 
we might see from that perspective. In this situation it may be important to access the SPP 
stream to set the imagined egocentric position and to delimit what might also be seen from 
there. This is as well as using it to delimit the relative size and shape of the Rubiks Cube in 
that spatial context. At that point the correct parameters can be sent from the SPP stream to 
the Associative Memory centres to retrieve the shapes and colours of those objects, which 
can then be depictively represented in the correct relative locations in the visual buffer. 
This in turn is what controls what is subsequently visually imagined. In this latter example, 
merging with the SPP stream in an appropriate manner would be crucial to the appropriate 
FRPSOHWLRQRIWKLVWDVN7RLOOXVWUDWHWKLVIXUWKHUOHW¶VORRNDWDQH[DPSOHRIZKHUHWKLV
integration might go wrong and we may be unable to retrieve the correct depictive 
information due to damage to the SPP stream.  
 
148 
ii) the Piazza Del Duomo Example 
Perhaps the most famous example of where this system can go wrong is from the 
Representational Neglect literature. For example, in a classic study by Bisiach and Luzzatti 
(1978), they asked a subject with associated Visual and Representational Neglect to 
describe from memory the Piazza del Duomo when viewed from opposite ends of the 
square. In both cases the same subject managed to omit features on the left hand side, even 
though they are included in the description based on the view from the other end. This 
shows that this disorder is not due to memory loss, but due to an exclusion of details on the 
left side of the remembered scene from a certain perspective. The simple explanation of 
this is that their imagery deficit seems to be matching the actual visual deficit they would 
have, were they to actually view the square from these same positions. This seems to 
indicate that there is something in common in the incomplete way these scenes are 
experienced by the subject in vision and visual imagery. 
 
In terms of explaining this phenomenon we need to be aware that there is currently a 
debate about whether Visual and Representational Neglect is mainly due to an inability to 
represent the left hand side of the scene, or an inability to attend to it. We can see that both 
approaches would explain why features on the left hand side are omitted from visual and 
remembered reports in the Piazza Del Duomo example. If they are represented but not 
attended to, they will be ignored and not reported. If they are not represented in the first 
place, then no amount of attending to the left side will reveal the relevant details for 
reporting. Unfortunately, once again I have to say that, although investigating the debate in 
this area would be fascinating and instructive, and is something I would ideally like to 
return to in future, this would also fall outside the main remit of this thesis. It will suffice 
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to say here that there is evidence either way and it seems that both explanations of Neglect 
have some merit in different situations71.  
 
7KHUHDVRQZHGRQ¶WQHHGWRJRLQWRWKHGHWDLOVKHUHLVWKDWWKH.RVVO\Q0RGHOFDQ
potentially accommodate both approaches to explaining Representational Neglect. This is 
because we can explain a representationally based deficit by suggesting the visual buffer 
fails to be filled with the information that would normally underpin a visual image of the 
left hand side of the scene. This could be because only half the normal information is being 
identified in the SPP stream, which also seems to be having problems processing this 
information in the online visual case. In terms of the attention based explanation, it may be 
that the visual buffer is actually being filled-in completely and in an appropriate manner, it 
is just that it may not be being accessed fully, or the eventual image that is generated is not 
being attended to properly. So once again the Kosslyn Model seems flexible enough to 
accommodate with both these explanations.  
 
The point of introducing this example here was to show what might happen if the SPP 
VWUHDPGRHVQ¶WLQWHUDFWZLWKWKHUHVWRIWKHLPDJHU\V\VWHPFRUUHFWO\6SHFLILFDOO\ZHPD\
loose the ability to imagine certain scenes with the appropriate spatial properties. So in the 
process of discussing this deficit we have also described in more detail the second way that 
the visual buffer could be filled by a combination of the Associative Memory mechanism, 
the OPP stream and the SPP stream. And along with the OPP stream and Associative 
Memory only example (default perspective on a scene), this gives us at least two ways that 
                                               
71
 See Bartolomeo (2007) for a good review of the current thinking in this area. As an example of the use of 
IDPLOLDUODQJXDJH5RGHHWDOGLVFXVVHYLGHQFHWKDWWKH\FRQFOXGHLVµfar more consistent with a 
working memory/image generation defect account of representational neglect than they are with a directed 
DWWHQWLRQGHIHFWDFFRXQW¶6HHDOVR%UHZHUIRUDQHDUO\SKLORVRSKLFDODQDO\VLVRIWKLVILHOGWKDW
concludes that one should be wary of trying to oversimplify explanations in this field by reducing them to 
one single root cause or another (this again parallels earlier warnings about Neglect and those to do with 
autism spectrum disorder in other parts of the thesis). 
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the Associative Memory Mechanism could be seen as equivalent to the Identifier 
Mechanism in the simulation diagram given above. To summarise the two ways discussed 
here: the first way relied mainly on the OPP stream and made few demands on the SPP 
stream, perhaps by using only a default egocentric perspective to delimit what was sent to 
the visual buffer. The second needed to be much more spatially specific and hence drew on 
the SPP stream to delimit what was present in the scene, and this was then used to guide 
what information is eventually sent to the visual buffer.  
 
In general terms the identification of Associate Memory with the Identifier Mechanism 
seems fairly intuitive. This is because if Associative Memory is used online in identifying 
objects by matching them to certain stored parameters. Then it makes sense to access these 
same stored parameters to guide how the visual buffer should be filled in the offline case. 
Therefore I think the above gives a fairly good defence of identifying the Identifier 
Mechanism with the Associative Memory Mechanism as it is utilised in the Kosslyn 
Model. It also seems that in the process of defending this match-up, we have also learnt 
more about how the SPP and OPP streams might interact with the Associative Memory 
Mechanisms and the Visual Buffer to support imagery that is specific about is spatial 
context. This marks a major step in explaining at least the spatial part of Spatio-temporal 
Imagination. I will return to discuss this more in Chapter 6 and we can perhaps now look at 
the next downstream input mechanism. 
 
4.3.2 ± Offline Feeder Mechanism   (Feeder Mechanism) 
The role of the Feeder Mechanism is to actually feed the relevant information gathered 
from Associative Memory into the visual buffer. Hence we need to look for examples of 
mechanisms that seem able to fill-in the visual buffer with depictive information internally. 
Within the Kosslyn Model, as described above, Kosslyn suggest one possible way that the 
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visual buffer gets filled-in by a method that is similar to a search priming process; and I 
will say a little bit more about that here. However I would also like to briefly introduce the 
idea that a visual emulator might also be available for the same purpose. While I will not 
be able to provide an argument that can discriminate which process is more likely to 
operate, my main purpose here is simply to show that there are at least two options on the 
table at present; even though the second option will turn out to be slightly less well 
supported at present. It is however possible that it in the future we will discover that these 
two processes in fact work together to fulfil this role. The main benefits of both these 
approaches is that they build up from already existant mechanisms involved in online 
vision, and hence allow a potentially more parsimonious explanation of their development 
into a mechanism available for offline processing. This then lends itself to evolutionary 
style explanations of how they may have emerged, by suggesting they developed for an 
online purpose in the first place, and then got commandeered for an offline one later. And 
while I wont elaborate on the ideas behind this approach here, I did make some comments 
to this effect in Section 2.2.372. We can now look at the two possible candidates for the 
Feeder Mechanism that I have identified, starting with seeing it as an adapted search 
priming process. 
 
i) Feeder Mechanism as an Adapted Search Priming Process 
As described at the start of the chapter, the Kosslyn Model predicts that the processes 
normally used for non-canonical object recognition might be similar to those used for 
image generation. This is where information from the Associative Memory areas are 
broadcast to other areas (e.g. Information Shunting and Attention Shifting), so that useful 
features can be searched for in the visual scene. Kosslyn calls this search priming and this 
                                               
72
 Recall I quoted Currie and Ravenscroft (1997: 177) and Currie (1995a) suggesting that it may be a good 
evolutionaU\WULFNWRFRPPDQGHHUDOUHDG\H[LVWDQWPHFKDQLVPVLQDµSDUDVLWLF¶ZD\EHFDXVHWKLVOHDGVWRD
more parsimonious explanation of how these offline mechanisms could develop, all other things being equal. 
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enables a slow, more involved method, of object recognition. They explain how this relates 
to generating imagery in the following quote: 
µ$FFRUGLQJWRRXUWKHRU\WKHVDPHPHFKDQLVPWKDWLVLQYROYHGLQSULPLQJWKH
stored representation of a distinctive part that one expects to see during perception 
is also used to prime the representation during imagery. In imagery, however, the 
priming is strong enough that the representation is evoked in early visual cortex, 
reconstructing the shaSHRIWKHREMHFWLQWKHYLVXDOEXIIHU¶.RVVO\QHWDO
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They also refer to Kosslyn (1994) for details of the neural implementation of this process73. 
From these two sources we can gather that although these two processes are similar, there 
is one crucial difference. That is, in non-canonical object recognition the primed areas do 
not go so far as filling-in the visual buffer, they just alert other areas to search for certain 
things within it. In other words, they are primed to check for certain expected patterns in 
the visual buffer. 
 
In terms of imagery on the other hand, the extended claim from Kosslyn is that in image 
generation this process is to a certain degree more active. So much so that in the imagery 
version of the priming process it starts to actually affect the contents of the visual buffer to 
such an extent that it actually starts to insert depictive contents into it. These internally 
generated contents then somehow form the basis for the eventual vision-like image we 
experience. Maybe we can describe the transition from one process to other like this: we 
are looking so hard for a certain feature that in the end we start to generate an image of it in 
our minds. That is, the priming is so strong that the features we are looking for, somehow 
actually get inserted into the visual buffer, and this is the basis for the eventually 
experienced visual image. In terms of our eventual capacity for fully willed imagery, it 
seems that at some point this ability would have to have come under conscious control so 
                                               
73
 And this feature is particularly discussed and built up in the last three chapters of that book. 
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that, instead of just searching for objects and imagining them, we eventually could just 
imagine any object that we wanted to irrespective of the current visual context. So perhaps 
it is this that formed the basis of a separate visual imagery capacity that we can now 
completely separate from a search priming process. At this point an adapted search 
priming process can be accessed at will to fill-in the visual buffer with information relevant 
to the task, as delimited by upstream processes, and as discussed above. 
 
Perhaps then this suggests one way that data stored into the Associative Memories is used 
in a top-down (retrograde) manner to generate information that the Feeder Mechanism 
inserts into the visual buffer. To a certain extent this is a reversal of the normal object 
recognition process: where instead of trying to recognise objects represented by data in the 
visual buffer which is fed upstream; we are using stored information of previously 
recognised objects, so we can send them back downstream to feed into the visual buffer. 
However this data, which has been deliberately sent downstream, is not experienced as a 
normal visual experience, it is experienced as a pseudo-visual experience with apparent 
shapes and colours. So I would suggest that somehow the data coming downstream is 
tagged or labelled differently so that it is not treated as an online input and hence not 
normally experienced as an external object. Hence this information coming from the 
Associative Memory is somehow tagged appropriately as mock data and is treated as such 
by other mechanisms that then access the visual buffer. Making sure this information is 
VWDPSHGDVµPRFN¶EHIRUHIHHGLQJLWLQWRWKHYLVXDOEXIIHUFRXOGEHRQHRIWKHMREVWKH
Feeder Mechanism does as it fills it in. The Feeder Mechanism could either do the job of 
actually stamping this tag on or merely double check that it is there. That mock label is 
therefore what ensures that the information it feeds in is not at risk of being taken seriously 
as an external input by ensuring it is tagged appropriately. Perhaps the search priming 
process already makes this distinction between information involved in a search as 
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compared with the data that is representing external objects. Which then may mean this 
step also has a usefully commandeered pre-cursor. And again we can speculate that a 
breakdown in this checking or stamping process might lead to internally generated but 
externally experienced pseudo-visual events: e.g. hallucinations.  
 
Putting it this way then allows us to see how this can easily be interpreted as a simulation 
process where: stored data is drawn from Associative Memory and sent to the Feeder 
Mechanism; this is then tagged as mock, and hence identified as an offline input, which is 
then fed into the visual buffer by something close to an adapted search priming process; 
the visual buffer could then be accessed by other mechanisms to generate the finally 
experienced visual image. So as long as the search priming process can be adapted to feed 
willed inputs into the visual buffer, this certainly seems to give us one good candidate for 
the Feeder Mechanism. Although establishing this further would take significantly more 
work, this seems at least in principle to provide one possible candidate for the Feeder 
Mechanism. But simply identifying a possible candidate is all that was aimed for at this 
point, so we can now perhaps look at the second possible candidate, which is based on 
visual emulators. 
 
ii) Feeder Mechanism as an Adapted Visual Emulator 
In this sub-section we will look to see what evidence there is for visual emulators in the 
first place and then discuss how this may be potentially employed as a Feeder Mechanism. 
Given the distinctions made in Section 2.3 between Emulators and Simulators generally, a 
visual emulator would strictly only be involved in improving, or fine tuning and 
smoothing, the performance of the currently active online visual system. This might 
involve anticipating certain features of the scene that one is about to observe and preparing 
the visual system to process these. Alternatively it could help by filling in sensory data 
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where the original data is degraded. This is certainly something that Kosslyn and Sussman 
VXJJHVWKDSSHQVZKHUHWKH\DUJXHWKDWLPDJHU\µLVXVHGWo complete 
IUDJPHQWHGSHUFHSWXDOLQSXW¶DQGWRµSULPHWKHSHUFHSWXDOV\VWHPZKHQRQHH[SHFWVWRVHH
DVSHFLILFREMHFW¶7KH\RIIHUVRPHHYLGHQFHRIWKLVLQWHUPVRIDSKHQRPHQRQWKDWLV
NQRZQDVµUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOPRPHQWXP¶+HUHRQHIDOVHO\UHPHPEHUVWKDWDQREMHFW¶V
ILQLVKLQJSRLQWZDVµIDUWKHUDORQJLQWKHWUDMHFWRU\WKDQLWDFWXDOO\ZDV¶>SJ@+HQFH
showing some anticipation of an objects future position and the confusion of this with its 
actual finishing point. This gives us one way of suggesting that feeding the visual buffer 
internal inputs was initially developed to aid online vision by predicting future states and 
filling-in areas where externally inputted information was degraded or incomplete.  
 
In addition to the above, Grush (2004: 392) quotes evidence from Duhamel et al (1992) 
WKDWVXJJHVWVµWKHUHDUHQHXURQVLQWKHSDULHWDOFRUWH[RIWKHPRQNH\WKDWUHPDSWKHLU
UHWLQDOUHFHSWLYHILHOGVLQVXFKDZD\DVWRDQWLFLSDWHLPPDQHQWVWLPXODWLRQ¶3URYLGLQJ
evidence that the visual areas are anticipating data that they may be about to receive. He is 
very explicit about this interpretation in a later paper: 
µ«WKH33&>posterior parietal cortex] neuron will begin firing shortly after the motor 
command to move the eye is issued, but before the eye has actually moved. The 
PPC neuron appears to be anticipating its future activity as a function of the current 
retinal projection and the just-issued motor command. That is, it is a visual modal 
HPXODWRU¶*UXVK 
 
So he clearly counts this as fairly good evidence for a visual emulator working in a single 
sensory mode74. Grush (2007: 400) also thinks that evidence from a study by Rao et al 
(2001) supports the idea of a visual emulator. This because that study suggests that the 
                                               
74
 7KLVGLVWLQJXLVKHVLWIURPDPRGDOHPXODWRUVWKDWVHHPWRµHPXODWH¶WKHHQYLURQPHQWXVLQJLQIRUPDWLRQ
from multiple-sensory modes, in an amodal way. However this now sounds like simulation since it is not 
fine-tuning any online performance, but rather helping to strategy test. Thus illustrating another way my 
distinctions in Chapter 2 might be applied. 
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visual system not only uses information from events that have just happened to improve 
current visual accuracy, but they also use information predicted from future events to do so 
as well. This again re-enforces the idea that there may be some mechanism anticipating 
likely future visual states and using these to improve performance in the present. Much of 
the other evidence he cites in his 2004 article, which was analysed extensively in Section 
2.3, I would interpret as talking about simulation processes, rather than emulators as such. 
So he does not provide as extensive a defence of an emulation process in the visual 
modality, as compared with motor emulators. Which is natural given his background focus 
on motor control; hopefully more details will be forthcoming from Grush in the visual 
arena in the future. 
 
So in summary, I would suggest that current evidence for visual emulators is suggestive 
rather than compelling, but there is certainly some potential for developing this approach in 
the future. However, even if the existence of a full visual emulator was eventually 
confirmed, there is at least one important disanalogy between it and a motor emulator. And 
this is that the visual emulator seems to be already filling-in the visual buffer directly in 
order to improve online vision. This is in contrast to the motor emulator, which was seen as 
a separate mechanism that only helped fine-tune the signals sent from the Motor Controller 
to the body. Hence the motor emulator only ever interacted with the Motor Controller and 
never sent any commands directly to the online system (i.e. the body). However this 
disanalogy makes the visual emulator even more ameneable for commandeering as an 
offline simulation process. This is because if it is already feeding inputs directly to the 
visual buffer, this is just what we want to use it for as a Feeder Mechanism. Except in this 
case we are not feeing it inputs for what we might expect to see in our vision in the near 
future, we are feeding it parameters of things we would want to imagine. If this change of 
input is possible, then it seems that at least in principle, a visual emulator could be 
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commandeered as an internal way to feed appropriate information from associative 
memory into the visual buffer.  
 
The above perhaps offers another, admittedly more speculative, way to internally fill-in the 
YLVXDOEXIIHU8QIRUWXQDWHO\,FDQ¶WUHDOO\JRLQWRDQ\IXUWKHUGHWDLOKHUHEHFDXVHXQWLO
more is known about how the actual online visual emulator is thought to operate, it is hard 
to predict what specific features it offers to the offline simulationist. Hence the aim here is 
merely to point to visual emulators as a potentially useful starting point for developing 
ideas about this mechanism further; and again this is something I would like to peruse in 
the future. For now, and in line with the aims of this sub-section, I offer this analysis 
merely as a way of identifying another potential candidate for the Feeder Mechanism. 
 
So as a way of drawing this section to a close, we can perhaps suggest that if any of these 
lines of evidence are at least initially plausible, then it could lead to the following three-
way split in how information can get sent to the visual buffer. These are: 1) external and 
online from the eyes; 2) internal and online from a kind of visual emulator; and 3) internal 
but offline from the associative memory. It may be useful to distinguish these in a short 
hand form by returning to elaborate on the notation utilised in the last chapter, as follows: 
 
1) Visually Perceived: {online, external} Array Cell (X, Y): [colour (RGB: P, Q, R), depth Z, etc] 
2) Visually Perceived: {online, internal} Array Cell (X, Y): [colour (RGB: P, Q, R), depth Z, etc] 
 
3) Visually Imagined:{offline, internal}Array Cell (X, Y):[mock, colour (RGB: P, Q, R), depth Z, etc] 
 
In the above I have appended the cell-by-cell contents of the visual buffer with a prefix to 
indicate whether they were filled-in from internal or external sources and whether they are 
µPRFN¶HQWULHVRUQRWVHHEROGWH[WIt is also worth noting that of the three entries, the 
second has also been given the least support at present, since the evidence for visual 
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emulators is still accumulating. Fortunately, this is the one we are least interested in from 
now on, since we will mostly be focusing on the differences between the first and the third 
entries in what follows. The second entry was introduced here as a suggestive way that the 
internal filling-in of the visual buffer may have been aided by the presence of a visual 
emulator. Now that has been discussed, the second line will not be referred to again and 
hence will not need developing or defending further at present. 
 
So by now focusing on the first and third lines perhaps we can suggest the following. The 
ILUVWµ3HUFHLYHG¶ entry would be treated as an online real input since it has been ultimately 
caused by external sources. This is what supports normal perception of external objects 
once the visual buffer is accessed appropriately. The exact nature of this process, and how 
it relates to visual imagery will be the subject of the rest of the thesis. For now we can say 
that we have a good theory of how the visual buffer may underpin online visual perception. 
7KHµ,PDJLQHG¶ entry, on the other hand, is appended with the mock label so that it is 
prevented from being treated as a real external input. Although I have said little about this, 
this is assumed to occur somehow in the processes that input data into the visual buffer 
internally. I have suggested that this might be a job the Feeder Mechanism might usefully 
fulfil since it is the last step before mock data is entered into the visual buffer. This means 
that information about imagined or remembered objects can be filled into the visual buffer 
internally without them interfering with our normal visual processing. It also means that 
when this information is accessed from the visual buffer as an output, these mock entries 
can be treated differently and potentially kept in a separate imagery stream. How separate 
this is and how much it is like the online process, is the subject of the second half of the 
thesis, where we look at what may happen next on the output side of the imagery process. 
For now I feel I have achieved the main goal of this sub-section, by identifying a few lines 
of evidence that indicate how the visual buffer can be filled-in internally. This therefore 
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gives us a few options of how an Feeder Mechanism can be explained in terms of the 
Kosslyn Model and how this can also be seen as an offline simulation process. This 
concludes my analysis RIWKHµLQSXW¶VLGHRIWKHGLDJUDPLQ)LJXUH:HZLOOORRNDWKRZ
this may underpin full phenomenal imagination in the next chapter. 
 
So in summary in this chapter there have been two main themes. The first was to introduce 
and defend the Kosslyn Model as a whole. I did this by introducing some other 
mechanisms and streams that are thought to work together with the visual buffer in order to 
underpin visual imagery. To illustrate how this system works, I went through some 
positive evidence in favour of it and explained how it can defend itself against some 
putative counter examples from the brain damage literature. This illustrated the complex 
and flexible nature of the Kosslyn Model and hopefully showed how robust it is and why I 
have chosen to adopt it in what follows. 
 
The second theme was to start to look at the Kosslyn Model through the eyes of an Offline 
Simulation Theorist and to start to show how features of that model could be seen as the 
equivalents of offline simulation mechanisms. I have particularly discussed the Feeder 
Mechanism and the Identifier Mechanism in detail here, and suggested which parts of the 
Kosslyn Model they may integrate with. Specifically I have suggested the Identifier 
Mechanism can be identified with the Associative Memory Mechanism and the Feeder 
Mechanism can be identified with an adapted search priming process or an offline visual 
emulator. I have also discussed the full input stream in general, as a way of explaining how 
an episode of STIm is instigated and directed in the first place. We have particularly seen 
how relevant information about the spatial context (i.e. where you are imagining) could be 
accessed and used to control the information sent to the visual buffer for depictive 
representation. This has given us an idea of how spatially specific visual imagery might be 
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generated and this has given us a good explanation of the spatial aspect of STIm. I will 
discuss the more temporal aspect of STIm in Chapter 6, where we will also look at how 
these visual images are interpreted. The net effect so far has hopefully been to show how 
the Kosslyn Model seems like a good candidate to treat as an offline simulation process. 
 
What remains to be done is to discuss the more output side of Figure 4.3 by looking at how 
the contents of the visual buffer might be accessed and transformed into a phenomenally 
experienced visual image. This marks the transition from looking at the sub-personal 
processes under-pinning visual imagery, to looking more at the philosophical theories of 
perception that might have something to say about phenomenal imagination as an offline 
simulation. Hence in the next chapter we will start to look at how adopting a Selective 
versus Generative Approaches to perception might affect the debate at this point. 
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PART II ± STIm and Phenomenal Imagination  
Selective vs. Generative Approaches to Perception and Visual Imagery  
 
 
Introduction to Part II 
In the last chapter we looked at the Kosslyn Model as a whole system and analysed 
whether it could be seen as an offline simulation process. We focused there mainly on the 
input aspects of the simulation process that would feed different kinds of information into 
the visual buffer. I concluded that it looks like the Kosslyn Model is quite amenable to 
being interpreted as an offline simulation process and identified many of the mechanisms 
we would expect to find in such a system. So far particular attention has been paid to the 
following: the Main Mechanisms that we would take offline (the Visual Buffer); the 
Identifier Mechanism (Associative Memory); and the Feeder Mechanism (as an adapted 
search priming or visual emulation process). I had also described how the visual buffer can 
get filled with hybrid depictive representations that represent: either a real external object 
in the case of online perception; or an imagined object in the case of offline visual 
imagery, as long as they are labelled as mock entries. Additionally in the first half of the 
thesis we have been mainly looking at the sub-personal processes that might underpin 
phenomenal imagination and have particularly identified a way that spatially specific 
information could be gathered and represented in the visual buffer by integrating it with the 
SPP stream. This has given us a way of describing the underlying way that the spatial 
layout of STIm could be controlled and I think this therefore represents a solid platform 
from which to continue the thesis. 
 
In Part II of the thesis we will start to look at the phenomenally experienced image itself 
and explore some ways that this could be analysed based on what has gone before. So what 
we require now is some analysis of how the real (online) and mock (offline) entries in the 
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visual buffer get accessed and can potentially lead to these different styles of phenomenal 
experiences. This represents a shift in focus towards firstly, the output side of this process 
(c.f. right hand side of Figure 4.3), and secondly, to analysing the more personal level 
phenomenally conscious experiences themselves. The next three chapters will explore this 
aspect by building on what has gone before. 
 
For me, the main issue to clarify at this point is to understand what might be happening in 
the online visual case, so that we can then see how closely this can be applied to the offline 
imagistic case. This naturally leads to an analysis of certain perceptual theories of 
phenomenal experience that can help explore this idea. To my mind, the most important 
and useful distinction to utilise at this point is between Selective and Generative 
Approaches to perception. These terms were introduced briefly in Section 1.4 and I 
attributed them as originally coming from Robinson (1994: 70). However I also follow 
Fish (2009: 137) in how I use these terms as in the quote below, and have generally found 
this way of talking is optimal for helping clarify the crucial issues discussed here: 
µ$FFRUGLQJWRJHQHUDWLYHDFFRXQWVWKHUHOHYDQWQHXUDOSURFHVVLQJJHQHUDWHVD
SKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHUIRUWKHPHQWDOVWDWHDFFRUGLQJWRWKHVHOHFWLYHDFFRXQW³WKH
process does not generate a content but puts one in touch with the stimulus that is 
DOUHDG\RXWWKHUH´5RELQVRQ«7KLV>VHOHFWLYH@FRQFHSWLRQRIWKHUROHRI
the brain in experiences sees it not as the organ that somehow generates conscious 
experience, but rather as the organ that enables us to detect different features of the 
ZRUOGLQZKLFKZHOLYH¶)LVK 
 
So in what follows I will look at what I think this crucial difference means to the 
imagination-as-simulation debate and these terms will be explained further below.  
 
I have also illustrated how initially I see these two contrasting approaches as differing in 
terms of what they say about visual imagery in Figure 1.5, where I illustrated how the same 
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phenomenal generation mechanism might be used both in perception and imagery in a 
more Conjunctivist approach. That is they seem to use most of the same mechanisms, 
including one that generates phenomenal character, and hence there is much overlap or 
conjunction, between the kinds of things they are. This is as opposed to a more 
Disjunctivist Position that might deny any common overlap at a certain level of 
description75. This is because they want to preserve veridical perception as something that 
puts one directly in touch with external reality, and things like hallucinations would be 
classed as a different kind of thing. This is summarized in a disjunct like the following: 
EITHER you are having a veridical experience as one kind of thing; OR you are having an 
experience, which is another kind of thing (e.g. hallucinations). These distinctions will be 
explained further in Chapter 5. 
 
It is the combination of a Generative Approach and a Conjunctivist Position that I will 
eventually adopt and my main purpose here is to justify taking this route. A Generative 
Approach, as I will now develop it here, suggests that the brain can generate the 
phenomenal character of both perception and phenomenal imagery in fairly similar ways, 
with obvious differences to account for the difference in phenomenology. The opposite of 
this, in my opinion, would be a Selective Approach, which suggests that, at least in the 
perceptual case, the brain and body (e.g. sense organs) merely selects what external 
IHDWXUHV\RXEHFRPHDZDUHRIEXWGRHVQ¶WWKHQDOVRJHQHUDWHWKHSKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHU 
itself. In this sense the brain merely facilitates you becoming aware of the qualities that are 
already out there: e.g. the colours and shapes of external objects. I think this sort of 
approach is more compatible with a Disjunctivist Position, which might deny any common 
                                               
75
 $QGUHFDOO,KDYHIROORZHG-RKQVWRQ¶VWHUPLQRORJ\KHUHEXWLWLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDWKHWULHVWRVWHHr a 
path between a Disjunctive and Conjunctive Approach. As I see it he wants to avoid Conjunctivism because 
RIµYHLORISHUFHSWLRQ¶FRQFHUQVDQGZDQWVWRDYRLG'LVMXQFWLYLVPEHFDXVHKHILQGVLWODFNVH[SODQDWRU\
power on the non-veridical side of the disMXQFWVHH&KDSWHU8QIRUWXQDWHO\,ZRQ¶WKDYHWLPHWRGHDOZLWK
his work in detail here, but simply use this terminology in a similar way to him. 
164 
overlap between visual perception and visual imagery, at least in certain crucial ways that 
will be discussed. These two approaches will be described in turn in more detail in the 
following chapters, but as a way of motivating taking this line of analysis, I will give a 
further brief justification here. 
 
As already mentioned, by the end of the thesis I will adopt a Generative Approach, which 
accepts that the brain does generate phenomenal character76 and it is versions of this that 
we are aware of in all cases of phenomenal consciousness. This is the general claim but I 
will focus mainly on the visual modality in this context. A Generative Approach is in line 
with theories that accept that phenomenal character supervenes locally, as illustrated in the 
Brain in a Vat (BIV) thought experiment77. This position therefore accepts that a micro-
physically identical brain to yours that is being nutritionally sustained and fed fake inputs 
identical to your perceptual inputs (i.e. a BIV), would also be having an identical 
experience to yours. To put it another way, in this situation you could not tell the 
difference between being you, or being a BIV. This is explained because if you were this 
BIV, you would also be enjoying the same full range of vivid phenomenal experiences. 
Because of this I will treat this approach as accepting that phenomenal character 
supervenes locally (or narrowly) on the brain and this also gives the first indication of why 
it can be seen as a highly Conjunctive Position to hold. That is, all visual phenomenal 
experiences are generated in a fairly similar locally supervenient way, it is just the way that 
they are represented and experienced that differs. This latter point will be elaborated on in 
detail in Chapter 7. 
                                               
76
 $QGUHFDOOIURPWKHLQWURGXFWLRQWKDW,XVHWKHWHUPµSKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHU¶QRQ-technically to merely 
indicate the qualitative character of your phenomenal experience. 
77
 Local supervenience can also be expressed as: if mental states locally supervene on brain states, then being 
in the same brain state entails being in the same mental state. This can be paraphrased by saying if two 
persons are indistinguishable in all of their physical properties, they must also be indistinguishable in all of 
their mental properties (c.f. McLaughlin & Bennett 2005). I use it here in the restricted context of discussing 
phenomenal character as indicated in the text. For BIV see: Putnam (1981) and Brueckner (2004). 
165 
 
The benefit of adopting this kind of approach in this context is as follows. If the brain 
generates phenomenal character in the case of online perception, then this seems like a 
process that could also possibly be commandeered to generate the phenomenal character of 
offline visual imagination. Of course these processes will have to be different at some 
point to explain their different phenomenology, but this kind of theory predicts these 
modifications will be minor compared with the differences predicted by non Generative 
Approaches. These minor modifications that might need explaining include why we have 
experiences of objects as being external and in the world even though they are locally 
VXSHUYHQLHQWPHQWDOVWDWHVDQGZK\ZHGRQ¶WH[SHULHQFHSKHQRPHQDOYLVXDOL]DWLRQVin the 
same way. Hence some explanation is owed as to how this difference in phenomenology is 
supported. This dept will be paid in Chapter 7, where I will use the difference between a 
real online input and a mock offline input to underpin a difference in how these states are 
represented in our experience. Hence for me, this seems like a promising route to take in 
order to explain these phenomenal experiences and how they relate to each other, and is the 
main reason I have taken this expository route here. 
 
But before I can develop that positive account, I think I need to explain why I reject 
Selective Approaches. Explaining what an example of this approach entails and why I 
GRQ¶WIDYRXULWLVWKHPDLQIRFXVRI&KDSWHU7KHUHDSDUWIURPLQWURGXFLQJD
paradigmatic example of Selective Approach and rejecting it, I will also offer one possible 
way that phenomenal imagination could be accommodated within this approach. I have 
already indicated what form this might take in Figure 1.5 and this diagram will be repeated 
and updated in the next chapter. However I will not spend much time exploring and 
developing this formulation, as I will ultimately reject it on other grounds.  
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A Selective Approach, as I develop it here, is one where the brain does not generate 
phHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHULWVHOIEXWUDWKHUSXWV\RXLQWRXFKZLWKZKDW¶VDOUHDG\RXWWKHUH7KDW
is you are directly aware of the phenomenal properties of the object itself and this is what 
supports the phenomenal character of your experience. This means there is no need for the 
brain to generate any phenomenal experiences in perceptual cases, since simply becoming 
aware of the object has the same effect phenomenally. This is why we might be able to 
regard this kind of approach as being widely supervenient on the object, the brain and all 
the causal processes in between (e.g. light propagation). In this sense all your brain and 
body does (e.g. your eyes), is select which range of electromagnetic waves you detect (e.g. 
the visible spectrum) and then processes these, in order to somehow make you directly 
DZDUHRIZKDWLVDOUHDG\RXWWKHUH7KLVLVVRPHWLPHVUHIHUUHGWRDVµ\RXUPLQGreaching 
out WRSXW\RXLQGLUHFWSHUFHSWXDOFRQWDFWZLWKH[WHUQDOREMHFWV¶DQGLWLVWKLVFODLPWKDW,
will put pressure on in terms of the Time-spread Argument in Section 5.3.  
 
In order to keep this discussion focused I will be forced to concentrate on one paradigmatic 
example of a Selective Approach known as Naïve Realism. This theory is gaining in 
popularity in the recent literature and is very closely linked to Disjunctivist Positions. This 
will be explained below but initially shows why it is a good one to choose, as it seems to 
make fairly contrary claims to mine by denying any common overlap between vision and 
other vision-like states (e.g. phenomenal hallucinations and imaginations). Hence rejecting 
it will also act as way of motivating the Generative Approach that I will adopt later. I will 
say a few words at the end of the Chapter 5 about how my arguments against Naïve 
Realism might generalize to other Selective Approaches that would claim perceptual 
phenomenal character has a wide supervenience base. 
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It should be noted that Selective Approaches are very closely aligned with Relational and 
Direct Realist theories of perception, which claim that in a perceptual relation the object 
you are aware of must exist for you to be aware of it. The sort of perceptual relation you 
are in is one of acquainting you directly with the object as it is and hence necessarily 
involves the object itself. This is contrasted with how a Representationalist might construe 
the situation where it is the representation that is the more crucial aspect. Crane (2006) 
discusses these distinctions at length and I introduce these terms and use them according to 
his definitions. Naive Realism is a very obvious example of a Relational perceptual theory, 
DOWKRXJKWKHUHDUHRWKHUVWKDWDUHYHU\FORVHO\DOLJQHGWRLW)RUH[DPSOHµWKH7KHRU\RI
$SSHDULQJ¶GHIHQGHGUHFHQWO\E\$OVWRQDQG/DQJVDPLVH[SOLFLWly a 
relational theory and can be treated in a very similar way to Naïve Realism. As mentioned 
above I will focus on Naïve Realism here, although I think my critique does extend to 
these theories also (see Chapter 5 for more). I will introduce and analyse more 
Representational-style theories in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
,ZLOOXOWLPDWHO\UHMHFW1DLYH5HDOLVPE\XVLQJZKDW,KDYHWHUPHGµWKH7LPH-spread 
$UJXPHQW¶ZKLFKLVDQH[WHQVLRQRIWKHPRUHFODVVLFDO7LPH-lag Argument. This will 
basically suggest that the external world is not actually in the right configuration anymore 
IRU\RXWRµUHDFKRXWWRLW¶E\WKHWLPHWKHOLJKWUHDFKHV\RXUH\HVDQGKHQFHLWFDQQRWSOD\
the role of constitutively being part of your experience. In other words, if the properties 
your mind is reaching out to have minutely changed by the time your perceptual state 
occurs, then it seems a mystery to me what your mind reaches out to and how it does it. 
And further due to differential travel times from objects to your eyes, the scene you are 
eventually aware of is actually composed of different features spread backwards through 
WLPHDQGKHQFHWKLVSXWVSUHVVXUHRQWKHGLUHFWUHDOLVWFODLPWKDW\RXVHHREMHFWVµDVWKH\
ZHUHLQWKHSDVW¶FI/H0RUYDQ 
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The Time-spread Argument will be discussed in detail in Section 5.3, and will show how 
appealing to the visual buffer within the Kosslyn Model might help illustrate these points 
further. This is because under this model the details we are eventually aware of in 
perception seem delimited to the current contents of the visual buffer and not the 
configuration of external objects as they were spread backwards through the past. This use 
of the visual buffer to comment on perceptual theories represents a reversal in its normal 
role in my arguments up to now. Before I was concerned with defending its role in visual 
perception and visual imagery, but perhaps now that I have defended and accepted it, I can 
use it to explore ways that it might guide our choice of perceptual theories. 
 
As mentioned already, I will briefly analyse what a theory of visual imagination based on 
the Kosslyn Model might look like under a Selective Approach. The general idea here 
being that this way of describing perceptual states seems much less ameneable to being 
commandeered in an offline simulation process. This is because if in the online perceptual 
case the information in the visual buffer is supposed to support you getting in direct 
SHUFHSWXDOFRQWDFWZLWKWKHREMHFWLWVHHPVWKDWWKLVµUHDFKLQJRXW¶IXQFWLRQ(if I can call it 
that) is not something that is usefully commandeered for visual imagination. This is 
because in visual phenomenal imagination there is no equivalent object in the world, or 
indeed in the mind, that we could reach out to and therefore it seems we are left without an 
HTXLYDOHQWREMHFWZKRVHSURSHUWLHVZHFDQµODWFK¶RQWR+HQFH,ZLOOVXJJHVWWKDWD
separate phenomenal generation step is required for phenomenal imagery to occur and this 
means that the mock contents of the visual buffer could be treated very differently to the 
real online ones when they are processed upstream. 
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So if one adopted a Selective Approach to perception, this suggests to me that the visual 
buffer will be accessed in very different ways depending on whether you are dealing with 
online versus offline entries. This therefore seems to represent a divergence in the kinds of 
mechanism these processes might use further upstream, and hence this might be an end to 
where we can find online mechanisms suitable for taking offline. In a nutshell, I am saying 
WKDW,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKHPHFKDQLVPVVXSSRUWLQJWKHRXWSXWVLGHRIVHOHFWLYH-style online 
perception will be suitable for taking offline in order to generate offline phenomenal 
imagery. And hence this could represent an end to the offline simulation process and the 
start of another process that uses mock inputs in markedly different way to perception. If 
this is plausible, then to me this also makes the disjunct between the two processes very 
clear, in that you are EITHER: selectively reaching out and directly visually perceiving a 
currently present object; OR, in other vision-like cases like phenomenal imagery and 
hallucination, you are locally generating a vision-like experience of a non currently 
occurring object. This is the premise of the second half of the thesis and why I think it is 
important to spend some time exploring Selective and Generative Approaches in order to 
develop a full theory of phenomenal imagination and hence STIm. But before looking at a 
Selective Approaches in Chapter 5 in detail, I will make a few more clarifying points 
regarding the second half of the thesis. 
 
8SWRQRZ,KDYHEHHQWDONLQJDVLIWKHYLVXDOEXIIHULVµDFFHVVHGE\RWKHUPHFKDQLVPV¶
which then go on to form perceptual and imagistic states. However it is quite possible that 
the visual buffer actively sends its information somewhere, or can even support 
phenomenal perception or imagery on its own. Hence I have implicitly used the phrase 
µDFFHVVHGE\RWKHUPHFKDQLVPV¶WRVWDQGLQIRUDPRUHXQZLHOG\VHQWHQFHOLNHµWKHYLVXDO
buffer is accessed by, or sends its information to, another mechanism, or then goes on to 
SURFHVVWKHVHIXUWKHULWVHOI¶6RDWWKLVSRLQW,DPH[SOLFLWO\PHQWLRQLQJWKDW,RQO\XVHWKLV
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phrase for ease of reference to represent the idea that this information moves upstream in 
some way and has further processing applied to it before the final phenomenal product is 
realised. I will say a little bit more about what I think this might involve in Section 7.3.1, 
where I look at theories of consciousness that cover a range of ideas as to what else is 
necessary for phenomenal experience to occur. 
 
Also before we go on it is worth pointing out that, although I focus on phenomenal 
imagination here, this does not preclude the possibility that some mental imagery 
processing occurs at a more sub-personal level. This point is illustrated by noting that the 
$SSHQGL[RI7\H¶VERRNFDOOHGµWKH,PDJHU\'HEDWH¶LVFRPSRVHGRIDFRPSXWHU
SURJUDPPHWKDWLWHUDWLYHO\µURWDWHVDQREMHFW¶LQ degrees increments and compares this 
WRDµWDUJHWREMHFW¶7KHLGHDEHLQJWKDWWKLVLVDV\PEROPDQLSXODWLRQHTXLYDOHQWWR
mentally rotating a phenomenal image of an object until you can tell if it is a rotated 
version of a target object. But obviously this is a computer programme and hence this is 
occurring in a purely mathematical and algorithmic way by manipulating binary symbols. 
The equivalent versions of imagistic rotating and scanning experiments were discussed 
briefly in Section 3.2. The point I making here is that an equivalent more sub-personal kind 
of processing may also occur in the brain, based on fairly mechanistic neuronal firings, 
without us being consciously aware of it. And by focusing mainly on phenomenal imagery 
I am not denying this point. It is only that I am deliberately restricting my attention to 
phenomenal imagery, which I find more interesting and I think is more appropriately 
approached from a philosophical perspective. Hence my focus here is not prohibitive of 
sub-personal imagistic processing that is analogous to the computer programme mentioned 
above. It is merely restricted to looking at personal level phenomenal imagination as a way 
of limiting the scope of the thesis. 
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Finally, in terms of doing the groundwork for the second half of the thesis, in Section 2.2 I 
lumped together the Output Detector Mechanism and the Offline Output. Since we are now 
looking at the output side of Figure 4.3 in more detail here, I will just briefly explain this 
move again. The Output Detector Mechanism is thought to be the mechanism that 
differentiates between online and offline entries in the visual buffer and would potentially 
siphon them off for upstream processing according to which category they fall into. This 
will ensure they get treated diffHUHQWO\DQGZHGRQ¶WHQGXSFRQIXVLQJZKDWZHKDYH
imagined with what is really out there. I wont say much about this in what follows and 
merely assume it occurs in some way. And although this may seem like an inefficient extra 
process to include, it need not be interpreted in this way. Consider the sieve analogy 
proposed by Currie and Ravenscroft (2002: 70), where it is simply the size of the stones 
that make the difference as to whether they follow one path or another, rather than needing 
any extra sorting effort to occur. In a similar way, simply having the mock tag attached, 
may be enough for the offline entries in the visual buffer to be treated differently by the 
processes accessing them. Hence in what follows I will assume this Output Detection and 
differentiation occurs fairly automatically and potentially fairly easily in our mental 
economy78. And we will therefore focus mainly on the Offline Output and I this will be 
taken to mean an episode of phenomenal imagination in this context. 
 
There is also one other output mechanism that I will discuss in a bit more detail in Part II 
of the thesis, and that is the Interpretation Capacity (see Figure 4.3), which allows us to 
interpret the visual image we are having in a useful way relative to the task at hand. We 
will look at this in Chapter 6, by analysing an idea proposed by Tye (1991: 94) about how 
visual images are labelled and interpreted. However I will modify and expand his account 
                                               
78
 Although of course we could suggest that even if this sifting process does incur a significant extra 
efficiency cost, this might be worth it given the predictive powers and problem solving abilities it may allow. 
So as long as the benefits outweigh the costs then this may not be a preventative necessary extra step. 
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to one that I think reflects our experience of imagery more closely and also deals with a 
wider range of the possibilities in this area. It is at this point that I will start to introduce 
how a visual image can come to be interpreted as representing different temporal and 
spatial contexts, even if the spatial layout of the objects in the image remains the same. 
Hence giving us a suggestion as to how spatio-temporal aspect of Spatio-Temporal 
,PDJLQDWLRQRU67,PLVVXSSRUWHG%HIRUHGHDOLQJZLWKWKLVDVSHFWRI7\H¶VZRUN,ZLOO
DOVREULHIO\H[SODLQZK\,GRQ¶WDGRSWKLVIRUPRI Representationalism about perception 
and phenomenal imagination. This will involve looking at some problems for this kind of 
theory and showing how I think it may be rejected along with other Selective Approaches.  
 
So having said all that, we can now progress to look at Selective Approaches in more 
detail, and more specifically we will look at a paradigmatic example of this which is 
known as Naïve Realism. 
173 
5 ± STIm and a Selective Approaches to Perception: 
Naïve Realism and imagination-as-simulation  
 
 
µI simply do not understand how material objects, understood in a realist way, can be literally 
parts of H[SHULHQFHV$QGWRVD\DVLVVRPHWLPHVVDLGWKDW³WKHPLQGVSUHDGVLWVHOIon the 
ZRUOG´only adds to the REVFXULW\«DQGPRVWLPSRUWDQWHYHQLIWKHYiew in question were 
intelligible and known to be correct, it would still remain true that there would be no 
difference between a veridical experience and a suitable hallucinatory experience that would 
be genuinely discernible to the perceiver in question -and so no genuinely internalist reason 
IRUWKLQNLQJWKDWWKHEHOLHILQTXHVWLRQLVWUXH¶ 
Bonjour (2004: 363 ± footnote 32 ±addressing work by Brewer 1999) 
 
In this chapter I will introduce and analyse Selective Approaches to perception by looking 
at a specific clear example of this approach called Naïve Realism. Along the way I will 
also explore its implications for the imagination-as-simulation approach as I see it. So 
specifically, I will try to do the following three things. Firstly, I will introduce and explain 
Naïve Realism, which I will take as my paradigmatic example of a Selective Account. This 
will give us an idea of the things this theory claims so that I can then criticise it later. I will 
then look at how this theory defends itself against the Argument from Hallucination and 
how this may relate to some arguments about the overlap between perception and visual 
imagery. This will explain why naïve realists are usually also Disjunctivists, and why, 
conversely, I consider my theory to be a highly Conjunctive one, with much overlap 
between perception and phenomenal imagination. At this point I will also suggest one way 
that Selective Theories could accommodate locally (or narrowly) supervenient phenomenal 
imagination, even if they adopt a widely supervenient relational theory in terms of 
perception. Secondly, I will look at two motivating factors for defending Naïve Realism 
DQGH[SODLQZK\,GRQ¶WILQGWKHPYHU\FRPSHOOLQJ7KLVZLOOKRSHIXOO\H[SODLQZK\,ILQG
issues such as the Time-lag Argument more crucial in guiding my choice of perceptual 
theory.  Finally,ZLOOH[SODLQLQGHWDLOZK\,GRQ¶WIDYRXUD6HOHFWLYH$SSURDFKOLNH1DLYH
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Realism, based on an extended version of the Time±lag Argument, which I call the Time-
spread Argument. I will also explain how the work done previously on the features of the 
Visual Buffer might help guide us here. This will allow me to develop a positive 
Conjunctivist account of phenomenal imagination in Chapter 7 based on a Generative 
Approach. I will start by introducing and analysing Naïve Realism in a bit more detail 
next. 
 
5.1 ± Naïve Realism as a Selective Approach to Perception 
For something to count as a Selective Approach according to my usage of the term, it 
PXVWQ¶WVXJJHVWWKDWLQYHULGLFDOSHUFHSWLRQWKHEUDin generates the phenomenal character. 
Instead the role of the brain is merely to help select what one is aware of in the external 
world. Hence the phenomenal character must in some way depend on some perceptual 
relation between the observer and the object and the object must play a constitutive role in 
our awareness of it (cf. Crane 2006). To my mind modern accounts of Naïve Realism seem 
to be paradigmatic examples of this kind of approach, and therefore I will introduce and 
analyse a version of that here. The version I will analyse has been defended recently by 
researchers like Martin (2004, 2006), Fish (2008, 2009) and Kennedy (2007, 2009), and as 
mentioned already, Fish (2009: 137) specifically endorses and discusses the utility of 
categorizing Naïve Realism as a Selective Approach.  
 
,WVHHPVWKDWGHIHQGHUVRIDSRVLWLRQFDOOHGµWKH7KHRU\RI$SSHDULQJ¶DOVRVHHPDWOHDVW
sympathetic to this kind of approach, for instance Langsam (1997: 53) specifically 
endorses this association to Naïve Realism and Alston (1999: 183) may be sympathetic to 
the more modern version of it as discussed here. It certainly seems to bear the same crucial 
features and can perhaps therefore be a target for this critique in a fairly similar way. I will 
only discuss Naive Realism explicitly in what follows, but this extension to the Theory of 
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Appearing will be implicit in everything I say in this chapter. I will say a bit more about 
these theories at the end of the chapter. 
 
Naive Realism, and its related supporting theory Disjunctivism, is a currently expanding 
philosophical theory that has recently grown in popularity79. As an example of the things 
Naïve Realism claims I give the following three quotes, and it should be noted that the first 
quote is referred to by Kennedy (2007: 320DVDµIDLUO\FDQRQLFDOVWDWHPHQWRI
FRQWHPSRUDU\GLUHFWRUQDwYHUHDOLVP¶ 
µ$FFRUGLQJWRQDwYHUHDOLVPWKHDFWXDOREMHFWVRISHUFHSWLRQWKHH[WHUQDOWKLQJV
such as trees, tables and rainbows, which one can perceive, and the properties 
which they can PDQLIHVWWRRQHZKHQSHUFHLYHGSDUWO\FRQVWLWXWHRQH¶VFRQVFLRXV
H[SHULHQFHDQGKHQFHGHWHUPLQHWKHSKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHURIRQH¶VH[SHULHQFH
This talk of constitution and determination should be taken literally; and a 
consequence of it is that one could not be having the very experience one has, were 
the objects perceived not to exist, or were to lack the features they are perceived to 
have. Furthermore, it is of the essence of such states of mind that they are partly 
constituted by such objects, and their phenomenal characters are determined by 
those objects and their qualities. So one could not have such a type of state of mind 
were one not perceiving such an object and correctly perceiving it to have the 
IHDWXUHVLQPDQLIHVWVLWVHOIDVKDYLQJ¶0DUWLQ (1997: 83-84 - my emphasis) 
and: 
µ7KLV,VXJJHVWLVKRZZHVKRXOGXQGHUVWDQGWKHQDwYHUHDOLVW¶VFODLPWKDWH[WHUQDO
REMHFWVDQGWKHLUSURSHUWLHVVKDSHWKHFRQWRXUVRIWKHVXEMHFW¶VFRQVFLRXVH[SHULHQFH
WKH\VKDSHWKHFRQWRXUVRIWKHVXEMHFW¶VFRQVFLRXs experience by actually being the 
FRQWRXUVRIWKHVXEMHFW¶VFRQVFLRXVH[SHULHQFH>DQGWKLVLVDVRSSRVHGWRMXVWFDXVLQJ
WKHPPRUHLQGLUHFWO\@¶)LVK 
and: 
µ7KHH[SHULHQFHLQDSHUFHSWXDOFDVHUHDFKHVRXWWRDQGLQYROYHVWKHSHUFHLYHG
external obMHFWVQRWVRWKHH[SHULHQFHLQRWKHUFDVHV¶6QRZGRQ-7) 
 
I will now go through each quote in turn and say a few things about it. In the first quote we 
can readily see why I have adopted a terminology that suggests the object must play a 
                                               
79
 C.f. Haddock and Macpherson (2008) and Gendler and Hawthorne (2006). 
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constitutive role in perception. And if this is taken literally as Martin suggests, this means 
we are literally aware of the object itself in some way. This immediately means this 
approach is quite obviously a direct realist theory, and I will say a little more about what 
this means in the next section. I have italicised a part of the first quote because this is a 
phrase that I will try to put pressure on in my Time-spread Argument to follow. Simply 
put, there seems to be many examples of perceived objects that no longer exist and yet we 
still perceive them, such as when looking at extinct stars (more on this in Section 5.3). 
 
In the second quote we have another expression of the idea that it is the objects themselves 
that seem to be shaping our experience and not, for example, some indirect representation 
of them. In what follows we will briefly look at a move by Fish (2009) that defends Naïve 
Realism against the Argument from Hallucination by denying, against convention, that 
hallucination has phenomenal character. He also questions the idea that detailed 
phenomenal character can be locally supervenient. If this is plausible then it threatens to be 
eliminativist about, not only the phenomenal character of hallucination, but also that of 
phenomenal imagination. And hence may represent a potential threat to my assumption 
that there is such a thing as phenomenally experienced imagination in the first place. I will 
explain why this seemingly unintuitive step is motivated at the end of this section and give 
one example, based on after-LPDJHVRIZK\,WKLQNLWLVQ¶WQHFHVVDU\WRWDNHXSWKLV
extreme position in order to defend Naïve Realism. 
 
,QWKHWKLUGTXRWHZHKDYHDQH[SOLFLWH[SUHVVLRQRIWKHµUHDFKLQJRXW¶WHUPLQRORJ\ZKHUH
the mind is said to reach out and put one directly in contact with external objects (and see 
the opening quote from Bonjour 2004). This also illustrates one way in which Naïve 
Realism can clearly be seen as a Disjunctivist Position, because it seems to be saying that 
this reaching out is unique to perception and is not the case in other experiential states, 
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such as perhaps hallucination and phenomenal imagination. Hence we can initially see why 
vision and other vision-like states might be classed as very different kind of things with 
little or no common overlap. Martin (2004: 38) suggests that: µ7KHSULPHUHDVRQIRU
HQGRUVLQJ'LVMXQFWLYLVPLVWREORFNWKHUHMHFWLRQRIDYLHZRISHUFHSWLRQ,¶OOODEHONaïve 
Realism¶, and as far as I can tell all modern naïve realists are also Disjunctivists. So having 
explained the quotes above in a bit more detail, perhaps we can now briefly look at the 
main claims of Disjunctivism. 
 
Specifically Disjunctivism is employed to defend against the Argument from 
Hallucination80 where it now becomes possible to deny the following: when two mental 
states are phenomenally indistinguishable, this means that they must be the same kind of 
thing. Analogously a lemon fruit and lemon shaped bar of soap, may be superficially 
indistinguishable on sight, but it would be a mistake to read anything more into this in 
terms of deeper ontological categorizations. Fish (2005: 122) refers to this as the 
µ'HFLVLYHQHVV3ULQFLSOH¶ZKLFKLVZKHUHZHLQIHUIURPSKHQRPHQDOLQGLVWLQJXLVKDELOLW\
that there must be some further commonality between the items in question. He suggests 
WKDWµ«endorsing the decisiveness principle leads straight to a non-GLVMXQFWLYLVWWKHRU\¶
DQGµWKDWWKHUHLVQRcontradiction in supposing that we might be unable to tell the 
difference between two things which are nevertheless fundamentally different¶+HQFH
agreeing with Fish, we must be wary of arguing for a more Conjunctivist Position based 
simply on these superficially matching appearances. They may turn out to be the same 
thing, but both sides can agree that a more detailed argument is required to establish this. 
 
                                               
80
 It is also used to defend against the Argument from Illusion. However this aspect is much less clearly 
developed in the literature and even the position of illusion either side of the disjunct is also debated between 
researchers. Hence I will stick to discussing hallucination in what follows: but c.f. Byrne and Logue (2008) 
and Thau (2004) for a good discussion of this. And note I follow Thau in treating illusion as a kind of 
perception, all be it one that has gone wrong in some way: analogously Thau (2004: 248) suggests a mis-kick 
of a IRRWEDOOLVVWLOODµNLFN¶UDWKHUWKDQVRPHWKLQJHOVHOLNHDFRPSOHWHPLVV 
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So the main point of appealing to Disjuntivism as I see it, is to preserve a special place for 
veridical perception as a thing that does put us in direct contact with the external world. 
This is contrasted with, for example, a vivid global hallucination that would not do this, 
even though the two might be phenomenally indistinguishable. To me, this suggests that 
while veridical perception may only be compatible with Selective Approach in this way, a 
naïve realist might agree that a phenomenal hallucination could be characterised under a 
PRUH*HQHUDWLYH$SSURDFK$WOHDVW,WKLQNWDNLQJWKLVURXWHGRHVQ¶WREYLRXVO\VHHPWR
violate the main concerns of Naïve Realism or Disjunctivism and has certain other benefits 
to be discussed next. In support of this claim, consider the following quote: 
³«>'LVMXQFWLYLVP@LVQRWLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHYLHZWKDWWKHUHDUHVRPHH[SHULHQFHV
among the non-veridical ones which fit the characterisations offered by sense datum or 
intenWLRQDOWKHRULHV´0DUWLQ 
 
I take this as at least accepting the possibility that other vision-like states could fall under 
some theories with more sympathy towards a Generative Approach. This sympathy seems 
to be reasonably explicitly stated in the above, but the Disjunctivist literature in general 
focuses more explicitly on hallucination because of it was specifically developed as a 
defence against the Argument from Hallucination. However we might now also want to 
ask, particularly within the context of this thesis, how this dialectic might comment on 
phenomenal imagination as a simulation process?  
 
My interpretation is that phenomenal imagination would fairly obviously fall on the non-
veridical side of the disjunct along with hallucination, and hence could also be treated 
under a more Generative Approach. Consider the following argument in support of this: if 
the original reason for explicitly stating this disjunct is in terms of hallucination, and this is 
because it is a threat because it could possibly be mistaken for a veridical perception; then I 
see no reason why anyone would deny this disjunct in terms of phenomenal imagination, 
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given that it is even less likely to be claimed to be the same thing as a veridical perception. 
In other words, since phenomenal imagery is not even phenomenally indistinguishable 
from veridical perceptions, there seems even less prima facia reasons for claiming they 
might be the same thing. If that thought process is sound then it seems reasonable to me to 
assume that the Naive Realist could accept that phenomenal imagination is a different kind 
of thing from veridical perception, and be fairly neutral as to whether this falls under a 
Generative Approach or not. So as long as phenomenal imagery remains a different kind of 
WKLQJWRDYHULGLFDOSHUFHSWLRQDQGGRHVQ¶WWKUHDWHQLWVVWDWXVDVJLYLQJGLUHFWFRQWDFWZLWK
external reality, then naïve realists could plausibly remain neutral to how it is developed 
further. 
 
It should be noted that I have qualified the statementVDERYHZLWKµFRXOG¶DQGµPLJKW¶
because generally the Disjunctivist debate only explicitly refers to hallucination. And apart 
from the explicit quote regarding the difference between perception and imagery given in 
Section 1.4, from Martin (2001: 273-274), this is merely my interpretation of the situation 
on behalf of other naïve realists. Hence it merely represents one possible way of 
approaching the disjunct between perception and other non-veridical visual-like states like 
phenomenal hallucinations and imagination. However given the reasoning process above I 
think this is a fairly plausible route to take and may at least act as a good starting point for 
extending this debate towards the imagination end of the vision-like experience spectrum. 
Therefore I feel reasonably justified in giving the following illustration in Figure 5.1 of one 
possible way of describing visual imagery within a Selective Approach to perception. It 
should be noted that this actually involves proposing a mixed approach, where we adopt a 
Selective Approach for perception and Generative Approach for phenomenal hallucination 
and imagery: 
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Figure 5.1 ± Diagram illustrating one possible way that visual imagery could  
be described within a Selective Approach to perception 
 
 
In the diagram above I have tried to illustrate a possible way of explaining the disjunct 
between veridical perception and other vision-like states, by very obviously placing them 
in separate output streams. This has the benefit of fitting with the compelling overlapping 
mechanism evidence on the input side, which has been discussed in the first part of the 
thesis. In other words they can both utilise the visual buffer in common, as long as how 
they are treated afterwards constitutes a big enough ontological difference to justify the 
disjunct. The main difference in the output stream that I think could justify this, is the way 
this information is treated once it leaves the visual buffer. Specifically, in the visual case 
this information acts to somehow put you in touch directly with external reality, but in 
visual imagery and hallucination case, the brain generates the phenomenal character itself. 
In this latter generative stream there is a further difference, in that the internally caused 
(potentially due to neuronal misfiring) hallucinatory information is somehow treated as 
being online and hence experienced externally; or at least is (mis)taken as having occurred 
externally. And this is opposed to the visual imagery stream, which is caused internally as 
previously discussed (e.g. by an act of will) and goes through the generation process but is 
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QRWWKHQH[SHULHQFHGH[WHUQDOO\$QGZKLOH,DSSUHFLDWHWKHUHDUHDORWRIGHWDLOV,KDYHQ¶W
mentioned in this diagram, I do not want to go into more detail here81. 
 
I do not intend to spend more time on explaining Figure 5.1, as discussed earlier, I do not 
favour this kind of approach in the first place, and merely offer this description here as one 
way that this could be developed if so desired by a defender of a Selective Account. Saying 
that I do think it offers one fairly reasonable way of explaining how the main claims of 
Naïve Realism can be preserved in terms of direct veridical perception, whilst still 
allowing the possibility that other vision-like phenomenal states could be locally 
supervenient and generated somehow by the brain. And as mentioned earlier this seems at 
first sight to remain compatible with the known empirical evidence from visual science as 
discussed in the last two chapters. So there are some benefits to adopting this kind of 
approach for the naïve realist and perhaps therefore offers one potential platform from 
which it could be developed further. This is particularly pertinent since Disjunctivism is 
sometimes accused of not offering much in the way of explanation of the non-veridical 
side of the disjunct82. 
 
Having said that, one interesting implication of this approach is that it perhaps indicates 
that phenomenally experienced hallucinations cannot be produced in a proximally causally 
matching way to veridical perceptions: e.g. by the exact same overall brain state. This is 
because of the extra generation step involved in hallucination that is not present in 
perception, which I would suggest requires at least some minimal change in the underlying 
                                               
81
 For example, I have placed the hallucination stream arrows as falling in the cusp of the online and offline 
streams to indicate that this would need to be discussed further in order to refine this placement. I also 
KDYHQ¶WGLVFXVVHGKRZWKLVSURFHVVZRXOGEHLQVWLJDWHGLQWKHILUVWSODFHDQGKDYHMXVWVXJJHVWHGLWPD\EH
GXHWRDQµLQWHUQDOQHXURQDOPLVILUH¶RIVRPHNLQGSHUKDSVGXHWRDQLQ-balanced neuro-chemistry, which in 
turn could be due to, for example, tiredness, starvation or a drug intake. 
82
 See Johnston (2004), Dunn (2008) and Sturgeon (1998) for expressions of this sentiment. But note this is 
becoming less acute as Disjunctivism gets more attention in the literature. And also note that this mixed kind 
of approach may be implicated in Noe (2006) (see also Prinz 2006). 
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neurology. This could possibly be seen as a benefit of this approach, because accepting that 
these two phenomenally indistinguishable yet fundamentally different mental states can be 
caused by an identical underlying neurology has lead, in my opinion, to some strange 
consequences in the literature. 
 
For example, I think that accepting phenomenal indiscriminability and a proximally 
matching causal base, leaves very little room to explain where the ontological difference 
between perceptiRQDQGKDOOXFLQDWLRQFRPHVLQ6RPXFKVRWKDWLQ)LVK¶V
case, this has lead to the unintuitive denial that hallucinations have any phenomenal 
character at all. This is suggested because, if we accept both the above constraints, this 
might indLFDWHWKDWWKHSKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHULQYROYHGLQKDOOXFLQDWLRQVFRXOGµVFUHHQ\RX
RII¶IURPWKHH[WHUQDOZRUOGLQWKHSHUFHSWXDOFDVH83. So to deal with this, Fish suggests that 
perhaps in hallucination it is just that you merely believe you are experiencing something 
and you are in fact fooled into believing it has phenomenal character and therefore it does 
KDYHVRPHµIHOWUHDOLW\¶DVVRFLDWHGZLWKLW,UHIHUUHGWRWKLVDVDGR[DVWLFKDOOXFLQDWLRQDQG
Fish spends some time explaining how this kind of thing could fill the same functional role 
that a more traditional phenomenal hallucination does. He also spends some time 
challenging the assumption that the brain can support detailed vision-like phenomenal 
character and hence denies a certain form of the local supervenience principle. This 
eliminativism of the phenomenology of hallucination it seems to me could perhaps also 
lead to denying that of vivid visual imagery84, and I think this also a very unintuitive claim 
since I personally experience quite vivid phenomenal imagery; as I assume many other 
people think they do. So this leads to a situation where Fish is defending the fairly intuitive 
                                               
83
 6HH0DUWLQ)LVK-RKQVWRQDQG'XQQ¶VUHSO\WR-RKQVWRQIRUPRUHRQWKH
µVFUHHQLQJRII¶SUREOHP(VSHFLDOO\XVHIXOLV-RKQVWRQ¶Vµ6XUJHU\([DPSOH¶ZKLFKLOOXVWUDWHVWKLVSRLQWZHOO 
84
 I have had confirmation of this potential threat to the phenomenal character of imagination in personal 
communication with William Fish. 
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position of Naïve Realism (see later), by adopting a fairly unintuitive position that denies 
the phenomenology of hallucination and imagery. 
 
+RZHYHULQP\RSLQLRQSHUKDSVWKHELJJHVWSUREOHPIRU)LVK¶VDSSURDFKLVWKDWLWVHHPVWR
also deny the phenomenology of other experiential states like phosphenes85 and dreams, 
and even struggles to explain after-images. All of which are generally agreed to have quite 
detailed and vivid phenomenology, although they may differ form visual states in other 
ways: e.g. they fade quickly or are temporally disjointed. Confirmation of this stance is 
expressed in the quote below: 
µ,VHHQRUHDVRn why even phosphene experiences, after image experiences and the 
OLNHVKRXOGQRWVXEPLWWRWKHVDPHNLQGRIH[SODQDWLRQ>DVKDOOXFLQDWLRQ@¶)LVK
(2009: 134 ± footnote 12) 
 
The problem with this latter claim is that although we cannot just summon up a 
hallucination to check our phenomenology, we can do so with an after-image. To see how 
unintuitive this claim is first hand, follow the instructions below that lead to what I would 
suggest is the generation of a fairly vivid, complete and potentially indistinguishable after-
image. 
 
Here you need to look at the left hand white dot for a while, until you have the sense that 
there is a complete red square present in the figure on the left (it may help to cover the 
right hand side of the image with your hand). Then you look at the orange dot on the right 
and observe the left side phenomenology and how closely it matches your perception of the 
right hand side of the orange dot. And note that this may involve shifting your attention 
while keeping your eyes focused on the orange dot: 
                                               
85
 Phosphenes are the coloured experiences one has when you close your eyes and put light pressure on the 
sides of your eyes for a minute or so. 
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Figure 5.2 ± After-image example designed to test how well you can  
discriminate it from a closely matching perception 
 
 
What you should see on the left of the orange dot, is a quickly fading version of the image 
on the right hand side of the same dot: i.e. a green square over four black circles on a grey 
background. And while it is true that these two experiences do not exactly match, they are 
fairly similar in at least general colour and shape86. It seems then that the implication of 
FLVK¶VSRVLWLRQLVWKDWZKLOHLWZRXOGDFFHSWWKDW\RXDUHKDYLQJWKHSKHQRPHQDO
experience on the right of the orange dot (as a veridical perception); it would deny the 
phenomenology on the left of the orange dot to do with the after-image (in a similar way to 
a doxastic hallucination). That is, on the right you are in a normal phenomenal experiential 
state, but on the left you just believe you are, but are actually mistaken about the apparent 
phenomenal character you seem to experience. This is even though they could theoretically 
be made to appear completely indiscernible (and see footnote 86). This seems highly 
LPSODXVLEOHWRPHDQGOHDGVWRVHYHUDORWKHUSUREOHPVWKDW,FDQ¶WJRLQWRLQGHWDLOKHUH87. 
Suffice to say that if the mixed Selective and Generative Approach to vision and visual 
imagery that I have proposed above (c.f. Figure 5.1), precludes the possibility that 
                                               
86
 They could perhaps be made to match more closely by someone with better graphic design skills than mine 
and even made to fade at the same rate on a computer screen. And note I have found this after-image much 
harder to generate from a paper print out, as compared to a version presented on a computer screen. So I refer 
the reader to the original article this came from which can then be viewed on a monitor as a PDF file (see 
Shimojo et al 2001- and note I have adapted their example slightly to illustrate my points here). 
87
 But see my book review of Fish (2009) for more on this issue (King forthcoming). As a brief example of 
the concerns expressed there, it seems that accepting this interpretation might make us worry that we could 
also doubt the phenomenal character of the veridical perception. If this is so it seems possible that we are 
actually philosophical zombies and just believe we have phenomenal character in all cases! 
185 
perceptions and hallucinations can share a common underlying neurology, and hence 
avoids needing to deny the phenomenal character of hallucinations and after-images, then 
this may not be such a bad thing.88  
 
The other good thing about using this particular after-image is that it also illustrates a 
phenomenon known as colour bleeding, where non-coloured areas of the original seem to 
get filled in by the mind: e.g. to form the completed square shapes. This occurs, not only in 
the original image on the left, but also in the after-image of Figure 5.2. This could be 
interpreted as an example of where the mind is anticipating what it should see aQGµILOOLQJ
LWLQ¶SKHQRPHQDOO\,WLVWHPSWLQJWROLQNWKLVWRWKHGLVFXVVLRQRIYLVXDOHPXODWRUVDQGWKH
internal filling-in of the visual buffer discussed in Section 4.3.2. But attempting this cross 
level correlation is a lengthy, complicated and possibly a controversial process89. Suffice to 
say that the explanation just mentioned, involving a correlated filling-in at the phenomenal 
and sub-personal level, is certainly one possible interpretation. However the main point of 
introducing this example is that it seems to offer some support to the claim that the brain 
generates vision-like phenomenal character in at least some cases. Hence this may further 
vindicate adopting the mixed Selective and Generative Approach as proposed above. 
 
So in summary, the mixed approach illustrated above has the benefit of fitting with the 
known empirical data, at least on the input side, as described by my defence of the Kosslyn 
Model previously. It also has the advantage that it makes the ontological difference 
                                               
88
 For the record, Fish (personal communication) agrees that he could fall back on something like the mixed 
approach discussed above. However he thinks this is a slightly weaker position and prefers stay with the 
more radical option that he has argued foUDOUHDG\7KHUHIRUHGHSHQGLQJKRZWKLQJVJRIRU)LVK¶VWKHRU\WKLV
RSWLRQPD\EHFRPHPRUHDWWUDFWLYHLQWKHIXWXUHEXWLWLVKDUGWRWHOODWSUHVHQW)RUWKHUHFRUG,GRQ¶WUHDOO\
see why a Disjunctivist need accept that perception and hallucination can occur in a causally matching way. 
It is certainly not a constraint that is insisted on by any opponent, but one that they seem to accept voluntarily 
as far as I can tell (c.f. references in footnote 83). 
89
 See Noe et al (1997) for a review of the range of interpretations of this phenomenon. I think my 
interpretation is not ruled out by them but it is certainly cautioned against, in much the same spirit as 
+XUOH\¶VµLQWHUOHYHOLVRPRUSKLVP¶ZDUQLQJWKDW,GLVFXVVHGLQ6HFWLRQ,ZLOODOVRGLVFXVVthis 
further in Chapter 7. 
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between veridical perception and other vision-like states very apparent and can therefore 
obviously justify their treatment under a Disjunctivist Position. Unfortunately I do not have 
the space or motivation to develop and explain this formulation further, because in the next 
two sections I will give my reasons for rejecting Selective Approaches like Naïve Realism 
in the first place. So the above is just offered as one potential way to develop a theory of 
visual imagery as an offline simulation process, given a Selective Approach to perception. 
If my concerns about the Time-spread Argument discussed below could be ameliorated, 
then this is possibly something I would enjoy developing further in the future. But until 
then my preferred avenue for developing a full theory of STIm, involves the adoption of a 
Generative Approach. Defending this move is what we can turn to now by, first attempting 
to neutralise some of the main motivations that I think there are for adopting Naïve 
Realism in the first place (Section 5.2), and then rejecting it outright based on the Time-
spread Argument (Section 5.3). 
 
5.2 ± Neutralising some general arguments for Naïve Realism 
Before looking at the Time-spread argument against Naïve Realism in detail in the next 
section, I think it is worth explaining why I take that argument to be the most crucial one to 
discuss in this context. This is because I feel many of the other arguments for and against 
Naïve Realism are less compelling ones, or have been adequately dealt with for now. For 
instance, it seems that the appeal to Disjunctivism offers some immunity from the 
Argument from Hallucination, or at least this is a strategy that is currently under debate 
DQGLVJDUQHULQJPXFKVXSSRUW,QZKDWIROORZV,ZLOOEULHIO\H[SODLQZK\,GRQ¶WIHHO
motivated to defend Naïve Realism on other grounds and this will also act to help justify 
why I am happy to adopt a much less intuitive indirect realist and Generative Approach in 
what follows. So for now we can briefly look at why someone would willingly adopt a 
theRU\WKDWKDVWKHZRUGµQDwYH¶DVSDUWRILWVQDPHDQG,WKLQNWKHVHIDOOLQWRWZRPDLQ
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categories to do with its apparent intuitive and epistemological benefits90. I will discuss 
each of these in turn below. 
 
The first main motivation that I think there is for adopting Naïve Realism is that it is the 
most intuitive position to adopt. It just patently appears to us that we are directly in contact 
with external objects and it is these objects that form a constitutive part of our perceptual 
experience. This can be perhaps best be expressed as two separate but related intuitions. 
)LUVWO\WKHUHLVWKHµ2SHQQHVV,QWXLWLRQ¶, which claims that it just seems like our perceptual 
VWDWHVDUHµRSHQWRWKHZRUOG¶DQGLWLVWKHZRUOGLWVHOIZHDUHDZDUHRI(c.f. Crane 2005). 
The second is the µ7UDQVSDUHQF\,QWXLWLRQ¶, which claims that in most normal perceptual 
H[SHULHQFHVLWGRHVQ¶WVHHPOLNHZHDUHREVHUYLQJWKHZRUOGWKURXJKDQ\LQWHUPHGLDU\
states. If it turns out we are, then these are usually transparent to us and it¶VDVLIZHVHH
straight through them; like a really clean window. The simplest explanation for both these 
intuitions is that we are actually just directly aware of the external world and that in fact 
there is nothing transparent through which we see. Hence transparency may actually be a 
misnomer in this situation91 and the natural conclusion to reach from this is that both these 
intuitions favour Naïve Realism. Consider this quote from Kennedy emphasising this 
point: 
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVWVWDNHWUDQVSDUHQF\to support their theory and to work against the 
qualia theory. In this paper I argue that representationalist assessment of the 
philosophical importance of transparency is incorrect. The true beneficiary of 
transparency is another theory, naïve realism. Transparency militates against qualia 
DQGWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVWWKHRU\RIH[SHULHQFH¶.HQQHG\DEVWUDFW 
 
                                               
90
 And see Pautz (2007: 504) for a similar division of the field into intuitive vs. epistemological arguments 
used in defence of Naïve Realism. This is not to say that there are not others but I interpret them as the most 
important ones. 
91
 I take this point from Kennedy (personal communication), because perhaps for Naive Realism there is 
QRWKLQJOLWHUDOO\µWRVHHWKURXJK¶RUWRµEHWUDQVSDUHQW¶DVVXFK7KHDERYHUHSUHVHQWVP\XVHRIWKHWHUP
µWUDQVSDUHQF\¶EXWVHH6LHZHUW Kind (2003), Loar (2003) and Crane (2006) for how this word has 
been variously used and abused. 
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In general agreement with Kennedy I do not intend to dispute that our basic intuitions 
favour the naïve realist and not the Representationalist; this point is readily conceded. 
+RZHYHU,ZRXOGSRLQWRXWWKDWWKLVLVPDLQO\EHFDXVH,GRQ¶WWKLQNLWFRQFHGHVPXFKRI
importance. Consider the strength of the intuition that the sun revolves around the Earth: 
one can concede that this is the naive intuitive position, while still holding relatively 
sophisticated scientifically based reasons for denying it. And further, even after you are 
aware of these facts, it is still very hard to see this situation as the Earth rotating relative to 
a static sun and hence it remains difficult to change your intuitions. Analogously our 
intuitions about perception will probably always favour Naïve Realism, even if it turns out 
we can eventually prove that it is false, which therefore devalues it as evidence for or 
against a position in the first place. Saying that, I accept that ones intuitions should only be 
doubted if there are fairly strong reasons to do so. However I do think that there is already 
enough evidence to seriously doubt whether our intuitive take of perception should be 
trusted and much of this is also science based and is why many researchers in this field are 
not naïve realists92. Hence I suggest people should be wary of leaning on the Openness and 
Transparency Intuitions too heavily and much of the next section is aimed at explaining 
why I think this reliance is a mistake and to outline reasons for resisting these intuitions. 
This will hopefully have the effect of removing one of the main motivations for defending 
a naïve realist position. 
 
Related to all that, I think the second main motivation for defending Naïve Realism, is that 
it seems to give us a more assured and direct epistemological access to the external world. 
The idea being that if external objects are mainly as we perceive them and it is the objects 
themselves that we directly perceive, then this acts as a relatively solid basis for our 
knowledge claims about reality. This is relatively solid when compared to, for example, 
                                               
92
 &IDFROOHFWLRQRISDSHUVJDWKHUHGWRJHWKHUXQGHUWKHµTXDOLD¶EDQQHULQ:ULJKWPDQ\RIZKLFK
appeal to scientific reasons for rejecting direct realism. And see Chapters 6&7 for more on this. 
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indirect realist theories where we may be mistaken about a large part of our experience and 
perhaps actually truthfully know very little about external reality: e.g. if a Generative 
Approach is true then we seem to be only aware of states generated by our brain and are 
therefore cut off in some way from the external world in itself93. This point is related to the 
XVXDOµYHLORISHUFHSWLRQ¶EDVHGDUJXPHQWVXVHGDJDLQVWLQGLUHFWUHDOLVWWKHRULHV,UHIHUWR
this motivation for arguing for a naïve realist position as the Epistemological Desire 
Argument. The quote below may be an example of this phenomenon and is also an 
H[DPSOHRI-RKQVRQ¶VXVHRIKLVµFRQMXQFWLYH¶WHUPLQRORJ\ 
µ'HVSLWHWKHYHQHUDEOHFUHGHQWLDOVRIWKHDUJXPHQWZHVKRXOGUHMHFWWKH&RQMXQFWLYH
$QDO\VLVRIYHULGLFDOVHQVRU\DZDUHQHVV«:KDWLVRGGDERXWWKHDQDO\VLVis that it 
entails that the objects of hallucination are present to us in a way that external 
particulars cannot be, even when we are seeing external particulars. We should 
instead hold out for a view to the effect that when we see, or more generally, sense, 
H[WHUQDOSDUWLFXODUVWKRVHSDUWLFXODUVDUHQROHVV³GLUHFWO\´SUHVHQWWRXVWKDQ
DQ\WKLQJLVLQKDOOXFLQDWLRQ¶-RKQVWRQ 
 
7KHLGHDWKDWZHVKRXOGµKROGRXW¶IRUDSHUFHSWXDOWKHRU\WKDWILWVRXUHSLVWHPRORJLFDO
desires, seems to risk precludLQJVRPHYHU\SODXVLEOHWKHRULHVVLPSO\EHFDXVH\RXGRQ¶W
like their potential consequences. And while I generally sympathise with these 
epistemological desires (i.e. I would also like GLUHFWUHDOLVPWREHWUXH,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKLVLV
a valid form of argument because it is at risk of putting the cart before the horse. What we 
desire, whilst possibly being a valid initial motivational factor, is not actually an argument 
in defence of that same theory; that is any more than my desire that the Earth be flat is an 
argument for flat-Earthism. The moral being that we must discount what we would like 
perception to end up delivering epistemologically, from influencing which theory we 
                                               
93
 7KLVLVZK\0DUWLQFDOOVDOOLQGLUHFWUHDOLVWWKHRULHVµHUURUWKHRULHV¶%XWQRWHWKDWEHOLHYLQJWKH
Earth revolves around the sun is also an error theory. So this must just be a descriptive rather than a 
SHMRUDWLYHXVHRIWKHZRUGµHUURU¶,WPD\ZHOOEHWKDWDNLQGRIHUURUWKHRU\RISHUFHSWLRQLVLQIDFWWKHFRUUHFW
one and this is something I try to defend here. 
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initially favour. In that case, in my opinion, epistemological desires must be confined to a 
motivating factor to defend the theory, not a defence of the theory itself.  
 
&RQYHUVHO\DFFXVDWLRQVRIµSXWWLQJXSDYHLORISHUFHSWLRQ¶PXVWEHGLVFRXQWHGDV
arguments against any indirect realist or Conjunctivist theory, simply because this may be 
an unavoidable consequence of this theory if it is indeed correct. It may not be, but we 
VKRXOGQ¶WUHVLVWFRQFOXGLQJDWKHRU\LVFRUUHFWVLPSO\EHFDXVHZHGRQ¶WOLNHLWV
implications. This is why I suggest we should not concern ourselves with the 
epistemological implications of the theory too early, because I suspect that at times this 
leads to a discounting of the scientific evidence and possibly leads to a misleading spin on 
WKHPHWDSK\VLFDODUJXPHQWV$V5H\SRLQWVRXWµ«VXUHO\RQHPXVt be wary of 
VXFKDWWHPSWVWREX\HSLVWHPRORJ\E\VHOOLQJRXWPHWDSK\VLFV¶ 
 
$GGHGWRWKLVLVWKHIDFWWKDWHYHQLILQGLUHFWUHDOLVPZHUHWUXHDQGZHGRQ¶WKDYHDVJRRG
an epistemological access to the world as we would like, it still seems like we have just 
what is necessary for survival evolutionarily speaking. That is if indirect realism is true 
then it seems that this is all we need for survival, and this is better than no access at all and 
hence there is no need for absolute direct access. So perhaps to desire more than the basics 
QHHGHGIRUVXUYLYDOPLJKWVHHPDQDFKURQLVWLFRUDQWKURSRFHQWULFDQGKHQFH,GRQ¶WUHDOO\
IHHOWKHLPSDFWRIYHLORISHUFHSWLRQUHODWHGREMHFWLRQV:HVHHPWRµNQRZ¶MXVWHQRXJKWR
survive and thrive as a species and hence desiULQJDQ\KLJKHUNLQGRIµ.QRZOHGJH¶PD\
just be a pre-Darwinian remnant of our outlook on the world and our place within it. And 
see also the opening quote from Bonjour (2004: 363) for a statement of how limited the 
actual epistemological benefits of Naïve Realism may be given an internalist 
epistemological approach. To paraphrase what I think Bonjour is saying there: it seems that 
HYHQLI1DwYH5HDOLVPLVWUXH\RXVWLOOFDQ¶WWHOOZKHQ\RXDUHKDOOXFLQDWLQJRUSHUFHLYLQJ
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and therefore would be unable to tell what is a veridical perception or not. And hence our 
whole perceptual experience could still be in global error like that of a BIV. Hence given 
an internalist epistemological approach we are still no better of at combating global 
scepticism if we adopt a direct realist position94. 
 
Related to the discussion above, since Naïve Realism involves such a simply construed 
close contact with the world, I accept that it has the strongest claim to being called a direct 
realist theory. Indeed I greatly respect its clarity and the candour of its supporters on at 
least this issue. But perhaps this means that in comparison any other theory that does not 
FODLPWKLVLPPHGLDWHFRQWDFWZLWKUHDOLW\PXVWDWOHDVWEHVHHQDVDµOHVV-GLUHFW¶WKHRU\
And even though less direct theories may seem to be less intuitive, just being labelled as an 
indirect theory is not necessarily a bad thing as long as its well motivated. Consider the 
following from Fish on this point: 
µ«6RFDOOLQJDWKHRU\³LQGLUHFW´VKRXOGQRW,PDLQWDLQFDrry with it any negative 
connotations which may have been associated with it for these reasons [such as the 
veil of perception]. And it may well be, therefore, that some version of a non-
disjunctive theory such as the representational theory turns out to be the best theory of 
perception we have. All this paper aims to show is that, if that were the case, our best 
theory of perception would fall into a category which is justifiably, but non-
SHMRUDWLYHO\NQRZQDV³LQGLUHFWUHDOLVP´¶)LVK6HFWLRQ 
 
In what follows I will therefore defend an indirect realist theory on the understanding that, 
while this may seem unintuitive, this does not a necessarily immediately make it a weaker 
position to adopt, and there may be compelling reasons for accepting this categorisation. I 
also think that accepting the indirect tag in a non-pejorative way really helps be clear up 
                                               
94
 Although given the above, I can appreciate how Naïve Realism might improve our epistemological access 
if a form of Contextualism is adopted (c.f. Sosa 2000, DeRose 1999), and we confine our discussions to a 
more local form of scepticism. This could take place under the assumption that we are not a BIV and could 
then look at epistemological concerns within this restricted context. So I am aware that this issue is a 
complex one, but I cannot really allocate it more space in this thesis: and see the comments that come next in 
the main passage. 
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the terminology in this area, where many different theories seem determined to claim 
directness, even when it is not obvious how this is supported. For instance, I think this area 
KDVSHUKDSVEHHQPXGGLHGE\WKHRULHVWKDWUHIHUWRWKHPVHOYHVDVµ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVP¶
and I join the naïve realists in being sceptical of how they can back up these claims of 
directness 95. This will be discussed further in Chapter 6. 
 
This completes my attempt to neutralise the two main motivations for adopting Naïve 
Realism as I see them. Before moving on it should be noted that the two discussions above 
are only aimed at diluting or neutralizing these motivations and are not presented as knock 
down arguments against them. What I hope to have explained is merely why I do not feel 
the same draw towards this kind of theory and this is partly why I am happy to adopt a 
Generative Approach. So the arguments above are merely designed to give the reader an 
initial indication of why I think I can neutralize these motivations and why other issues, 
like the Time-spread Argument discussed below, tip the balance for me towards 
Generative Accounts. So now that we have introduced Naïve Realism and I have explained 
its main motivations and why I resist them, lets look at what my main argument against it 
is. 
 
5.3 ± The Time-spread Argument against Naive Realism 
In this section I will take the classic Time-lag Argument normally cast against direct realist 
theories and make it more acute by spreading and sharpening it up. The eventual aim is to 
show why I think these kind of theories cannot deal with this problem whilst still 
remaining physicalist or without introducing implausible new physical properties; both of 
which I do take to be pejorative claims. Specifically I will show how the Time-lag 
                                               
95
 For example Tye (1995) and Dretske (1995) and other theories within the school now called 
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVP¶ 
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Argument can be made more acute for this kind of theory by introducing the idea that we 
are actually aware of objects as they were spread backwards through time. I refer to this 
new version of the Time-lag Argument as the Time-spread Argument, and I will focus on 
applying it against modern Naïve Realism, as I see it as the most unambiguously direct 
realist theory on the market. I will particularly put pressure on the naïve realist claim that 
external objects must literally constitute part of your experience and hence just are what 
make up the contours of your visual states (c.f. the quotes at the start of the chapter). This 
LVRIWHQGHVFULEHGDVµ\RXUPLQGUHDFKLQJRXWWRSXW\RXLQGLUHFWFRQWDFWZLWKREMHFWV¶DQG
I will try to show that this is a highly implausible metaphysical claim. This also puts 
pressure on the idea that our perceptual states widely supervene to include the object, 
because the properties of the object may have drastically changed by the time you perceive 
them. The most extreme case of this is where the object may have ceased to exist entirely 
many years before you perceive it, as in the classic time-lag counter example of seeing an 
extinct star. 
 
,ZLOOWDNH/H0RUYDQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVP\UHSUHVHQWDWLYHGLUHFWUHDOLVWGHIHQFHDJDLQVW
the Time-lag Argument. His paper draws together eight main arguments against direct 
realism and gives a standard defence to each of them based on a review of the literature. 
Hence he presents these defences as the united reply from direct realists generally and I 
think therefore it appropriately characterises the best modern exposition of a direct realist 
defence against the Time-lag Argument96. He summarises this defence as follows: 
µ,W¶VLPSRUWDQWWRNHHSLQPLQGKHUHWKDW'LUHFW5HDOLVWVQHHGQRWEHFRPPLWWHGWRWKH
claim that we can now be aware of the no-longer existent object as it is now, but only 
                                               
96
 This is certainly in line with what I have gathered in personal communication with modern naïve realists. 
And see Robinson (1994: 80) for a good introduction to the classic formulation of the Time-lag Argument. 
Note that I am aware of another recent relational direct realist attempt to reply to the time-lag argument given 
by Langsam (1997). However I think Djukic & Popescu (2003) have dealt with this adequately and my 
arguments here also deal with it indirectly and create new problems for Langsam. 
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that we can now be aware of the once-existent object as it used to be.¶/H0RUYDQ
(2004: 224) 
 
The first thing we can note from this defence is that it immediately weakens any appeals to 
the naïve intuitions we have about perception. This is because my naïve intuition is that I 
just see objects as they are now, and not that I see them as they were in the past. However 
this is only a mild weakening, a much stronger critique is that being aware of things as they 
used to be in the past is by no means a trivial metaphysical claim, and we will see that even 
this refined defence is still possibly inaccurate and implausible. So in order to develop this 
stronger critique further, I will introduce the Time-spread Argument by way of developing 
WKHµ%OLSSHU([DPSOH¶LQWKHQH[WWZRVXE-sections and use it to help illustrates my points. 
,ZLOOWKHQORRNDWKRZ/H0RUYDQ¶VGHIHQFHFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGXQGHUGLIIHUHQWWKHRULHVRI
time in sub-section 5.3.3 and show how this defence seems implausible irrespective of 
your position on the nature of time. 
 
5.3.1 - The Blipper Example and the Time-spread Argument 
Lets begin by noting the different light travel times from certain visible objects as a way of 
illustrating the spread in time-lag between objects at varying distances from you. So 
LPDJLQHLW¶VWZLOLJKWDQG\RXDUHHQMR\ing the last bits of the sunset across a panoramic 
view of distant mountains, but you can also see the Moon and a few early stars, some of 
which are planets, all at the same time. I appreciate this is a fairly unusual situation but this 
does not affect the main points I want to make here. Some examples of the travel times of 
light reflected or emitted from surfaces of these various objects to your eyes are as follows: 
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Object Light Travel Time (approximates) 
 
Stars millions of years 
 
Planets e.g. 4mins (Mars minimum)  
and 32mins (Jupiter minimum) 
 
Sun 8 mins 
 
Moon 1.3s  (assumed 1 second for ease of reference below) 
 
Anything on Earth 0.01s or less (one hundredth of a second) 
 
 
 
 
N.B. 0.1s (one tenth of a second) = Assumed minimum time interval discriminable by the 
human eye (this is approximate ± see below); and speed of light = 300,000km/s  
 
 
Table 5.1 ± Table of light travel times from various objects to your perspective given the  
situation described in the text where they are all visible to you at once at twilight 
 
 
In the table above the light travel time range is between, a few millions of years, to less 
than one hundredth of a second. This means the view you are enjoying in the example 
above is actually a conglomerate of objects as they were at different times in the past. I 
think this immediately counts against the Openness Intuition introduced above, because 
you are not aware of the world (and universe) in a formation that it has ever been in. 
Certain of the stars you view have not even existed at the same time as each other, so this 
particular configuration you are experiencing is unique to you where the light is 
converging on your eyes and not anything that has ever existed in the external world. 
Hence it seems implausible to me to suggest yRXDUHSHUFHSWLRQVDUHµRSHQ¶WRWKHZRUOGLQ
the way this intuition initially suggests. This phenomena is what I call inter-object time-
spread, but there also exists a more subtle form I call intra-object time-spread. 
 
To illustrate intra-object time-spread, imagine looking at a large blank cinema screen. Lets 
say you are seated exactly opposite the middle of the screen, so that the shortest distance 
from you to the screen is a straight line that comes out at right angles from the centre of the 
screen to a point between your eyes. Now imagine a small circle around the centre point 
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that slowly grows bigger until it goes off the edge of the screen all together97. Now as the 
circle increases in size, the distance of any point on its circumference, to where you are 
sitting, is also increasing. This is because it is along a hypotenuse of an imaginary right-
angled triangle that goes from any point on the circle to the centre of the screen and then 
out to you and back to the circle. Hence the travel times of light from the circle to you are 
also very slightly increasing as the circle moves outwards. If you represented this on a time 
axis then it would look like a cone spreading out backwards through time, like this: 
                                               
97
 Note this is also another good example of how visual imagination can help you understand what I am 
talking about. And there is another example of this in two paragraphs time. 
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Figure 5.3 ± Illustration of the cinema screen Time-spread example, where: T(1), or the 
small black circle, represents the point closest to you on the screen and hence correlates with 
the fastest light travel time; and T(4), or the large orange circle, represents a point farther 
away from you on the screen and hence correlates with a larger travel time; and T(2), the 
blue circle, and T(3), the red circle, are intermediary stages. 
 
 
The diagram above generalizes to any object that has any facing surface area relative to 
your perspective, because there will be a slight differential in travel time from different 
parts of the object that are different distances away from you. Since most objects we can 
experience do have surface area, we can safely say that in nearly all cases of perception 
there is a fractional amount of intra-object-time-spread. But how big is this fraction? 
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Well, in the table above I have indicated that, for the sake of argument, I will take the 
smallest discernable temporal interval in visual perception to be about 0.1s (or one tenth of 
second). To get a feel for this imagine a light flashing ten times a second and trying to 
count the flashes. I think just from this imaginary exercise we can agree that the individual 
flashes are close to being indiscernible at ten per second. To illustrate this further we can 
probably agree that twice a second would be easily discernable, and twenty times a second 
they would be definitely indiscernible. It is worth noting that it is surprisingly hard to get 
an accurate figure on this minimum threshold because it seems to vary between individuals 
DQGZLWKWKHLQWHQVLW\RIWKHOLJKWVRXUFH0HDVXULQJWKLVPLQLPXPDOVRGRHVQ¶WVHHPWREH
anything that anyone has spent any time researching specifically and hence this is just a 
figure I have gathered from various online sources and extrapolating from phenomenal 
H[SHULHQFH)RUWXQDWHO\WKHH[DFWILJXUHGRHVQ¶WPDWWHUWRRPXFKEHFDXVHDQ\WKLQJ\RX
could possibly observe on Earth has a travel time that is way below this threshold. For 
example, in the cinema screen example, the maximum travel times are many factors of ten 
EHORZWKLVVWKUHVKROG7KHSRLQWLVWKDW\RXZRXOGQ¶WQRWLFHWKLVHIIHFWIURPDQ\HDUWK-
bound object even if you tried to. So to develop these ideas further we can introduce a 
useful object called Dµ%OLSSHU¶VRWKDWZHFDQPRYHLWDZD\WRJUHDWHUGLVWDQFHVWKDWDUH
not earth-bound. 
The Blipper Example 
A Blipper is a variable intensity light that flashes a strong blue light and looks significantly 
different when it is not turned on (e.g. bright blue vs. see through). The Blipper is set up so 
that it can work out how far away it is from you because it is wirelessly connected to a GPS 
receiver mounted on your head. This distance-to-your-eyes measurement is then used to 
change the frequency that the Blipper flashes so that its duration is exactly the same as the 
time it takes for light to travel to you. The net effect is that when you perceive the Blipper as 
being on, it is actually always off and vice versa. In other words, as soon as the light from it 
reaches your eyes, it turns itself off, and as soon as the light stops arriving at your eyes from 
the last flash, it turns on.  
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N.B. The Blipper example can also be extended to be a situation where its actual shape also 
changes. Or more exotically it gets teleported in front of you and then disappears at the 
required frequency. This is introduced to pre-empt defences against this example that might 
concede the point in terms of colour, but deny it in terms of shape. In other words this 
example can be adapted so that both the shape and colour you should perceive are not 
present in the external world at the time of perception. And note it is not the actual 
possibility of this set up that is at question, but rather how your perceptual theory would deal 
with it if it were in fact possible. 
 
Now obviously at earth-bound ranges these changes will not be noticeable because the 
Blipper will be flashing at a frequency way below your discernable threshold. It may be 
that it looks a bit lighter than an equivalent permanently-on-Blipper next to it, because the 
light intensity is halved, but this is not a feature I need to appeal to here to defend my 
position. 
 
The point of introducing the Blipper is that we can now move it gradually away from you, 
while at the same time gradually increasing its light intensity (and possibly size). This is so 
that it appears roughly the same to you and you can still see it when it is at a much greater 
GLVWDQFHVXFKDVRQWKH0RRQ$WWKLVSRLQWZH¶OODVVXPHWKDWWKHWUDYHOWLPHWRWKH0RRn 
is about one second and therefore the Blipper will be flashing on and off at about once per 
second; which is now well above your discernable threshold of 0.1s. It is here that I think 
the naïve realist has problems with an explanation. Because all the time you are perceiving 
EULJKWEOXHOLJKWWKHUHLVLQIDFWQRQHLQWKHH[WHUQDOZRUOGDQGZKHQ\RXGRQ¶WVHH
anything but the Moon (because the Blipper is not visible at this distance when turned off), 
there is in fact a bright blue light shining at you. 
  
The problem for the naïve realist here is that there is nothing in your present environment 
that is instantiating the kind of properties that match up with your perception at the time, 
and hence nothing that seems to be able to literally constitute your experience in the 
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appropriate way. To put it another way, the features that you are experiencing are not 
currently present in the external world and hence unavailable to form the actual contours 
of your perception. So we must literally be directly perceiving the Blipper and the Moon as 
it was 1 second ago. That defence is fine as it stands so far, but I think there are two places 
I can now put further pressure on this line of argument. The first is to suggest that we are 
not even aware of things as they were in the past due to intra-object-time-spread, and the 
second is that seeing things as they were in the past is a controversial claim; and I will deal 
with each of these in turn in the next two sub-sections. 
 
Before doing that I will need to make one assumption on behalf of the Naive Realist, and 
this is to assume that they are not going to suggest there is a different process underpinning 
perceptions of earth-bound objects compared with those at distances away where the time-
lag is theoretically discernable. I say this because I want to exclude the possibility that 
these two versions of a perceptual experience will be treated or classed differently. It 
seems to me that exactly the same perceptual relations and mechanisms are present in these 
two cases (i.e. the Blipper on Earth or on the Moon) and if the earth-bound ones reach out 
to put you in direct touch with external objects then I would suggest it makes sense to 
assume that the non-earth-bound ones do too. 
 
For instance, I would be sceptical of a move to treat the non-earth-bound examples as 
illusions, since there is a continuous progression as the Blipper moves away from you to 
the Moon98. It also seems that there is no deviant travel paths to appeal to (like the stick in 
water) and no cognitive interpretation effect to appeal to (like the Muller Lyer Illusion)99. 
                                               
98
 This move has been suggested to me by one naïve realist as a possible defence and specifically rejected by 
another because these non-earth-ERXQGSHUFHSWLRQVFDQVWLOOEHGHIHQGHGXQGHUD/H0RUYDQ¶VVW\OHGHIHQFH
So it is debatable if this option would be favoured eventually; I merely offer the above as a pre-emptive reply 
if it was favoured. 
99
 I refer to a useful division in how illusions are classified given in Fish (2009: Chapter 6) 
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If this is classed as any other kind of illusion, then the naïve realist has to give a principled 
account of at which point on its way to the Moon, does it stop being a veridical perception 
and start to become an illusion. I predict that any such choice of distance will seem fairly 
ad hoc without identifying a change in underlying mechanism at a certain point and I am 
sceptical this is possible because of the gradual progression of the Blipper to the Moon. 
This defence may also put the naïve realist at the top of a slippery slope, which could end 
up opening them up to the suggestion that all perceptions are in some way illusory. At any 
rate this line of defence perhaps misses the point in certain crucial ways, because even if it 
is classed as an illusion, it still leaves at least two points that need clarifying. These are: 
how the phenomenal character is constitutively dependent on the object in the past in the 
veridical case; and also how this now looses this dependence at a certain point away from 
Earth in the illusory case and exactly what one is aware of now. So given the above, in 
ZKDWIROORZV,ZLOODVVXPHWKDW,FDQIRFXVRQDQDO\VLQJWKHGHIHQFHWKDWLQERWKFDVHVµZH
veridically see the objects DVWKH\ZHUHLQWKHSDVW¶ 
 
5.3.2 - The Blipper Screen and Intra-object-time-spread 
7RLOOXVWUDWHWKHLGHDWKDWZHGRQ¶WHYHQVHHWKLQJVDVWKH\ZHUHLQWKHSDVW,ZLOOLQWURGXFH
the Blipper Screen Example. To do this we need to move further away from Earth and 
introduce more Blippers into the thought experiment: 
Screen of Blippers Example 
Imagine a massive screen fifteen times the facing surface area of the Sun, which is 
covered in Blippers100. If we place the screen at roughly the same distance as the Sun, 
then the differential travel time from the centre of the screen compared with the edges is 
about one second. Just to start off with we turn the screen on all at the same time, 8 
minutes later you will see the Blipper Screen lights turn on in a wave, spreading from the 
middle of the screen to the edges, over the period of a second. This is because the light 
                                               
100
 I have calculated these figures using basic trigonometry and kept the features close to what is more easily 
imaginable; like keeping it close to where the Sun is experienced. Again, whether this set up is actually 
possible is beside the point, the question is how your perceptual theory deals with it if it were. 
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travelling from the edge of the screen takes about 1 second longer to travel to you than 
that at the middle (c.f. the cinema screen example given above). At the point that you see 
the screen turning on in a outward wave the Blippers will be switching off in an outward 
wave, and will be off for the next eight minutes that you experience the screen being fully 
on. 
 
The point of introducing this example is to illustrate how what we see is actually a 
conglomerate of any object as it was spread backwards through time. As the Blipper 
Screen illustrates, even though the Blippers on the screen are turned on simultaneously, 
this is not what you experience. Your experience is determined by the rate that the light 
from this turning-on-event reaches you. Explicitly the turning-on-event is simultaneous at 
the object, but for you it appears to be spread across the period of one second (which is 
also delayed by 8 minutes). So it seems that it is more correct to say that the way you 
experience the object is more determined by the simultaneous light that is hitting your 
eyes, rather than particularly what is happening at the object; although of course this has a 
distal causal role to play for it to count as a perception in the first place. 
 
Perhaps we can re-phrase this point by suggesting that it is the detected light array that 
controls what you see and not any actual way that the object is configured at any single 
time. I ZLOOUHIHUWRWKHOLJKWGHWHFWHGDWWKHH\HVLQDQ\RQHLQVWDQWDVWKHµGHWHFWHGOLJKW
DUUD\¶DQGDEEUHYLDWHWKDWWR'/$\IURPKHUHRQ+HQFHZKDWZHSHUFHLYHVHHPVFUXFLDOO\
controlled by what the DLAy is telling us rather than necessarily how the object is at any 
one instant. It seems to me that it is exactly the same process that occurs in earth-bound 
cases, and hence you experience the world according to the light that is simultaneously 
reaching your eyes (i.e. The DLAy), rather than what is out there at any one single time. Of 
course at closer distances this difference will be indiscernible, but the point is that the 
process is the same in both cases. 
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This is perhaps where we can appeal to what we have learnt from the previous analysis of 
the visual buffer. If the DLAy determines the retinotopic way that the eye is stimulated, 
and this configuration is also passed on and processed in a matching topographic way in 
the visual buffer, then this must be the information that your eventual visual state is at least 
based on. And as we have seen in the Blipper Screen Example, at large travel times and 
distances, the state you perceive and the one that is actually out there can be discernibly 
different. Hence the distribution of the DLAy that is represented in the brain can be 
discernibly different from that which was emitted simultaneously at the objects. This is one 
example of how the analysis of the visual buffer can help us here, by showing how our 
internal representations of external reality may always be slightly mis-matched from what 
was actually out there. 
 
To deny this the naïve realist would have to suggest that the brain somehow corrects for 
the travel time that the light has undertaken to reach you. As far as I know this claim has 
not been made and I would suggest that it would be a fairly weak reply without some 
supporting empirical evidence to motivate it. This could in theory be tested, but I would 
predict that most people would agree that it is most likely that it would confirm the Blipper 
Screen Example as I have described it. Therefore I would assume that no one would really 
want to claim something like the following: that the brain delays the processing of the 
information reaching it from the centre of the Blipper Screen; in order to match it up with 
the information reaching it a second later from the edge of the Blipper Screen; because it 
has somehow worked out they come from the same contemporaneous event and should be 
represented in experienced as such. So I will assume that the naïve realist must accept that 
we perceive objects as they were spread backwards through time due to both inter-object-
time spread and intra-object-time-spread. At least I will assume this until I hear an 
argument that the brain somehow corrects for this time spread somewhere upstream from 
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the visual buffer. For now I take it that that this defence is unlikely to be forthcoming, 
although I would be interested to hear it if it is attempted. 
 
This suggests to me that it is therefore more accurate for the naïve realist to change their 
defence against the Time-spread Argument to one that says something more like the 
following: we are not aware of objects as they are now, as our naive intuitions tell us; in 
fact we are not even aware of objects as they were at any one particular time in the past; 
but rather we are aware of objects as they were spread backwards through time. Hence the 
defence by Le Morvan is shown to perhaps be at least inaccurate and we are now in a 
position that is even further from what out naïve intuitions tell us. If this interpretation is 
plausible then this seems to work against the intuitions that motivate Naïve Realism in the 
first place and hence, seems to me, to weaken their claims in this respect even further. This 
is because although on the surface it seems like we are just aware of objects immediately 
and they form part of our experience, by simply applying some basic science and 
trigonometry, the actual case seems much more complicated and unintuitive. Hence I hope 
WRKDYHH[SODLQHGZK\,GRQ¶WILQGPodern Naïve Realism that plausible on at least this 
count. This potential explanation will be made even more complicated once I have looked 
at some of the basic metaphysics behind even claiming this modified time-spreading 
defence. 
 
Before doing that it may be worth developing one other good way of illustrating these 
points. And that is to imagine that the speed of light was significantly slower so that light 
WRRNDERXWRQHVHFRQGWRUHDFK\RXHYHQIURPREMHFWVKHOGLQ\RXUKDQG<RXZRXOGQ¶W
really notice the difference for fairly static uniform objects, but for anything moving there 
would be a very distinct lag between what you saw and where you could feel it was. Rather 
like the lag between seeing a jet engine and hearing its roar, or the lag between thunder and 
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lightening, but here it is your sense of touch that is working faster than your sense of sight. 
At this slower speed of light, the time-spread on the Screen of Blippers would be 
discernable at the scale of a cinema screen too. Hence we can compensate for the relatively 
fast speed of time at short distances, by challenging the naïve realist to give an explanation 
of their theory under a thought experiment where there is a much slower speed of light. It 
seems that all perceptions, even if they were stLOOFODVVHGDVµGLUHFW¶ZRXOGSRWHQWLDOO\EH
non-YHULGLFDOLQWKLVFDVH,IWKH\FDQ¶WJLYHDSULQFLSOHGGHIHQFHDJDLQVWWKLVSRVVLELOLW\
then the plausibility of Naïve Realism seems contingently dependent on a rapid speed of 
light and hence this weakens their position to my mind. 
 
,WWKHUHIRUHVHHPVWRPHWKDWWKHIDFWWKDWZHGRQ¶WQRWLFHWKHWLPH-spread phenomena in 
earth-bound examples, is just a contingent feature of the rate of our visual discrimination 
being so much lower (0.1s) then the time-spread discriminations allowed for by the actual 
speed of light (less than 0.01s). We can therefore suggest the reason the Openness and 
Transparency Intuitions are so compelling is simply a contingent feature of a very fast 
speed of light, rather than any deeper direct constitutive contact with external reality. At 
the very least this direct contact is now far more complicated than our intuitions would 
suggest and is now a fairly involved metaphysical claim. Which brings me to the second 
part of this analysis: how plausible is to say we see things as they were spread backwards 
through time in the first place? To analyse this we need to look at some basic implications 
for this approach under different philosophical theories of time. 
 
5.3.3 ± Time-spread and theories of time 
Very briefly this section will look at the initial plausibility of saying that we are aware of 
objects as they were spread through the past. To do this I propose that we look at the two 
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main theories of time, namely Presentism and Eternalism, and see how they might help 
assess this claim. 
 
i) Presentism 
First of all I take Presentism to be the most intuitive (common man) approach to time and 
hence it is prima facia the one that seems the most compatible with the intuitive claims of 
Naïve Realism; not that much depends on this, as discussed next101. According to 
Presentism (e.g. Markosian 2002) only the present exists ontologically and therefore there 
are no material objects, or anything of any kind (e.g. matter and energy), that is not 
constrained within the present time frame. This means that it is metaphysically impossible 
for objects from the past to be literally a constitutive part of your perception, because there 
is no physically realised past to play this relational role. The naïve realist may still claim 
that we can see now how things were in the past, and hence appeal to a perceptual event 
that seems to occur entirely in the present, but this does not explain how the non-existant 
external object in the past is supposed to literally constitute the current contours of your 
experience. So it is hard to understand exactly what the naïve realist thinks we are aware of 
by appealing to non-existent entities and this claim therefore seems initially implausible 
given a presentist theory of time.  
 
To put it another way, under Presentism it seems like there is no such thing as objects as 
they were in the past for your mind to reach out to. And further, even the thought of your 
mind leaving the present to reach out to the past is probably impossible under this theory of 
time. This is even if you embrace dualism about the mind and therefore somehow your 
PLQGFDQHVFDSHWKHPDWHULDOVKDFNOHVRIWKHSUHVHQWWKHUHMXVWGRHVQ¶WVHHPWREHDQ\
material objects to latch on to anywhere else but those in the present. Hence the material 
                                               
101
 Again this is not to say tKHUHDUHQ¶WJRRGDUJXPHQWVIRUGRXEWLQJ3UHVHQWLVPRQO\WKDW,WDNHLWWKDWWKLVLV
what most people on the street would naively agree with if pressed to think about it. 
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objects that constitute your experience can only be as they are in the present and this 
removes any relata that that your mind could constitutively perceptually relate you to in the 
past, which contradicts the defence stated above and hence means that initially Presentism 
seems incompatible with Naive Realism102. 
 
,WLVZRUWKQRWLQJWKDW3UHVHQWLVPGRHVQ¶WFODLP that objects that were in the past have gone 
out of existence or have been destroyed and current objects are being perpetually created. 
Rather that the objects of the past have transformed into objects of the present, which will 
change into other forms in the future. And these will have continuingly varying properties 
at these different times according to the laws of physics and entropy. The point is that the 
objects as they were in the past no longer exist in the form that you experience them as 
being in now and in fact in the case of the Blipper, you never see it as it actually ever is, 
which is the only state available to reach out to. Hence it seems that under Presentism the 
objects of our perception can have moved on to instantiate different properties and to exist 
in different configurations, and there is no past configuration to go back to, let alone one 
that is spread backwards through time. 
 
ii) Eternalism 
The other main option as I see it here, is to be an Eternalist about time (e.g. Sider 2001). 
The main way of characterising this position is to say that it involves all times actually 
existing eternally in a static 4D block universe. That is the past, present and future all 
literally ontologically exist, but they are spread out in a way that means they can be 
represented as in Figure 5.4 below. Here we collapse the three physical dimensions into a 
2D plane and plot these aJDLQVWWLPHRQWKHRWKHUD[LVDVDµIRXUWK¶GLPHQVLRQ 
                                               
102
 And note I do not deny that you can be in other kinds of relations with objects, such as: remembering 
them; or thinking about them; or even being taller than them. I am just focusing on my interpretation of the 
perceptual relation proposed by the naïve realist (c.f. Djukic & Popescu 2003 for another criticism of 
appealing to other non-perceptual relations to defend a relational perceptual theory). 
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Figure 5.4 ± Diagrammatic representation of Eternalism as a static 4D block universe 
 
 
Although Eternalism is motivated, as I see it, because of concerns to do with physics (e.g. 
relativity), they have trouble explaining our conscious experience of the forward flow of 
time and usually have to explain it as merely an illusion. This is because our experience of 
the flowing passage of time is hard to incorporate into a static universe where nothing even 
moves or interacts in the way that we normally think it does103. Hence if the naïve realist 
appeals to Eternalism, they immediately trade a strong intuition about perception, for a 
highly unintuitive one about consciousness DQGWKHSDVVDJHRIWLPHDQGKHQFH,¶PQRWVXUH
they have made progress in defending their intuitive position. In other words, they might 
establish that we can have direct unmediated contact with objects as they were spread 
backwards through time, but concede that the way we are conscious of objects over time is 
a complete illusion. The net effect perhaps being that we have no better over all 
epistemological grip on reality than we had before. In addition the indirect realist who is 
also a presentist could now possibly claim equal rights to intuitive claims, hence nullifying 
one of the main reasons for favouring Naïve Realism in the first place, as discussed above. 
So there may at least be an intuitive trade off if this route is taken. 
 
                                               
103
 I think it also has many other problems to do with causation and explaining entropy and physics, but these 
need not concern us here; suffice to say that I prefer Presentism and think I can defend it against the normal 
UDIWRIREMHFWLRQVOHYHOOHGDJDLQVWLW%XWWKDWLVDYHU\LQYROYHGSURFHVVWKDW,FDQ¶WHYHQVXPPDULVHKHUH 
Time 
Physical 3D 
space collapsed 
into a 2D surface 
Particular 
slices of 
time 
209 
Apart from that it is metaphysically complicated, and maybe even more unintuitive, to 
explain how our perception reaches back, spreading through time, as the illusion of 
consciousness goes forward, whilst everything is actually frozen in a static universe! So 
this is not a simple metaphysical claim by any means and one that will need significant 
unpacking before its plausibility can be assessed. So the idea of our minds reaching 
backwards through time, in an otherwise static universe, to different time slices of the same 
object is very involved one to make by Le Morvan and other direct realists. And this makes 
me very pessimistic about the utility of appealing to this kind of theory of time to defend 
Naive Realism against the Time-spread Argument. Of course I would be very curious to 
hear an Eternalism based solution to the Time-spread Argument that still preserves the 
intuitions of Naive Realism. But until I hear that argument and can assess its plausibility, I 
feel I am justified in being sceptical about the utility of taking this route for the naïve 
realist.  
 
This therefore seems to leave no obvious options for the naïve realist to take at this point 
and hence I see it as an implausible position to hold and this is the main reason why I 
prefer Generative Approaches. And note I take it as fairly obvious why the Time-spread 
Argument is not a problem for indirect realist Generative Approaches, since the locally 
supervenient generation of experience can occur entirely in the present, even though the 
physical processes that ultimately distally cause it can be spread through the past; I will 
explain what I mean by this in more detail in Chapter 7. 
 
A quick word might be appropriate here to eliminate appeals to intermediary theories of 
time such as Pastism: where only the past exists and the present is being continuously 
created. First of all any theory that posits a static block universe in the past suffers the 
same fate as Eternalism in terms of awareness reaching back to the past. This is even 
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though it may have less trouble explaining our perception of time flowing in the present. 
Secondly, the main benefit of Eternalism is that it avoids the ontological excesses of a 
µFRQWLQXRXVO\FUHDWHGSUHVHQW¶ZKLFKZRXOGEULQJDVWDJJHULQJDPRXQWRIPDWWHUDZKROH
universe worth) into existence at every moment. Eternalism does posit a lot of matter into 
existence (the whole universe for all times), but at least it has always been there and 
arguably we are just realising how much of it there is. Hence it is not necessarily 
ontologically profligate, but just committed to a much, much larger ontology in the first 
place. Therefore I will not deal with these intermediary positions in detail and treat them as 
less plausible versions of Eternalism. At least I think what I have said above seems 
applicable to all the most plausible theories of time that I know of. 
 
This therefore concludes the section on Time-spread Arguments against Naïve Realism. 
7KHPDLQSRLQW,KDYHWULHGWRHPSKDVLVHLVWKDWWKHQRUPDOGLUHFWUHDOLVWFODLPWKHµZHVHH
things now aVWKH\ZHUHLQWKHSDVW¶LVLQDFFXUDWHEHFDXVHLWLVWRRVLPSOLVWLFDQGDOUHDG\
seems fairly implausible because of time-spread concerns. This seems particularly acute 
for naïve realist positions that depend on the object-as-it-was to literally constitute part of 
your experience. Just the briefest of looks into this area has shown that the Le Morvan 
style defence is quite a significant metaphysical claim that needs substantial elaboration. It 
is only at that point that can we tell if this approach still remains plausible and I have given 
several reasons why I feel justified at present to be sceptical that such an elaboration is 
possible. To further justify this I have had verbal communication from two current naïve 
realists that time-spread is still a problem for this kind of approach. That is not to say that I 
am claiming there is no possible reply, only that I have been given good reason for 
standing by this argument for now, and why I do not favour theories like Naïve Realism at 
present. Hence until I get some form of a response to these points, I will carry on as if it is 
a less plausible approach than a Representational theory of perception. And note I am not 
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claiming to have disproved Naïve Realism, but merely to have shown why I do not favour 
it and why I feel justified in setting it aside at least for the remainder of the thesis. 
 
There remains a further question as to whether this critique could be applied to other 
positions that claim to be Selective Approaches and hence direct realist theories. At first 
glance I would suggest that they would obviously apply to any relational perceptual theory, 
or one that claims wide supervenience of phenomenal character, where the object is 
somehow meant to be directly involved in the perceptual state in something like a 
constitutive role. This is because I would suggest that the arguments stated above question 
whether it is ever possible to be in any kind of perceptual relation with objects as they were 
spread backwards through the past. Hence I feel confident that this approach could be 
applied to at least most relational perceptual theories that claim direct contact with external 
reality and I take these to be the best candidates for Selective Approaches to perception. 
Conversely, agreeing with the naïve realists (see quotes above), I would be sceptical that 
any theory that does not claim such a close relational contact with external objects is 
properly called a direct realist theory, and we will look at one such theory briefly in 
Chapter 6. There I will look at the LPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKLVDQDO\VLVIRU7\H¶VYHUVLRQRI
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVP¶DQGDWWKHVDPHWLPHZHZLOOORRNDWVRPHLGHDVRIKLVWKDWPD\KHOS
analyse the Interpretation Capacity Mechanism. So while I cannot explicitly apply this 
Time-spread Argument to all direct realist theories here, I remain confident that such an 
analysis is at least possible (and see below).  
 
On a final note then, I can summarise what I have been aiming for in this chapter. That is 
to show that Naïve Realism, while admittedly being an intuitive position that satisfies 
certain epistemological desires, still has significant problems with the Time-spread 
$UJXPHQW7RPHLWVHHPVOLNHWKHH[WHUQDOZRUOGMXVWFDQ¶WSOD\WKHFRQVWLWXWLYHUROHLQ
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perception that a Selective Approach might want it to. Hopefully therefore the analysis 
above has shown why I have focused on this critique rather than others, since I see it as the 
most compelling reason to abandon Selective Approaches generally. That said, even if a 
version of a Selective Approach could reply adequately to the Arguments from Illusion and 
Hallucination and the Time-spread Argument, I think it is still explanatorially 
minimalistic. In other words there is still a significant explanatory debt owed to explain 
how the mind reaches out to make us conscious of external objects and I call this the 
Awareness Mystery. It seems that most Relational perceptual theories just take how we 
become aware of external objects as obvious without feeling any need to explain this 
because it is so intuitive. However, this mystery is so acute that it leads some researchers to 
abandon any materialist attempts to explain it: 
µ%XWWKHPHUHIDFWWKDW>WKH7KHRU\RI$SSHDULQJDVDUHODWLRQDOSHUFHSWXDOWKHRU\@WDNHV
the appearing relation to be fundamental and irreducible means that it is incompatible 
ZLWKPDWHULDOLVPDQGVRZLOOEHRSSRVHGE\PDWHULDOLVWVIRUWKDWUHDVRQ«,DPDWD
loss to think of what material relation the appearing relation might be, once we reject 
any reduction of it to the causal chain that eventuates in the perceptual experience. And 
so [this theory] is opposed to materialism in any form. Since materialism holds no 
DWWUDFWLRQIRUPH,FDQFKHHUIXOO\DFFHSWWKDW¶$OVWRQ 
 
So Alston readily accepts that his relational and direct realist perceptual theory cannot be 
squared with a materialist outlook. However it seems to me that, once we are freed of the 
confines of materialism, then the mind can spread wherever it likes whether these places 
still exist physically or not. But this still leaves a really unsatisfying explanatory deficit, 
and one that is now perhaps out of the realms of empirical study, and therefore it seems 
that the Awareness Mystery is now even more acute than it was before. For example: how 
can a non-physical mental state interact with objects as they were in the past, even if they 
do exist, and why is this relation confined by the speed of light; and how are the contents 
of the visual buffer accessed to yield this direct immaterial awareness of objects spread 
backwards through time? To me this would come close to invoking some sort of 
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immaterial mind-beam that is emitted from the brain and can go back instantly in time to 
put one in touch with the objects as they were. But this is a mysterious entity indeed and 
hence some elaboration from these kinds of theories about what they have in mind is 
necessary before we can assess the plausibility of their response to the Awareness Mystery. 
 
So for me the appeal to dualism opens up many more problems than it solves and hence, 
along with the concerns stated above, it makes me sceptical that any relational direct realist 
theory is really compatible with a satisfying materialist outlook. I therefore take theories 
that invoke non-materialist solutions as appeals of last resort and prefer to continue by 
remaining within a materialist framework and generally abandoning Selective Approaches 
of perception instead. So until the concerns I have raised here are at least neutralised, then I 
feel justified in I setting aside all Selective Approaches for now, or certainly at least for the 
remainder of this thesis. Therefore in the next two chapters we will start to look at 
Generative Approaches and Representational theories in more detail and specifically look 
DW7\H¶VYHUVLRQRI5HSresentationalism and the Interpretation Capacity Mechanism in 
Chapter 6 next. 
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6 - 67,PDQG7\H¶V7KHRULHVRI3HUFHSWLRQDQG,PDJHU\ 
Representationalism and Image Interpretation 
 
 
µ2UJDVPLVSKHQRPHQDOO\impressive and there is nothing very impressive 
about the representational content that there is an orgasm. I just expressed it 
and you just understood it, and nothing phenomenally impressive happened (at 
OHDVWQRWDWP\HQG¶%ORFN 
 
µ7KHDSSURDFK,KDYHWDNHQGUDZVKHDYLO\RQWKHYLHZVRIERWK [depictivism] and 
[propositionalism], but is not properly classifiable as falling into either camp. The 
problem with the theories I have rejected, as I see it, is not that they are completely 
wrong-headed but rather that they are only partly right. In some respects mental 
images are a little like pictures, but in others they are like descriptions. The truth 
DERXWLPDJHV,VXJJHVWLVWKDWWKH\DUHDPL[HGEUHHG¶7\H± names of 
theories changed to match the equivalent terms used here) 
 
 
In the last chapter I introduced and rejected Naïve Realism as a paradigmatic example of a 
Selective Approach. I did this by relying mainly on the Time-spread Argument, but I also 
explained why I find other motivations for defending Naive Realism uncompelling. I 
suggested that these arguments might generalise to other forms of Selective and Relational 
Approaches to perception, although I did not have time to go into this latter claim in much 
detail. Getting to this position now allows me to focus on more Representational, and 
possibly Generative Approaches, in the remainder of the thesis and the full positive theory 
that I favour will be developed along these lines in the next chapter. Before I can do that 
there are two more features that I think I need to address, and both of these involve 
DQDO\VLQJWZRGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVRI7\H¶VZRUNRQWKHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQ
perception and imagery. Hence both of these analyses will contribute to refining and 
defending my final theory of STIm as an offline simulation of visual perception. Hence in 
WKLVFKDSWHU,ZLOOVWDUWE\DQDO\VLQJZKHWKHU7\H¶V5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDO3$1,&
theory of consciousness is best interpreted as a Selective or Generative Approach, 
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especially in terms of visual perception. I will then go on to analyse some earlier ideas by 
Tye (1991), to do with how visual images come to be interpreted. This will act as a way to 
develop some ideas of my own about the Interpretation Capacity on the output side of 
Figure 4.3 as discussed in Chapter 4. I will now say a little more about each part of this 
chapter in terms of an introduction before starting the analysis proper. 
 
As mentioned briefly in Chapter 1, I defend an approach that is very Tye-like at least at the 
level of symbol manipulation in related areas of the brain. This is because Tye (1995) also 
suggests the visual buffer is utilised in both vision and visual imagery and they are both 
based on a similar kinds of hybrid depictive representational processes. For Tye this means 
they are both based RQµLQWHUSUHWHGV\PEROILOOHGDUUD\V¶LQWKHYLVXDOEXIIHUDQG,UHSHDW
the most pertinent quote from Tye to illustrate this point; and note that this is the same 
quote that was first given in Section 1.3:  
µ7KHUHLVVWURQJHYLGHQFHWKDWLPDJHVDQGYLVXDOpercepts share a medium that has 
EHHQFDOOHGWKH³YLVXDOEXIIHU´7KLVPHGLXPLVIXQFWLRQDOLWFRQVLVWVRIDODUJH
number of cells, each of which is dedicated to representing, when filled, a tiny 
patch of surface at a particular location in the visual field. For visual percepts and 
afterimages, the visual buffer is normally filled by processes that operate on 
information contained in the light striking the eyes. For mental images (other than 
afterimages), the visual buffer is filled by generational processes that act on 
information stored in long-term memory about the appearance of objects and their 
spatial structure. Images and percepts, I have argued elsewhere, are interpreted, 
symbol filled patterns of cells in the visual buffer ¶7\H%R[ ± 
footnotes removed, emphasis mine) 
 
I will explain what this may mean in more detail below in the first part of this chapter. 
7KHUH,ZLOOVXJJHVWWKDWDGRSWLQJ7\H¶VXQGHUO\LQJVWUXFWXUHVWLOOVHHPVWREHFXUUHQWO\
viable and is consistent with much that I have already discussed in terms of defending the 
.RVVO\Q0RGHOLQ&KDSWHUV	7KLVLVZKDWPDNHV7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\DQGZKDWKH
thinks happens next, very relevant to this project. However it is at the point of discussing 
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how these underlying symbol filled arrays lead to full phenomenal consciousness that I 
will mainly disagree with Tye. This is because I will suggest that his form of reductive104 
Representationalism is best seen as a Selective Approach and hence suffers many of the 
same problems I have identified in the last chapter. I will argue that, in my opinion, he fails 
to explain adequately how accessing these symbol filled arrays in the visual buffer leads to 
phenomenal consciousness. So while accepting much of his underlying PANIC structure, I 
will slightly modify the top level of his representational theory in favour of a less 
representationally reductive approach (and these terms will be explained further in what 
follows). 
 
In the second half of this chapter I will focus on what Tye might mean by the idea that 
WKHVHV\PEROILOOHGDUUD\VQHHGWREHµLQWHUSUHWHG¶WREHFRPHPHQWDOLPDJHV$OWKRXJKDV
indicated above, he includes this as a qualification in his later (1995) full PANIC theory, 
he says little about it there, and we therefore need to look at an earlier book by him called 
µ7KH,PDJHU\'HEDWH¶WRH[SODLQWKLVTXDOLILFDWLRQ105. Regarding this issue I will 
again argue against Tye and suggest that un-interpreted imagery can occur, although 
VRPHWLPHV,WKLQNLWQHHGVWREHµODEHOOHG¶appropriately so that it can be used for a willed 
episode of problem solving. However this still allows seemingly spontaneous and abstract 
un-interpreted and unlabelled images to occur, and I think this reflects our 
phenomenological experience of imagery much closer. We will therefore need to look at 
WKHGLVWLQFWLRQV,ZLOOGHYHORSEHWZHHQµLPDJH-ODEHOOLQJ¶DQGµLPDJH-H[DPLQDWLRQ¶DQG
DQDO\VLQJWKLVZLOOIRUPWKHEXONRIP\FULWLFLVPRI7\H¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ-based 
approach. 
                                               
104
 ,ZLOOH[SODLQWKLVµUHGXFWLYH¶GLVWLQFWLRQLQZKDWIROORZVEXWJHQHUDOO\LWUHIHUVWRWKHZD\KHUHGXFHV
phenomenal character to representational content without the need for any extra explanatory step or 
mechanism. I will defend a non-reductive form of Representationalism in the next chapter that accepts some 
form of extra generative step is necessary. 
105
 Note that I have used other arguments from this text to refine the distinctions about hybrid depictive 
representations as discussed in Chapter 4. Here we will look at a different aspect of this book. 
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Discussing these ideas will also allow me to suggest that this is how visual images become 
labelled with a temporal context and this is what allows them to represent events that may 
occur in the future, or could have occurred in the past. This section will therefore 
constitutes my main arguments for how the temporal and spatial context becomes 
associated with STIm. Recall I have already discussed in Chapter 4 how the spatial layout 
of features that are contained within the imagined scene are controlled by integrating it 
with information processed in the SPP stream. So in addition to the way that objects are 
spatially laid out in the imagined scene, I will also discuss here how this scene can also be 
labelled according to different spatial contexts. For instance, you can visually imagine the 
spatial layout of your room being located in the jungle or the desert, even though the actual 
distribution of the objects in your room can be the same in each case. This allows me to 
distinguish between the spatial layout of an image, which is determined by how the objects 
in it are distributed in apparent 3D space, and the spatial location of that scene, which 
determines what geographic location this is set in and under which you consider it. But 
note that this spatial context can be left unspecified if not relevant and can be an imaginary 
location too. Hence by discussing this labelling and interpretation process I hope to 
develop a way to explain our full capacity to imagine different arrangements of objects, 
under different temporal contexts, and in potentially different spatial locations. This will 
form the platform for explaining my full theory of STIm in Chapter 7. 
 
6RVSHFLILFDOO\WKLVFKDSWHUZLOOIRFXVRQWZRUHOHYDQWDVSHFWVRI7\H¶VZRUNDQGGHYHORS
them as a platform for the concluding chapter to follow. To recap, it will firstly argue that 
7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\FDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVDNLQGRI6HOHFWLYH$SSURDFKDQGLIVR
inherits some of the problems discussed in the last section. I will also briefly discuss some 
other problems with his PANIC theory as I see it and link this with more recent work by 
218 
him (e.g. Tye 2009). And secondlyWKLVFKDSWHUZLOOGHYHORS7\H¶VLGHDWKDWWKH
symbol filled arrays in the visual buffer need to be interpreted to become mental images. I 
will instead suggest an alternative approach, which argues that they only need to be 
labelled appropriately if they are to be used in a willed episode of imagery. This labelling 
step will also accommodate the idea that they can be labelled according to an alternate 
temporal context and/or spatial location. This will provide the platform I require for 
developing a full account of STIm based on a Generative and Representational Approach 
LQWKHQH[WFKDSWHU6RZHZLOOVWDUWQRZE\DQDO\VLQJ7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\Dnd 
why I think it is best seen as a specific variety of a Selective Approach. 
 
6.1 ± 7\H¶V3$1,&7KHRU\RISHUFHSWLRQDQGLPDJHU\" 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQ,ZLOOILUVWEULHIO\LQWURGXFH7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\RI
phenomenal consciousness and then I will criticise it. As mentioned above, I will mainly 
DFFHSW7\H¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHXQGHUO\LQJVWUXFWXUHRIKRZSKHQRPHQDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVLV
supported (or underpinned). My criticism will mainly come in at the level of how Tye 
explains how phenomenal consciousness relates to this underlying physical framework. I 
will suggest that he provides no adequate account for this unless he is suggesting a version 
of a Selective Approach, in which case he may be subjected to the arguments I made 
against these kinds of theories in the last section. Hence this first part of the chapter will be 
split into two main phases: firstly I will simply introduce his PANIC theory, and then I will 
argue that it might best be seen as a Selective Approach, and if so then I can reject based 
on the Time-spread Argument as described in Section 5.3. 
 
 
6.1.1 ± 7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\± the underlying structure 
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,QP\RSLQLRQWKHEHVWELWRI7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\LVKLVH[SODQDWLRQRIWKHEDVLF
underlying structure of phenomenal consciousness, which is heavily empirically guided 
and remains plausible even today. This relies mainly on the uncontroversial suggestion that 
sense organs, such as the eyes, ears and skin, collect information from the environment, 
which gets processed via early raw sensory arrays, into final sensory arrays (FSAs) in the 
brain. This involves a relatively straightforward process of detecting incoming signals in 
transducers in the sense organs and relaying these to neural network arrays in the brain for 
further processing. Hence these FSAs could be said to represent the information detected 
from the body and the environment via the sense organs. A detailed example of this causal 
process in terms of vision has been described in Chapters 3 & 4, while defending the 
Kosslyn Model. And some RI7\H¶VHDUOLHUFRPPHQWVDERXWKRZWKHVH
representations are utilised by the visual buffer have been discussed and incorporated 
WKHUH7KLVSDUWRI7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\WKHUHIRUHFXUUHQWO\UHPDLQVKLJKO\SODXVLEOHLQP\
opinion, even given the updated version of the Kosslyn Model discussed earlier; indeed 
this part of his work has been much of the inspiration for the direction this thesis has taken. 
+HQFH,ZLOOQRZLQWURGXFH7\H¶VQH[WVWHSLQMXVWHQRXJKGHWDLOVR,FDQDQDO\VHKLV
transition from the FSAs to full phenomenal consciousness. 
 
7RWKDWHQGLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDW7\H¶VIXOO3$1,&WKHRU\LVDLPHGDWH[SODLQLQJDOO
forms of phenomenal consciousness, and hence my focus on visual perception in this 
context, is just a specific subset of his full theory. Hence it seems possible that equivalents 
RIWKHµYLVXDOEXIIHU¶FRXOGEHLQYRNHGIRURWKHUVHQVRU\PRGDOLWLHV)RUH[DPSOHLWLV
known that the somatosensory cortex is subdivided into areas that correspond to skin on 
different parts of the body, with areas that are more sensitive having more volume of 
cortex devoted to them, as depicted in the diagram below: 
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Figure 6.1 ±Divisions of the somatosensory cortex that associate pain sensations to 
areas of the body. On the right is its location in the brain; on the left is an 
illustration of the relative amount of brain matter devoted to each region of the 
body. Note for example how the hands and lips have a very large amount of brain 
matter devoted to them compared with their relative actual size (diagram adapted 
from Carlson 1994) 
 
 
So Tye thinks a similar thing can be said for other sense modalities and this purportedly 
allows him to explain how more general things like orgasms and moods can represent 
things going on within the environment and ourselves. I do not propose to go into whether 
these arguments are successful or not (although I think they largely are at the symbolic 
level), as this is not the area I have in contention with these theories106. Hence I will focus 
simply on visual perception from here on, but be aware that in some of the quotes below, 
Tye is talking more generally too. Although having said that he does also tend to focus on 
the visual modality, as do most other perceptual theories in the literature. 
 
In terms of vision Tye (1995) recognises that there are subsidiary processing steps that 
subserve the upstream sensory modules, like edge detection and colour processing. These 
LQWXUQ\LHOGDVLWVRXWSXWµDXQLILHGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHHQWLUHYLVXDOILHOG¶SJ+H
equates WKLVXSVWUHDPVHQVRU\PRGXOHLQYLVLRQZLWK.RVVO\Q¶V9LVXDO%XIIHUDVGLVFXVVHG
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 But see Block (1996, 1998, 2003: and see opening quote), Tye (1996, 2003, 2005), Rey (1998), Alston 
(2005) and Crane (2001: 78) for a sample of other research on these issues. 
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above. Here is how Tye explains the steps going from the FSAs in the sensory modules in 
the brain (i.e. the visual buffer) to full blown phenomenal experience: 
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQs occurring within the modules supply information the creature 
needs to construct or generate sensory representations, but they are not themselves 
sensory. Phenomenal content, in my view, is not a feature of any of the 
representations occurring within the sensory modules. As I noted in the last 
chapter, experience and feeling arise at the level of the outputs from the sensory 
modules and the inputs to a cognitive system. It is here that phenomenal content is 
found. 
 
Sensory representations (viewed in the above way) represent either internal or 
external physical items. Bodily sensations represent internal bodily changes. They 
are directly tuned to such changes (in optimal conditions). Likewise emotions and 
moods. In the case of perceptual experiences, the items sensorily represented are 
external environmental states or features. 
 
Phenomenal content, I maintain, is content that is appropriately poised for use by 
the cognitive system, content that is abstract and nonconceptual. I call this the 
PANIC theory of phenomenal character: phenomenal character is one and the same 
DV3RLVHG$EVWUDFW1RQFRQFHSWXDO,QWHQWLRQDO&RQWHQW«,WIROORZVWKDW
representations that differ in their PANICs differ in their phenomenal character, 
and representations that are alike with respect to their PANICs are alike in their 
SKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHU¶7\H± referred to as Main Quote in what 
follows - my emphasis in quote) 
 
 
,ZLOOQRWGLVFXVVWKHµLQRSWLPDOFRQGLWLRQV¶FODXVHKHUHEHFDXVHWKLVTXDOLILFDWLRQLVQRW
relevant to my arguments in this context, although it becomes quite crucial later for his 
responses to Inverted Earth arguments (Tye 2000: Chapter 6). For now we can see that for 
7\HµSKHQRPHQDOFRQWHQW¶LVMXVWDIRUPRIµLQWHQWLRQDOFRQWHQW¶EHFDXVHWKH)6$VZKLFK
are the basis for phenomenal content, are all about (or they represent) something in our 
surrounding environment or bodies, and hence they are intentional. 
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+HQFH7\HPDLQWDLQVWKDWµ3KHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHURUZKDWLWLVOLNHLVRQHDQGWKHVDPHDV
a certaLQVRUWRILQWHQWLRQDOFRQWHQW¶>SJ± Box.5.2]. He thereby equates phenomenal 
character with Poised Abstract Nonconceptual Intentional Content (or PANIC for short): 
the poised indicates that it is not always accessed by the Cognitive System to form beliefs 
and desires but only stands ready to be; the abstract indicates that the state does not have 
to have a real concrete object as its focus, it can be real or non-existant (e.g. 
hallucinations); the nonconceptual indicates that the subject need not have matching 
concepts for the general features entering into these contents; and the intentional content 
indicates that it is about or directed at (or represents) something.  
 
He ends his section on PANIC by re-stating his reduction of phenomenal character to 
representational content, which presumably is aimed mainly at qualia theorists who might 
argue that phenomenal character can out-stretch representational content: 
 
µ6RWKDWLVZKDWZKDWLWLVOLNHLVUHDOO\OLNH,WLV3$1,&3KLORVRSKHUVZKRKDYH
attempted to draw a sharp distinction between the representational aspects of our 
mental lives and their phenomenal or subjective or felt aspects are mistaken. The 
ODWWHUIRUPDVXEFODVVRIWKHIRUPHUOLNHLWRUQRW¶7\H 
 
This is why, in line with other prominent interpretations available in the literature (e.g. 
/\FDQDQG&KDOPHUV,WKLQN7\H¶VDSSURDFKLVUHIHUUHGWRDVD
µUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOO\UHGXFWLYH¶SRVLWLRQ7KLVLVEHFDXVHLWUHGXFHVSKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHUWR
representational content without remainder. That is, it suggests there is no need to appeal to 
anything ontologically new at this point, such as qualia, or any immaterial sense-data, for 
instance.  
 
It is worth noting this kind of reduction can be importantly differentiated from reduction to 
the physical because even representationally non-reductive theories can claim to be 
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compatible with materialism. They must however then just claim that anything else 
involved in their theory is also physical. Hence this allows a space for those who favour a 
less representationally reductive approach, but still want to remain broadly monist about 
substance, even though materialist non-reductive representationalism may seem to be at 
first sight a bit less intuitive107. This latter approach is the kind of position I favour and 
these issues will be discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
$OVRQRWHWKDWWKLVµUHGXFWLYHYVQRQ-UHGXFWLYHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVP¶GLVWLQFWLRQLVGLIIHUHQW
WRWKHµVWURQJYVZHDNUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVP¶GLVWLQFWLRQVLQWKHOLWHUDture. This is because 
strong representationalism only suggests that representation of a certain kind suffices for 
phenomenal character. Conversely weak representationalism suggests only that 
phenomenal character has some representational content, and hence neither say anything 
specifically about a reduction to representational contents. This point is illustrated by 
noting that strong representationalism can come in reductive and non-reductive forms, 
where the latter could appeal to qualia in one form or another. This way of splitting the 
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDO¶ILHOGLVLQOLQHZLWKKRZ,WKLQN&UDQHZRXOGFUXFLDOO\
distinguish it from Relational theories, as discussed in Chapter 5. And it is also probably 
why I think Crane takes the differences between different, broadly speaking, 
representational theories (e.g. Tye and certain qualia theories) as only being a minor 
crevasse, when compared with the large chasm between Representational vs. Relational 
theories108.  
 
                                               
107
 It is less intuitive because Reductive Representationalism seems to rely in all its stages on elements that 
are more obviously physical, and this may have been one of the main reasons for motivating it initially. See 
MacPherson (2003: 56 & footnote 27) and Lycan (2006) for an expression of this sentiment about the work 
of Dretske (1995) and Tye (1995). 
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 +HUHKHLVUHMHFWLQJ%ORFN¶VFODLP that the dispute between Representationalism and Qualia 
7KHRU\LVWKHµJUHDWHVWFKDVPLQWKHSKLORVRSK\RIPLQG¶ 
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This categorisation also possibly matches up with that indicated by certain other 
researchers who may only reluctantly accept being categorised as qualia theorists. For 
LQVWDQFHLQWKHLQWURGXFWLRQWRDUHFHQWFROOHFWLRQRQµTXDOLDWKHRULHV¶:ULJKW
ODPHQWVWKHH[FOXVLYHXVHRIWKHWHUP³5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVP´IRU7\H-style reductively 
representational theories. When actually historically older representational theories were 
V\PSDWKHWLFWRTXDOLDWKHRULHV)RUH[DPSOH:ULJKW¶VILUVWHGLWHGFROOHFWLRQZDV
FDOOHG³1HZ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVPV´DQGDFFRUGLQJWRKLPWKRVHDUWLFOHVDOOµHVSRXVHG¶
TXDOLD+HQFH:ULJKWKDVDEDQGRQHGWKHXVHRIWKHWHUP³5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVP´LQIDYRXU
RIGHIHQGLQJDEURDGO\FRQVWUXHG³4XDOLD7KHRU\´+RZHYHUZLWKWKHpossible implicit 
recent rejection by Tye (2009) of his PANIC theory because it appeals to phenomenal 
concepts (as briefly mentioned in Section 1.4 footnote 22 and see below), and the 
FRPSOLFDWLRQVLQYROYHGLQXVLQJWKHQRZPRUHWHFKQLFDOWHUPµTXDOLD¶,ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDW
perhaps abandoning this useful term may be too hasty. Perhaps it is better to suggest that 
7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\DQGFHUWDLQRWKHUTXDOLDDQGRULQWHQWLRQDOWKHRULHVDUHERWKYDULHWLHV
of Representationalism but are crucially different in how they expand on that. I think this is 
best rHIOHFWHGLQUHIHUULQJWR7\H¶VDSSURDFKDV5HGXFWLYH5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVPDQGWR
theories that are more sympathetic to Generative Approaches, as non-Reductive 
Representationalism. This is the convention I will adhere to in what follows where I will 
criticiVH7\H¶V5HGXFWLYH5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVPDQGWKLVZLOODOORZPHWRGHIHQGDQRQ-
Reductive Representationalist theory in the next chapter. 
 
However, it is worth noting that even given my interpretation of the way this field is 
divided, which is in turn based on the interpretation of leading researchers within this same 
field, this is a complex and evolving matter and neat categorisation may not always be 
possible. Hence I will still try to stick to the classifications that are most important to my 
analysis of STIm in the context of this thesis, and that is mainly the distinction between 
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Selective and Generative Approaches. So in my opinion the most important next step is to 
DQDO\VHKRZD5HGXFWLYH5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDODSSURDFKOLNH7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\DWWHPSWWR
explain phenomenal character and this is where I think he can be interpreted as possibly 
condoning a Selective Approach. But before I can justify this conclusion I need to analyse 
WKHVWHSVLQ7\H¶VWKHRU\EHWZHHQWKH)6$VDQGWKHHYHQWXDOH[SHULHQFHRISKHQomenal 
character. 
 
6.1.2 ± 3UREOHPVIRU7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\ 
So now that I explained what I mean by Reductive Representationalism we can return to 
VSHFLILFDOO\DQDO\VLQJ7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\*LYHQWKH0DLQ4XRWHIURP7\H
above and especially the part I have emphasised with italics, he seems to suggests that it is 
somewhere between the output of the final sensory modules or arrays (the FSAs like the 
visual buffer) and the input to a Cognitive System that phenomenal content is found and 
experiences and feelings arise. It is worth noting that throughout his body of work he says 
SUDFWLFDOO\QRWKLQJDERXWZKDWKHWKLQNVWKHµ&RJQLWLYH6\VWHP¶DFWXDOO\LVDSDUWIURP
containing a mechanism for forming beliefs and desires based on some of our percepts. He 
also fails to address just what happens at the output stage from the visual buffer to a stage 
that it can be accessed by the Cognitive System appropriately. Hence there appears to be 
no explanation of the way these FSAs output their information in order to make the 
symbolic representations available to phenomenal conscious and hence poised for the 
Cognitive System to access. And therefore it seems to me like he just leaps across the 
VLJQDOWRSKHQRPHQDOJDSZLWKRXWH[SODLQLQJKRZLW¶VGRQH7KLVLVHVSHFLDOly odd after 
making the problem of mechanism at the gap so clear earlier in his book: 
µ+RZFDQHOHFWULFDODFWLYLW\LQGXOOJUH\PDWWHUJHQHUDWHIHHOLQJDQGH[SHULHQFH"
What is wanted here is a description of mechanism that underlies the generation of 
perspectival entities from nonperspectival ones and that closes the enormous gap 
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ZHLQWXLWLYHO\IHHOEHWZHHQWKHWZR7KLVLVWKHSUREOHPRIPHFKDQLVP¶7\H
43) 
 
I refer to this as the Generation Mystery and it is something any Generative Approach to 
perception must accept exists. That is there remains a question as to how the brain 
generates phenomenal character from these simple physical and symbol manipulation 
processes such as neurons firing in arrays in the brain like the visual buffer. And note this 
is different to the Awareness Mystery, which I introduced at the end of Chapter 5, which 
questions how the brain supports us being directly aware of the shapes and colours of 
external objects. So in the former case the brain generates phenomenal character itself and 
in the latter it merely supports awareness of external objects and their properties, and Tye 
GRHVQ¶WVHHPWRJLYHDQH[SODQDWLRQRIKRZHLWKHULVDFKLHYHGRUHYHQWKDWLWQHHGVD
separate explanation. 
 
7KLVODFNRIGHWDLOLQ7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\has led Kriegel (2002a) to suggest that none of 
the individual PANIC criteria are enough to discriminate phenomenal from non-
phenomenal mental states. This is because it seems that non-phenomenal mental 
representations can be: abstract and non-conceptual and have intentional contents, just by 
representing a certain kind of external object that may or may not actually exist via an 
FSA. Kriegel then argues that poisedness, the only feature that is now left, is not a 
difference in phenomenal content but rather a vehicular property in the different functional 
role it can play. So the fact that it can be experienced phenomenally is not about a 
difference in its phenomenal contents (what it represents) but rather how it functions: i.e. 
whether it is poised or not. And this might risk collapsing a representationally reductive 
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theory into a functionalist theory, and functionalist theories are mainly criticised for their 
lack of explanation of the phenomenal109. 
 
6RLWVHHPVWKDW7\H¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQRISKHQRPHQDOFKDUDcter with PANIC leaves what 
happens between the output from the visual buffer and phenomenal experience seriously 
under described. Given the functional interpretation above it seems that just having these 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVDSSURSULDWHO\SRLVHGGRHVQ¶WH[SODLn how potentially non-phenomenal 
representational content becomes phenomenal content and hence phenomenal character. So 
we must perhaps look elsewhere for an explanation of what is happening in the case of 
perception and perhaps try and identify an extra step that helps explain how Tye thinks 
phenomenal character arises. Related to this I will analyse and reject the idea that an 
interpretation process that Tye could appeal to might be a suitable candidate in Section 6.2 
next. 
 
Before doing that however, it think it would be appropriate to investigate whether, given 
WKHDERYH7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\FDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVEHLQJD*HQHUDWLYHRU6HOHFWLYH
Approach, and this can then be used to relate his theory to my analysis of STIm. That is, I 
will analyse whether in perception the extra step might involve: either reaching out to put 
one directly in touch with external objects and their properties, as a Selective Approach 
might suggest; or would it involve the brain generating phenomenal character based on the 
contents of the visual buffer, as a Generative Approach might suggest110. It seems to me 
that both of these steps could potentially take the outputs of the visual buffer and make 
them phenomenally available for the Cognitive System to utilise in further thought 
                                               
109
 C.f. Block (1978, 1980), and Churchland (2005) for a review of 40 years of Functionalism. 
110
 I will assume here that this exhausts the possibilities open to Tye at this point given that he needs to 
explain where the phenomenal character of our experience comes from in some materialist way: i.e. he is not 
eliminativist about it and hence it does need an explanation of some kind. 
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processing. That is after this extra step the phenomenal character can be poised and one 
can attend to it or not and hence form beliefs and desires about it or not. 
 
*LYHQ3$1,&WKHRU\¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOO\UHGXFWLYHQDWXUH,ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDWLWLVQRW
best seen as a Generative Approach, as this step would then need to be explained 
separately, and Tye explicitly denies in the quotes above that anything else is necessary. 
He also seems to want to avoid at all costs introducing any potentially immaterial 
intermediary by which we experience external objects indirectly111. So I do not favour 
interpreting his position as a Generative Approach. 
 
&RQYHUVHO\JLYHQ7\H¶VH[WHQVLYHDSSHDOVWRWKH7UDQVSDUHQF\,QWXLWLRQ,ZRXOGVXJJHVW
his theory is most naturally interpreted as a version of a Selective Approach. He seems to 
expressly suggest that in perceptual states it is the properties of the objects themselves that 
we are aware of directly. Consider the following two quotes from sections of his work 
specifically appealing to the Transparency Intuition: 
µ7KHOHVVRQRIWKHSUREOHPRIWUDQVSDUHQF\LVWKDWSKHQRPHQRORJ\DLQ¶WLQWKH
head«WRGLVFRYHUZKDWLW¶VOLNH\RXQHHGWRORRNRXWVLGHWKHKHDGWRZKDWEUDLQ
states represent. Phenomenology is, in this way, externally based. So systems that 
are internally physically identical do not have WREHSKHQRPHQDOO\LGHQWLFDO¶7\H
(1995: 151) 
 
µ$QH[SODQDWLRQLVQHHGHGRIZK\WKHSKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHURIYLVXDOH[SHULHQFHV
is sensitive in this way to surface qualities ± qualities that, if they are anything at 
DOODUHTXDOLWLHVRIVXUIDFHVH[SHULHQFHG«WKHH[SODQDWLRQVXUHO\LVWKDWWKH
phenomenal character involves the surface qualities of which the subject of the 
visual experience is directly aware ± that these qualities at least partly constitute 
SKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHU«7KHEHVWK\SRWKHVLV,VXJJHVWLVWKDWYLVXDOSKHQRPHQDO
character is representational content of a certain sort- content into which certain 
H[WHUQDOTXDOLWLHVHQWHU¶7\H 
                                               
111
 C.f. his pervasive, and some would say far too brief, dismissals of Sense-Data theories: e.g. Tye (2000: 
45-46) and Maund (2005: 40) for a critique. 
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The combination of these quotes together with his claims to being a direct realist theory, 
suggest to me that Tye takes the Transparency Intuition to favour the idea that it is the 
qualities of the surfaces of the objects themselves that at least partly constitute phenomenal 
character and which we experience directly by representing them in the way described 
above. For example, in the first quote he seems to be suggesting the phenomenal character 
of our perceptual experiences has a wide supervenience base and hence phenomenology 
involves external objects as a Selective Approach might suggest. To deny that internally 
physically identical duplicates must be phenomenally identical also seems to favour this 
interpretation and goes against the BIV intuition that a Generative Approach would 
accept112 (as discussed previously). In the second quote he seems to suggest that it is the 
intrinsic qualities of the objects themselves that we are aware of and in Tye (2000) he 
argues that colour is an intrinsic physical property of the external objects113. And note his 
VXJJHVWLRQZKLFKHFKRHVWKDWRIWKH1DLYH5HDOLVWV¶FI6HFWLRQWKDWWKHTXDOLWLHVRI
the objects themselves at least partly constitute WKHFKDUDFWHURIRQH¶VFRQVFLRXV
experience. This therefore seems like a theory that suggests it is just the objects 
themselves, and their respective surface qualities, that we are aware of in visual perception, 
and hence one I would interpret as best falling under the category of a Selective Approach 
to perception as defined here. 
                                               
112
 This quote seems to deny internalism about phenomenal character and Tye seems to still favour 
externalism in his most recent work (2009: Chapter 8). For an internalist thesis about BIVs see Horgan et al 
(2004). 
113
 It is a currently debated point as to whether colour is actually an intrinsic property of an object at all as 
7\H¶VWKHRU\QHFHVVLWDWHVDVGRHV1DwYH5HDOLVPHence Tye (2000: Chapter 7) spends some time defending 
WKHSRVLWLRQRI&RORXU5HDOLVPEXWDV/\FDQQRWHVµ2IFRXUVHFRORUUHDOLVPKDVEHHQDPLQRULW\
position in the history of philosophy, so this must be counted as a liability of [a reductive] Representational 
WKHRU\¶7KHUHUHPDLQVHULRXVSUREOHPVZLWK&RORXU5HDOLVPVXFKDVWKHSUREOHPRIPHWDPHUVDQGFRORXU
constancy: see the following for more on this debate: Hardin (2008), Byrne and Hilbert (2003), McLaughlin 
(2003) and Wright (2003). I also have an original criticism against Colour Realism based on the contents of 
the visual buffer that I hope to develop in future. Basically it states that we are not aware of the light that is 
reflected at the object, but rather what arrives at our eyes and the two are rarely, if ever, the same due to 
differential wavelength absorption on propagation. Hence we cannot be aware of the colours that external 
objects are, even if they are coloured. I see this as a version of the Awareness Mystery because it is still a 
mystery to me how we are aware of the colours objects have even if they do have them. 
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This is because it seems that all the brain now does is select which external properties one 
is directly aware of by representing them appropriately, rather than locally generating these 
phenomenal states. So it seems this selective process would now need to be explained as 
occurring via an underlying representational method as opposed to a more obviously 
relational scheme such as those invoked by Naïve Realism for example. Hence I suggest 
WKDWXQGHU7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\RXUUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOFRQWHQWSXWVXVLQWRXFKGLUHFW ly with 
external reality, and hence PANIC theory is best classified as a Selective Approach in this 
respect. 
 
,IWKHDERYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVFRUUHFWWKHQ7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\FDQEHFULWLFLVHGXVLQJWKH
Time-spread Argument as described in the last chapter. This is because the representational 
contents formed based on the processed data in the visual buffer, will be delimited by the 
current information detected at the eyes (the DLAy), which is also in accordance with 
7\H¶VWKHRU\6RDWODUJHGLVWDQFHVLQDQ environment with rapidly changing properties 
(say a Blipper Screen), the representational contents may not now correspond with what is 
actually out there in the external world at present. If the environment is not instantiating 
the right surface qualities then these cannot partially constitute what we experience, and 
this leaves no explanation of where the phenomenal character of our experience comes 
from under a Selective Approach. To put it another way, what the PANIC states represent 
as being out there will be significantly out of phase with what is actually in the external 
world in these cases. And since it is the intrinsic physical surface qualities of the objects 
(i.e. colours) that we are aware of, as properties of the objects, if these objects no longer 
exist, then neither to these properties114+HQFHLI7\H¶VWKHRU\LVUHDOO\VXJJHVWLQJD
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 And note this prevents Tye appealing to universal properties that do not go out of existence with the 
object, since these colour properties are supposed to be intrinsic properties of the objects: namely surface 
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Selective Approach to perception then it seems to me to also fall foul of the Time-spread 
$UJXPHQW7KLVLVEHFDXVH,GRQ¶WWKLQNDQ\RIWKH3$1,&IHDWXUHVFDQH[SOain how we 
become aware in the present, of objects as they were spread out backwards through the 
past. That is in any better way than any of the more obviously relational perceptual theories 
discussed in Chapter 5; or at least this is what I will assume here until I hear a reductive 
representationalists reply to this criticism. 
 
7KHSUREOHPIRU7\HDV,VHHLWLVWKDWKHGRHVQ¶WSURYLGHDVDWLVIDFWRU\DFFRXQWRIHLWKHU
the Awareness Mystery or the Generation Mystery. Instead he suggests that just by 
representing something based on the outputs of the FSAs in the brain, which are in turn 
SRLVHGLQWKHULJKWZD\WREHDFFHVVHGE\WKHµ&RJQLWLYH6\VWHP¶WKDWVRPHKRZZH
become at directly aware of external objects and their surface qualities. And further this is 
even true when those objects and properties are spread backwards through the past and 
hence may have drastically changed the surface qualities that they are instantiating during 
the time it takes the reflected light to reach our eyes. A mystery still remains as to how this 
one-way causal system (object-to-eyes-to-brain) somehow makes us directly aware of 
these physically and temporally distant objects as they were spread backwards through the 
past, some of which may no longer exist. So just saying that the phenomenal character just 
is the same as the representational content does not explain these features, because the 
representational content as far as I can tell, is just based on some neural networks in the 
brain (the visual buffer) that is output and appropriately poised to be accessed by some 
RWKHUSDUWRIWKHEUDLQWKHVRFDOOHGµ&RJQLWLYH6\VWHP¶+HQFHLWVHHPVOLNHWKHUHVWLOO
remains an Awareness Mystery of how this very plausible underlying system makes us 
                                                                                                                                              
VSHFWUDOUHIOHFWDQFHVVHH7\H&KDSWHU$QGVHH'XQQ¶V6HFWLRQDQDO\VLVRIWKH
implausibility of appealing to uninstantiated universals (especially for a materialist). 
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phenomenally conscious in a way that seems direct and partly constituted by the object and 
its surface qualities115. 
 
As discussed briefly in Section 1.4 (c.f. footnote 22), normally Tye (2000: Chapter 2) 
ZRXOGDSSHDOWRµSKHQRPHQDOFRQFHSWV¶WRH[SODLQZK\DQ\UHPDLQLQJDSSDUHQW
explanatory gap LVPHUHO\GXHWRDFRJQLWLYHLOOXVLRQ+RZHYHU7\H¶VUHFHQWERRNFDOOHG
µ&RQVFLRXVQHVV5HYLVLWHG¶KDVUHMHFWHGWKHSODXVLELOLW\RIWKLVDSSHDOWRSKHQRPHQDO
concepts and therefore it seems that this move is not open to him anymore (see Tye 2009: 
and especially Chapter 3). My interpretation of his new position is that he has now moved 
to a more obviously Selective Approach, based on knowledge by acquaintance, and hence 
the arguments above and in the last chapter will be even more pertinent. He certainly 
seems to still be committed to the Transparency Intuition (pg. Xiii), and repeating my 
agreement with Kennedy (2009: abstract) on this issue from Section 5.1, I would suggest 
this intuition is most compatible with Naïve Realism and Relational perceptual theories, as 
opposed to Reductively Representational theories116. 
 
6RJLYHQWKHDERYH,IHHO,FDQUHMHFW7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\RIFRQVFLRXVSHUFHSWLRQIRU
being overly representationally reductive and as long as my interpretation of it as a 
Selective Approach is appropriate. If however Tye had moved to a more Generative 
Approach then I think this would resemble something more like the theory I will defend in 
WKHQH[WFKDSWHU6RLQPDQ\ZD\VP\WKHRU\UHSUHVHQWVDQH[WHQVLRQRI7\H¶VXQGHUO\LQJ
structure, but where the Transparency Intuition is accepted as misleading due to the Time-
                                               
115
 And note this problem occurs irrespective of the underlying representational system you adhere to: i.e. 
propositionalism or depictivism. For example, how does a propositional representation in the brain lead to 
phenomenal consciousness, especially if the external world is not instantiating that property anymore. 
116
 It should be noted however that the interpretation above of his very recent work is relatively tentative and 
I eagerly await the first reviews and replies to his new work to test this hypothesis further. It suffices for me 
WRVD\DWWKLVSRLQWWKDWKLVQHZERRNGRHVQ¶WVHHPWRDGGUHVVDQ\RIWKHSUREOHPV,LGHQWLI\KHUHDVIDUDV,
can tell and if anything I think it perhaps makes them more acute. 
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spread Argument and hence as a result the brain is cited as needing to generate 
phenomenal character itself. This would also entail that phenomenal character cannot be 
reduced to representational contents alone as Tye suggests, and some further generative 
step is also required. This involves suggesting that the brain can generate phenomenal 
character in all cases, which is in line with what I think the Time-spread Argument 
compels us to accept because the external world does not have the right features to do this. 
It also involves accepting that there is still a Generation Mystery and this will be discussed 
further in what follows. So this is the non-Reductively Representationalist direction I have 
DGRSWHGEDVHGRQWKHXQGHUO\LQJVWUXFWXUHRI7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\DQGWKLVZLOOEH
developed and defended further next, in Chapter 7. Before doing that I will look at the 
RWKHUUHOHYDQWDVSHFWRI7\H¶VZRUN,PHQWLRQHGDERYHDQGWKDWLVZKHWKHU symbol filled 
DUUD\VQHFHVVDULO\QHHGWREHµLQWHUSUHWHG¶WREHFRPHYLVXDOLPDJHV 
 
6.2 ± The Interpreting and Labelling of Visual Images 
,Q&KDSWHURI7\HKHGHYHORSVZKDW,ZLOOFDOODQµLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ-EDVHG¶DSSURDFK
to mental imagery as summarised in the quote below: 
µ7KHDUUD\VLQDQGRIWKHPVHOYHVPHUHO\UHSUHVHQWVXUIDFHVDQGORFDWLRQVDVVHHQ
from a particular viewpoint. Mental images result only via specific interpretations 
of the arrays. For example, an array representing a horse-like appearance becomes 
DQLPDJHRIDKRUVHYLDWKHLPDJHU¶VLQWHUSUHWLQJLWDVUHSUHVHQWLQJDKRUVH,VKDOO
assume that it is correct to view thought generally as involving linguistic 
representations in some neuronal code, that is representations have combinational 
syntax and semantics. Hence, I take the interpretation here to require the appending 
RIDQLQQHUVHQWHQFHZLWKWKHFRQWHQW³7KLVUHSUHVHQWVDQ)´WRWKHDUUD\¶7\H
(1991: 94) 
 
I take this quote to suggest that the information stored as hybrid depictive representations 
in the visual buffer array need to be interpreted for them to become experienced images. 
There are a number of reasons I think this approach should be resisted and the extent of the 
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interpretation phase limited to only certain specific episodes of imagery. Therefore in the 
ILUVWSDUWRIZKDWIROORZV,ZLOO,VXJJHVWWKDWWKH7\H¶VµLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶VWHSLVRQO\
required in a consciously willed episode of imagery. It just so happens that these occasions 
are the ones that I am most interested in analysing in this thesis. I will then suggest that this 
SURFHVVPLJKWEHWWHUUHIHUUHGWRDVDµODEHOOLQJ¶SURFHVVDQGWKHWHUPLQWHUSUHWDWLRQUHVHUYHG
for the eventual examination RIWKHYLVXDOLPDJH7KLVµODEHOOLQJ¶VWHSDOVRSURYLGHVDJRRG
way of getting to my final conclusions about how STIm gets allocated its spatial and 
temporal context and hence forms a vital step in my arguments. Therefore I will start by 
DUJXLQJDJDLQVW7\H¶VQHFHVVDU\LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVWHSLQWKHQH[WVXE-section, before 
dHYHORSLQJP\RZQWKHRU\ZLWKLWVRZQµODEHOOLQJ¶WHUPLQRORJ\ 
 
6.2.1 - Arguments against the necessary interpretation step  
The first SUREOHP,KDYHZLWK7\H¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ-based approach to imagery, is that it 
seems the possible range of our phenomenal mental imagery experiences far out-runs the 
capacity of any linguistic representation to interpret it117. For example abstract rapidly 
changing shapes, amorphous blobs, and other seemingly un-describable imagistic 
experiences, would all seem to be dissociated from any real ability of an interpretation 
sentence to capture the detail of their phenomenology; that is, certainly in enough detail to 
PDUNWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQRQHDPRUSKRXVEOREDQGDQRWKHU,WWKHUHIRUHMXVWGRHVQ¶W
seem to be the right kind of thing to make the difference between a symbol filled array and 
the equivalent experienced mental image. 
 
This is particularly pertinent when we recall that Tye invokes the same procedure for 
SHUFHSWLRQDVWKLVTXRWHVXJJHVWVµImages and percepts, I have argued elsewhere [i.e. Tye 
@DUHLQWHUSUHWHGV\PEROILOOHGSDWWHUQVLQWKHYLVXDOEXIIHU¶>7\H%R[
                                               
117
 A similar point is made by Martin (1992) in terms of experience out-stripping our possession of 
intentional concepts. 
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± also quoted above]. To illustrate this point in terms of perception, take for example a 
perceptual experience of a complex fractal pattern on a poster. What difference exactly is 
the ability to append the perceptual experience with the interpretation - ³7KLVUHSUHVHQWVD
IUDFWDOSDWWHUQ´± meant to make. Certainly there is a difference in understanding when 
looking at this poster if one poVVHVVHVWKHµIUDFWDOSDWWHUQ¶FRQFHSW2QHFDQ¶WUHDOO\see it 
as a fractal pattern DQGUHIHUWRLWDVVXFKLIRQHGLGQ¶WKDYHWKDWFRQFHSWWRGHSOR\%XW
SRVVHVVLQJWKLVFRQFHSWRUEHLQJDEOHWRPHQWDOO\LQWHUSUHWLWDVVXFKMXVWGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\
seem essential in order to change it from an array to a complex phenomenal experience. 
Conversely, is it a consequence of this approach, that if you lack such a capacity to form 
this inner sentence, then you cannot see the picture? I would suggest that we could all see 
fractal patterns before we ever learnt the concept or had a suitable linguistic mental 
representation under which to bring them. 
 
Additionally this interpretation step requirement also seems to be at odds with his general 
PANIC theory where these arrays can be non-conceptual and abstract, and only need to be 
SRLVHGLQWKHDSSURSULDWHPDQQHUVRWKH\FDQEHDFFHVVHGE\WKHµ&RJQLWLYH6\VWHP¶LQ
order to produce further beliefs and desires. Unless he links this interpretation requirement 
with some kind of limit to the poisedness criteria, it seems that just the information output 
from these arrays should be enough to support phenomenal experience without them also 
needing to be interpreted. After all, they do contain all the symbolic information one would 
need to create an image (surface colours and their locations) irrespective of whether it is 
also interpreted or not118. It seems that this interpretation step is more to do with the 
Cognitive System, which includes a belief and desire forming mechanism, bringing these 
H[SHULHQFHVXQGHUFRQFHSWVOLNHWKHEHOLHIWKDW³7KLVKRUVH-shaped object in front of me 
                                               
118
 See also my criticism of propositional only theories in Section 3.4 where I argued that they might also 
have to appeal to padded arrays of propositions in order to describe every pixel of the visual field in rich 
enough detail. 
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UHSUHVHQWVDKRUVH´RUPRUHVLPSO\³7KLVUHSUHVHQWVDKRUVH´$QGUHFDOOWKDWDFFRUGLQJWR
7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\WKLVLVQRWGRQHIRUDOOSKHQRPHQDOH[SHULHQces we have but only 
stands poised to be available for beliefs and desires to be generated from them by the 
µ&RJQLWLYH6\VWHP¶ 
 
I would therefore suggest that we could have imagistic sensory experiences of horse-like 
shapes without necessarily appending aQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVHQWHQFHWRLWRIWKHIRUPµ7KLV
UHSUHVHQWVDKRUVH¶7KLVZRXOGLQYROYHMXVWKDYLQJKRUVH-shaped experiences without 
bringing them under any particular concepts or linguistic mental representation. This seems 
like the right way to go about it because all the information required to form a mental 
image is presumably stored in the visual buffer, and this just needs to get converted so that 
some awareness of what is represented occurs. This could just be some automatic 
conversion mechanism (maybe analogous to painting-by-numbers), and it seems unclear 
why appending this with an interpretation changes it from mere symbolic representations 
RIµVXUIDFHVDQGORFDWLRQVDVVHHQIURPDSDUWLFXODUYLHZSRLQW¶WRDQLPDJHRIDKRUVH
Surely we can have a mental image of something horse shaped without ever previously 
experiencing or learning about horses, or even having some internal linguistic mental 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIDKRUVH2QWKHRWKHUKDQGZHFDQJUDQWWKDWRQHFDQ¶WWUHDWWKLVLPDJHDV
RIDµKRUVH¶XQOHVVRQHKDVWKHULJKWFRQFHSWVWREULQJWKHLPDJHXQGHU 
 
The second main problem I have with this approach is that there seems to be many 
examples of un-interpreted phenomenal experiences that we may barely even attend to or 
particularly notice. In terms of mental imagery, examples might include an unremarkable 
daydreaming episode or simply a seemingly random mental image that is automatically 
generated in association with your current experience. Examples from perception might 
include driving without really concentrating on your surroundings and things going by in 
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your peripheral vision. It would seem like a waste of brain processing power to require 
everything to be interpreted in order to perceive it; that is even if such an interpretation is 
possible for everything we experience. Hence I would suggest that this interpretation stage 
is reserved for more consciously willed and attended to episodes of consciousness, where a 
clearer conception of what is represented would be very valuable and hence worth 
processing. But to develop this idea we may need to distinguish between sub-personal and 
personal levels of interpretation and this is what I will discuss next. 
 
6.2.2 - Different kinds of interpretation, examination and labelling 
To look at different forms of interpretation, consider a willed episode of imagery where 
there is a specific goal in my mind, such as the Rubiks Cube problem. Here we need to 
work out how many small squares faces there are on a Rubiks Cube (this example was first 
introduced in Chapter 1). It could be argued that under the already adopted Kosslyn Model 
the processes involved in working this out could go something like this:  
1. To consciously identify the need to visualize a Rubiks Cube in order to solve the 
problem.  
2. For the information of what a Rubiks Cube looks like to be retrieved from memory. 
3. For this information to be sent to fill the visual buffer appropriately. 
4. For this to be accessed appropriately so a visual image is generated. 
5. To then place close attention to one face in particular to count off the number of 
small squares. 
6. To count of, or check, the total number of sides by mentally rotating the cube 
7. And finally to perform some simple arithmetic to work out the total number of 
small squares. 
 
The net result being that you are fairly certain that a single face is composed of 3 sets of 3 
rows of small squares (nine squares per face) and that there are six faces per cube, yielding 
the final result that there are 54 small squares in total on the sides of a Rubiks Cube (6x9 = 
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54$VVXPLQJWKHGHVFULSWLRQDERYHLVIDLUO\XQFRQWURYHUVLDODQGPDWFKHVPRVWSHRSOH¶V
H[SHULHQFHVRIWKLVSURFHVVZKLFKVWHSVFRXOGLQYROYHFHUWDLQIRUPVRIµLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶" 
 
I would like to identify two possible steps that require two different kinds of processes that 
might be close to what Tye means by interpretation. The first and most relevant in this 
context, is in the initial instigation of the episode of mental imagery. This involves the 
conscious willing of the generation of an image based on memories of what a Rubiks Cube 
looks like. In this case it seems plausible that this send-request needs to be coded in some 
NLQGRILQWHUQDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHNLQG7\HKDVLQPLQG³*HQHUDWHDQLPDJHWKDW
UHSUHVHQWVD5XELNV&XEH´7KLVZRXOGVRPHKRZDFWLYate the OPP stream to search out 
WKLVLQIRUPDWLRQIURPWKHDVVRFLDWLYHPHPRU\RIZKDWD5XELNV&XEH¶VYLVXDOSDUDPHWHUV
are. This may also involve the SPP stream in some minimal way to delimit the spatial 
parameters of the image, as discussed in Chapter 4. Once this information is retrieved it 
can be sent to the visual buffer in order to fill the arrays there. It seems likely that this will 
VRPHKRZUHWDLQDQDSSHQGHGLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ³7KLVUHSUHVHQWVD5XELNV&XEH´VRWKDWLW
remains linked to the original goal. This would also allow the eventual mental image to 
come with an understanding of what it is and what it is being generated for. Hence the 
image comes pre-interpreted in a way due to the fact that has been consciously willed in 
the first place. 
 
On top of that I would say there is another importantly different way that this image then 
QHHGVWREHVXEVHTXHQWO\µLQWHUSUHWHG¶RUPRUHDFFXUDWHO\examined; for instance to check 
the number of small squares and count the number of faces on a cube. For ease of reference 
I would like to re-WHUPWKHILUVWNLQGRILQWHUSUHWDWLRQGHVFULEHGDERYHDVµimage labelling¶
DQGUHVHUYHWKHWHUPµimage examination¶IRUWKLVVHFRQGNLQGRILPDJH-interpretation-
process. This latter process would involve shifting your attention to the relevant parts of 
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the image and examining it to retrieve the appropriate information relevant to the task at 
hand (e.g. counting off the small squares). Hence, from now on, I will only use the term 
µLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶ZKHQUHIHUULQJWR7\H¶VXVHRIthe term, or when I am just using it 
according to its general meaning. It may be worth noting here that an appropriate Attention 
Shifting mechanism is already suggested in the Kosslyn Model as depicted in Figure 4.1. 
 
How does this help clarify the situation? Well for a start it allows mental imagery to occur 
without a consciously accessible labelling process. This could occur by spontaneous (non-
willed) filling-in of the visual buffer with information that defies any simple language-like 
interpretation or labelling. For example the abstract shapes and amorphous blobs suggested 
earlier could just arise by the filling-in and accessing of the visual buffer in an appropriate 
way. Secondly it allows for a differentiation between labelling that you are conscious off 
DQGVRPHWKDW\RXDUHQ¶WDQGDOORZVDVWRU\WREHWROGRIKRZRQHFDQEHFRPHDZDUHRILW
if one attends to it closely enough. To illustrate this consider the example below. 
*UDQGSD¶V)XQHUDO([DPSOH 
By visually noticing the anniversary date in my diary I am reminded of my 
JUDQGSD¶VIXQHUDOODVW\HDU6RRQDIWHU,PD\EHVXUSULVHGWRUHDOLVH,DP
experiencing an associated memory image of the front row of the people at the 
church service, and on examining it, I can subsequently remember who was sitting 
there.  
 
I would suggest that this apparently spontaneously generated mental image was linked to 
the funeral by a fairly automatic sub-personal process that associated the two. This is what 
caused the un-willed instigation of the image and led to the seemingly spontaneous 
generation of the memory image, presumably by a relatively automatic filling-in of the 
visual buffer. Then on becoming aware of the image I am able to attend to the image and 
make explicit, by thinking about it further, the associated links of the context of the image 
and understand why it occurred when it did. In other words I can now become conscious of 
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the spatio-temporal context of the image and have conscious access to why it may have 
EHHQODEHOOHGLQP\PHPRU\DV³7KLVUHSUHVHQWVDQHSLVRGHIURP\RXU*UDQGSD¶V)XQHUDO
LQ2[IRUGODVW\HDU´3HUKDSVZHFDQFDOOWKHLQLWLDOVXE-personal form of labelling a 
µLabel-6¶ DQGWKHHTXLYDOHQWFRQVFLRXVSHUVRQDOOHYHORQHDµLabel-3¶. So the image was 
originally associated with the funeral because it was labelled-S in my memory. Once 
retrieved and the image generated, I could examine and interpret the image and make the 
label-3H[SOLFLWE\WKLQNLQJ³WKLVUHSUHVHQWVDQLPDJHRIDQHSLVRGHIURPP\JUDQGSD¶V
IXQHUDO´ 
 
Its worth noting however that I am not suggesting that there are two different kinds of 
labels here, only that there is one label that can be utilised in two different ways: either it is 
used only in sub-personal processes; or it can also be available at the personal level to used 
in a conscious episode of reasoning. This seems to explain the phenomenology of the 
experience and seems to be a good way of explaining the sub-personal processes that must 
be occurring some-how based on the neurons firing in your brain. I will use the term 
µOabel-6	3¶ZKHQWKHODEHOLVEHLQJXVHGDWERWKOHYHOVDWRQFH7KLVDOVRHPSKDVLVHVWKH
point that it is the same label and that there are just two different ways it can feature in our 
mental economy: i.e. by it just being appended to the imagery process in sub-personal 
mechanisms, or by also being aware of it at a conscious personal level. 
 
To illustrate this utility further, this approach perhaps also allows the appending of new 
labels to new perceptual encounters, such as the fractal poster mentioned earlier. At first 
you just experience the phenomenal shape and colour aspects of the percept based on how 
it fills the contents of your visual buffer. Then you learn a general term used to refer to this 
category of fractal poster experiences, which then becomes associated with objects of this 
kind in memory and language and is thereby applied in future encounters of the same sort. 
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Note this GRHVQ¶WSUHVXSSRVH the necessary existence of the label in order for this 
experience to occur, which seems to me like a fairly natural explanation. It also allows a 
QHDWH[SODQDWLRQRIVLWXDWLRQVZKHUH\RXFDQ¶WTXLWHUHPHPEHUWKHQDPHRIVRPHWKLQJEXW
it feels like its on-the-tip-of-the-tongue. In this case perhaps the associations that would 
normally transfer the label-S to a consciously accessible level of label-3DUHQ¶WTXLWH
strong enough to bring it to mind presently, but you might keep working on it sub-
consciously until it pops into your mind later. 
 
If this categorisation is at least plausible, then we now have at least four possible ways that 
a mental image can be generated and accessed. Firstly, it can just arise spontaneously by 
subpersonal processes filling the visual buffer, where no labelling of any kind is required 
but a phenomenal experience can never the less be generated (e.g. an unattended 
meandering daydream). Secondly, it can be generated in a willed episode where conscious 
effort generates a label-S&P (i.e. at both levels) and this triggers a controlled episode of 
imagery. These forms of labels can remain associated with the image throughout the 
episode, as in the Rubiks Cube Problem discussed above. Thirdly, it can be triggered sub-
personally with a label-S in associative memory. This may seem spontaneous at first, but 
on further reflection the association can be made explicit (label-P) to our conscious 
DZDUHQHVVDVLQWKH*UDQGSD¶V)XQHUDOH[DPSOHDERYH$OWKRXJKWKHDVVRFLDWLRQPD\EH
VRDEVWUDFWRUWHQXRXVWKDW\RXFDQ¶WHYHUUHDOO\PDNHWKHIXOOFRQQHFWLRQHYHQWKRXJK\RX
have a distinct feeling there is a connection, as in a vague feeling of knowing or 
recognising something. And fourthly, once the image is generated it can be examined or 
interpreted so that useful information relevant to the current goal can be drawn from it. 
And note this may allow new labels-6	3WREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKLWIRUH[DPSOH³7KLV
UHSUHVHQWVDIUDFWDOSRVWHU´DQG³7KLVUHSUHVHQWVMXVWRQHNLQGRIIUDFWDOSDWWHUQDPRQJVW
PDQ\´6RWKLVVHHPVWRFDWHUIRUDZLGHUUDQJHRILPDJHU\H[SHULHQFHVDQGWKLVVHHPVWR
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match general reports of our imagistic experiences more closely. But is this an 
LPSURYHPHQWRQ7\H¶VDSSURDFK" 
 
I would argue it is, because it covers a wider range of potential imagistic and perceptual 
experiences, from consciously willed ones to seemingly spontaneous ones. I say seemingly 
spontaneous here because they are obviously physically caused in the brain for some 
reason or another, its only that they may seem surprising and not obviously associated with 
anything from our personal level conscious perspective. Also, perhaps ironically, I might 
VXJJHVWWKDWP\DSSURDFKILWVPRUHFORVHO\WR7\H¶VXQGHUO\LQJVWUXFWXUHRI3$1,&WKHRU\
in that the contents of the visual buffer only need to be accessed in a certain way for un-
interpreted, non-conceptual, abstract and intentional experiences to be enjoyed. That is not 
only does it not have to be conceptual but it can also be uninterpreted at the 
representational level and they can be poised so that beliefs and desires can be generated 
from them is appropriate: i.e. this need not happen in all cases. This approach may also be 
able to cope more easily with other seemingly more spontaneous and un-interpreted vision-
like states such as dreams and hallucinations and this is certainly one way I think this 
approach can be applied and developed elsewhere. 
 
Another possible benefit of this approach is that it allows us to interpret the same 
phenomenal experience in different ways, perhaps by labelling the same contents in the 
visual buffer in a different way. For instance consider this Sailor Picture Example: here 
there is a picture of a sailor on a ladder that leads to a boat at the docks. The picture is 
meant to be ambiguous as to whether the sailor is going up or down the ladder and hence if 
he is returning from a trip or just setting off on one. It seems to me an equivalent visual 
image of the same scenario could be labelled either way and different associated concepts 
and labels might then be deployed to interpret it. For instance: if he is imagined to be going 
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down the ladder and away on a trip, you will label it as such and there may be associated 
feelings of sadness for the loved ones he is leaving behind; conversely, if he is imagined to 
be returning then the label will change and there may be more happy associations; and 
perhaps if you are just checking the image to see if he is wearing a hat it may not matter 
either way119. Hence the very same image can be examined and labelled in very contrasting 
ways, even though arguably the contents of the visual buffer and the apparent spatial 
layout of the imagistic phenomenal experience could be identical in all three cases. What 
makes the crucial difference to your attitude towards the image is how it is labelled and 
whether this needs to be made explicit to examine it for information relevant to the task. 
 
6.2.3 ± Visual imagery and spatio-temporal labelling 
The utility of this approach in terms of STIm should be evident here as it also potentially 
allows us to have certain images additionally labelled according to their temporal context 
and spatial locations. For example, a mental image of your room painted bright yellow 
might be labelled as: a memory of how it was in the past (past factual); how it could have 
been in the past (past counterfactual); or how it might possibly be in the future (future 
possible). In all cases the image conjured up could be look identical, but the label 
associated with it can represent a different temporal context. This also allows a neat way to 
explain the well-known phenomena of confabulation where imagined events are mistaken 
for real remembered events. For example, the actual image remains the same but somehow 
due to a processing error the label-S is switched from imagined (imagined possible) to 
remembered (factual past), and hence an imagined scene could get treated as if it actually 
KDSSHQHG,W¶VDOVRSRVVLEOHWKDWWKHFKDQJHLQODEHODOVRLQYROYHVFKDQJLQJRWKHUDVSHFWVRI
your phenomenal experience. For instance, you may think it feels different to consider the 
                                               
119
 You may also be surprised at what you find in the image having not realised you had imagined the sailor 
wearing a hat (or even that it was a male sailor that you were imagining). See Currie and Ravenscroft (2002: 
26) for further discussion of this feature. 
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same image as representing an event in the past, compared with if you imagine it in the 
IXWXUH$SSHQGLQJWKLVDVVRFLDWHGUDZIHHOLQJRIµSDVWQHVV¶RUµIXWXUHQHVV¶LVQRWHVVHQWLDO
for my approach, but it is certainly not ruled out120. 
 
Now obviously in the above I have assumed the subject has some concept of time with 
which to understand what these different temporal labels mean. But it is debatable point 
whether some way of imagining or remembering different temporal situations might be a 
necessary pre-cursor for even conceiving of other times. It may be that loss of an Episodic 
Thinking System, of which STIm may be a part, leads to a loss of any extended temporal 
awareness, as with certain subjects who seem stuck in the present with no memory or 
future directed thinking capacities121. It may even be that the capacity to imagine and 
understand other temporal contexts may have evolved hand-in-hand and are really two 
inextricable features of our ability to think temporally in the first place. This is certainly a 
debate that I am interested in exploring, but one that would involve a lengthy analysis that 
would go beyond what I can do justice to here122. Hence in this thesis I will restrict myself 
to modern human minds and only attempt to explain how they work in the present. So 
within this restricted context, I can safely assume that in normal situations, we already 
have some conception of past and future from which these labels can gain the significance 
that I need. This gives an indication of how the temporal aspect could be supported in 
STIm and how it could form the basis for further investigations into its role in our mental 
economy and perhaps even in supporting our ability to conceive of time itself. 
 
                                               
120
 See Starwson (1994) and Horgan & Tienson (2002) for a discussion of how even mental states usually 
classified as non-sensory might have their own phenomenology. This might entail that considering different 
temporal contexts have a different feel to them. My theory is consistent with taking this position, even though 
I personally might not want to be quite as pervasive about what I consider to be phenomenal mental states. 
121
 Although this is a complex matter and see Tulving (2002) for an example of a subject K.C. who can 
visually imagine things but has no memory of the past, or any idea of what he may do in the future. 
122
 See especially Suddendorf and Corballis (1997, 2007) and Suddendorf and Whiten (2007) on the 
evolution of oXUDELOLW\WRUHSUHVHQWRWKHUWLPHVEDVHGRQDFDSDFLW\NQRZQDVµ0HQWDO7LPH7UDYHO¶ 
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In terms of spatial labelling it seems that you can imagine the same scene in very different 
circumstances. For example, you can imagine your bedroom as it is now in the arctic or in 
the desert, and then imagine what consequences there may be following from that. Note 
here that there are two different forms of spatial imagining going on. There is the apparent 
3D distribution of the objects in your room and will I refer to this as the spatial layout of 
the image. And there is the geographic location that your room is thought to be in, which is 
a feature that might not manifest itself in the actual image, but may change your attitude 
towards the image and I will refer to this as the spatial location of the image. Regarding 
the latter, note that deploying this feature may also rest on the assumption that we have the 
ability to deploy and understand different spatial contextual labels that might get associated 
with these images. That is, in normal human beings we already possess the ability to 
understand that there are different possible spatial locations and hence these labels 
referring to them can be appropriately understood. That is even though the capacity to 
imagine a different spatial location and the ability to know that other spatial contexts are 
possible, may also be closely linked together in terms of their phylogenetic development. 
This is in a similar way to the temporal context labels discussed above and again 
something I cannot go into in detail here, but only assume that this capacity is present 
already in modern humans so that it can then be deployed123. This may also depend more 
on the SPP stream and our ability to keep track of where we are locally and globally (and 
even in the context of the wider universe).  
 
I will return to be more explicit about these spatial and temporal context labels in the next 
chapter when I will illustrate what I think is a useful way of annotating them. This will 
then allow the imagistic contents of the visual buffer to, not only represent a specific 
spatial layout of certain objects, but this can also now be thought of as occurring under 
                                               
123
 Interestingly there is less discussion of this aspect in the Episodic Thinking literature and may represent 
one way that my theory can help expand on and contribute to this field. 
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different temporal contexts and/or spatial locations. Hence covering all the aspects of 
STIm that I think are necessary for exploring its nature and function. 
 
6.3 ± STIm and the Interpretation Capacity 
$WWKHVWDUWRIWKHFKDSWHU,VXJJHVWHGWKDWDQDO\VLQJWKLVSDUWRI7\H¶VZRUNZRXOGKHOSus 
elaborate in the Interpretation Capacity mechanism introduced in Section 2.2.3 and 
depicted on the output side of Figures 4.3. This mechanism is envisaged to be the one that 
allows us to examine the visual image and extract any useful information it represents that 
may be pertinent to the task at hand. Examples of this are counting or checking the number 
of sides a cube has and counting the number of small squares per face of a Rubiks Cube. I 
have associated this with interpretation-as-image-examination, and distinguished it from 
WKHXVHRIWKHWHUPµLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶XVHGE\7\H,KDYHDOVRVXJJHVWHGWKDWSHUKDSVXVLQJ
the terms image-labelling and image-examination helps disambiguate these two possible 
uses of the word interpretation in this context. I would suggest that the Interpretation 
Capacity as a whole would need access to both these facets in order to work properly. That 
is, it will not only have to examine the image, but how it interprets what the image 
represents will depend not only on the things contained in its spatial layout, but also the 
spatio-temporal context it is labelled as having. It will also be involved in helping direct 
attention to the pertinent items in the image, so it may work closely with the Attention 
Shifting mechanism as suggested by the Kosslyn Model (see above and Figure 4.1). In 
other words it needs to access any information relevant to the general interpretation of 
what the image represents and be able to use this to guide further thoughts and help 
instigate any further imagistic episodes that may aid this process. 
 
Unfortunately I cannot go into much more detail in terms of explaining how the 
Interpretation Capacity does all this here due to space constraints. Hence I will only 
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suggest briefly that, since imagery appears to us in the same visual style as vision (i.e. in 
shapes and colours), then perhaps the capacities with which we examine and interpret our 
online perceptions, may also be available for this same job in imagery. That is, I would 
suggest that all the knowledge and concepts that we have previously learnt and are able to 
deploy in terms of perception (e.g. folk physics, object names, emotions), should also be 
available to us in interpreting the meaning of visual imagery, because it presents itself in 
the same visual style modality. To now demand an attempt to explain how that all works 
for both perception and imagery, would be tantamount to asking for a solution to one of the 
major puzzles in Cognitive Science, and indeed Artificial Intelligence. Naturally I cannot 
attempt to do that here124, but it may give one strong reason why it is useful to imagine 
non-current possibilities in a similar modality to how we perceive them. This is because we 
can re-use and apply all the same kinds of mental capacities, as we would use in 
interpreting online perception in terms of what certain shapes and colours represent. All 
this without having to develop a whole new set of mental processes exclusively for use 
with imagery.  
 
Of course re-using these interpretation mechanisms used in perception would also require 
making sure they are applied in a mock or offline way when applied to mental imagery. 
For instance by making sure any conclusions you draw from experiencing a visual image 
RIµDWLJHULQIURQWRI\RX¶DUHQRWWKHQWUHDWHd as if there really is a tiger in front of you. 
This could be realised by making sure all these interpretation processes maintain a mock 
label of some sort, as would the visual image. Hence this re-use of perception-based 
concepts and reasoning processes, in order to examine and interpret imagined episodes, 
seems like a feature that again supports the parsimony of an imagination-as-simulation 
                                               
124
 This mirrors a similar claim by Stich and Nichols (2003: 30), that any further demands to explain which 
previously held beliefs get updated or not based on a new belief, would also be unreasonable, because this 
would be tantamount to solving WKH)UDPH3UREOHPµZKLFKKDVEHGHYLOOHGFRJQLWLYHVFLHQWLVWVIRUGHFDGHV¶ 
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approach. So while I have not gone into much detail about the Interpretation Capacity here, 
I think there is no real mystery surrounding why it should occur. This is because we can all 
probably accept that the same thing must occur in online vision and that this same capacity 
seems like the right kind of thing to apply to visual images, since they are both directed at 
similar features, like the shapes and colours of objects laid out before us. 
 
 
So in summary, the main aim if this sub-VHFWLRQZDVWRVKRZKRZ7\H¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ-
based approach might be seen as being too constrictive and inflexible, and hence to 
provide a platform to develop my own alternative label-based approach that seems to me to 
explain more of the data and to be more flexible. It may be noted that I have offered no 
empirical evidence to support this label-based approach and it is merely offered as some 
theorising of what I think must be going on somehow. However there is some support for 
this because we may just be appealing to a more propositional-style approach to mental 
representation in order to develop this labelling aspect, and this is already generally fairly 
well accepted in the literature. Thus all I am trying to do here is to suggest a way a more 
propositional-style kind of labelling process might interact with the more depictive element 
that is the basis for generating the detailed spatial layout of phenomenal imagery. And 
although this labelling seems to me to not be essential for imagery to occur, it seems likely 
that it will be required for any considered episode of thinking that utilises imagery125. It 
certainly seems that my labelling-based approach could be used as a basis for further 
empirical work or as a basis for interpreting already existant evidence in this area. 
 
                                               
125
 The use of imagery in thinking and analysing how reliant we are on language to reason, is something I 
would like to analyse further in the future. Imagistic thinking certainly opens the possibility that other 
animals might utilise it without requiring them to be able talk. This is why I think this approach may be 
XVHIXOIRUGHYHORSLQJLGHDVLQWKH(SLVRGLF7KLQNLQJOLWHUDWXUH6HHDOVR%HUPXGH]¶VERRNHQWLWOHG
µ7KLQNLQJZLWKRXWZRUGV¶DQGDUHYLHZRILWE\)RGRU 
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,KDYHQRZGHDOWLQ&KDSWHUZLWKWKHWZRDVSHFWVRI7\H¶VZRUNWKDW,WKLQN,QHHGHGWR
before moving on to develop my own positive account in Chapter 7. Specifically in the 
above, I have rejected his Reductive Representationalism PANIC theory and developed 
and expanded on his interpretation-based approaches to of perception and imagery. In 
doing so I have suggested why I think a form of non-Reductive Representationalism is to 
be favoured and why my labelling-based approach to mental imagery has significant 
benefits. Further to that, and more generally, it is worth noting that I think have now 
looked at all the individual mechanisms depicted in Figure 4.3, in as much detail as I think 
is appropriate for each one; and certainly this is in as much detail as I have time for here. 
So perhaps I can now try and draw all these strings of evidence and reasoning together in 
the next concluding chapter, in order to develop my full theory of STIm. Given what has 
gone before, this will obviously be in terms of imagination-as-simulation, which in turn 
will be based on the Kosslyn Model, and which will appeal to a Generative and a non-
Reductive Representational Approach. 
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7 ± STIm: the Full Theory 
A Representational and Generative Approach 
based on the Kosslyn Model as an imagination-as-simulation process 
 
 
Let me add, finally, that the [local] supervenience thesis enjoys further support 
from extensive research in neuroimaging. Every aspect of experience, from illusory 
contours to motion illusions, to phantom limbs to diffuse pain, can be correlated 
ZLWKVRPHQHXURQDOUHVSRQVH«1HXURVFLHQFHVKRZVHYHU\SURPLVHRIEHLQJ
deliciously completH«0DQ\SKLORVRSKHUVZRXOGEDONDWWKLVFODLP1HXURVFLHQFH
LVLQFRPSOHWHLQRQHFUXFLDOUHVSHFWLWFDQ¶WH[SODLQZK\DOOWKHVHQHXUDOFRUUHODWHV
IHHOWKHZD\WKH\GR,WFDQ¶WHYHQH[SODLQZK\WKH\IHHOOLNHDQ\WKLQJDWDOO
Perhaps this is the missing element that makes Noe feel like he has to go outside 
WKHKHDG,IVRLWLVDIRRO¶VHUUDQG)RUWKLVGHHSHSLVWHPLFSUREOHPRIKRZSK\VLFDO
states can be phenomenal experiences is in no way ameliorated by broadening the 
VXSHUYHQLHQFHEDVH-XVWDVLW¶VKDUd to understand why brain states feel a certain 
ZD\LW¶VKDUGWRXQGHUVWDQGZK\EUDLQVWDWHVWRJHWKHUZLWKELWVRIH[WHUQDO
HQYLURQPHQWIHHODFHUWDLQZD\¶3ULQ]± on a review of Noe 2006) 
 
µ:KDW,FDQQRWFUHDWH,GRQRWXQGHUVWDQG¶ 
± the inscriptLRQOHIWRQ5LFKDUG)H\QPDQ¶VEODFNERDUGDIWHUKHGLHG 
 
 
,QWKHODVWFKDSWHUZHORRNHGDWWZRGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVRI7\H¶VZRUNWKDW
concerned the nature of perception and visual imagery. These were his PANIC theory of 
phenomenal consciousness and his interpretation-based approach to imagery. There I 
rejected his overlying PANIC theory and I developed my own label-based theory that 
H[SDQGHGRQ7\H¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ-based approach. I had also suggested there that these 
were the last two features that I needed to address before developing my own full theory of 
visual imagery. Hence in this chapter I will now introduce and defend my preferred 
imagination-as-simulation approach to STIm under a Generative Approach to perception. 
The majority of this chapter will consist of a fairly positive exposition of my Conjunctivist 
Position, which suggests that, contrary to what Disjunctivists might claim, perception and 
imagery do have a significant common overlap in the kind of things they are. This claim 
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will be explained further below, where I will also draw together most of the threads of the 
arguments from previous chapters and develop them under a non-Reductive 
Representationalist framework. 
 
A non-Reductive Representationalist position suggests that while perception is essentially 
Representational (as opposed to Relational), the phenomenal character of experience 
cannot be reduced merely to its representational contents. Here I will suggest that some 
further generative step is required where the experienced visual field is produced based on 
the neuronal representations in the visual buffer. I will argue that these same processes 
might also be available for the generation of phenomenal imagery based on accessing the 
offline contents of the visual buffer. Hence I will utilise and adopt the claims put forward 
by the Kosslyn Model, which suggests that both vision and visual imagery utilise the visual 
buffer and these are in turn based on an underlying hybrid depictive representational style. 
The main aim of this chapter is therefore to look at phenomenal imagery from either side 
of the symbol to phenomenal gap, by explaining how these underlying representations in 
the brain may eventually underpin phenomenal imagery. The conclusions from this will 
then be merged with my labelling-based approach for setting the spatio-temporal context of 
a visual image and this will yield a final full account of STIm by the end of the chapter. 
 
So specifically in this chapter, I will firstly briefly repeat what I think I have established so 
far and hence what I will assume as my platform for the following positive arguments. This 
will also act as my main summary of the thesis before my main conclusions later in the 
chapter. Secondly, I will re-iterate and develop in more detail what I see as the relationship 
between the visual buffer (cells) and the visual field (pixels). This can then be applied to 
describe the relationship between the visual buffer and phenomenal imagery. Thirdly, I 
will suggest that this can then be used to explore the relationship between STIm and 
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phenomenal consciousness under a Generative Approach to perception. I will explore some 
options for what this generative process might be based on, but will not attempt to explain 
the mechanism itself. And then finally, I will put forward my main proposal for STIm, 
which will include how a generic visual image becomes associated and labelled with 
different spatio-temporal contexts. At this point my theory will have explained all of the 
features I have set out to explore in the thesis and hence I can then give my main 
conclusion. To that end I will start this chapter by summarising the claims I have made so 
far in the thesis. 
 
7.1 ±  Thesis summary - the claims so far 
The key claims of the thesis so far have been as follows. In Chapter 2 I introduced some 
examples of different simulation mechanisms and went into detail about the kinds of 
features we should look for in an offline simulation process. I also discussed a potentially 
useful way to distinguish between emulation and simulation mechanisms. This gave us an 
insight into the current debate in this field and illustrated some ways that simulation 
mechanisms are being utilised in certain recent theories to explain mental features related 
to STIm: e.g. motor imagery and visual emulators (Grush 2004) and processes that might 
underlie our capacity to deliberate (Hurley 2008). This acted as a way to illustrate what I 
mean by offline simulation process, which in turn provided the template with which to 
investigate whether the Kosslyn Model can be interpreted as an offline simulation process 
in the next two chapters. 
 
In Chapter 3 I introduced the hybrid depictive representational approach favoured by the 
Kosslyn Model and defended it against a propositions only approach (c.f. Pylyshyn 2003). 
This allowed me to suggest the following way of annotating the hybrid contents of array 
cells in the visual buffer: 
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$UUD\&HOO;< >FRORXU5*%345GHSWK=VXUIDFHRULHQWDWLRQ%HGJH'HWF«@ 
. 
This involved a mixture of depictive and proposition-like elements and hence yielded a 
hybrid representational approach. The depictive element stems from the topographic way 
that these images are represented in the visual buffer and the proposition-like element 
comes from the information stored in each of the cells in the array. 
 
In Chapter 4 I took a close look at the Kosslyn Model and defended it against some 
putative counter examples. These threatened to show that detailed depictive imagery could 
occur without the visual buffer, which would count against this kind of approach. I also 
looked at deficits in vision and visual imagery in terms of Neglect and offered an 
explanation of how information in the ventral (OPP, what) stream and dorsal (SPP, 
where/how) stream126 could interact and be affected together or separately. This suggested 
one way that the spatial layout of a visual image could be delimited by integrating 
DVVRFLDWLYHPHPRULHVRIDQREMHFW¶VVKDSHVDQGFRORXUVZLWKDSRVVLEO\PLQLPDOLVWLF
default) spatial layout set by the SPP stream. We then looked at a couple of options for 
potential ways that the visual buffer could be filled in internally in an online or offline 
(mock) way. One of these offline options included some tentative evidence for a visual 
emulator mechanism and the other ZDVDYHUVLRQRIWKH.RVVO\Q0RGHO¶VVHDUFKSULPLQJ
process. The combination of the features discussed in Chapter 4, allowed me to suggest the 
Kosslyn Model could indeed usefully be interpreted as an offline simulation process. This 
                                               
126
 5HFDOOIURP&KDSWHU233VWDQGVIRUµ2EMHFWV3URSHUWLHV3URFHVVLQJ¶DQGFRQWUROVWKHFRORXUVDQG
shapes that objects have in imagery and runs forward (ventrally) from the visual cortex through the temporal 
OREHVDQG633VWDQGVIRUµ6SDWLDO3URSHUWLHV3URFHVVLQJ¶DQGFRQWUROVWKHVSDWLDORULHQWDWLRQRIWKHREMHFWVLQ
imagery and runs up through the back (dorsal) part of the brain from the visual cortex to the parietal cortex. 
See also Appendix B. 
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also suggested the following separation of ways the visual buffer could be filled-in and 
labelled: 
Perceived: (online, external) {Array Cell (X, Y): colour (RGB: P, Q, R), depth Z, etc} 
 
Imagined: (offline, internal) {Array Cell (X, Y): mock, colour (RGB: P, Q, R), depth Z, etc} 
 
At this point I concluded that the Kosslyn Model could indeed be usefully interpreted as an 
offline simulation process and seemed to be a good theory to adopt for the remainder of the 
thesis. This is because it is fairly well corroborated and the same mechanism (the visual 
buffer) is used in vision and visual imagery, but in imagery it is only used in an offline, or 
mock, way. This also allowed me to account for ways that the image could be maintained 
and transformed and how this could account for certain other aspects of the 
phenomenology of imagery: e.g. scanning and rotation tasks and that it is normally less 
vivid and quickly fades away unless a concerted effort is made to maintain it. Hence 
yielding a good combined theory of the sub-personal processes underpinning imagery, 
which could be used as a platform for exploring the more phenomenal aspects of visual 
imagery in what followed. 
 
To begin Part II of the thesis I explained that it might help to understand what is happening 
in the offline simulation of visual imagery, if we understood what might be going on in the 
online perceptual case. To that end I identified the most important distinction to this 
analysis as being that between Selective and Generative Approaches and indicated that I 
would reject the former in favour of the latter. This would allow me to suggest that the 
brain generates phenomenal experiences in a fairly similar way in both perception and 
imagery and hence leads me to adopt a Conjunctivist Position. To that end I explored and 
rejected what I have interpreted as two different kinds of Selective Approaches to 
SHUFHSWLRQ1DwYH5HDOLVPDQG7\H¶V3$1,&7KHRU\,Q&KDSWHU,LQWURGXFHGDQG
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explained why Naïve Realism, which I took as a paradigmatic example of a Selective 
Approach and Disjunctivist Position, may seem at first like an attractive theory to adopt, 
EXW,DOVRH[SODLQHGZK\,GRQ¶WVKDUHVRPHRIWKHXVXDOPRWLYDWLRQVWKDWDUHJLYHQIRU
defending it. I then offered the Time-spread Argument as my main reason for rejecting it 
and briefly indicated that this also might lead me to reject all Selective Approaches to 
perception. 
 
,Q&KDSWHU,FULWLFLVHG7\H¶V3$1,&WKHRU\IRUEHLQJRYHUO\
representationally reductive and not really offering an explanation for how PANIC states 
support phenomenal consciousness. However at the same time I acknowledged that much 
of his work describing the mechanisms underlying vision and visual imagery seem to be 
compatible with more recent work on the Kosslyn Model and hence at least this part of his 
WKHRU\UHPDLQVKLJKO\FRPSDWLEOHZLWKP\WKHRU\+RZHYHU,KDYHLQWHUSUHWHG7\H¶VIXOO
PANIC theory as being most naturally classed as a Selective Approach and hence I have 
rejected this overlying explanation of phenomenal character by appealing once again to the 
Time-spread Argument. Finally I have given arguments defending my replacement of 
7\H¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ-EDVHGDSSURDFKWRPHQWDOLPDJHU\ZLWKP\RZQµODEHOOLQJ¶
approach, which I felt explained a wider range of our imagistic phenomenology in a much 
more intuitive way. This also provided me with a way to explain how the spatial layout of 
a visual image could also be associated with different temporal contexts and/or different 
spatial locations, by simply being labelled as such. Hence allowing it to be thought of in 
different spatio-temporal context and this provided the final pieces I felt I needed to give a 
full account of STIm in this chapter. 
 
The main conclusions from Part II so far are therefore as follows. Due to the Time-spread 
$UJXPHQWLWVHHPVLPSODXVLEOHWRPHWKDWSKHQRPHQDOFKDUDFWHULVQ¶WORFDOO\VXSHUYHQLHQW
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and this allows me to now assume some form of Representational and Generative 
Approach to perception. I refer to my theory as non-Reductively Representational because 
it accepts that phenomenal character is generally representational, but denies that it can be 
always reduced to representational contents and hence something else is needed to explain 
the phenomenal aspect. And while I will not be specific as to how this extra generation 
step works, my theory will be broadly compatible with those that accept that the brain 
generates phenomenal character in some way and hence accepts some form of a local 
supervenience constraint (e.g. sense-data and qualia theories). Reaching these conclusions 
also allows me to suggest here that if the brain generates phenomenal character in the case 
of perception then perhaps this same feature can be used to generate phenomenal imagery. 
How this can be developed in detail is the main focus of what follows and I will start by 
looking at the structural relationship between the symbolic contents of the visual buffer 
and the our phenomenal experience of the visual field next. This will leave the generation 
step as the missing link to cross the gap between the two sides and this will be discussed in 
Section 7.3. 
 
7.2 ± The relationship between the visual buffer and the visual field 
At the very start of the thesis in Section 1.3, I introduced some evidence which suggests 
that damage to areas of the visual buffer that are farther apart, leads to scotomas (or 
blindspots) in the visual field that are also farther apart (c.f. Kosslyn et al 2006: 15 and also 
see my Figure 1.4). Hence there seems to be some correlation between damage to areas in 
the visual buffer with a related loss in the visual field. This is to be expected if under the 
Kosslyn Model we are suggesting that the topographically organised areas of the visual 
buffer correspond to the way light is detected at the eyes retinotopically and this in turn is 
related to where the light has come from within the part of the world that corresponds to 
the visual field. Hence it is fairly well predicted and supported that under this model, 
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topographic areas in the visual buffer correspond to areas of the visual field. And recall 
that central areas of the visual buffer seem to have more cells devoted to them in order to 
support more detailed experiences at the centre of your attention (c.f. Section 3.1.2). 
 
Further evidence for this includes correlations between which parts of the visual buffer are 
accessed and utilised in relevant episodes of perception and imagery: e.g. in rotation and 
scanning tasks. I have detailed a few experiments that support this interpretation127 in 
Chapters 3 and 4, but will explain one further one here to make this even more explicit. 
This is where the size of the perceived object, or the size of an imagined object, correlates 
with the amount of visual buffer activated (c.f. Kosslyn 1978). This means that objects that 
occupy more of your visual field also require a larger area of visual buffer to be activated. 
The visual size of an object can be best described as the visual angle it takes up in the 
visual field. A large object far away will not occupy much of your visual field and hence 
occupy a small visual angle, but when it is close up it will occupy a large visual angle. So 
the evidence above is explained as being due to the greater the visual angle that the object 
occupies, then there will be more cells in the visual array required in order to process it. It 
seems that this feature is duplicated in imagery tasks, where imagining objects that would 
take up more of the visual field, also activate more of the visual buffer. And further it 
seems that in some cases, a drop in the size of the available visual buffer, perhaps due to an 
operation, can also correlate with a corresponding drop in the maximum size of the image 
that one can imagine. This also corresponds to a drop in the size of the actual visual field 
available at the personal level. Hence we seem to have another fairly good case for 
correlating areas of the visual buffer with areas of the visual field. 
 
                                               
127
 See also Kosslyn et al (2006: 108-130) for a more detailed analysis. 
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In addition to this evidence there is also some interesting new research emerging that 
builds on these assumptions. In recent studies, pattern recognition programs are being 
trained to predict what a subject was looking at by analysing a brain scan taken at the time. 
This is done by the program interpreting fMRI brain scans of the topographically organised 
areas in the visual cortex and from that attempting to reconstruct the shape of the original 
external visual stimulus. At first the program is trained by matching a copy of the shape of 
the original perceived stimulus with a scan of the relevant brain area and this allows it to 
form a method and generate algorithms for predicting future stimuli. Then a new brain 
scan of a novel stimulus is given to the program and it can fairly convincingly reconstruct 
the shape of the original external stimulus. For example Kamitani et al (2008) showed 
VXEMHFWVWKHOHWWHUVLQWKHZRUGµQHXURQ¶LQVHTXHQFHDQGWKHSURJUDPUHFRQVWUXFWHGWKHVH
as depicted below: 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1- showing the perceived stimulus (above) and the averaged reconstructed 
pattern (below) worked out from brain scans of relevant topographically organised 
areas of the brain after initial training ± as adapted from Kamitani et al (2008) 
 
 
These results and the assumptions they employ seem to re-enforce quite positively the 
relation between areas of the visual field and topographically organised areas of the visual 
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cortex. This has lead the researchers conducting these experiments to speculate that the 
same principle could be applied to decode offline imagined states after the program had 
been trained using the online perceptual situation first, as this quote might suggest: 
µ0RUHLQWHUHVWLQJDUHDWWHPSWVWRUHFRQVWUXFWVXEMHFWLYHVWDWHVWKDWDUHHOLFLWHG
without sensory stimulation, such as visual imagery, illusions, and dreams. Several 
studies have suggested that these subjective percepts occur in the early visual 
FRUWH[.RVVO\QHWDOFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHUHWLQRWRS\PDS«2ISDUWLFXODU
interest is to examine if such subjective percepts share the same representation as 
stimulus-HYRNHGSHUFHSWV«2QHFRXOGDGGUHVVWKLVLVVXHby attempting to 
reconstruct a subjective state using a reconstruction model trained with physical 
VWLPXOL¶.DPLWDQLHWDO± other references removed from quote) 
 
I interpret this as meaning that it may be possible, once the pattern recognition program is 
trained to interpret the brain scans from online sensory stimulus, that this could then be 
used to reconstruct what someone might be visually imagining. For instance, instead of 
VHHLQJWKHOHWWHUµ1¶WKHVXEMHFWFRXOGIRFXVRQYLVXDOL]LQJLWDQGWKe program could then 
attempt to reconstruct what one is imagining by analysing the relevant brain scan. The idea 
of this possibility is repeated by other researchers like Kay et al (2008) who suggest that 
such a device could potentially decode what one was imagining or dreaming128. If this 
process worked then it would be fairly good confirmation of the Kosslyn Model and 
indicates how it is being used as a basis for further pioneering work. Hence this is an 
exciting time to be in this field and further experiments might soon be able to confirm the 
ideas presented here one way or the other. The reason I introduce them here is as further 
recent evidence for the claim that cells in the visual buffer and pixels in the visual field are 
closely related. 
 
                                               
128
 ,WLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRQRWHWKDWWKHµ%LJ%URWKHU¶PLQGUHDGLQJLPSOLFDWLRQVRIVXFKDGHYLFHZHUHTXLFNO\
associated with these studies in the media at the time (see also the New Scientist article on this in the 20th 
December 2008 issue). 
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At this point it is perhaps worth recalling that at the start of Chapter 2, I introduced a 
ZDUQLQJIURP+XUOH\WKDWVXJJHVWHGZHVKRXOGEHZDU\RIµLQWHUOHYHOLVRPRUSKLVP
DVVXPSWLRQV¶EHWZHHQSHUVRQDODQGVXE-personal levels of description. In this context this 
might mean we should be careful not to automatically assume that neuronal structures at 
the sub-personal level in the visual buffer, are correlated to the structure of our 
phenomenal visual experience at the personal level. With this warning in mind, and given 
the above, it may be that in this case some kind of interlevel structural isomorphism is 
justified. That is, it seems that we have good evidence that links topographically organised 
areas of the visual buffer with areas of the visual field. Perhaps then this is no longer 
counts as a mere assumption, but is instead a well supported hypothesis. Hence, whilst I 
IHHO,KDYHKHHGHG+XUOH\¶VZDUQLQJWKHHYLGHQFHGRHVVHHPWRMXVWLI\DFFHSWLQJDFHUWDLQ
amount of interlevel structural isomorphism in the case of vision and visual imagery at 
least. 
 
,Q&KDSWHUWDONHGDERXWUHIHUULQJWRVPDOODUHDVLQWKHYLVXDOILHOGDVµSL[HOV¶LQDQ
analogous way to pixels on a TV screen. I also made the corresponding warning there that 
naively using this term might be misleading, because it might be taken to indicate I think 
the visual field is actually split up in this way. However this is not something I need to, or 
ZDQWWRDUJXHIRU,FDQXVHWKHWHUPµSL[HO¶KHUHWRVLPSO\UHIHUWRDVPDOODQGSHUKDSV
only-just-discernable, area of the visual field, without also arguing that the visual field is 
actually split up in this way as a TV screen might be. With these warnings in mind then, it 
therefore seems possible to draw some correlations between cells in the visual buffer array 
DQGµSL[HOV¶LQWKHYLVXDOILHOG%XWDJDLQ,ZRXOGKLJKOLJKWWKHIDFWWKDW,DPQRWVXJJHVWLQJ
there is a one-to-one relationship, only that activity (or lack of it) in certain cells of the 
visual buffer does seem to correlate with phenomenal experience (or lack of it) in certain 
areas or pixels of the visual field. It may be that several cells are needed to support one 
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pixel, or that there is a more complicated interaction between nearby cells and upstream 
processes, that eventually affects what one experiences in a certain area. I do not need to 
take a more specific stance on this as long as there seems to be some close correlative link 
between areas of cells and pixels, then I think this is enough to support what I want to talk 
about next. 
 
So given the above perhaps I can tentatively suggest the following example to illustrate 
these points. Consider a case where you see, or are asked to imagine, a red rectangle on the 
left and a blue square on the right. And consider how this might change if you were asked 
to see, or imagine, a blue rectangle on the right and a red square on the left. Perhaps we 
could annotate the simplified contents of the visual buffer in the diagram below, where I 
have only specified the colour detected in each cell. That is, all other content apart from 
those representing colour have been removed for simplicities sake (and see Figure 3.3 for 
my first use of a diagram like this): 
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 8 8 8 8 1 5 5 5 1 
1 8 8 8 8 1 5 5 5 1 
1 8 8 8 8 1 5 5 5 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
          
          
          
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 5 5 5 5 1 8 8 8 1 
1 5 5 5 5 1 8 8 8 1 
1 5 5 5 5 1 8 8 8 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Figure 7.2 ± Visual Buffer Matrix Annotation for:  
above ±red rectangle on left and blue square on right (seen);  
and below ±blue rectangle on left and red square on right (imagined) 
 
 
In the situation above, cells in the visual buffer are filled in with values that represent the 
retinotopically distributed light wavelengths detected at the eye. These will eventually get 
accessed by upstream mechanisms and experienced as shapes and colours in corresponding 
parts of the visual field. Of course this is vastly oversimplified to make the point and other 
information in each cell has been left out to make things simple. For example information 
like the depth (or distance to object) values can be assumed constant. I have tried to 
illustrate the two cases slightly differently, by filling in the top set in with numbers in bold, 
and the bottom set in with numbers in italics. This is intended to indicate the potential 
difference between how real online inputs and offline mock inputs could be represented in 
the visual buffer. For example: the top matrix might represent a visual episode and the 
bottom matrix might represent an imagined episode.  
 
Again I stress this is a very simplified schematic and just serves to illustrate the point that 
similar cells in the visual buffer might be filled-in in each case in slightly different ways to 
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keep them separate during further processing. This way of looking at it is consistent with 
the evidence that the same areas are used in vision and visual imagery and that they 
compete for resources in both processes. And importantly this would still count as an 
offline simulation of the online visual process because the visual buffer is being used in 
both cases. But note that this interrelation of offline and online entries could be very 
complex and it is possible that they can co-exist in the same cell and be distinguished by 
the presence or absence of a mock label. This inter-cell and intra-cell co-habitation of the 
mock and real entries in the visual buffer, and how they might compete for our limited 
attention, is certainly something I would like to analyse further in the future, but 
unfortunately is all I can say about it here129. 
 
In terms of now describing how the situation above relates to the visual field, I offer the 
illustration below, which is an adapted version of Figure 1.4, which was the scotoma 
diagram from Chapter 1. In the below I have coloured-in the cells of the visual buffer 
rather than filled-them-in-with-numerical-values for ease of illustration. But if you prefer, 
it is easy to transpose the numbers IURPWKHDERYHH[DPSOHHJWKH¶VDQG¶VRQWRWKH
visual buffer on the left hand side of the diagram: 
 
 
                                               
129
 It may be worth noting however that the visual buffer is composed of millions of neurons so this kind of 
complexity could easily sustained. And this might also help prevent one from thinking of the cells as literally 
bucket like slots in a matrix where only one thing can fit in it. The reality of the situation may be far more 
complex than that. 
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Figure. 7.3 ± Visual buffer cell to visual field pixel relation for the situation 
described in the text and the situation described in Fig 7.2 above 
 
 
If the above is plausible, it perhaps offers one way that we can think of the cells in the 
visual buffer corresponding with perceived objects in the visual field. And given what has 
gone before it seems reasonable to suggest that this can also be related to how the spatial 
layout of a visual image can be controlled and delimited with certain crucial differences 
which I will say more about below. 
 
It seems to me that a similar set of diagrams could be made for objects that are uniform in 
colour but vary in depth, where the Z-coordinate would vary in the visual buffer in 
proportion to distance to object in the visual field. Although the description above has 
necessarily been very simplified, I suggest that this is more to do with the need to describe 
it in a mainly a text constrained fashion. To avoid these constraints I see no reason why 
WKLVFRXOGQ¶WEHGHYHORSHGDQGGHPRQVWUDWHGLQDPRUHFRPSOLFDWHGDQGLQYROYHGZD\
perhaps on a graphics package on a computer. Perhaps this could be done by representing 
more than one cell content at once and displaying many more pixels in a much finer grid. 
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Hence the above can be seen as an exposition that sets the style of explanation rather than 
any real attempt to indicate the complexity of the actual situation. So now we have a 
correlation between the layout of the visual buffer and our phenomenal experience, these 
leaves an explanatory gap between how one is actually produced from the other. I take this 
to require some kind of generation step to bridge the symbol to phenomenal gap and 
exploring the extent of what we can reasonably say about this at present will be the focus 
of the next section. 
 
7.3 ± Visual imagery, phenomenal consciousness and the generative process 
On the assumption that the mechanisms underlying visual perception can be characterised 
in a cell to pixel correlation under the Kosslyn Model as described above, what can we say 
about how this relates to Generative Approaches to perception? What I would want to say 
here is that what ever process that you think generates phenomenal character in the online 
perceptual case, can now perhaps be commandeered to generate the phenomenal character 
in the imagistic case. This would indicate that imagery and perception are produced in 
fairly similar ways, with certain minor differences in how they are caused and experienced, 
and these features will be discussed below. The conjunction of these different features 
under the same process is illustrated in the following diagram, where the crucial step is that 
they all go through a generation process, which converts them from merely symbolic 
information in the visual buffer to phenomenal experiences of shapes and objects: 
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Figure 7.4 ± Schematic of a Conjunctivist & Generative Approach to vision and visual imagery: 
assuming an imagination-as-simulation approach based on the Kosslyn Model. 
 
 
Note that I have included on the left some different external and internal stimuli that might 
lead to filling-in the visual buffer in different ways. These have been linked by matching 
the colours of the arrows in the processing flows to the respective eventual mental states 
that they may lead to (on the right). Since I have already attempted to explain sub-personal 
mechanisms that fill-in the visual buffer up the point of the generation process, I will focus 
mainly on the right hand side of the above diagram in what follows. 
 
It is also worth noting here that the above diagram explicitly illustrates why my theory can 
be clearly classed as a form of Conjunctivism. This is because it conjoins or unifies: 
perception and illusions and hallucinations and imagery, as all being locally generated 
visual style phenomenal representational mental states. This means they are all: visual 
style130 phenomenal states in that they are all experienced in apparent shapes and colours 
                                               
130
 Recall: I first used this term in Chapter 1 to refer to any mental state that is experienced in apparent or real 
shapes and colours. This is as opposed to vision-like states, which includes visual hallucinations and visual 
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(this includes visual states themselves); and that they represent things that one is seeing or 
might see; and they are all generated locally by the brain; and hence they are ontologically 
similar things in at least this respect. That is they are relatively similar things when 
compared to non-phenomenal mental states and even when compared to different types of 
phenomenal mental states in other sense modalities: e.g. hearing and taste. This is because 
these other states need not share the same underlying topographic processing style and 
extensively overlapping neurology (especially not the visual buffer) and will not lead to the 
generation of the same style of phenomenal experience (i.e. they wont be experienced in 
apparent shapes and colours in normal subjects). This is what puts these vision and vision-
like states together as a group and why we can say they share a significantly higher 
common factor when compared to other types of mental states. 
 
It may also be worth emphasising that I think this claim is crucially different from claiming 
that these vision and vision-OLNHVWDWHVDUHDOOµWKHVDPHkind RIWKLQJ¶VLQFHWKLVPLJKWWKHQ
UHTXLUHDQDQDO\VLVRIZKDWRQHPHDQVE\µNLQG¶DQGZKDWmight count as a natural or 
fundamental kind in this respect. It is possible that vision, illusion, hallucination and visual 
imagery all share a significant common factor and yet could be classed as different natural 
or fundamental kinds of things at some higher level of description. This may depend on 
your definition of what counts as a natural or a fundamental kind131. The claim here is 
merely that they share a significant common factor and are therefore relatively similar (but 
not identical) kinds of things. This similarity is especially emphasised when compared to 
                                                                                                                                              
imagery, and these are like visual states in that they have the same visual style, but have different causal 
histories. 
131
 For a discussion of natural kinds see Hacking (1991) and also see Pautz (2007) for a criticism of appeals 
to fundamental kinds IURP1DwYH5HDOLVWVOLNH0DUWLQ)RULQVWDQFH3DXW]FODLPVµI 
do not understand the notion of a fundamental kind. Neither Wiggins [1980] nor Martin gives any 
H[DPSOHV«$QGVLQFHLWLVYHU\GLIILFXOWWRMXVWLI\WKHFODLPWKDWWKHUHDUHVXFKWKLQJVDV
IXQGDPHQWDONLQGVDWDOOLWLVYHU\GLIILFXOWWRMXVWLI\1DLYH5HDOLVPDV0DUWLQIRUPXODWHVLW¶+HQFH
,SUHIHUQRWWRXVHWKHWHUPµNLQG¶LQDQ\WHFKQLFDOVHQVHLQZKDWIROORZVEXWPRUHDVDJHQHUDO
V\QRQ\PIRUµW\SH¶IRUH[DPSOHDVLQµDVLPLODUW\SHRUNLQGRIWKLQJ¶ 
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the large differences between these states that might be claimed by a Disjunctivist, as 
discussed in the last section and illustrated in Figure 5.1 for instance132. So while the 
Conjunctivist accepts there are some minor differences between these states, we would 
claim they are all still relatively quite similar, and share a significant common factor in that 
they are all locally generated visual style phenomenal representational mental states. 
 
In addition to that the Conjunctivist can still claim this similarity in the types of mental 
states they are, is still compatible with the fact that the way that they are caused and 
experienced may be very different. I think I have explained in detail the differences in how 
they are caused in the first part of the thesis, and have developed the annotations given 
above to reflect this. Explaining the differences in how they are then experienced is the 
topic of Section 7.3.2, but first I will look in the next section at what I think I can sensibly 
say about the generation process. 
 
7.3.1 ± The generation process and phenomenal consciousness 
So in terms of the generation process itself, I will not attempt any explanation of a 
mechanism by which consciousness is actually generated. Nor will I try to describe 
explicitly how the symbol to phenomenal gap is crossed, since I think this remains a 
fascinating mystery at this point in our understanding. I also think it is far too early in our 
understanding of consciousness to say anything very strong about whether on the limit we 
will ever be able to understand how consciousness can be a physical process. My opinion 
is that modesty and honesty at this point is the correct emphasis to have133. As a result, all I 
                                               
132
 There I suggested that under Naïve Realism that perhaps: online visual states could be classed as widely 
superveniHQWDQGSXWRQHLQWRXFKGLUHFWO\ZLWKWKHREMHFW¶VSURSHUWLHVRIVKDSHDQGFRORXUEXWYLVLRQ-like 
states like imagery could be locally supervenient and their apparent shapes and colours would be generated 
by the brain.  
133
 And I agree with Shallice (1997) that it would be a-historic to assume the problem of consciousness is 
unsolvable, unlike many other at-the-time seemingly mysterious physical phenomena e.g. planetary motion 
and fire. 
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will say is that based on accessing the information in the visual buffer by other upstream 
(or same level) brain areas, somehow phenomenal character is generated, and this is what 
we experience in phenomenal consciousness. This means that what is represented in the 
visual buffer is necessary, but probably not sufficient, for full phenomenal consciousness. 
However, as discussed in the above, the contents of the visual buffer probably tightly 
FRQWUROWKHSDUDPHWHUVRIZKDWLVSHUFHLYHGHYHQLIWKH\GRQ¶WFRQWUROWKHILQDOexplicit 
phenomenal way that it is perceived. That is they provide the basic symbolic representation 
of what is out there in the world, but this can still be interpreted slightly differently by 
processing quirks further along the visual process.  
 
As an illustration of this flexibility: this allows for something like the Muller Lyer 
Illusion134 to be potentially explained by processes further upstream. For instance this may 
be because it occurs due to certain processing shortcuts to do with considering the context 
of the attached arrowheads, which means the raw data is interpreted as lines of different 
lengths. This may be despite the fact that the raw information in the visual buffer might 
represent them as being the equivalent of equal length lines (e.g. equal number of cells 
filled). Note this explanation is merely allowed for here, rather than suggested. The Muller 
Lyer Illusion could still be caused by processing quirks within the visual buffer itself or 
further downstream and I take no strong stance on this issue. What we could say though, is 
that these illusory cases are probably rare and our experience will usually match up fairly 
closely with the information accessed from the visual buffer. Which in turn will also match 
quite closely with the external world itself. That is, these kinds of illusions are the 
exception rather than the norm and our perceptual experience is most often veridical (even 
if not as direct as some might hope for once a Generative Approach is adopted). 
                                               
134
 The Muller-Lyer illusion consists of two equal length horizontal straight lines with arrow-heads on the 
end. The arrow-heads point inwards on one line and point outwards on the other. This gives the illusion that 
the lines are different lengths when on measuring them they are clearly equal. 
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As mentioned above although I will not attempt an explanation of how the signal to 
phenomenal gap is actually crossed, I will make a relatively weak assumption that some 
physical story will eventually be told about this generation process. That is even though I 
accept that, in the limit, some very modest form of dualism may be necessary and we just 
GRQ¶WNQRZLIWKLVZLOOEHUHTXLUHG\HWWKRXJKDQG,DPRSWLPLVWLFWKDWLWZRQWEH135. I say 
µPRGHVWGXDOLVP¶EHFDXVH,WKLQNLWZLOOVWLOOEHWLHGYHU\FORVHO\WRWKHZRUNLQJVRI
individual brains and will invoke as little as possible extra in terms of non-physical 
entities: i.e. just enough to explain how brain states can generate phenomenal 
consciousness and no more. However, as mentioned at the end of Chapter 5, at the moment 
I take appeals to dualism to be premature and are equivalent to appeals of the last resort, 
since they seem to just open more questions than they answer at present and hence offer no 
real benefits whilst incurring the invocation of strange non-material entities. The important 
point I want to stress here is that I take it that the same generation process could still occur 
in vision and in visual imagery, whether it is a purely physical process or not. Hence I 
GRQ¶WVHHWKLVDVVXPSWLRQDVYHU\FUXFLDOWRP\&RQMXQFWLYLVWPosition and the above is 
merely an indication of my position on materialism for the benefit of the reader. So while I 
have not pretended to offer a complete theory of consciousness, I hope to have given a 
fairly comprehensive account of the implications of this to a simulationist approach 
irrespective of whether materialism is eventually found to be true or not.  
 
                                               
135
 I think this makes me a Type-C 0DWHULDOLVWDFFRUGLQJWR&KDOPHUVRUµSK\VLFDOLVWKRSHIXO¶
according to Tye (2000: 22), but a detailed categorisation of my position is not essential here. For the record I 
KDYHVRPHV\PSDWK\ZLWKDSRVLWLRQFDOOHGµ6XEMHFWLYH3K\VLFDOLVP¶SXWforward by Howell (2008). And see 
Block (2003) and Kriegel (2003) for suggestions that accepting local supervenience of phenomenal character, 
does not necessarily entail that you deny physicalism; only that this local generation of phenomenal character 
and the resulting experiences must also be eventually described as physical entities. While I accept that this 
may be harder to explain and conceive of at present, the point here is that this move does not necessarily 
entail abandoning physicalism as yet. 
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,DSSUHFLDWHWKDWWKLVUHPDLQLQJµ*HQHUDWLRQ0\VWHU\¶DV,UHIHUWRLWPD\VHHP
unsatisfying to some readers136. In reply to this, I would remind those readers that this is 
not a thesis specifically designed to analyse the metaphysics of consciousness. It does 
involve many elements to do with consciousness, but is mainly focused on looking at the 
overlap between vision and visual imagery at the sub-personal and personal levels. And 
since I have already argued for a highly Conjunctivist Position, I may now perhaps feel 
justified in assuming that the generation process in both vision and visual imagery will be 
similar in both cases. This is because I think they are underpinned by similar processes and 
lead to similar kinds of locally supervenient phenomenal experiences. The differences I 
predict are therefore mainly in the ways these mental states are initially caused and 
eventually experienced (see later), with much of the in-between processes being used in 
common. 
 
Having said that, there are various theories about the neural correlates of consciousness 
(NCC) currently on the market, all of which I think are generally compatible with my 
theory. That is, I am not aware of any theory in this field that needs to be specifically 
addressed that would potentially contradict my approach137. To illustrate this point, here 
are two theories that are perhaps at opposite ends of the spectrum of the NCC debate. 
These either predict that a relatively small part of the brain is sufficient for supporting 
phenomenal experience, or that it is a much more widely distributed event. In terms of the 
former, they might suggest that the NCCs are in the visual cortex itself and these somehow 
generate phenomenal character on their own. Examples of these kinds of theories are: 
                                               
136
 It is worth noting that I have criticised Tye (1995, 2000) in the last chapter for denying that an explanation 
of how the signal to phenomenal gap is crossed is required. This is different from my position because I 
accept that some explanation is required and it is only that I think it is currently premature to attempt to give 
one. Hence I readily identify this as one part of my theory that remains unexplained, which is importantly 
different from denying it needs any explanation. 
137
 For a fuller survey of the potential neural correlates of consciousness see Chalmers (1998, 2000) and 
Crick and Koch (1998). 
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II\WFKH¶VµPLFUR-FRQVFLRXVQHVVWKHRU\¶WKDWLQGLFDWHVWKDWDFWLYLW\LQYLVXDOFRUWH[LQ
general may be sufficient; and Tootell et al (1995) who have more specifically suggested 
sub-area V5138. Conversely, it may be the NCCs are a more distributed global event based 
on the rhythmic firings of different parts of the cortex, which in turn can be detected as 
µEUDLQZDYHV¶SXOVLQJDWGLIIHUHQWIUHTXHQFLHV$QH[DPSOHRIWKLVLV&ULFNDQG.RFK¶V
(1990) 40-hertz oscillations over the whole cerebral cortex, which not only includes the 
visual cortex, but the frontal, parietal and temporal cortexes also. Despite these contrasting 
claims I would suggest that these bipolar opposite approaches are both generally 
compatible with my theory and by inference I think all the less extreme ones in between 
will be to. This is because I suggest the options described above, and any intermediary 
ones, could all potentially access information from the visual buffer to delimit what is 
finally experienced after further (same level or upstream) processing. So in terms of what I 
ZDQWWRVD\QH[WLWWKHUHIRUHGRHVQ¶WUHDOO\PDWWHUWRRPXFKZKLFKRIWKHFXUUHQWWKHRULHVRI
the NCCs eventually becomes more established, since my theory seems to potentially 
compatible with them all at present.139 
 
The main thing to stress at this point is that I think that the online generation process, what 
ever it turns out to be, will presumably also be available to generate offline mental 
imagery. I think this is assured because there is no reason I am aware of, that the other 
QHFHVVDU\XSVWUHDPSURFHVVHVFRXOGQ¶WDFFHVVWKHYLVXDOEXIIHUWKHVDPHZD\LQERWKFDVHV
That is they could access information from the visual buffer irrespective of whether it is 
ODEHOOHGDVRQOLQHRURIIOLQH$QGWKHRIIOLQHµPRFN¶ODEHOFRXOGNHHSLPDJLVWLF
representations isolated from online perceptual representations in further processing. So I 
                                               
138
 Recall the visual buffer is thought to be in downstream areas V1 and V2 at the most. So the relatively 
upstream area V5 could easily access these areas as predicted by my theory. 
139
 But again mainly for the record and the interest of the reader, I tend to favour a more in-between approach 
OLNHWKHRQHSXWIRUZDUGE\.ULHJHO¶VELQKLVSDSHURQWKLVVXEMHFW+HUHKHEURDGO\VXJJHVWVWKDWSDUWV
of the frontal cortex access more downstream areas, which also fits with the Kosslyn Model as discussed. 
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will assume this is at least plausible in what follows, even though admittedly very little is 
known or has been said about this aspect at present. I will however return to address this 
point further after the next section. 
 
7.3.2 ± Similar kinds of representations leading to different sorts of experiences 
So assuming from now on that some form of (admittedly still mysterious) generation 
processes is involved in somehow generating visual phenomenal experiences in all cases, 
perhaps this just leaves an explanation of how these overlapping underlying processes give 
rise to such noticeably different experiences like perception and imagery. In other words 
perhaps I can now focus on the far right output end of Figure 7.4. What then might 
underpin the phenomenological difference between apparently experiencing objects 
externally in perception and experiencing them not-externally during imagery140? Well in 
this respect maybe we can talk about it in terms of where the object is represented as being. 
In the perception case it is represented as being in the external world and hence you 
experience it as apparently out there. Perhaps we can think of this as the representation 
being given specific online egocentric coordinates141 of where it refers to in real world 
space. For instance, a red-rectangle on the left five metres away, is represented 
phenomenally by taking the contents of the visual buffer and conjoining them with its 
actual calculated external egocentric coordinates. This then controls where the apparent 
experience is perceived to be occurring and gives rise to an apparent experience as-if of a 
red rectangle actually out there in the external world five metres away on your left. 
 
                                               
140
 Recall I introduced and talked about the Perky (1910) experiments to motivate the idea that it is 
commonly accepted that imagined objects are not experienced externally in the same way that perception is. 
Hence this is one of the initial assumptions of the thesis and I refer to visual imagery simply as not 
representing things as being in the actual external world while leaving it open as to how this is developed 
further. 
141
 Recall: that egocentric coordinates locates objects relative to where you are and also locates where you are 
in the world; and allocentric coordinates only refer to the location of objects relative to other objects, or to the 
relative location of pertinent features within an object (like the equal distances between the corners of a 
cube). 
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In terms of imagery then, maybe we can just give a negative version of the online visual 
case. This could be done by simply not merging the imagistic representation with any 
actual online external egocentric coordinates. That is, in imagery the imagined features are 
just represented as being viewed from a certain point of view, but this does not require 
them to actually be representing anything actually out there now. Hence there is no need to 
allocate or merge these with real online egocentric coordinates at all, and hence no need to 
experience them as actually being apparently out there in the external world. In this sense 
perhaps just getting the relative coordinates of the objects right will do the job for imagery, 
because this will set the relative locations and sizes of the objects, as delimited by what 
you remember or imagine that you would have seen from a particular point of view (and 
see below for a worked example of this). Of course imagining what things look like from a 
particular position may involve working out your imagined egocentric location relative to 
them and where you are in the world, but these values need not then be treated as real 
enough to be experienced as actually happening in the real external world now. So even if 
in some cases images do need to be allocated some egocentric coordinates, then these can 
be labelled as merely mock or pretend ones. Hence we just need to imagine the relevant 
objects and their relative locations and sizes from the imagined viewpoint and this need not 
be given any real online external coordinates in any situation. 
 
So perhaps I can summarise this step in my theory by saying that: whilst in the perceptual 
case you represent real objects and experience them as being in the external world; in the 
imagistic case you just represent them as being seen from a particular, possibly standard, 
imaginary point of view. Or alternatively: whilst in perception it is important to represent 
the actual egocentric location that the current stimulus is coming from; in imagery you just 
need to represent things as being seen from a particular imagined (or remembered) 
viewpoint, and this can be done without representing them as being anywhere in particular 
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in your current environment. Hence in the imagery case online egocentric coordinates just 
DUHQ¶WQHFHVVDU\IRUWKLVSURFHVVDVORQJDVWKHUHODWLYHSRVLWLRQVRIWKHREMHFWVDUHVHW
properly and the details of the correct viewpoint filled out appropriately, then a non-
externally experienced apparently 3D image can be generated and examined. This means 
that the imagined scene can mimic (or simulate) what you would have seen in the real case, 
without needing to place it as necessarily being anywhere specific in the external world.  
 
Another related representational difference between imagery and perception is that in 
imagery there is no need to always reproduce a full and detailed equivalent of the visual 
scene. This is because it may be more efficient to produce just enough detail in imagery to 
complete the task at hand. So you can save energy (i.e. brain processing power) by just 
representing the minimum amount needed, for the minimum time needed, with the 
minimum vivacity required to complete the job. In other words, why bother generating a 
fully phenomenal vivid external experience, when sometimes all that is required is a 
weakly experienced, fleeting, vague point of view on an imagined situation. Although of 
course this will still have to have just enough detail so you can check the relevant details 
relevant to solving the problem. This gives an additional efficiency based explanation of 
the phenomenological differences between a seemingly complete vivid perception and an 
often relatively less vivid and incomplete image that only persists for as long as it is useful 
and is focused upon. 
 
It may be helpful at this point to illustrate these ideas with a worked example. Take my by 
now familiar example of when you imagine a Rubiks Cube and need to count off the small 
VTXDUHVIURPLWVIDFHV,WVHHPVWKHYLVXDOLPDJHRID5XELNV&XEHGRHVQ¶WQHHGWREH
represented as being anywhere in particular in the environment to do this, you just need to 
make sure it is experienced with the right shape, size, vivacity and detail, so that you can 
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check how many small squares it has. The phenomenology will be similar to the perceptual 
case, because you are taking a perspective on something that seems shaped and coloured. 
However in the imagined case this is just not represented as actually occurring in your 
current external environment and hence not experienced as such. My theory would explain 
this experiential difference as being due to the fact that the visual image of a Rubiks Cube 
is not merged with online real egocentric coordinates and hence only experienced from an 
imaginary, usually default, point of view (e.g. near distance directly ahead). This lack of 
merging with the online egocentric coordinates means it is never treated as actual, but the 
details of the image are presented in enough details, in the correct format (apparent shapes 
and colours) to be able to solve the problem. This therefore gives one way of explaining 
the differences between perceiving a Rubiks Cube online and imagining one offline. The 
above characterises my main claims about how different kinds of representational styles 
might lead to the phenomenal differences we experience between vision and visual 
imagery in terms of its vividness, completeness and where it is represented as occurring. 
Below I will show how these claims can be illustrated further and also describe some other 
features that I think my theory is now compatible with and indeed motivated by in the first 
place. 
 
To that end perhaps another useful way of thinking about these distinctions is to link this 
explanation with motor actions. Consider that in online visual perception, it helps 
enormously if our visual states match up with our tactile bodily feelings (as discussed in 
Chapter 2). This is because we can then use vision to guide actions and to avoid current 
environmental danger that might damage our bodies: e.g. grabbing things and avoiding 
lethal drops. So it makes sense to have visual experiences match up with where we 
experience them bodily, and that means matching them up with the online egocentric 
coordinate system used in motor control of physical actions, which do to occur in real 3D 
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space. In imagery this is not required and perhaps even needs to be inhibited, because we 
dRQ¶WUHDOO\ZDQWWRZDVWHHQHUJ\UHDFWLQJWRZKDWZHKDYHPHUHO\LPDJLQHGHJUXQQLQJ
away from an imagined tiger. So it makes sense to make sure imagery is not experienced 
as external and is instead just represented as not occurring in the current external 
environment. Consequently it could have evolved to be specifically isolated from being 
integrated with the actual online egocentric coordinate system.  
 
I think this approach is compatible and specifically motivated by my explanation of these 
features in Chapter 4, when I first introduced the egocentric coordinate terminology and 
talked about the interactions of the OPP and SPP streams in terms of Neglect (visual and 
PRWRU,WLVDOVRKLJKO\FRPSDWLEOHZLWK+XUOH\¶V6KDUHG&LUFXLWV0RGHOWKDWOLnks 
motor control with visual perception in terms of sensory-motor feedback as discussed in 
Section 2.3. So there seems to be some potential for interlinking the ways these different 
sense modalities (e.g. touch and vision) and their respective online and offline versions 
(e.g. perception and imagery) can work together. And as long as we can keep tight control 
RIZKDW¶VUHDODQGZKDWLVLPDJLQHGWKHQWKHVHYDULHGV\VWHPVFDQUXQTXLWHFORVHO\
together. For example: by vision and touch identifying a real world problem; and then by 
using imagery to covertly practice or choose between a range of possible reactions to that 
problem; and then to use vision and motor control to help guide the action you eventually 
decide to execute in the external world. This is a cycle that can be repeated indefinitely in 
order to improve our online decision making process so we can survive and thrive. 
 
It is worth noting here that what I am describing is different but related to using a map-like 
representational capacity to control what you might imagine seeing from a particular 
viewpoint: as in the Piazza Del Duomo example in Chapter 4. Here you imagine an 
egocentric geographic location and imagine/remember what you might see if you were 
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standing there and use this to delimit the information that is eventually sent to the visual 
buffer. However there then seems to be no need for these guiding egocentric geographic 
coordinates to be now sent along to the visual buffer as well. But even if they are, they can 
perhaps at least now be ODEHOOHGDVRIIOLQHDQGKHQFHRQO\LPDJLQDU\VRWKDW\RXGRQ¶W
suddenly think you are actually positioned there. 
 
In the above I have offered one way to think about how the phenomenological differences 
between perceptual and imagistic states could be explained. Perhaps this then offers a 
tangible way to account for the differences between externally experienced online vision 
and visual imagery that is not experienced externally but is still perspectival. And I think it 
can also account for how imagery is experienced in a vision-like way, but perhaps using 
only allocentric or imagined-egocentric coordinates, instead of being matched up with 
actual online external egocentric coordinates. This concludes my discussion of the features 
illustrated on the right hand side of Figure 7.4. In the next section I will relate this more 
generally to other theories of phenomenal consciousness before tying this all together in an 
interim conclusion. 
 
7.3.3 ± Visual imagery and Generative Approaches to consciousness 
Given the DERYHWKHUHDGHUPD\QRZVWLOOZDQWWRDVNµ,ILQYLVXDOLPDJHU\WKHLPDJLQHG
object is not experienced as being in the external world then where does the image of a 
5XELNV&XEHRFFXU¶7RZKLFK,ZRXOGUHSO\WKDWLQVRPHZD\VWKLVTXHVWLRQKDVPLVVHGWKH 
SRLQW7KHLPDJHGRHVQ¶WRFFXUDQ\ZKHUHDV-such, it is an experience that you go through if 
you happen to be undergoing the appropriate kind of brain processes. That is, it is nowhere 
but as a physical brain process, involving all the areas discussed above, that gives rise to 
this apparent 3D phenomenal experience. The question misses the point because it seems 
the same question can be asked about the apparent externality in the online perceptual 
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case, which is also just a locally supervenient mental state, but one that is experienced as 
apparently external. So an equally pressing question would be to ask how can the brain can 
generate phenomenal experiences of apparently external 3D objects? But to ask about this 
feature, is again I would say just to ask about the Generation Mystery. 
 
This is because it seems me that it is also difficult to explain how something like a BIV can 
locally support an experience that feels like we are just seeing the external world directly 
as our naïve intuitions suggest. The same difficulty also arises if you accept the standard 
account of visual hallucination and after-images, which are both locally supervenient 
vision-like states that give one an experience of an object that is apparently located in the 
external world, when of course no such object actually exists. So just as you can ask this 
kind of question about visual imagery, one can ask a similar thing about other vision and 
other vision-like states. Therefore I would suggest a question about where one experiences 
a visual image, is just a sub-set of the Generation Mystery question. And I have dealt with 
this point above by arguing that brain states must somehow be producing these apparently 
VSDWLDOH[SHULHQFHVEXWZHMXVWGRQ¶WNQRZKRZDV\HWDQGVRLWUHPDLQVDP\VWHU\. I hope 
my approach can someday be linked to research that may make some progress in this area, 
but I think it is too soon to attempt this at present; and this is especially true in the 
restricted context of this thesis142. 
 
To put this point another way, I would suggest that once you have accepted that the brain 
can locally generate phenomenal character in the perceptual case by representing it in 
apparent shapes and colours in the external world, then it seems to me that this explanation 
                                               
142
 But I think investigating things like mirrors, 3D cinemas and Magic Eye pictures, can give us some insight 
how the mind generates 3D experience from what is actually information coming from a flat surface. A good 
start to this thought process is perhaps to just look at a mirror and think how strange this experience is of you 
at a spatial point somewhere behind the wall. Now ask yourself: where does that occur? See also Levine 
(2008) for a related discussion of virtual space. 
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is also potentially available to explain the phenomenal character of visual imagery. The 
difference comes not in the generation step, but in where the real or imagined objects are 
represented as being: where the former are represented as occurring externally and the 
latter as just represented from a certain (possibly default) point of view. Hence the most 
difficult step to justify in my opinion, is at the point of accepting local supervenience of 
phenomenal character, and once this is done we are free to suggest that the brain can 
represent things in different ways. This is why I spent a significant amount of time 
developing the Time-Spread Argument to motivate my Generative Approach to 
phenomenal character. 
 
To now demand details of how this difference in generation occurs is to ask for a detailed 
account of the way different kinds of visual phenomenal consciousness are generated based 
on these different kinds of online and offline representations. That is I would need to 
develop a theory about the generation of consciousness and how it varies among vision and 
vision-like states. And although this is something I would like to develop in future, I do not 
have the space to enter into that discussion here in enough detail to do it justice. Instead I 
suggest it mainly regards a sub-distinction within a general Generation Mystery question 
and this is something that I have already indicated I will not attempt to do here, because it 
would be very speculative given our current lack of knowledge of this generation process. 
Hence I feel that by arguing in detail for a Generative Approach based on the Time-spread 
Argument, and by providing as detailed an argument from both sides of the signal to 
phenomenal gap as I think is currently possible, I have done what I think is reasonably 
possible in order to fulfil the aims of this thesis.  
 
What I we can say that is a bit more positive is that according to the local supervenience 
thesis, if you are undergoing the appropriate kinds of brain processes, then you will be 
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undergoing a imagistic phenoPHQDOH[SHULHQFHVRPHKRZDQGWKLVGRHVQ¶WHQWDLOWKDWLWLV
going on anywhere apart from as activity in your brain. This may therefore be compatible 
with the straight forward claims of Identity Theory on the one hand. Or at the other 
extreme it may be compatible with a more complex theory about the relation between 
physical matter and consciousness such as Emergentism, where apparently 3D visual 
experience somehow emerges from the complexity of the neural interactions involved143. I 
can stay neutral in this respect also, as long as this process is equally accessible for taking 
RIIOLQHIRULPDJHU\,FDQVHHQRUHDVRQZK\LWZRXOGQ¶WEHEHFDXVHLWLVMXVWDGLIIHUHQFHLQ
representational style rather than invoking anything ontologically new. And note that the 
above is not the same as saying prejudicially that this is the only way that this kind of 
experience can occur. My position is consistent with saying that the same phenomenal 
experience could be had by many different brain states, or even other physical states with 
very different supervenience bases (e.g. silicon). The claim here is only that if you are in 
this particular brain state (or better, if you are that particular brain state), then you will also 
be undergoing this kind of phenomenal experience: to deny this under my approach is just 
to deny materialism.144 
 
As mentioned earlier I take my theory to be compatible with any Generative Approach that 
suggests that the brain generates phenomenal character in all cases. These are generally 
also referred to as (highest) common factor approaches in the literature (c.f. Crane 2005: 
Section 3.4) and these usually accept the local supervenience of phenomenal character and 
try to remain compatible with the BIV intuition. For some examples of theories of 
consciousnesVWKDWP\WKHRU\PD\EHFRPSDWLEOHZLWK,ZRXOGVXJJHVWWKDW:ULJKW¶V
                                               
143
 For Emergentism see for example Crane (2001: Section 18), Chalmers (2006) and Harre (2006). For 
papers on Identity Theory see for example: Smart (1972) and Borst (1970). 
144
 See Kriegel (2EIRUDVLPLODUFRPPHQWµ«LWLVGLIILFXOWWRFRQFHLYHRIDVFHQDULRLQZKLFKTXDOLD
are inverted but the neurophysiological underpinnings of experiences remain the same. In fact, the 
supervenience of qualia on matter excludes the possibility of such a scenario. To insist that such a scenario is 
metaphysically possible is to deny qualia-PDWWHUVXSHUYHQLHQFHDQGHIIHFWLYHO\UHQRXQFHPDWHULDOLVP¶ 
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FRPSLODWLRQFDOOHGµ7KH&DVHIRU4XDOLD¶FRQWDLQVDJRRGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHFROOHFWLRQ
of modern theories that I think are compatible with mine; perhaps also given some 
relatively minor qualifications. Indeed many of these theories explicitly indicate that they 
are indirect realist theories and often also appeal to science based arguments in a similar 
way that I do. However as discussed in Chapter 1, I would prefer to avoid the use of the 
WHUPµTXDOLD¶LQWKHQDUURZVHQVH145 as non-intentional states (c.f. Block 1996), since I 
remain sympathetic to the idea that qualia can represent things and hence can be intentional 
(c.f. Loar 2003, Levine 2008). An example of this kind of approach, in the Wright (2008) 
FROOHFWLRQLVDSDSHUE\*UDKDPDQG+RUJDQRQµ4XDOLD5HDOLVP¶ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWV
another paper on their continued promotion of a position called Phenomenal Intentionality. 
Amongst other things this school of thought claims that all qualia are intrinsically 
LQWHQWLRQDOVWDWHVZKLFKLVYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURP%ORFN¶VQDUURZXVHRIWKHWHUPDQG,WKLQN
this amply illustrates my reluctance to use this term since it is obviously potentially 
confusing. 
 
Although the broad category of Generative Approaches stated above does include sense-
data theories, and I am relatively sympathetic to these theories, I tend not to favour these 
kinds of approaches since they risk introducing ontologically separate entities with strange 
properties into their explanations: i.e. mind independent sense-data objects146. I see my 
approach as most compatible with the recently emerging phenomenal intentionality 
                                               
145
 And recall in the last chapter I suggested that Wright (2008) only reluctantly uses this term since 
µ5HSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVP¶KLVSUHIHUUHGWHUPKDVEHFRPHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHRULHVKRVWLOHWRTXDOLDHJ7\H
1995, Dretske 1995) 
146
 Hence I would prefer something more in the spirit RI$GYHUELDOLVP%XWKDYLQJVDLGWKDW,ZRXOGQ¶W
necessarily take being labelled as a sense-data theory as a very strong criticism taken on its own. This is 
because I agree with Maund (2005: 40), who suggests that some researchers seem to dismiss sense-data 
WKHRULHVIDUWRRHDVLO\IRUDµ«ZKROHKRVWRIIDPLOLDUUHDVRQV¶FI7\H0: 45-46). He also suggests that 
the recent work on sense-data theories by Howard Robinson (1994) might deserve a different and more 
FRQVLGHUHGWUHDWPHQW6R,ZRXOGQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\FRXQWDOOVHQVH-data theories as disproved, even though they 
may be currentO\RXWRIIDYRXU6HHDOVR+RZHOO	)DQWODQG+LOEHUW¶VIRUGHIHQFHVDJDLQVW
RWKHUFULWLFLVPVXVXDOO\OHYHOOHGDJDLQVW³+LJKHVW&RPPRQ)DFWRU´DSSURDFKHVHJWKHµVSHFNOHGKHQ¶DQG
µFORVHO\PDWFKLQJVDPSOHV¶REMHFWLRQV 
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movement147 because those theories seem to explicitly appeal to the BIV intuition and to 
endorse a form of non-reductive representationalism. In other words I think it can 
potentially be classed as both a Representational and Generative Approach, and therefore it 
seems broadly in lines with my preferred approach to perception and hence imagery148. 
Unfortunately I do not have time to go into the details of this compatibility here, and only 
mention it here as one suggested way that my theory could be merged and developed along 
with other more established approaches to perceptual consciousness. It would only be a 
problem for my approach if all of these kinds of theories were shown to be implausible, but 
for now there seem to be many live options that I can appeal to in this respect. 
 
7.3.4 ± Interim Conclusion on the nature of visual imagery 
So in conclusion to this section I would offer the following summary of how I would 
describe the similarities and differences between perception, hallucination and visual 
imagery based on the above arguments. [And note in what follows I treat illusion as a 
variety of perception, all be it a mis-perception, even though I have said little about this so 
far, and will say little to justify it further; I include it here merely for completeness149]: 
                                               
147
 C.f. Horgan and Tienson (2002), Horgan and Kriegel (2008), Horgan et al (2004), Farkas (2008) and 
Georgalis (2003). 
148
 I think my theory aligns particularly closely with the body of work put forward by Kriegel (2002ab, 2003, 
2007ab, 2008), especially his work on the NCCs (2007b - DVGLVFXVVHGDERYHDQGKLVSDSHURQµ,QWHQWLRQDO
,QH[LVWHQFHDQG3KHQRPHQDO,QWHQWLRQDOLW\¶DZKLFK,VHHDVDQRWKHUZD\RIDSSURDFKLQJSKHQRPHQDO
imagination and which defends an Adverbialist approach. See also footnote 152 below for an indication of 
P\WKHRULHVFRPSDWLELOLW\ZLWK&UDQH¶VDSSURDFKWRLQWHQWLRQDOLW\ 
149
 But see Thau (2004: 248) and Chapter 5 footnote 80 for more on this. 
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1) In visual perceptual states (including illusions as mis-perceptions) - you are 
visually representing things about your environment by generating phenomenal 
experiences of apparently external objects based on the (mostly) externally caused 
and filled-in online contents of the visual buffer. 
 
2) In visual hallucinations and afterimages - you are visually mis-representing 
things about your environment by generating phenomenal experiences of 
apparently external objects based on the (at least partially) internally caused and 
filled-in online contents of the visual buffer. 
 
3) In visual imagery - a phenomenal image is generated of a scene from a point of 
view that simulates at least partly what you might see if this situation were to 
actually be occurring. It can represent a situation that either: you may have actually 
already seen (memory); or you could have possibly seen (counterfactual past); or 
one you might possibly see (future possible). However in this vision-like 
representation the objects are not experienced as being in the external world, but 
are only experienced from a certain point of view in apparently spatial shapes and 
colours, and this is based on the internally caused and filled-in offline contents of 
the visual buffer. 
 
AND: in all cases of perception and hallucination and imagery, they are relatively 
similar kinds of mental states as they are all locally generated visual style 
phenomenal representational mental states. That is they share a significant 
common factor in the kinds of phenomenal mental states they are and the crucial 
brain mechanisms that underpin them; especially in terms of their use of the visual 
buffer. However there are some minor processing and phenomenological 
differences as stated above, the main one being that the imagery case is an offline 
simulation of the online visual case as currently compatible with my interpretation 
of the Kosslyn Model of perception and imagery. 
 
From the above you will note that I have put this in the form of a three-pronged distinction, 
which are all brought together as similar kinds of things as described by the last paragraph 
that starts ZLWKµ$1'¶7KLVLQGLFDWHVWKDWWKLVLVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWHOHPHQWDQGH[SODLQV
the predominant common factor between these states. Specifically this conjunction 
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suggests they are all locally generated visual style phenomenal experiences with significant 
overlaps in the underlying processing mechanisms they use. This is especially in terms of 
their crucial use of the visual buffer as suggested by the Kosslyn Model. The idea of the 
three-way sub-distinction is that it can explain the less crucial phenomenological and 
processing differences by explaining how perception, hallucination and visual imagery are 
caused and experienced differently, even if they are ultimately very similar kinds of things. 
 
So the above aims to give a summary explanation of how visual and vision-like states can 
seem similar in certain ways and have a significant processing overlap, which is in line 
with our phenomenological experiences and the available empirical data respectively. 
Hence I hope to have given one way of explaining both the difference in phenomenology 
between vision and visual imagery, but also the similarities between them based on sub-
personal processes and their common factor as locally generated visual style phenomenal 
experiences. So if this way of putting it is at least plausible, it gives one way of explaining 
the underlying nature of visual imagery and its relation to perception, in line with one of 
the main aims of the thesis. We can now perhaps apply these points to a final exposition of 
my full positive account of STIm next. 
 
7.4 ± From generic visual  imagery to full blown STIm 
Although the interim summary above explains certain things that characterise visual 
LPDJHU\LQJHQHUDOLWGRHVQ¶WH[SODLQKRZWKLVFRPHVWREHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKRWKHUVSDWLDO
and temporal contexts. Recall that the above does control for how imagined objects are 
distributed in apparent 3D space and how their shapes and colours are allocated. This gives 
them what I have referred to as their spatial layout, which I define as the distribution of 
these imagined objects within an imagined scene. Towards the end of the last chapter 
(Section 6.2) I developed a labelling-based approach to imagery, which suggested a 
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method by which visual images could become associated with different temporal contexts 
and/or be imagined to be located in different spatial locations. This involved appending 
these images with a label as to various aspects that the image was thought to represent. For 
instance representing an event that may occur in the near future in a different location to 
the one you are currently occupying. At the end of the last chapter I promised to return to 
this spatio-temporal labelling aspect of imagery and propose a way that it could be 
annotated. This is what I intend to do next as a way of concluding my explanation of the 
full nature and function of STIm in terms of visual imagery. 
 
I think that perhaps the best way of doing this is to provide a worked example to illustrate 
how an imagined scene with the same spatial layout can come to be thought of under 
different spatio-temporal contexts. To that end I will return to use my trusted example of a 
Rubiks Cube and show how a visual image of it can be treated in very different ways 
depending on how it is labelled. In order to make this as close as possible to a real life 
situation I have included examples of what your belief and desire attitudes towards this 
image might be and how these may affect your subsequent actions. These in turn can then 
be interpreted as illustrating a way that this image could be function in our wider mental 
economy. Hence I will introduce four cases below where I not only vary the spatio-
temporal context of the same Rubiks Cube image, but I also vary your intentional belief 
and desire attitudes towards it as well. 
 
In order to present these four cases I will annotate the visual image of the Rubiks Cube in 
exactly the same way in each case. Based on what I have said previously I would annotate 
the representation of spatial layout of the Rubiks Cube in the visual buffer like this: 
 
 Offline  ³7KLVUHSUHVHQWVD5XELNV&XEH´^$UUD\&HOO;<FRORXU5*%345GHSWK=«HWF` 
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Where the right hand side within the curly brackets refers to the information contained 
within the visual buffer that represent the spatial parameters of the Rubiks Cube. Since this 
LVDZLOOHGHSLVRGHWKLVKDVDOVREHHQDSSHQGHGZLWKWKHODEHOµ7KLVUHSUHVHQWVD5XELNV
&XEH¶7KLVLQWXUQFDQDOVREHODEHOOHGDVRQOLQHRURIIOLQHGHSHQGLQJLIWKHVHVSDWLDO
parameters are perceived or imagined respectively. In the example above it is offline and 
hence represents an imagined Rubiks Cube. This information would then need to be 
accessed appropriately by the upstream generation processes before a phenomenal image 
of an apparently shaped and coloured Rubiks Cube could be experienced. However since I 
want to focus on the labelling (left hand) side of the annotation above, and the right hand 
side will be the same in each case, I will abbreviate the right hand side to simply this 
µ^9% 5&`¶ZKLFKZLOOLQGLFDWHWhat the visual buffer (VB) contains the information 
needed to visually represent the spatial parameters of a Rubiks Cube (RC) and is also 
ODEHOOHGµ7KLVUHSUHVHQWVD5XELNV&XEH¶7KLVZLOODOORZPHWRDSSHQGPRUHODEHOVWRWKH
left hand side in a clearer fashion. Hence in what follows {VB=RC} will represent the 
information contained in the visual buffer that is accessed and labelled appropriately in 
order to generate a phenomenal experience as of a Rubiks Cube and will remain constant 
in each case. 
 
This now allows me to focus on varying the left hand side labelling aspect of this image. 
So in the list below I will illustrate three ways to annotate the same image and one way to 
annotate a similar episode of perception. They all represent a different situation that is 
described in a sentence above each annotation: 
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Case 1: This represents you imagining a Rubiks Cube that you want to buy: 
(Believe= yes, Desire= yes) (Location= toyshop, Time=future/present, possible) ±Offline 
{VB=RC} 
 
Case 2: This represents yRXLPDJLQJD5XELNV&XEH\RXZLVK\RX¶GKDGDVDFKLOG 
(Believe= no, Desire= yes) (Location= non-specific, Time=past, possible) - Offline {VB=RC} 
 
Case 3: This represents you remembering a Rubiks Cube you regret buying on holiday: 
(Believe= yes, Desire= no) (Location= Spain, Time=past, actual) ± Offline {VB=RC} 
 
Case 4: This represents you actually seeing a Rubiks Cube you want to buy: 
(Believe= yes, Desire= yes) (Location= 5m infront, Time=present, actual) - Online {VB=RC} 
 
Table 7.1:  Case 1-3 ± are nested annotations of different spatio-temporal contexts and 
intentional attitudes to the same Rubiks Cube image. Case 4 ± is a nested annotation of a 
perception of a similar Rubiks Cube. NB ± in all cases {VB=RC} is short for the visual 
buffer being filled and labelled with the relevant representations as of a Rubiks Cube 
 
 
From the above we can see that in Case 1-3 our attitude to the same image can vary 
according to our belief and desires for the object represented in the image. It can also vary 
in the spatio-temporal context it is labelled as being in. These vary in the temporal domain 
between: being in the past and factual (memory); to being in the past and counterfactual 
(imagined); and being a possibility in the future or present (imagined). Hence this covers 
the four main temporal settings that I think are possible (present, future, past actual, past 
possible) and shows how the temporal aspect can be varied and controlled. Similarly I have 
given some examples of how the spatial context of the image can vary. For example: from 
the local toyshop, to a holiday location in Spain, to being left unspecified. All this even 
though the actual spatial layout of the image of the Rubiks Cube remains the same in each 
case. I also see no reason why the spatial location could not be set in non-earth-bound 
locations, such as Mars, or even in imaginary places (e.g. Narnia).  
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And recall that in Section 6.2 I have made the assumption that a normal modern adult 
human subject has the concepts and mental equipment necessary to understand and 
interpret what these spatio-WHPSRUDOODEHOVPLJKWPHDQ6RDOWKRXJK,FRXOGQ¶WJRLQWRWRR
much detail about how this aspect actually works, I have suggested this might be a good 
platform from which an investigation into this aspect of our mental lives might start from. 
It is also worth noting that varying of spatio-temporal context of the image may in turn 
change other attitudes you have towards the Rubiks Cube visualization, such as emotional 
ones of positive happy anticipation or negative sad regret. I have tried to suggest this in the 
desire aspect above and this is also illustrated in the sailor example I described in Section 
6.2.2. 
 
I have included Case 4 above as a way of contrasting the imagery case with that of 
perception, although I GRQ¶WLQWHQGWRVD\PXFKPRUHDERXWLWKHUH7KLVLVEHFDXVH,WKLQN
I have discussed how I see the relationship between perceptions and imagery in enough 
detail already. The main purpose of introducing Case 4 here, is mainly to illustrate how the 
offline label would be dropped or replaced by an online label in perception, and hence how 
this would mean that it would be represented in consciousness as being actually currently 
occurring in the external world150. 
 
So leaving the perceptual case aside for now and returning to discuss the imagery cases 
further, it seems to me that how the Rubiks Cube image is utilised in your wider economy 
is really only limited by your imagination as to what the Rubiks Cube can mean to you. For 
instance: it can retain a fairly factual meaning and represent an annoying puzzle; or 
become very fictional and creative and come the represent, for example, a key to a magical 
portal. It all depends on whether you are using it factually to solve problems and guide real 
                                               
150
 And note I am aware that this may involve changing the information held within {VB=RB}, for instance 
by filling in more detail, but have left this factor out to simply focus on the labelling process here. 
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life decisions, or are using it more creatively in an episode of play or fiction. Any more 
creative imaginative act might include also changing the spatial layout of the Rubiks Cube 
so that it turns into another shape like a pyramid. And while I have been unable to explore 
this broader and more creative use of visual imagery here, this is also something that is 
anticipated by this theory and may be developed in the future151. 
 
Conversely one of my main purposes here has been to show why this capacity may have 
evolved in the first place, and solving practical problems seems like a good way for 
imagery to earn its keep by increasing our survival chances. To that end I have now 
indicated at least two practical problems that an image of a Rubiks Cube could be useful 
for: the first being in problem solving to work out the number of small squares it has; the 
second being about guiding the decision-making process of what to do next. As examples 
of the latter, the desire for a Rubiks Cube in Case 1 could lead to you actually going to the 
shop to buy a Rubiks Cube, and the negative memory of one in Case 3 might prevent you 
from impulse buying another one. And the combination of these two applications to 
practical problem solving is what I see as its main function of STIm. This is what I have 
alluded to throughout the thesis, variously in terms of: strategy testing, problem solving, 
decision-PDNLQJDQGGHOLEHUDWLRQWRXVH+XUOH\¶VWHUP6RWKLVJLYHVDQLGHDRI
what I see as the main function of STIm and I have suggested in Chapter 1 how this may 
integrate with, and contribute to, the currently growing fields studying Episodic Thinking 
and Mental Time Travel that also investigate thinking of other spatio-temporal situations in 
order to plan actions. 
 
Therefore in the above I think I have offered a way that different labels could be appended 
to an image depending on not only the spatio-temporal context but also our other 
                                               
151
 For more on creative imagination see for example: Beaney (2005), Carruthers (2002), Currie (2003), 
Harris (2000) and McGinn (2004). 
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intentional attitudes towards it152. This gives an indication of how it can be integrated with 
further thinking based on the consequences and meanings of these further attitudes. Hence 
suggesting a way that the phenomenal image could be incorporated and function in our 
wider mental economies. Hence these latter distinctions conclude my exposition of the 
features that control how STIm is generated, maintained and labelled and how it is utilised 
in our thinking processes and why it exists in the first place. It may be worth finally 
reminding you that this exposition has been mainly to do with STIm in its realisation as 
phenomenal visual imagery and that this does not preclude an exposition that deals with its 
more semantic and non-sensory aspects. This limitation was only invoked in order to keep 
the thesis focused and this represents another way this thesis could be developed further in 
future. 
 
7.5 ± Conclusion 
The summary above, and the interim conclusion in the last sub-section, represents my main 
conclusions as to the nature and function of STIm and how it relates to perception. These 
can be further summarised to provide an overall conclusion by way of specifically 
DQVZHULQJWKHTXHVWLRQLQWKHWLWOHRIWKHWKHVLV7KLVTXHVWLRQZDVµ:KDWLVWKHQDWXUHDQG
function of Spatio-temporal Imagination? Can it plausibly be explained as an offline 
VLPXODWLRQRIWKHYLVXDOSURFHVV"¶+ence a succinct concluding reply to that would now go 
as follows: 
                                               
152
 And note that WKLVZD\RIWDONLQJVHHPVWRPDWFKXSZLWKFHUWDLQDVSHFWVRI&UDQH¶VLQWHQWLRQDO
theory of consciousness, where he suggest we can consider the same object  (or content) under different 
PRGHV)RUH[DPSOHFRQVLGHUWKLVTXRWHµ)RU,PD\LPDJLQHWKH little restaurant in Capri, and I may 
remember it. These states of mind are different, but their contents are the same. To distinguish these states, 
ZHQHHGWRPHQWLRQWKHGLIIHUHQWZD\VLQZKLFKWKH\UHODWHWRWKLVFRQWHQWE\PHPRU\DQGE\LPDJLQDWLRQ¶ 
Crane (2001: 31). This suggests another way my theory might be integrated with a wider and more 
HVWDEOLVKHGLQWHQWLRQDOWKHRU\RIFRQVFLRXVQHVV,KDYHXVHGVRPHRI&UDQH¶VGLVWLQFWLRQV
to guide my thesis already and it is interesting to note he has recently published an article that accepts that 
perception has intentional or representational content, but at the same time rejects the idea that this means it 
necessarily has propositional content. I see my approach to perception and imagery as largely compatible 
with his combined claims about phenomenal consciousness, including this most recent one. 
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The nature of STIm in terms of visual imagery is as a locally supervenient visual 
style phenomenal representational mental state, which is generated by the brain 
based on the contents of the visual buffer. In this respect it is very similar to 
perception and hence they share a significant common factor in the kinds of mental 
states they are. However imagery differs from perception in that it is not caused or 
experienced externally and operates as an offline or mock version of the equivalent 
online perceptual processes that gives one an imagined perspective on a visual 
scene. Hence it seems it can indeed be usefully interpreted as being an offline 
simulation of a visual process, especially given my interpretation of how this could 
integrate with the Kosslyn Model based on a hybrid depictive representational style. 
 
Visual images represent the spatial layout of an imagined or remembered scene, 
and they can also be associated with different spatio-temporal contexts. This is 
done by labelling them appropriately according to this spatio-temporal context, so 
that our attitude towards the apparent spatial layout of the image can be modified 
accordingly. The appending of this spatio-temporal label is what turns generic 
phenomenal visual imagery into full-blown Spatio-Temporal Imagination (or 
STIm) and what allows it to aid in our ability to plan our actions for the future and 
in the present, based on our knowledge of the past and how it could have been 
different. Thus the main function of STIm is to allow us to strategy test, make 
better decisions and to be aware of our extended spatio-temporal environment. 
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Appendix. A - Explanation of the Tower of Hanoi Puzzle 
 
The idea of the puzzle is to get from the initial state to the goal state (see Figure.A1) by 
moving one ring at a time. The ring that is moved must be placed on a peg before the next 
ring is moved. Only the top ring on any peg can be moved. Only one ring can be moved at 
a time. 
 
 
 
Figure. A1 ± The Tower of Hanoi Puzzle ± Initial and Goal State 
 
There are a number of ways to the goal state and these are represented below in Fig.A2. 
 
 
Figure. A2 ± Possible routes to the goal state 
 
The Tower of Hanoi Puzzle tests your ability to plan ahead and to remember your past 
moves. It may also require imagination to maintain an idea of the goal state and compare it 
with your current progress. 
 
Diagrams taken from: Eysenck, M.W. & Keane, M.T. (2000) ± µ&RJQLWLYH3V\FKRORJ\$
6WXGHQWV+DQGERRN¶Fourth Edition ± Psychology Press Ltd pgs.400-1 
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Appendix. B ± Main Areas of the Brain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B1 ± Approximate locations of areas of cortex and processing streams 
mentioned in the text ± superimposed on a recent scan of the authors brain 
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